
MM 



Jl. 



STORY 



PENINSULAR WAR 




GENERAL CHARLES "WILLIAK VANE, 



liEQIISS ©IP .-ILtOMBONBIEIRE.lf. 



loiulorL. Henry CoIbTrm.. 1848. 



STORY 



PENINSULAR WAR. 



BY THE LATE 

MARQUESS OP LONDONDERRY, G.C.B., G.C.H. 

COLONEL OF THE SECOND REGIMENT OF LIFE-GUARDS. 



NEW EDITION. 



ILLUSTRATED BY LARGE MAP OF THE SEAT OF WAR, 
AND SIX PORTRAITS. 

/ Of Wq«h\0tf ' ' 

LONDON: 
WILLIS AND SOTHERAN, 136, STRAND. 

1856. 



V 

V 



y 



y.& 



PREFACE 
BY THE EDITOR. 



Scarcely any Work on the subject of the War in the 
Peninsula has enjoyed a more extensive popularity than that 
which fohns the basis of the present volume. The rank and 
official situation of the writer, who, it must be borne in 
mind, took an active part in the great struggle — as well as 
his near relationship to the war-minister of the day — 
afforded him opportunities of acquiring knowledge which 
perhaps no other individual (the Commander of the Forces 
alone excepted) could enjoy ; and of these his natural quick- 
ness of observation, as well as the habit of recording his 
daily impressions as they occurred, enabled him to make 
the best use. 

Lord Londonderry, however, was prevented from bringing 
down his narrative to the close of the war, having been 
compelled by ill health, after the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, 
to return to England. The History was, therefore, of neces- 
sity incomplete ; and, although both accurate and ably 



VI PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 

treated as far as it went, the work left the reader, at its 
close, with curiosity rather heightened than appeased. 

It is the object of the present publication to supply the 
deficiency in question, and to present the English Nation 
with what has long been a desideratum — a complete History 
of the Peninsular War, in the smallest possible compass, and 
at so moderate a cost as to be accessible to a very numerous 
class of readers. The eventful History is here brought 
down to the Peace of 1814 ; and, as no pains have 
been spared to render the work in every respect accept- 
able to the public, the Editor confidently trusts that the 
narrative, in its present shape, will go far to satisfy all who 
take an interest in the glorious period to which it refers, and 
will be regarded as a worthy and indispensable companion 
to the a Story of the Battle of Waterloo." 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

Page. 
State of the English army previously to 1808 — Disinclination to commit it 
against the Armies of France — A change of policy — State of Europe 
consequent on the peace of Tilsit — Submission of Spain to the will of 
Buonaparte — War of 1801 between Spain and Portugal — Terms of peace — 
Attempt of Godoy — Secret treaty of Fontainbleau —Corps of Observation 
of the Gironde — Protest of the French and Spanish Ministers . 1 



CHAPTER II. 

Junot crosses the frontier — Arrives at Salamanca, passes Alcantara, and 
enters Portugal — Alarm of the Court of Lisbon — Proposal to emigrate to 
Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and Sir Sydney Smith — The 
court gives consent, appoints a regency, and embarks — Junot reaches 
Lisbon — The tri-coloured flag hoisted — The regency abolished — The Por- 
tuguese army disbanded, and a heavy fine imposed upon the people — The 
Spanish troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection — Exertions of Junot to 
prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against the English . 16 



CHAPTER III. 

Entrance of fresh armies into Spain — Seizure of the frontier fortresses, and 
advance of Murat upon Madrid — Consternation of Charles and Godoy — 
Preparations for escape to South America defeated by the mob — Godoy 
dragged to prison — Charles abdicates, and Ferdinand is proclaimed king — 
Murat arrives in the capital — Departure of the royal family for Bayonne — 
Tumult of the 2nd of May— Resignation of the rights of the House of 
Bourbon — Secret instructions of Ferdinand — Measures adopted by Murat 
to preserve tranquillity , . . . .29 



IV CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER IV. 

Page. 
General insurrection of the Spanish provinces— The Junta of Seville assumes 
the title of Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies — Expeditions against 
Seville and Valencia— Actions at Alcolia and Baylen— Surrender of 
Dupont's corps— Moncey repulsed from before Valencia— King Joseph 
enters Spain — Battle of Medino del Rio Seco — Arrival of Joseph in Madrid 
— His flight in consequence of Dupont's capture — Expedition fitted out at 
Cork sails for the Peninsula — Sir Arthur Wellesley arrives at Corunna, 
and directs his course towards Portugal — Proceedings in that country — 
Mutiny of the Spanish garrison of Oporto — Seizure of General Quesnel — 
Junot's measures to suppress the revolt . . .40 



CHAPTER V. 

Arrival of Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oporto — Conference with the Junta — The 
transports assemble off Mondego, and the troops are landed — Strange 
conduct of General Freire and the Portuguese army — Junot takes mea- 
sures to oppose the progress of the English, and collects his detachments — 
Delaborde retires before Sir Arthur Wellesley — Battle of Rolica — Arrival 
of General Anstruther — March of the British army to Vimiero — Sir Harry 
Burrard arrives— Is visited by General Wellesley ; but refuses to sanction 
an advance — The British attacked by Junot's army — Battle of 
Vimiero ... 63 



CHAPTER VI. 



Inactivity of the British army under Burrard— Arrival of Kellerman at 
Vimiero— Sir Hew Dalrymple takes the command, and enters into a 
treaty with Kellerman — Preparations for a renewal of hostilities — Arrival 
of Sir John Moore's corps— The convention of Cintra condemned by both 
Portuguese and Spaniards — Almeida and Elvas given up— The British 
troops enter Lisbon — Joy of the inhabitants — CaraftVs corps restored to 
liberty, and re-armed — The French army sails for France, and the Russian 
fleet for England . . . . .77 



CHAPTER VII. 

Sir Hew Dalrymple is recalled, and Sir Arthur Wellesley returns to England 
— Sir Harry Burrard resigns the command to Sir John Moore— Prepara- 
tions for an advance into Spain — March through Alentejo— -Villa Viciosa — 
March to Elvas— Elvas, Badajoz— Difference of character between the 
Spaniards and Portuguese — Colonel Lopez receives despatches from Cas- 
tanos — Merida— Its antiquities— State of agriculture in its vicinity . 89 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Page. 
Advance towards Madrid — Rumours of Blake's defeat — Arrival at Naval- 
Carnero — Madrid — State of public feeling there — Want of energy in the 
Spanish government ; exhausted treasury and defective armies — Movement 
of Hope's corps upon Salamanca — Fears lest it should be cut off — Over- 
throw of the Spanish armies, of Blake, Belvedere, and Castanos — French 
corps* at Valladolid — Skirmish at Arrivola — Rumour of General Baird's 
retreat — Reflections on the conduct of the war . . 95 



CHAPTER IX. 

Visit to head-quarters — Interview with Sir John Moore — A retreat deter- 
mined upon — General dissatisfaction of the army — Fresh resolution taken 
and orders issued to advance — Movement upon Tordesillas — Skirmish at 
Rueda — Moore resolves to attack Soult on the Carrion — The army ad- 
vances — Brilliant cavalry affair at Sahagun — Preparations for battle sud- 
denly countermanded . . . . .107 

CHAPTER X. 

Dissatisfaction of the army — Sir John Moore prepares to retreat — The 
infantry and artillery retire in column, covered by the cavalry — Move- 
ments of the French — Cavalry affair at Majorga — Sufferings on the march 
— Benevente — Brilliant cavalry action — Romana's army — Disorganization 
of the English army — March from Astorga to Villa Franca — Skirmish at 
Villa Franca — Retreat to Lugo — Armies in position three days — Retreat 
upon Corunna — A fleet arrives, and the embarkation commences — Battle 
of Corunna — Death of Sir John Moore — The army embarks for 
England . . . . . .118 

CHAPTER XL 

Consequences of the campaign — Napoleon departs for Germany — Invasion of 
Portugal by Soult — He defeats the Portuguese and Spaniards at Monterrey, 
and enters Chaves — Oporto carried by assault — Lapisse fails to reduce 
Ciudad Rodrigo, and joins Victor— Batttle of Medellin — Sir John Cradock 
and Marshal Beresford make preparations to oppose Soult — Sir Arthur 
Wellesley embarks at Portsmouth ; reaches Lisbon, and makes arrangements 
to take the field . . . . .142 



CHAPTER XII. 

Disposition of the allied troops — They assemble at Coimbra, and are re- 
viewed — State of the French army changed by the defeat of General 
Lefevre— Sir Arthur Wellesley arranges his plans, and the brigades are 
commanded to move . . . . .149 



VI CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

Page. 

The array advances towards the Douro — The enemy attacked and driven from 

Albergaria Nova — Affair of Grijon — Passage of the Douro, and defeat of 

Soult . . . . . .155 



CHAPTER XIV. 

Sir Arthur Wellesley follows the French army — Skirmish at Salamonde — 
Soult makes for Orense, and the pursuit is abandoned — The allies counter- 
march on Coimbra, where a reinforcement of 5,000 men reaches them — 
Movement towards the south— Communications opened with Cuesta — His 
plans for the campaign opposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley — The army 
becomes sickly, and distressed for money and stores . .163 



CHAPTER XV. 

The British army moves towards Victor, who withdraws across the Tagus — 
Sir Arthur fixes his head-quarters at Plasencia — He visits Cuesta, and 
is shown the Spanish army by torchlight — Allied army put in motion, 
and Victor's posts driven across the Alberche — Preparations for attacking 
Victor — He effects his escape— Dissatisfaction of Sir Arthur Wellesley 
with the conduct of the Spaniards — He is compelled, by the indolence of 
Cuesta, to remain inactive . . . .172 



CHAPTER XVI. 

Cuesta follows the French— Is driven back in confusion — Battle of Talavera — 
Sufferings of the British army after the action, and its consequent retre at 
on Portugal . . . . .182 



CHAPTER XVII. 

Defeat of Cuesta's Army at the bridge of Arzobispo — Victor enters Talavera , 
— Wilson's corps worsted at the Puerto de Banos — Sir Arthur Wellesley 
takes up the line of the Tagus — Cuesta superseded, and Eguia succeeds in 
the command — Distresses of the British Army, and extraordinary conduct 
of Eguia and the Spanish government — Sir Arthur Wellesley retires upon 
the Guadiana — General Arrezaga and the Duke del Parque defeated — 
Successes of the French in Andalusia — Fall of Gerona and Astorga — 
Massena assumes the command in the Peninsula — The British army moves 
towards Almeida, leaving Hill's corps at Abrantes — Preparations for the 
campaign . . . . . . 194 



CONTENTS. yii 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

Page. 
Low state of the finances of the British army, and apprehensions entertained 
respecting the issue of the war — Massena opens the campaign by investing 
Ciudad Rodrigo — Skirmishes at the outposts — Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo — 
Affair of cavalry-— Rumours of Massena's intended operations, and dispo- 
sitions to meet him ..... 203 

CHAPTER XIX. 

Preparations proceed, and plans are formed — The light division attacked at 
Almeida — General movement of the British army towards the rear— Inde- 
cision of Massena — Difficulties against which Lord Wellington was called 
upon to struggle — Almeida besieged and taken — The garrison enter the 
French service — The British army retires upon Busaco . .214 

CHAPTER XX. 

Battle of Busaco — The Allied army retires upon Torres Yedras, followed by 
the French — Description of the Lines — Review of the campaign — Con- 
dition of the two armies — Lord Wellington receives reinforcements . 224 

CHAPTER XXL 

Massena halts before the Lines, which are industriously strengthened — Lord 
Wellington, alarmed for Abrantes, sends a corps across the Tagus — For- 
tifies a new position on the south side of the harbour — The enemy construct 
boats on the river — Retire to Santarem, and take up a position — The allies 
follow— Various movements of detached bodies . . .233 

CHAPTER XXII. 

State of the southern frontier — Soult's advance against Badajoz — Capture of 
Olivenca, and investment of Badajoz — Mendizabal defeated, and Badajoz 
taken — Campo Mayor reduced — Massena retreats into Spain — Beresford 
marches towards Badajoz — The Allies pass the Guadiana, reduce Olivenca, 
and invest Badajoz— Lord Wellington gives directions for the siege — Is 
recalled to the north, where the army remains in position round Fuentes 
de Honor . . . . .242 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

Battle of Fuentes de Honor — Investment of Almeida — The garrison blow up 
the place, and escape — Massena retires into Spain, and Wellington into 
cantonments — Siege of Badajoz — Raised by the advance of Soult — 
Wellington sends off reinforcements to Beresford, and sets out to join him 
— The Marshal's corps assemble in position at Valverde . .251 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

Page. 

Journey of Lord Wellington towards Badajoz — Battle of Albuera — Retreat of 

Soult, and renewal of the siege — It is pressed with vigour, and Fort St. 

Christoval is breached — Movements of the enemy to relieve the place — 

Cavalry affair at Usagre . . . . .259 

CHAPTER XXV. 

Siege of Badajoz — Fort St Christoval twice stormed — Movements to relieve 
the town — Lord Wellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into 
Portugal — Blake crosses the Guadiana, and retires to Cadiz — The British 
army takes post behind the Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas — Inter- 
cepted letter from Marmont to Berthier — The Allies go into canton- 
ments ....... 272 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

Amusements of the officers — Lord Wellington suddenly moves towards 
Rodrigo, and invests the place — Disposition of the army in its new align- 
ment — The country round Ciudad Rodrigo — Reports that the enemy would 
raise the siege — Arrangements in consequence . .278 

CHAPTER XXVII. 

Delay on the part of the enemy — They advance to the relief of Ciudad 
Rodrigo, throw in a convoy, and pass the Agueda— Skirmishes along the 
front of the British line — Display of French troops — Lord Wellington 
retires to Alfayates — Partial actions during the movement — The enemy 
withdraw, and the British troops retire into cantonments — Ciudad Rodrigo 
observed by flying parties — Exploits of Don Julian Sanchez . 282 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

Increasing jealousies among the Spaniards — Disasters in the south — Prepara- 
tions to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo— The French armies suddenly withdraw 
towards the south and east of Spain — Lord Wellington moves to the front, 
and invests Rodrigo — Progress of the siege — Storming and capture of the 
place . . . . . . . 295 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

March to Badajoz — Siege— Capture of the place . .312 



CONTENTS, IX 

CHAPTER XXX. 

Page, 
State of affairs in the North — Preparations for a new campaign — Advance to 
Salamanca — Reduction of the forts — Battle of Salamanca — Madrid — March 
on Burgos — Siege of the castle — Retreat to the Portuguese frontier — Cam- 
paign concludes . . . . .321 

CHAPTER XXXI. 

Difficulties with which Lord Wellington was beset — His new arrangements 
with the governments — The campaign of 1813 opens — Advance from the 
Douro — Brilliant success — Battle of Vittoria — Siege of St. Sabastian, 
and blockade of Pamplona — Battles of the Pyrenees— Second siege of 
St. Sebastian — City taken by storm — Passage of the Bidassoa — Battles of 
the Nivelle and the Nive — End of the campaign . . 348 

CHAPTER XXXII. 

State of affairs in Spain and in the North — Movements of the Bourbons — 
Opening of the campaign of 1814 — Passage of the Adour — Bayonne invested 
— Battle of Orthes — Manoeuvring — Progress of the war in Catalonia — Battle 
of Toulouse — Sortie from Bayonne — Peace . , 373 



ILLUSTRATIONS. 



Page. 
GENERAL THE MARQUIS OF LONDONDERRY . . Frontispiece. 

FIELD-MARSHAL HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON . . 1 

GENERAL HENRY VVILLTAM PAGET, MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY, 

K.G-, ETC. ...... 123 

MARSHAL-GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD . . . 265 

GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD HILL . . 297 

GENERAL SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN . . . .381 

MAP OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL . . . End qf Vol. 





5 S 



A I 



COMMANDER IN CHIEF, 



STORY 

OF THE 

PENINSULAR WAR. 



CHAPTER I. 

State of the English army previously to 1808— Disinclination to commit it 
against the Armies of France— A change of policy — State of Europe 
consequent on the peace of Tilsit — Submission of Spain to the will of 
Buonaparte — War of 1801 between Spain and Portugal — Terms of peace — 
Attempt of Godoy — Secret treaty of Fontainbleau — Corps of Observation 
of the Gironde— Protest of the French and Spanish Ministers. 

The memorable struggle in which, during fifteen or sixteen 
years, England had been engaged, may be said, up to the year 
1807, or rather 1808, to have been merely a defensive war. 
Whilst her fleets swept the seas in each quarter of the globe, 
crushing, wherever they came in contact with it, the naval 
strength of the enemy, her armies either rested idly upon 
her own shores, or were scattered in detachments among her 
■colonies — or, at best, found themselves, from time to time, called 
upon to bear a part in some petty expedition, the object of which 
was usually as unprofitable, as the means employed for its 
attainment were insignificant. If we except the short campaign 
of Egypt, and the still shorter, though hardly less brilliant affair 
of Maida, the entire period, from 1793 down to the commence- 
ment of the Peninsular war, presents us with no single record of 
deeds performed, worthy of the ancient military renown of Great 
Britain; for neither the capture of a few islands in the West 
Indies, nor the seizure and subsequent abandonment of Toulon, 
nor the contests in Flanders and at the Texel, nor even the 



2 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. i. 

reduction of Copenhagen, can with any justice or propriety be 
referred to, as adding anything to the lasting reputation of 
Great Britain. 

But though the case was so, and government appeared, the 
while, unwilling to bring its land forces fairly into contact with 
those of France, it was by no means indifferent either as to the 
numerical strength, or the internal discipline and organization of 
the army. The threat of an invasion, followed up as it was by 
the assembly of numerous bodies of troops along the French 
coast, infused into the people of England a military spirit, to 
which, for generations, they had been strangers ; and the 
minister of the day was too prudent not to turn it to account. 
Every encouragement was given to the enrolment of corps of 
volunteers ; and these, with the regiments of militia, served as 
nurseries for the line. Men, who once bear arms, feel their 
objections to the life of a soldier gradually abate; and many 
an individual who armed only to protect the peace of the country, 
became, before long, a member of the regular forces. The 
victory of Trafalgar, likewise, while it left us no enemies with 
whom to contend at sea, naturally turned the views of the 
enterprising to the land service. From all these causes, recruits 
presented themselves rapidly as the most warlike administration 
could have desired. On the first of January, 1808, a regular 
army was enrolled under the British standard, amounting to 
300,000 men of all arms, exclusive of foreign mercenaries. 

Of the discipline which pervaded this prodigious mass, it is not 
necessary to say much; even our enemies — national jealousy 
apart — allow that the discipline of the British army was, and is, 
superior to that of any other in Europe. Under the wise and 
paternal management of the late venerated Commander-in-Chief, 
a code, stern enough in theory, but mild, though firm in practice, 
was established. Promotion, too, which in former times had 
proceeded without any regard whatever to the fitness of 
individuals, was rendered equitable as it ever can be under a 
system which admits of advancement by purchase. Boys were 
no longer permitted to hold commissions whilst they were yet 
acquiring the first elements of education ; nor was it any more 
in the power of the minister of the day, to reward a favourite 
with a regiment. A regular scale was drawn up, in accordance 



1808.] REFORMATION OF THE ARMY. 3 

with which none was permitted to hold an ensign's commission 
till he had attained sixteen. Three years' service was then 
requisite to qualify for the rank of captain, and seven for 
that of major. Nor were other and equally important matters 
left in the condition in which they once had been. In former 
times, the commanding officer of a regiment was in the habit of 
manoeuvring his battalion in any way, or upon any plan, which 
to himself might appear most convenient. The consequence was, 
that in the British army there were almost as many systems of 
field evolutions, as there were regiments of cavalry and infantry ; 
and no two could, when called upon to act together, effect a 
unity of movement. This disadvantageous mode of proceeding 
was abolished — a uniform and consistent system was drawn up 
for the infantry — another for the cavalry — and every regiment 
was expected to render itself perfect in these, before it attempted 
any thing besides. Such changes, together with the establish- 
ment of hospitals for wounded and disabled soldiers, and for the 
education of children whose parents had fallen in the defence of 
their country, could not fail of producing the most beneficial 
effect upon the morale of the British army ; which, from being 
unpopular with its own countrymen, and undervalued by the 
troops of other nations, rose to command, as well as to deserve, 
the esteem of the former, and the respect and admiration of the 
latter. 

There were, however, one or two considerations, which, not- 
withstanding these acknowledged improvements, long continued 
to keep alive a disinclination on the part of the ministry, 
to commit the British army on the great field of continental 
warfare. In the first place, it was doubted whether, among our 
own generals, there could be found any, capable of opposing the 
experienced and skilful captains of France.- We had never been 
accustomed to carry on war upon a large scale, except in India ; 
and it was believed that there, the successful conduct of a cam- 
paign required little talent in the commander. In the next place, 
it was not considered prudent to push a handful of British troops 
into the heart of Europe ; where, at a distance from the sea, and 
cut off* from all communication with their own country, they 
might be compromised at any moment, by the imbecility or 
treachery of an ally. It was considered unsafe for England to 

b 2 



4 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. i. 

take part in a continental war, unless she could do so on some 
point not very remote from her own shores, and covered by an 
extensive line of coast; because, in spite of the magnitude of 
ner army in the mass, she could never, it was asserted, bring 
more than thirty or forty thousand men into the field. These 
considerations prevented a British army from appearing in the 
field at Austerlitz and Jena, or taking a share in any of the 
previous armaments which from time to time rendered Germany 
the theatre of war. But the latter objection to the employment 
of our troops, the mad ambition of the French ruler at length 
removed ; whilst it required only the experience of a single 
campaign to demonstrate, that the former reasoning was 
fallacious. 

By the treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon was left virtually master of 
the continent ; the greater part being actually in his possession, 
and the rest entirely under his control. Over the Germanic 
'body, he exercised an authority the most arbitrary. Switzerland 
consented to call him her protector, obey his edicts, and fill 
up his ranks with men. Holding France, Flanders, and Italy 
for himself, he had placed one brother upon the throne of Naples, 
another upon that of Holland, whilst, for a third, a kingdom was 
erected in the heart of Germany, with territories taken indis- 
criminately from friend and foe. Joachim Murat, the husband 
of his sister, possessed a principality, with the title of Grand 
Duke of Berg; Eugene Beauharnois, his wife's son, was 
married to a princess of the house of Bavaria, and governed Italy 
as his viceroy ; whilst he was prepared, upon the next vacancy, 
to place his uncle, Cardinal Fesche, upon the papal throne. Not 
satisfied with thus enriching and loading with honours the 
members of his own family, he portioned out among his marshals 
tind companions in arms, kingdoms and principalities won by the 
-sword; and Dukes of Istria, and Dalmatia, Ragusa, and 
Dantzic, were numbered among the new nobility of France. His 
>own reputation moreover, political as well as military, had risen 
to an unprecedented height ; for it is not going too far to affirm 
that the world, dazzled by the splendour of his achievements, 
with the solitary exception of Great Britain, submitted to 
iiis thrall. 

An empire acquired as had been that of Napoleon, rests 



1808.] TREATY OF TILSIT. 



seldom on a sure foundation. One error in politics, one failure 
in war, may suddenly excite a storm which all the vigour of its 
chief will not be able to allay ; and of this truth the Emperor of 
the French was doomed to furnish a memorable example. Nor 
will it readily cease to afford matter of astonishment to the 
reflecting mind, that the first and most decisive blow to his 
power, should have come from a quarter where, above all others, 
he believed himself, and had just ground to believe himself, the 
most secure. 

When the sovereigns of Europe deemed it expedient to arm for 
the purpose of opposing the progress of the French Revolution,, 
the courts of Madrid and Lisbon entered, with apparent cordiality, 
into the general league. Spain sent across the Pyrenees an army.,, 
to which a few battalions of Portuguese attached themselves ; . 
whilst Portugal despatched nine sail of the line to follow the 
fortunes of the British fleet. The war in the south of France 
was not conducted with either skill or vigour. For a time, 
indeed, that is to say, as long as the Directory found itself too^ 
busy to pay much attention to the state of affairs in that quarter ., 
the allies obtained a few successes, but they were never followed 
up with intrepidity; and they had hardly been opposed bv 
moderate forces, when the tide of fortune turned against them. 
They not only lost the little ground which they had gained, but 
their beaten columns were pursued across the frontier ; Catalonia 
was overrun, and Madrid itself threatened. An imbecile prince, 
and no less imbecile favourite, alarmed by the progress which the 
victorious republicans were making, hastened to put an end to a- 
disastrous war, by a more disgraceful peace. It was concluded 
in 1795, by the treaty of Basle, which, at the distance of a year 
after, was succeeded by a league offensive and defensive, entered 
into at St. Ildefonso. 

From that moment Spain became, in point of fact, little else 
than a mere appendage to France. The family compact, as it 
was now absurdly termed, having been renewed with the Direc- 
tory, it was not to be expected that it would cease to operate 
when the democratical form of government gave place to the 
imperial ; or that the Emperor of the French would be less ready 
to avail himself of it, than had been the rulers of the republic. 
At the instigation of Buonaparte, Spain declared war against 



6 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. i. 

England ; and a contest began, which could hardly fail of bringing 
upon her the heaviest disasters. During its progress, her marine, 
which Charles III. had taken the utmost care to foster, was 
destroyed ; her commerce received a fatal blow ; the intercourse 
with her South American colonies was interrupted, and the way 
paved for that separation which has since occurred : her finances 
became every day more and more embarrassed ; and public credit 
sank to the lowest ebb. Her army, likewise, was drafted away to 
fight the battles of her lordly ally, in the most distant parts of 
Europe ; and she was left in a situation helpless and pitiable as 
ever a nation was reduced to. 

It is hardly necessary to state that, at this period, and for some 
time previous, Spain was governed by an individual on whose 
head fortune appeared to have taken delight in showering the 
richest of her favours. Manuel Godoy, a man of obscure birth* 
who originally filled no higher station than that of a private 
in the royal body-guards, attracted the notice of the Queen, by 
her influence was raised to the highest dignities in the state, 
and at last possessed an authority more decided than that of the 
weak master whom he professed to serve. Godoy, was, at the 
breaking out of the French Revolution, commander-in-chief of 
the armies, and lord high admiral of the fleets of Spain ; and, at 
the close of 1792, he was appointed to the important office which 
Florida Blanca had filled under Charles III., that of President of 
the Councils. He it was, who, after conducting the war with so 
little ability, accepted peace upon terms which laid Spain at the 
feet of her neighbour; and he received, as the reward of his 
services on that occasion, the title of Prince of Peace. Godoy 
appears to have been a strange compound of weakness and 
genius — numerous vices, and few virtues. That he willingly 
betrayed his country, there is no reason for supposing ; but, like 
all upstarts, he considered the general good as a matter to be 
postponed on every occasion to his private benefit ; and he 
unquestionably brought about the downfall of the Spanish 
monarchy, in the vain attempt to uphold his own power. Godoy 
was not disposed to favour the French, for he both feared and 
hated their ruler; but, like his sovereign, he dreaded that 
extraordinary man more than he hated him, and therefore sub- 
mitted to receive his yoke. When the peace of Amiens was 



1808.] DECLARATION OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 7 

broken, Napoleon, in virtue of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, called 
upon Spain to join him with her fleets and armies ; but Godoy 
was desirous of evading the request ; and he succeeded, for a 
short time, in purchasing an insecure neutrality, by the payment 
of forty thousand pounds per month into the imperial treasury. 
At last, however, Spain was hurried into the war, which brought 
so many and such severe calamities upon her — from the effects of 
which she has not recovered, and probably never will. 

Whilst Spain was thus acting the part of a province of 
France, Portugal, faithful to the terms of her ancient alliance 
with England, continued to maintain a hostile attitude towards 
the common enemy. Deprived, by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, of 
a barrier against French invasion upon which she had been 
accustomed to rely, Portugal could not but feel that, in striving, 
even with the aid of England, to assert her independence, she 
was attempting that which neither the condition of her defences, 
nor the numerical strength of her population, authorised her to 
attempt. But she was also aware that no peace would be granted 
to her on any other terms than the shutting of her ports against 
English vessels ; and she felt that a rupture with England must 
speedily reduce her to the greatest distress. Under these 
circumstances, the court of Lisbon issued orders for the enrol- 
ment of troops. The arsenals were replenished — the forts and 
towns on the frontier put in a state of repair ; and the ordinances, 
or levies en masse, received instructions to repair, each company 
to its accustomed place of rendez-vous, on the first alarm of an 
enemy. 

It is not necessary to detail at length the particulars of the war 
which ensued. For a time, no event occurred of greater import- 
ance than the occasional capture of a Portuguese merchant-man 
by one of the French privateers, which, in great numbers, found 
shelter in the ports of Spain. An invasion was indeed threatened ; 
Buonaparte, when in Egypt, declared to his troops, that " a time 
would come, when the Portuguese nation should pay with tears 
of blood for the insult which it had offered to the republic," by 
despatching a squadron to act in conjunction with the British 
fleet in the Mediterranean. But the continental war which broke 
out in 1799, delayed the execution of that threat ; nor was it till 
1801, that any serious movement was made for carrying it into 



8 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. i. 

effect. Then, however, the fate of Germany being decided, 
and peace dictated to the rest of Europe, the First Consul began 
s eriously to turn his attention towards the accomplishment of his 
threats ; under the persuasion that, in detaching Portugal from 
E ngland, he would be striking a blow at the power of the latter 
empire, in what he was pleased to term the most accessible part 
of her I ominions. 

A convention was accordingly entered into at Madrid, between 
the French republic and his Catholic Majesty, which had for its 
object the forcible deliverance of Portugal from the alliance of 
England. It was followed, on the 27th of February, by a 
declaration of war by Spain, for the prosecution of which her 
troops were already in motion ; whilst a French corps of fifteen 
thousand men passed the Pyrenees, and took up its quarters in 
the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo, for the purpose of supporting the 
Spanish army, to which the task of invading Portugal was 
assigned. 

To oppose this attack, the Duke de Lafoes, prime minister of 
Portugal, occupied both sides of the Tagus with a corps of 
30,000 men. They were miserably armed, wretchedly equipped, 
and neither fed nor paid ; and the only British force at hand to 
support them, consisted of a brigade of foreign regiments, a 
detachment of the 20th light dragoons, and a few guns, under th e 
command of General Fraser. The campaign was, as might be 
expected, unfavourable to the Portuguese, though by neither side 
was much activity or talent displayed ; and, before the middle of 
June, peace was signed between Portugal and Spain, at Badajoz. 
But with the terms of that peace, though they included the 
shutting of the Portuguese ports against all intercourse with 
England, the First Consul was not satisfied ; nor was it till the 
29th of the following September that the court of Lisbon 
succeeded in obtaining his approbation of the treaty. To secure 
this, Portugal was content to pay one million sterling to the 
French government ; besides consenting to other arrangements, 
both commercial and territorial, all of them in the highest degree 
prejudicial to her own interests. 

The peace of Amiens suspended for a while the operation of 
that article in the treaty which closed the ports of Lisbon and 
Oporto against English merchandise, and the old commercial 



1808.] PEACE OF AMIENS. 9 

intercourse between the two nations was renewed ; but the 
rupture, which so soon followed, again placed Portugal in a 
difficult situation. At first, Buonaparte insisted upon the neces- 
sity of recurring to the prohibitory system, and appeared bent 
upon allowing no modification of its operations ; but a variety of 
considerations led him at last to change his tone. The war in 
which Spain had engaged, unavoidably produced an interruption 
in the arrival of those treasures from South America which he 
found so useful to himself in the prosecution of his schemes of 
conquest, and it was necessary that some harbour should be left 
open for their reception. On this account, and on condition of 
securing, during the continuance of the maritime war, a monthly 
tribute of forty or fifty thousand pounds, Buonaparte consented 
that Portugal should continue to maintain a friendly intercourse 
with Great Britain ; and she became, in consequence, the only 
neutral state in southern Europe. 

In this condition both Spain and Portugal remained, from 1 803 
up to 1807; the one suffering all the misery attendant upon a 
compulsory alliance with a power which exhausted her revenues, 
and ruined her commerce ; the other, writhing under the pain of 
heavy contributions, and exposed every day to fresh vexations, 
which she possessed not the means of resisting. Nor were the 
internal affairs of either kingdom in a more prosperous state than 
their external connexions. In Spain, the nobility were sunk to 
the lowest pitch of degradation : the clergy, avaricious and 
domineering, ruled the people with a rod of iron ; and the King 
was not ashamed to appear a tool in the hands of the very man 
who was living in open adultery with his wife. Every depart- 
ment of the state was mismanaged. The towns, deserted by 
their inhabitants, presented a melancholy picture of what a nation 
must come to, whose rulers are possessed of neither energy of 
mind nor honesty of character, and the fields were, in many- 
places, left uncultivated, for want of sufficient hands to till them. 
In like manner, the Spanish army, which, under the Emperors* 
Charles V. and Philip, had been the admiration of Europe, was 
now a thing of name, — a very by- word of derision and contempt 
to the troops of other nations. The few soldiers that remained 
in the country were without pay, or clothing, or even arms ; the 
officers, taken from the lowest classes, were not ashamed to wait, 
as servants, in their uniforms, behind the chairs of the grandees. 



10 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. i. 

All the arsenals were empty. There were not provisions or stores 
of any kind, in any of the fortresses, sufficient for a month's 
consumption of the wretched garrisons which held them; and 
the very foundries had ceased to work, except at remote 
intervals. 

Yet was the spirit of Spain far from being wholly broken. 
Driven from the higher and prouder circles, it took refuge among 
the peasantry ; nor would it be easy to point out, in any quarter 
of the world, a nobler or finer race of men than those who 
cultivated the vine on the banks of the Ebro, or led their long 
lines of mules from one quarter of the kingdom to another. 
These men had partaken in no degree of the degeneracy of their 
superiors. The memory of their country's former greatness was 
kept alive in them by those traditionary ballads which Spaniards, 
more than the inhabitants of any other European state, delight in 
repeating ; and they never failed to contrast it with the humili- 
ating attitude in which the imbecility of their present government 
had placed their ancient kingdom. Had there been in Charles 
sufficient firmness to desire an emancipation from foreign thraldom, 
he might have roused, in one day, the whole male population of 
Spain. But there was no firmness in that weak monarch. The 
dupe of Godoy on the one hand, and of his own fears on the 
other, he continued to hug the chain which bound him, nor, when 
that chain was burst at last, did the smallest credit attach either 
to him or to his worthless minister. 

In Portugal, the same, or nearly the same, order of things 
prevailed. The Regent, a weak and superstitious prince, was 
not, indeed, like his father-in-law, under the influence of a 
favourite minister, but he was as completely the slave of his 
confessor, as Charles was of Godoy. As long as it was permitted 
him to attend religious processions ; as long as the church seemed 
to nourish in its primitive grandeur ; he cared not how other depart- 
ments of his kingdom were guided. Nor were the nobles who 
surrounded him more patriotic or more respectable than those 
who surrounded the throne of Spain. In Portugal, as in the 
neighbouring country, all that was valuable in the national 
character could be found only in the peasantry ; who, in spite of 
the corrupting influence of their superiors, continued to the last 
a brave and high-spirited race. 

It has been said that Godoy cannot with truth be accused of 



1808.J PROCLAMATION OF GODOY. 11 

submitting wilfully to the yoke which France had placed upon 
the neck of his country. Like the mass of the people, he 
writhed painfully under it ; and, as it afterwards appeared, nothing 
but an overwhelming dread of the consequences deterred him 
from making a vigorous attempt to cast it off. At last, however, 
the general feeling on that subject became so strong, that he 
determined to foster it ; and the methods which he pursued in 
maturing it, are already well known to the public ; but, since to 
these the whole series of events which followed may be traced 
as to immediate causes, it may not be amiss to offer a brief 
recapitulation of the leading circumstances which attended them. 
The overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty in Naples had sensibly 
alarmed the court of Madrid; and the prospect of that rupture 
with Prussia which ended in the peace of Tilsit, struck Godoy 
as furnishing a favourable opportunity of stirring up all Europe 
against a man whose ambition seemed to be unbounded. A 
secret arrangement was accordingly entered into between him and 
the ambassador Strogonoff, into which the Portuguese Envoy was 
admitted, that the two kingdoms of Spain and Portugal should 
instantly arm, for the purpose of attacking France at a moment 
when her troops should be called away to oppose the Emperor of 
Russia in the north. These preparations were to begin in Por- 
tugal ; with the ostensible view of overawing which, Spain was 
next to increase her armies ; whilst, expeditions being fitted out 
in the English ports, a combined force was to invade the south of 
France, which, it was believed, would not be in a fit state to offer 
any efficient opposition. Such were the plans of Godoy, in 
proposing which so much secrecy was preserved, that no other 
agent of the government, either at home or abroad, was made 
acquainted with what was pending ; but they were destined never 
to be carried into effect. Before a single step had been taken 
either in Spain or Portugal; before any direct communication 
had been opened with England, there suddenly appeared a procla- 
mation of the Prince of the Peace, calling upon all good Spaniards 
to arm, and to assist in delivering their country from the perils 
which menaced it. This proclamation was given to the world at 
a time when Buonaparte was absent on the Prussian campaign ; 
and its tenor was such as no person could possibly misunder- 
stand. 



1 2 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. i. 

Baron Strogonoff and the Portuguese Ambassador, startled at 
the imprudence of the step which had been taken, lost no time in 
disavowing all participation in a project which they now pretended 
to condemn. So fearful, indeed, w T as the court of Lisbon of 
being supposed to be a partner in the conspiracy, that it compelled 
Earl St. Vincent to withdraw his fleet from the Tagus. Godoy 
instantly saw the folly of the act into which his natural precipi- 
tancy had hurried him. He hastened to offer such explanations 
to the French ambassador as he judged most likely to allay the 
anger of Napoleon, and he instructed his private agent, Don 
Eugenio Izquierdo, to make the most abject submissions in his 
name to Napoleon in person. Paragraphs likewise appeared in 
the Madrid newspapers, some of them ascribing late events to an 
apprehension of an invasion by the Emperor of Morocco ; others 
offering rewards for the detection of the miscreant who had forged 
a circular letter to the intendants of provinces in the name of the 
Prince of the Peace ; whilst the motives of the proclamation, of 
which the authenticity could not be denied, were industriously 
pronounced to be a sense of duty towards France, and an over- 
anxiety to oppose the projects of England. 

Buonaparte received the documents above alluded to, subse- 
quently to the battle of Jena ; and he read in the palace of the 
King of Prussia a correspondence which placed the intended revolt 
of Spain beyond a doubt. He vowed at the moment to take 
revenge, but it suited his policy to utter the vow in secret ; and 
he affected to have forgiven the fault into which his ally, the 
King of Spain, had been drawn. It is now, however, perfectly 
ascertained, that this disclosure of the feelings of the Peninsular 
nations towards him, opened his eyes fully to the danger to which 
his power must always be exposed whilst these nations continued 
to be governed by their present royal families, — and he determined, 
on the instant, that the houses both of Bourbon and Braganza 
should cease to reign, and that their places should be supplied by 
those upon whose subserviency to his own views and wishes he 
might have better reason to depend. 

Had Buonaparte, as soon as the designs of Spain became 
known to him, directed his victorious legions upon Madrid, the 
dethronement of Charles would have been viewed by the rest of 
Europe as an arrangement dictated by self-defence; whilst it is 



1808.] NAPOLEON'S RESOLVE. 13 

not improbable that the war would never have assumed the 
character which his future proceedings gave it. But it was not 
in the nature of the French Emperor to act, in any case, either 
with openness or candour. Though a passionate lover of war, 
he never effected that by force of arms, which he believed it 
practicable to effect by diplomacy ; and the principle which guided 
him in other cases failed not to operate in this. There were, 
however, other reasons for the system which he pursued, and 
these deserve to be recorded. 

There are few states in which the favourite of the reigning 
monarch becomes not, sooner or later, an object of hatred to the 
heir apparent, and, as a necessary consequence, to all who are 
disposed to worship the rising sun rather than the sun in its 
meridian. This was peculiarly the case at the court of Madrid, 
Godoy was, and had long been, at variance with Ferdinand, Prince 
of Asturias ; and so bitter was the feeling of animosity subsisting 
between them, that the bare adoption by Godoy of one line of 
policy, was sufficient to guide Ferdinand to an opposite course. 
As soon, therefore, as Godoy's hostility to the French became 
known, Ferdinand made haste to declare himself a supporter of 
their interests. He even went so far as to address a private 
letter to Napoleon, in which he entreated him to deliver his 
father and mother from the influence of an artful favourite ; free 
Spain from the thraldrom of an upstart ; and to honour himself 
by granting him an alliance with a princess of the imperial blood. 
Whether Buonaparte ever entertained any serious intention of 
complying with these requests, it were difficult to determine now; 
but this much is known, that he answered Ferdinand's letter 
kindly, and that he readily consented to become the arbiter in the 
disputes which divided the royal family of Spain. How his 
arbitration was conducted, Spain and Europe will not readily 
forget. 

In the mean while however, under the pretext of standing in 
need of their services, Buonaparte required that a corps of 
16,000 Spaniards, under Romana, should proceed to join his 
armies on the shores of the Baltic. To these were added a 
division of 6,000 men, which, with General OTarrell at their 
head, had previously served in Tuscany ; and thus almost 
all the regular troops on which the government could depend, 



14 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. i. 

were removed entirely from Spain. But Napoleon's duplicity- 
went farther. At the very moment when he was giving Ferdi- 
nand assurances of his regard and protection, he induced the 
weak Charles to heap upon Godoy an additional load of favours, 
till both the king and his favourite became intoxicated. By this 
means, by appearing to each party inclined to countenance it in 
its projects and wishes, he not only kept alive, but widened the 
breach which already existed within the court of Madrid, and put 
matters in a train for that issue which, in all probability, he had 
already determined to bring about. 

The peace of Tilsit having restored him victorious to his 
capital, Buonaparte began to make immediate preparations to 
support a war of diplomacy by one of violence. Without any 
reasonable excuse having been assigned for the measure, a corps 
of 25,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry were collected in the 
month of August, 1807, at the base of the Pyrenees, and 
assumed the somewhat enigmatical appellation of the Corps 
of Observation of the Gironde. Whilst this force was 
organising itself under the directions of Marshal Junot, the 
Spanish minister at Paris was entering into a secret treaty, the 
object of which was nothing less than the erasure of Portugal 
from the list of nations. By the terms of that treaty, since be- 
come illustrious as the " secret treaty of Fontainbleau," it was 
agreed that Junot's army should enter Portugal at once, aided by 
three divisions of Spanish troops ; that a second army, of forty 
thousand French soldiers, should assemble in Gascony, ready to 
support the first, should it meet with any serious opposition ; and 
that Portugal, being subdued, should be divided into three parts, 
of which the following distribution was to be made. The pro- 
vince of Entre Minho e Douro, with the city of Oporto as its 
capital, was to be erected into a kingdom, under the title of 
Northern Lusitania, and given to the King of Etruria, in ex- 
change for his Italian possessions, which were to be ceded to 
Buonaparte. In like manner, Alentejo and Algarve were to be 
given to Godoy, who was to assume the style and title of Prince 
of the Algarves; and the remaining Portuguese provinces were 
to be held by Napoleon himself, till a general pacification should 
enable him to restore them to the house of Braganza, in exchange 
for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and the other Spanish colonies which the 



1808.] PROPOSED PARTITION OF PORTUGAL. 15 

English had conquered. These three sovereignties were, how- 
ever, to be held by investiture from the King of Spain ; and their 
princes were to owe to him the same sort of obedience which, in 
the feudal times, the bolder of a fief owed to his sovereign lord. 
The colonial possessions of Portugal, again, were to be equally- 
divided between the crowns of France and Spain ; and the Em- 
peror of the French was to acknowledge his Catholic Majesty as 
Emperor of the two Americas. 

Though nothing officially transpired indicative of the object 
which the army of observation was intended to effect, Europe was 
not so short-sighted as to remain for one instant in doubt as to 
the ultimate field of its operations. In the first place, the officer 
who was placed at its head had long filled, and still continued, in 
name at least, to fill, the station of ambassador at the court of 
Lisbon. It is true that, on the opening of the Austrian campaign, 
Junot had quitted the seat of his diplomatic duties, that he might 
execute the more congenial services which devolved upon him as 
aide-de-camp to the Emperor ; but he had done so by the express 
permission of his master ; and, instead of his place being supplied 
by another commissioned representative, the business of the 
mission was intrusted, as in the case of other temporary absences 
of the principal, to the chief secretary, M. de Rayneval. This 
circumstance was of itself sufficient to create a suspicion that 
something prejudicial to the interests of Portugal was intended. 
The treaty of Fontainbleau was hardly signed, when the ministers, 
both of France and Spain, presented a strong remonstrance to 
the Prince Regent, requiring that the Berlin and Milan decrees 
should be strictly enforced at every harbour of Portugal ; and it 
was further required, on threat of the immediate commencement 
of hostilities, that all the British subjects resident in the kingdom 
should be seized, and all British property confiscated. 

The conduct of the Regent of Portugal under circumstances so 
trying, was not very different from that which might have been 
expected at his hands. He dared not refuse obedience to the first 
mandate, and he remonstrated humbly against the second. But 
the powers with whom he had to deal entertained no wish that he 
should pay to their remonstrances a prompt attention ; they were 
pleased at every appearance of dissatisfaction which he happened 
to exhibit. Finding that * his sense of religion, and the regard 



1 6 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ii. 

which he had for existing treaties/' would not permit him at 
once to commit so flagrant an act of injustice, the French and 
Spanish ministers demanded their passports; and before either 
could be given, or the unhappy Prince was enabled to appeal 
through his own ambassadors to the generosity of his neighbours, 
the troops destined to overrun Portugal were in motion. 



CHAPTER II. 

Junot crosses the frontier — Arrives at Salamanca, passes Alcantara, and 
enters Portugal — Alarm of the Court of Lisbon — Proposal to emigrate to 
Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and Sir Sydney Smith— The 
court gives consent, appoints a regency, and embarks — Junot reaches 
Lisbon — The tri-coloured flag hoisted — The regency abolished — The Por- 
tuguese army disbanded, and a heavy fine imposed upon the people — The 
Spanish troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection — Exertion of Junot to 
prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against the English. 

The treaty of Fontainbleau was not yet signed, when, on the 
17th of October, 1807, Junot received orders to put his troops in 
motion within twenty- four hours. At daybreak on the 18th, the 
first division of the army of observation of the Gironde crossed 
the Bidassoa; it was followed, on the 19th, by the second; and 
the whole army, marching in six columns, each at the interval of 
one day, entered Spain. About the same time, three corps of 
Spanish troops took the road towards Portugal, by different 
routes. One of these, which was appointed to act under the 
immediate orders of the French Marshal, was directed to assemble 
at Alcantara. It consisted of eight battalions of infantry, four 
squadrons of cavalry, one troop of horse artillery, and two com- 
panies of sappers and miners, commanded by Don Juan Caraffa, 
captain-general of the province of Estremadura. Another, des- 
tined for the occupation of Northern Lusitania, mustered fourteen 
battalions, six squadrons, and one company of foot artillery, and 
was placed under the direction of Don Francisco Taranco y Piano, 
captain- general of Gallicia ; its point of rendezvous was Tuy, on 
the borders of Minho. A third, at the head of which was Don 
Francisco Solano, Marquis del Socorro and captain- general of 
Andalusia, was composed of eight battalions, five squadrons, and 






1808.] JUNOT'S FORCED MARCH. 17 

a troop of horse artillery, received instructions to collect in the 
vicinity of Badajoz. In order to complete these corps, it is 
scarcely necessary to state that every disposable soldier in the 
Spanish army was put in requisition ; that even the King's body- 
guard furnished its quota; and that in the capital there re- 
mained a garrison made up of skeletons only, and the depots of 
regiments. 

The French army was every where received, during its progress 
through Spain, with the utmost cordiality ; and, supported at the 
expense of the government, it reached Salamanca, where the 
General expected to winter, before the middle of November. But 
the last division had not come in, when a courier arrived at head- 
quarters, bringing the most urgent and imperative directions that 
no halt should be made between the Bidassoa and Lisbon. With- 
out having had time to make the slightest preparation for such a 
march, Junot set forward in the dead of winter, to pursue a route 
along which no depots of provisions or stores of any kind had 
been established ; where it was doubtful whether he would not 
meet with a formidable opposition from a peasantry brave to a 
proverb, and jealous of the appearance of foreigners among 
them ; and where, at all events, he was certain of having ob- 
stacles to overcome, which a mountainous district, intersected in 
every direction by rapid rivers and ravines, w r ould of necessity 
present. The apprehension, however, that an English army 
might arrive at Lisbon before him, was quite sufficient to make 
all these difficulties appear light. He pushed on accordingly, 
and, with his leading brigade, reached Alcantara on the 15th. 

In this place he found General Caraffa, with his corps of 
Spaniards ; but there was a woful scarcity of means by which 
to recruit the vigour of his own battalions, worn out by long 
marches through a difficult country, and in tremendous weather ; 
and it was with the utmost difficulty that the French soldiers 
could be supplied, each with rations for two days. Still the 
Emperor's orders were peremptory; and on the 19th, after 
having circulated proclamations in which the Portuguese were 
assured of protection from insult in the event of their remaining 
quiet, and threatened with the most terrible punishment if they 
should in any way impede the progress of troops which came 

c 



18 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ii. 

only to deliver them from the yoke of England, the allied armies 
were once more put in motion. 

It is not necessary to follow the movements of Junot's corps ; 
and will be sufficient to observe that, though the peasantry in 
general either rested peaceably in their cottages, or fled to the 
mountains and left their homes desolate, the route of the invaders 
might be traced, by gardens devastated, houses ruined, and 
villages burned to the ground. Notwithstanding this was the 
case, and though not a gun was fired, from the day when the 
head of the first French column passed the frontier till the 
arrival of its rear- guard in Lisbon, the march was most distress- 
ing. The season was stormy and inclement — the rain fell in 
torrents, cutting up the indistinct paths which traversed the moun- 
tains, and swelling into formidable rivers, streams which might 
usually be crossed without apprehension, either to man or beast. 
The reader is doubtless aware that the road, if such it deserves to 
be termed, which leads from Alcantara to Lisbon, by way of 
Castello Branco and Abrantes, passes over the summits of a ridge 
of rocks, and through a country desert and unfruitful as any 
which the traveller can meet with. It was by this track that 
Junot advanced ; and the fatigue and privations which his troops 
consequently endured, are represented to have been more terrible 
than fall generally to the lot of a retreating army. As a matter 
of course, neither wintry torrents nor permanent rivers were, in 
that wild district, supplied with bridges ; the soldiers were con- 
sequently obliged to cross as they best could ; and such was the 
rapidity of the streams in many places, that companies of men 
and troops of horses were swept away and destroyed. Nor could 
a march through defiles like these be long conducted with order 
or regularity. The artillery was soon left behind ; of the cavalry, 
only the best mounted were enabled to keep up ; and even the 
infantry lost its ranks, and straggled for miles over the face of 
the country. Long before the towers of Abrantes rose upon 
their view, the French columns may be said to have dissolved 
themselves ; for there were not above 5000 men who followed 
the General, and were in any condition to oppose an enemy, 
should one appear. 

But though fully aware of the risk he ran. Junot felt that 



1808.] COURT OF PORTUGAL. 19 

other and still stronger reasons forbade his pausing, even though 
a pause of a few days might bring back to their standards the 
thousands whom weariness and famine had left by the wayside. 
At Abrantes, intelligence reached him of the line of conduct 
which the Portuguese government was preparing to pursue ; and 
it was an object of the first importance to reach the capital, if 
possible, in time to interpose for its prevention. 

The treaty of Fontainbleau had not been kept so secret, but 
that the English government obtained information of its object ; 
and that information it lost no time in communicating to the 
cabinet of Lisbon. England had given her assent to the propo- 
sition made by the Regent of Portugal, of shutting the ports of 
his kingdom against her merchants ; she was aware that her 
ancient ally, in so doing, acted only by compulsion ; and she 
therefore connived at the transaction. But it was impossible for 
her to forgive the next step which his timid policy induced him 
to take ; and when he proceeded, in obedience to the mandate of 
France, to arrest all British subjects, and confiscate all British 
property, Lord Strangford, the ambassador, could do no other- 
wise than retire on board of one of the ships of the squadron, 
which, under the command of Sir Sydney Smith, lay at that time 
at anchor in the Tagus. As soon, however, as the details of the 
secret treachery reached them, both the Ambassador and the 
Admiral requested and obtained an audience of the Prince Regent, 
to impress upon him the wisdom of removing with his Court and 
family to the Brazils, and fixing there the seat of his government, 
till the troubles of the present times should pass away. This 
was a terrible alternative ; but when the famous article in the 
Moniteur was shown to him, in which it was openly announced 
that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign, all ground of 
hesitation was removed. The British subjects who had been 
arrested were set at liberty ; the property which had been seized 
restored to its rightful owners ; and the royal family of Portugal 
made every preparation for quitting the ancient seat of its sove- 
reignty, under the protection of the British flag. These resolu- 
tions had been formed, and these preparations were in a state of 
forwardness, when Junot reached Abrantes ; and it was the 
notice which he received of the intended emigration, which in- 

c2 



20 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ii. 

duced him, without pausing to refresh his followers, or collect 
those who lagged behind, to press on towards the capital. 

The consternation and anxiety which were evinced by the in- 
habitants of Lisbon, as soon as a rumour of the intended depar- 
ture of the Prince got abroad, beggar all attempt at description. 
Devotedly attached both by nature and habit to the persons of 
their sovereigns, the lower orders beheld, in the proposed emigra- 
tion, a certain prelude to national ruin and individual misery 
whilst the higher classes came to the conclusion that, as surely 
as the royal family should abandon the palace of their ancestors, 
so surely would the prophetic declaration in the Moniteur receive 
its accomplishment. Nor was this the only circumstance which 
tended to excite general alarm, independently of the impending 
approach of the French troops. As if he had come thither by 
appointment, Junot's army had hardly crossed the frontier, when 
the Russian admiral Siniavin entered the Tagus, with nine ships 
of the line and two frigates. Such a coincidence could not fail 
deeply to affect men already agitated by a thousand fears and 
doubts ; for though his arrival was purely accidental, it appeared 
to the ill-fated Portuguese that a plan of co-operation between 
the French General and the Russian Admiral had been laid ; and 
that the latter had come, at this critical juncture, to assist in the 
subjugation of the kingdom. 

In the mean while, preparations were making by the Court for 
its intended emigration. The royal treasury was emptied ; the 
plate, both of the Prince and of the courtiers who designed to 
follow him, was packed and made ready for removal on board of 
ship ; and finally, a proclamation appeared, assigning as the 
motive for a step so decisive, the conviction which rested upon 
the mind of the Regent, that his person, and not the oppression 
of the Portuguese people, was the design of the invasion. A 
regency was likewise nominated, to consist of four individuals ; 
namely, the Marquess de Abrantes ; Lieutenant-general Francisco 
da Cunha de Menezes, regidor das justicas, principal castro of 
the royal council ; Don Pedro de Millo Breyner, likewise of the 
council ; and Don Francisco de Noronha, lieutenant-general, and 
president of the board of conscience. In case any of these should 
refuse to act, the Conde Monteiro Mor was nominated to take 



1808.] JUNOT ADVANCES ON LISBON. 21 

his place ; and the same nobleman was appointed president of the 
Senado da Camara, having the Conde Sampaio, or Don Miguel 
Periera Forjaz, and Joam Anthonio Salter de Mendonca, as his 
secretaries. These functionaries were instructed to use every 
exertion for the preservation of the general peace of the kingdom ; 
they were to administer the laws in every respect as if the 
Regent himself were present ; and above all, they were them- 
selves to receive the French troops as friends. Upon this point 
the proclamation was the more explicit, inasmuch as both the 
English Admiral and the inhabitants of Lisbon had manifested 
a strong desire to defend the city to the last ; and, as the Regent 
was satisfied that all resistance must be fruitless, he positively 
forbade any to be offered. 

Whilst matters were in this train on the banks of the Tagus, 
Junot was moving, as rapidly as the state of the weather and the 
disordered condition of his troops would allow, upon the capital. 
He had assembled together as many soldiers of every corps and 
division as appeared capable of bearing the fatigue of a renewed 
march, and he caused large vessels to be constructed for the 
conveyance, down the stream, of those multitudes whom disease 
or weariness had rendered incapable of proceeding. General 
Caraffa, with a portion of the Spanish corps, was detached to 
Thomar for the purpose of collecting provisions, and keeping that 
part of the country in awe. The reserve artillery and heavy 
baggage, which had been left behind, received instructions to 
follow by the road which passes Alcantara and Badajoz : whilst 
the guns attached to the divisions in advance, were most of them 
conveyed by water carriage. Having completed these arrange- 
ments, he found that it was possible for him to move forward at 
the head of 6,000 or 8,000 men ; and he lost no time in putting 
them in motion. 

On the 26th of November, the advanced guard, consisting of 
four chosen battalions and a regiment of Spanish hussars, reached 
Punhete. On the following morning it passed Zezere in boats ; 
and Junot, who accompanied it, was met on the opposite bank by 
Jose Oliveira de Barreto, commandant of Aranjo. This officer 
was desirous that the march of the French troops should be sus- 
pended ; and that some confidential person should be sent forward 
for the purpose of arranging all the details of occupation with the 



22 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ii. 

proper authorities. But as he accompanied his request with an 
enunciation of the proposed departure of the royal family, Junot 
would on no account accede to it, and the troops continued their 
march, and reached Sacavem, a village situated about two leagues 
from Lisbon, at an early hour on the 29th. Here the French 
general was met by deputations from the supreme council, from 
the city, and from the merchants of Lisbon, who came to 
congratulate him on his arrival, and here he was informed of the 
embarkation and actual departure of the royal family. At the 
same time, the representatives of the regency, Lieutenant- 
general Martinho de Souza e xilbuquerque, and Brigadier- general 
Francisco de Borga Garcao Stockier, warned him of the state of 
violent excitation into which the inhabitants of the capital were 
thrown. They assured him that an English fleet was at the 
mouth of the river, evidently waiting for a fair wind to carry it 
up ; and that, unless the greatest precautions were used, it would 
be a hard matter to preserve that amity between the French and 
the Portuguese, which not prudence only, but the express orders 
of the Prince Regent, required them to maintain. Junot heard 
them to an end, and then dismissed them with a declaration, that 
he would hold the regency responsible for the peace of the city. 
To the other deputations, again, he recommended diligence and 
zeal in calming the spirits of their fellow-citizens ; and he sent 
forward numerous copies of a proclamation, to be posted in the 
most conspicuous parts of Lisbon, declaratory of the good-will of 
the Emperor towards the Portuguese. 

But though he thus affected to undervalue the perils of his 
situation, Junot did not feel himself really at ease. Of the 
28,000 men whom he had led across the Pyrenees, scarcely 
6,000 were at this moment in a condition to act. The rest 
were scattered over the line of march in one long column, 
divided here and there by impassable torrents, or no less impas- 
sable inundations. The division nearest to his advanced guard 
was that of General Delaborde, which had as yet penetrated no 
further than to Santarem. Of the cavalry and artillery which 
had fallen into the rear soon after the army began to move from 
Alcantara, no intelligence had reached him ; and he was quite 
ignorant whether or not the Spanish corps, which had been 
directed to move by Alentejo and Entre-Douro-e-Minho, had yet 



1808.] FLIGHT OF THE ROYAL FAMILY. 23 

begun their march. Thus situated, and with a large and populous 
city before him, in which at least 10,000 regular troops were 
garrisoned. Junot could not but look forward to the event 
with serious apprehension. But he was aware that any appear- 
ance of doubt or misgiving would now prove fatal — and he 
accordingly got together as many men as could be collected, and, 
on the following day, entered Lisbon. 

It is hardly necessary to remind the reader, that whilst the 
French marshal was thus executing his painful march, the royal 
family of Portugal were hurrying their arrangements for the 
abandonment of the country. The morning of the 27th had 
been fixed upon for their embarkation ; and on that day, amidst 
the tears and regrets of thousands, they entered the vessels 
appointed to convey them. But the wind proved not only adverse 
but boisterous ; it blew a hurricane, and the fleet was unable to 
move. At last, however, a favourable breeze sprang up, and at 
daybreak on the 29th the anchors were weighed. It was well 
that the storm ceased when it did ; for the ships were scarcely 
across the bar when the French entered the city. 

For some little time after the arrival of Junot, all things went 
on in the Portuguese capital, as they had been accustomed to do. 
The French soldiers coming in by small detachments, were 
conducted by the magistracy to their quarters ; and both they 
and their officers possessed sufficient prudence to conduct them- 
selves with decorum. But the stragglers were scarcely collected, 
and the strength of the weary restored, when French domination 
began to show itself; and a blow was struck at the national 
pride of the Portuguese, such as they found it difficult to bear. 

As soon as he could act with a high hand, Junot gave orders 
that Lisbon and all the ports in the Tagus should be evacuated by 
the Portuguese troops, and their places be supplied by French 
divisions. Delaborde was nominated governor of the capital ; 
and his soldiers were quartered, not in barracks or public-houses, 
but in the convents. General Loison, with his division, occupied 
Cintra, Mafra, and the sea- coast as far as the mouth of 
the Mondego ; one brigade, under General Thomieres, being 
quartered in the castle and peninsula of Penniche. To the third 
division, at the head of which was General Travot, was intrusted 
the defence of the entrance of the Tagus. Its head-quarters were 



24 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ii. 

at Ocyras, and it had garrisons in the forts of St. Julien and 
Cascaes on the right bank ; whilst on the left, two battalions were 
encamped upon the heights of Mafarem. The cavalry and 
artillery were kept entire in Lisbon ; there were detachments of 
infantry in Santarem and Abrantes ; and a Swiss battalion 
garrisoned Almeida. Such was the disposition of the French 
troops — the Spaniards were arranged as follow : 

The division of General Caraffa, having recalled its detachment 
from Thomar, took up its quarters in Lisbon, and was intermixed 
with the French corps. Solano, who had presented himself before 
Elvas on the 2d of December, and to whom that important place 
opened its gates, having disposed three battalions in the fort, 
established his head -quarters at Se tubal. From that point he 
sent out parties, which occupied the castles and towers of the 
Alentejo and Algarve, and completed the subjugation of the new 
principality; whilst Taranco was in like manner spreading his 
force over the northern provinces. The last officer having secured 
Valenca, a place of considerable importance as commanding the 
passages of Minho and the Lima, threw a garrison into the 
chateau of Sant Iago ; and, on the 13th, took possession of 
Oporto, where he fixed his head-quarters. 

Having ascertained that, of the arrangements some were com- 
plete, and the rest hurrying on, Junot proceeded to impress upon 
the minds of the Portuguese the painful truth that they were 
looked upon as a conquered people. On the 13th of December, 
a grand review of all the troops in the capital was announced, 
and the whole population of the place nocked from their houses 
in order to witness the spectacle. They were gazing at the scene 
before them, when a salute of artillery from the walls of the 
Moorish fort attracted their attention. All eyes were instantly 
turned thither, and they beheld the ancient flag of Portugal 
lowered from the staff, and the tri- coloured standard of France 
mounted in its place. It was a sight which seemed to affect them 
with emotions too deep for utterance. At first a solemn silence 
prevailed, broken only by the rattle of the soldiers' arms, or the 
voices of their commanders ; but by and by a murmur arose, 
resembling rather the roar of the ocean upon its bed of sand, than 
any other sound in nature. The people were grievously agitated* 
Cries of " Portugal for ever ! Death to the French !" were heard 



1808.] JUNOT APPOINTED REGENT. 25 

on every side ; and it appeared that some mighty convulsion was 
inevitable. But Junot had taken care to secure the persons of 
the principal men of the city, whose heads might pay the forfeit 
of any act of insurrection ; and the mob, without leaders and 
without arms, melted gradually away. 

In spite, however, of this flagrant attack upon their dignity as 
an independent nation, the Portuguese continued for some time 
to bear their fate, if not in absolute quiet, at all events without 
giving vent to their feelings in a way calculated to excite the 
serious alarm of their conqueror. Junot made no other change in the 
form of government, than by adding to the list of regency one or 
two creatures of his own ; and the laws continued to be adminis- 
tered in the name of the legitimate sovereign, as before. Above 
all things, Junot was extremely cautious in concealing, as far as 
he could, the terms of the treaty of Fontainbleau. So far from 
divulging these, he took care on all occasions to make it known 
that the Emperor was particularly desirous of preserving the 
integrity of the kingdom of Portugal ; till at last the idea began 
to be entertained, that, at the worst, the Portuguese might appre- 
hend only a change of dynasty. 

The same line of conduct which he pursued himself, the 
generals in command of the Spanish corps had been pointedly 
requested to adopt : but to the wishes of their chief they paid 
very little attention. Taranco, indeed, went no further than to 
insinuate to the authorities of Oporto, that they ought from 
thenceforth to regard their city as attached to the monarchy of 
Spain ; but Solano, the personal friend of Godoy, went much 
further. He appointed a grand judge, and a superintendent of 
finances, in the name of Emmanuel, prince of the Algarves; 
and he caused money to be coined, bearing the arms of the 
Queen's minion. Except in these particulars, however, Solano 
did nothing very offensive to the prejudices of the Portuguese, 
by whom he seems to have been deservedly esteemed. 

Matters continued in this state, Junot directing the principal 
share of his attention to the sea- side, and making every exertion 
to oppose any attempts which might be made by the English 
against him, up to the 1st of February 1808. On that day, 
however, he published a decree, which had issued from his master 
whilst at Milan, and bore date the 23rd of the preceding 



26 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ii. 

December. It dissolved for ever the council of regency appointed 
by the Prince of the Brazils, and directed Junot, duke of 
Abrantes, to govern Portugal alone, in the name of the Emperor 
Napoleon. It required that a chosen body of Portuguese troops 
should be sent, with as little delay as possible, into France. It 
changed the appellation of the corps now stationed about Lisbon, 
from that of the army of observation of the Gironde, to that of 
the army of Portugal ; and it condemned the Portuguese nation 
to pay, as the price of the protection of their private property, a 
line of one hundred millions of francs. Such were the orders of 
Napoleon ; and these the Duke of Abrantes proceeded, without 
the slightest compunction, to enforce. 

The effect produced by the promulgation of this decree, and 
by the changes in every department of the state which arose out 
of it, was such as it were no easy matter to pourtray. It was 
felt, not in the capital alone, but through every part of the most 
remote provinces. The army, already in a state of disor- 
ganization, disbanded itself — and those who had carried arms as 
soldiers, continued to bear them as robbers and plunderers — the 
peasantry, heart-broken and desperate, refused to sow their fields, 
and the higher classes, whose usual place of residence was 
Lisbon, fled from their homes, till the city presented the appear- 
ance of a place depopulated by war or pestilence. True, there 
were traitors to their country, who continued to surround the 
throne of the intruder, and flatter his vanity, or that of his 
master, by addresses fulsome and degrading ; but the mass of the 
nation felt the insults and wrongs to which they were subjected, 
and seemed to await only the moment to take revenge. 

It was not long before the offended pride of the Portuguese 
vented itself in acts of violence, for which the insolence of the 
French furnished constant opportunity and excuse, but which 
were invariably followed by punishments severe and arbitrary. 
At Mafra, because the populace had uttered cries indicative of 
their feelings, a citizen was condemned to death by a military 
commission, and executed immediately. A few days afterwards, 
a quarrel arose at the village of Caldas de Ranha, between the 
French troops quartered there, and some soldiers of the 2nd 
regiment of Oporto. The affair was represented to Junot as a 
seditious commotion; and the regiment was broken under 



1808.] FRENCH CRUELTY. 27 

circumstances the most ignominious, while six peaceable inha- 
bitants of the place, who had taken no part in the disturbance, 
were shot. Similar scenes occurred in every city, town, village, 
and hamlet in Portugal, till the minds of the people were wrought 
up to desperation.* 

As soon as Junot perceived the state of feeling to which the 
Portuguese were brought, he lost no time in fulfilling another of 
Napoleon's directions, by disbanding the whole of the army, 
except the regiments under orders to proceed to France. Pre- 
viously to the invasion, the standing army of Portugal amounted 
to thirty-seven regiments of horse and foot. Junot fixed the 
military establishment at six regiments of infantry and three of 
cavalry, and the rest were dismissed to their homes. The militia 
had long since been relieved from the fatigues of military service ; 
and now, to complete his measures, an edict was issued, requiring 
every Portuguese to surrender his fire-arms; and prohibiting 
even swords from being worn in the streets. 

Things continued in this state from the month of February till 
summer had advanced. In every part of the country, pictures, 
devices, or emblems of any sort, having a tendency to keep alive 
the recollection of national independence, were removed or 
defaced. From the gateways of the palaces the royal arms were 
pulled down ; the Quinas, or old Portuguese standard, was dis- 
placed, to make way for the imperial eagle ; and even justice was 
administered according to the French code, and in the name of 
the French Emperor. Yet were there occurring, from time to 
time, events which might have served to satisfy any reasonable 
person that matters were being pushed too far. Between the 
French and their allies, the Spaniards, jealousies arose — the 

* " No wonder, then, that national dislike ripened daily into implacable 
hostility ; and that the example of the sister kingdom was not lost upon a 
people subjected, like the Portuguese, to contumely and exaction. Junot 
was bitterly disliked. He had personally insulted the most influential portion 
of the community. The clergy, with good reason, detested a man who on 
every occasion robbed them of their privileges, and lowered them in the 
estimation of the laity. An exasperated priesthood, and a bigoted community, 
were not to be easily coerced. None could foretel the moment when popular 
indignation should be manifested by a sudden outbreak ; for, like a loaded 
mine, the slightest spark would produce an instant explosion." — Maxwell's 
Wellington. 



28 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ii. 

hiefs, disgusted at the flagrant violation of the treaty of Fontain- 
bleau, openly expressed their dissatisfaction ; whilst pieces of 
information began gradually to circulate among the common 
soldiers, which stirred up in them a disposition the reverse of 
friendly towards their nominal comrades. At last, an order 
arrived from Madrid, accompanied by a personal request on the 
part of Godoy, to Marshal Junot, that the Spanish corps should 
be permitted to evacuate Portugal, and recross the frontier. 
Acquiescence was of course refused ; and the divisions of Caraffa 
and Taranco remained at their respective stations. But Solano's 
corps actually took its departure, with the exception of four 
battalions, which continued to garrison Setubal — and, alarmed by 
this movement, Junot despatched Kellerman with his brigade to 
Elvas, for the purpose of watching its results. In the same 
disposition, he ordered General Quesnel, a French officer, to 
proceed to Oporto, and take command of the Spanish troops 
there, whom the death of Taranco had left without a leader : and 
he directed him to overawe the Portuguese by the presence of the 
Spaniards, while he kept the Spaniards to their duty by 
exciting in them a dread of the Portuguese. Nor was he 
remiss in the adoption of their expedients for the preservation 
of public peace. Whilst his emissaries were busily employed in 
collecting a tribute oppressive beyond endurance, he turned par- 
ticular attention to the state of the marine. Through the 
exertions of M. Majendie, a captain in the French navy, he fitted 
out two seventy-fours, three frigates, and seven smaller vessels, 
besides hulks. It is true that none of these were rendered 
effective ; but at all events they served the purposes of floating 
batteries ; and promised to prove of utility in case an English 
squadron endeavoured to force the passage of the bar. All 
Junot's dispositions, however, were of no avail. A cloud had 
already collected in another part of the horizon, which there was 
no reason to expect would dissolve without a storm ; and that no 
sooner began to rage, than it extended its influence to every part 
of a vice -royalty already insecure. 



1808.] FRESH ARMIES ORGANIZED. 29 



CHAPTER III. 

Entrance of fresh armies into Spain — Seizure of the frontier fortresses, and 
advance of Murat upon Madrid — Consternation of Charles and Godoy— 
Preparations for escape to South America defeated by the mob — Godoy 
dragged to prison — Charles abdicates, and Ferdinand is proclaimed king — 
Murat arrives in the capital — Departure of the royal family for Bayonne — 
Tumult of the 2nd of May — Resignation of the rights of the House of 
Bourbon — Secret instructions of Ferdinand — Measures adopted by Ferdi- 
nand to preserve tranquillity. 

The sixth article of the treaty of Fontainbleau had stipulated, 
''that a corps of forty thousand French troops should assemble 
at Bayonne, on or about the 20th November, for the purpose 
of supporting the force previously sent into Portugal, in case the 
English should oppose its progress, or menace it with an attack : % 
but it was expressly specified that the latter corps should make 
no movement in advance, until the two high contracting parties 
had come to a perfect understanding on the subject. 

In accordance with the tenor of this arrangement, Junot's 
corps had hardly commenced its march, until the formation of 
the army destined to support it began. Early in November 
there were 24,000 infantry, 3000 or 4000 cavalry, and thirty- 
eight pieces of artillery in camp ; and by the 22nd of the 
same month, the whole, under the orders of General Dupont, 
crossed the Pyrenees. For this movement, the assent of the 
Spanish court was neither requested nor obtained. Buona- 
parte felt himself too strong to need it ; and the corps pressed 
forward direct to Valladolid. Here, the head-quarters were es- 
tablished ; the troops being cantoned in the villages along the 
course of the Douro, whilst detachments were pushed on as far 
as Salamanca, in order that a persuasion might be generally 
created that its ultimate destination was Lisbon. 

Not satisfied with having thus introduced two armies into the 
heart of nations professedly in a state of profound peace with his 
government, Napoleon caused a third corps to form itself where 
the two former had been stationed, wliile a fourth was organized 
at Perpignan, in the opposite extremity of the Pyrenees. No 



30 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR, [chap. hi. 

great while elapsed before both the one and the other penetrated 
into Spain. The former, under Marshal Moncey, consisting of 
25,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon, 
passed the Bidassoa on the 9th of January, occupying the 
three provinces of Biscay, and extending as far as Castile. 
The latter, amounting to 15,000 men, and headed by Duhesme, 
made its movement a month later. The progress of both was 
marked by deeds of treachery, of which a few words will suffice 
to recal the particulars. 

As soon as Napoleon had determined upon the proceedings 
which he afterwards adopted with respect to Spain, it became to 
him a matter of the first importance to get possession of the 
fortresses and strongholds which covered its northern frontier, 
and protected it against French invasion. These were St. Sebas- 
tian, in Biscay ; Pamplona, in Navarre ; and Figueres and Bar- 
celona, in Catalonia. Whoever commands these four cities may 
be said to command the passes of the Pyrenees ; and to obtain 
that at any cost and by any means, was the last order given by 
Napoleon to his generals. The methods severally adopted to 
carry their master's projects into effect, are too well known to 
require repetition ; and it is only necessary to remark, that in 
every instance they proved successful. 

The four principal roads which lead .from France directly to 
Madrid, are, first, the Royal Causeway, which, passing the fron- 
tier at Irun, runs under St. Sebastian, and then through a wild 
and mountainous country (full of dangerous defiles) to the Ebro ; 
crosses that river by a stone bridge at Miranda, and leads upon 
Burgos, from which town it turns short to the left, is carried 
over the Duero at Aranda, and soon after encountering the Car- 
pentanos and the Sierra de Guadalaxara, penetrates them by the 
strong pass of the Somosierra, and descends upon the capital* 
Vittoria stands in a plain about half way between St. Sebastian 
and Burgos. 

Having thus succeeded, by unbounded treachery, beyond his 
expectations, in opening a way into the heart of Spain, Napoleon 
no longer deemed it necessary to affect concealment as to ultimate 
purposes. Column after column poured over the Pyrenees, till 
the whole line of the road from Bidassoa to the Douro was covered 
with French soldiers. In Catalonia fresh reinforcements daily 



1808.] SCHEMES OF THE FRENCH. 31 



arrived, till Marshal Bessieres, to whom the chief command of 
that district was entrusted, found himself at the head of 
25,000 men, including 6000 of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery 
of the guard. But to Murat, grand-duke of Berg, the im- 
portant task of subjugating Spain was committed. He was 
recalled from Madrid, where for some time he had acted as am- 
bassador, though in reality in promoting internal discord in the 
bosom of the court ; and, being appointed lieutenant to the 
emperor, he proceeded at once to take command of the grand 
army. 

In the mean while, events had occurred in the Spanish capital, 
which drew upon the actors the attention, not of Spain only, but 
of Europe. In the first place, the inhabitants of Madrid were 
astonished by the sudden appearance of a royal proclamation, in 
which it was announced that Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias, had 
been detected in a conspiracy to dethrone and murder his father, 
and that he had been consequently arrested. This was followed 
in a few days by a second proclamation, informing the public 
that the Prince having confessed his guilt, and given up the 
names of his associates, had been pardoned, and again admitted 
to the royal favour. The surprise excited by proceedings so 
extraordinary had not subsided, when intelligence of the opera- 
tions of the French armies on the frontier, and their rapid ad- 
vance into the heart of the country, excited in a more forcible 
degree the consternation of all classes. Godoy, alarmed himself, 
thought at one moment of recalling the Spanish troops from 
Portugal, and keeping them in readiness to act as circumstances 
might require ; and an order was issued to that effect. At other 
times he urged the King to forward a scheme, to which he had 
formerly opposed himself with all his influence, namely, the pro- 
curing a wife for Ferdinand from among the princesses of Napo- 
leon's blood. Lastly, he threw out hints as to the propriety of 
abdicating the crown ; whilst for himself, an asylum in the heart 
of France appeared to hold out the best hopes of protection 
against the violence of his enemies. 

In the midst of these deliberations arrived two announcements, 
of which it would be difficult to determine whether the former or 
the latter struck this imbecile court with the greater degree of 



32 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. in. 

horror and surprise. A letter from Napoleon himself, accom- 
panying certain presents of beautiful horses, informed the King 
of Spain that it was the Emperor's intention to visit Madrid, and 
there settle upon a solid foundation, the affairs both of Spain and 
Portugal. Such an arrival was desired neither by Charles nor his 
favourite ; and whilst they were yet hesitating how to act, Don 
Eugenio Izquierdo, who had long resided at Paris as the tool of 
Godoy, suddenly made his appearance in the Escurial, and com- 
municated the following details. The Emperor, he said, had 
determined to seize Portugal for himself, and to exchange it with 
the crown of Spain for the provinces north of the Ebro. New 
treaties of commerce and of alliance, offensive and defensive, 
were about to be drawn up. The title of Emperor of the Indies 
would be given to the King of Spain ; whose son, the Prince of 
Asturias, should receive the hand of the Emperor's niece ; but 
the marriage must be a subject of especial negociation, and de- 
ferred till other arrangements were complete. In addition to this 
official intelligence, Izquierdo informed his master of the sus- 
picions which he entertained touching the Emperor's real designs ; 
a statement which threw all parties concerned into the most serious 
alarm. 

It was now that the wisdom of following the example set by 
the Regent of Portugal, and removing the court to South 
America, suggested itself to Godoy. His dreams of sovereignty 
were dispelled, and his highest ambition was to secure a retreat 
for himself, whatever might be the fate of Spain : nor did he find 
Charles in a mood different from his own. The plan was no 
sooner proposed than it was agreed to. The King and Queen 
both professed their willingness to fly ; and preparations were 
instantly set on foot for securing an embarkation. 

With this view the corps of General Solano was recalled from 
Alentejo, and ordered to occupy the passes of the Guadarramas. 
Detachments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were directed to 
cover the road from Madrid to Seville ; whilst the body-guard, 
nine squadrons of royal carabiniers, the battalions of the Walloon 
and Spanish guards, and regiments of national infantry and 
cavalry, which composed the ordinary garrison of Madrid, 
marched from the capital to Aranjuez, where the court was then 



1808.] ABDICATION OF CHARLES IV. 33 

resident. All things, in short, were already in a state of for- 
wardness, when an unexpected tumult frustrated at once the 
intentions of Godoy and the King. 

Though the greatest precautions had heen adopted to keep 
secret the object of these preparations, it was not possible to 
hinder a rumour of the intended emigration from spreading 
abroad. The Spaniards were afflicted at the prospect of being 
abandoned by their King ; and as it was understood that Fer- 
dinand had expressed the strongest aversion to the measure, the 
whole was attributed to the selfish councils of the Prince of the 
Peace. The consequence was, that the hatred which had 
long been harboured towards Godoy, increased with tenfold 
violence ; and in this feeling the soldiers participated with the 
multitude. To such a height, indeed, was this universal dis- 
content carried, that Charles found himself under the necessity of 
abandoning his design ; and issued a proclamation, in which he 
assured his beloved subjects that no consideration whatever 
should induce him to desert them. This appeared on the 16th, 
but on the 1 7th the preparations for departure were renewed. 
Popular indignation was now excited to its highest pitch ; the 
mob, hastening to Aranjuez, found a cavalcade of carriages ready 
to proceed. They instantly cut the traces ; and then turning 
their fury against Godoy, ran in a tumultuous manner to assault 
his house. Of the soldiers whom he called in to his assistance, 
all, except his own body-guard, deserted him ; and with great 
difficulty he escaped to a place of concealment for the night. 

Next day Ferdinand showed himself to the people, and the 
tumult was appeased. The houses of Godoy, and his nearest rela- 
tives and dependants, were all levelled to the ground ; whilst he 
himself, dragged from his hiding-place, was with difficulty con- 
veyed to a public prison ; and this done, the mob immediately 
returned to their duty. Charles, however, had learned a lesson, 
such as he had no desire should be repeated. The burden of sove- 
reignty, he said, had become too heavy for him ; and it was, in 
the existing circumstances of the country, highly improper that an 
old and infirm man should endeavour to bear it longer. He there- 
fore, of his own free will, abdicated the throne, and named as 
his successor his eldest and beloved son, Ferdinand, Prince of 
Asturias. 



34 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. in. 

The joy of the people of Madrid, when this resolution was 
made known to them, is represented to have known no bounds. 
The houses were decorated during the day with flowers and green 
boughs ; and at night, one vast illumination extended from square 
to square, and from street to street. Ferdinand was hailed, 
wherever he appeared, as the preserver of his country ; and for the 
moment, the advance of the French troops, and the fears which 
their approach had occasioned, were forgotten. But this state 
of general satisfaction was not destined to continue. 

It has been stated that Ferdinand, instigated by personal hatred 
towards Godoy, had declared himself friendly to the wishes of 
France ; and the line of politics which he had pursued whilst a 
subject, he did not abandon after he became sovereign. Aware of 
the approach of Murat's army, the first use which he made of 
power was to order Solano's corps back to its former quarters in 
Portugal ; countermand the return of the divisions of Caraffa and 
Taranco ; and dismiss the whole body of troops which late events 
had drawn around the capital. Madrid was thus left almost 
without a garrison — and the very heart of the kingdom laid open 
to the French Marshal. 

In the mean while, the Grand Duke of Berg was leading his 
numerous armies towards Madrid. The columns marched as 
through an enemy's country, bivouacking every night, and taking 
all the precautions to secure themselves which are usually taken 
in a state of war, until they made themselves masters of the chain 
of mountains which separate Old from New Castile. The officers 
in command, having received instructions to that effect, delayed 
the posts at all the stations, and arrested such bodies of Spanish 
soldiers as they anywhere met by the way ; whilst they industri- 
ously gave out, at every town or village through which they 
passed, that their final destination was the camp of Saint Roche, 
before Gibraltar. 

Proceeding in this order, the advanced guard reached Boytrajo, 
where intelligence of the late commotions in the Spanish capital 
met them, and Murat instantly set forward. He took with him a 
numerous and brilliant staff, with a division of the imperial guard, 
and arrived just in time to be an eye-witness of Ferdinand's 
triumphal entry into Madrid. The spectacle was not without its 
effect upon the mind of the French Marshal. He saw that the 






1808.] THE FRENCH IN MADRID. 35 

feelings of the people were all in favour of their prince ; and he 
probably anticipated the occurrence of events which shortly 
followed. 

Eugene Beauharnois, at this time filled the office of ambassador 
to the court of Spain. It was but natural that Ferdinand should 
appeal both to him and to the Emperor's lieutenant for a recogni- 
tion of his new title ; but neither Beauharnois nor Murat had 
received any instructions on the subject. No sooner, however, 
was a sufficient body of French troops at hand, than both the one 
and the other began to hint that their master was by no means 
prepared to view with a friendly eye the revolution which had 
occurred. Ferdinand was neither visited nor addressed by any 
other title than that of Prince of iVsturias, and a correspondence 
in the country was opened with his father and mother, whose per- 
sonal safety was provided for by the substitution of a French 
guard at Aranjuez, in lieu of the Spanish troops which had hitherto 
done that duty. These proceedings on the part of the French di- 
plomatists could not but alarm Ferdinand ; and this alarm was 
augmented, when day after day passed by, and no answer arrived 
to the letters which he had addressed to Napoleon, informing him 
that he had been placed upon the throne of Spain. At last it 
was communicated to him that the Emperor in person was on his 
way to Madrid, for the purpose of acting as arbiter in the 
divisions which reigned within the bosom of his family ; and the 
communication was accompanied by suggestions, a too ready 
compliance with which brought matters to an issue. 

The sword of Francis I., which had hung in the amoria real 
since the battle of Pavia, was demanded by Murat, in the name 
of the Emperor. Ferdinand was not sorry to find so good an 
opportunity of evincing his deference to the wishes of a man 
on whose protection he relied ; and he gave the weapon up, with 
a suitable compliment,* to its new owner. Then followed a 

* " It was a mere trick for the Parisians, and neither they nor the tyrant 
himself felt that France was far more dishonoured by the circumstances under 
which the sword was recovered, than by the manner in which it had been 
lost. Accordingly, this trophy of Pescara's victory, which had lain since the 
year 1525 in the royal armoury at Madrid, was carried in a silver basin 
under a silken cloth, laced and fringed with gold, to Murat's head-quarters, 
in a coach and six, preceded by six running footmen, and under the charge of 

d2 



36 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. hi. 

recommendation that the Infant Don Carlos, his brother, should 
proceed a few days' journey towards the frontier, to meet the 
Emperor. To that hint, likewise, the most prompt attention was 
paid. But the next implied a measure, of which even Ferdinand 
doubted the wisdom ; and it required more than an ordinary 
degree of persuasion to overcome his reluctance to its adoption. 
The ambassador, Beauharnois, represented that it would be 
particularly agreeable to his master, should Ferdinand consent 
to go as far as Burgos to receive him. While wavering on the 
course he should adopt, the arrival of a new actor on the stage 
turned the balance, and he gave a reluctant consent. Assured 
by General Savary, who professed to be little else than an avant 
courier to the Emperor, that Napoleon was actually on the road ; 
that he had left him so near Bayonne as to render his arrival at 
Burgos by this time certain ; and, that if Ferdinand entertained 
any hopes of being recognised as King of Spain, he must take 
care to give the most satisfactory proofs of his desire to obey the 
wishes of the man, in whose hands his destiny rested, he judged 
it imprudent to hesitate longer, and in spite of the remonstrances 
of his counsellors, the memorable journey was determined upon. 
It began on the 10th of April, and it ended on the 20th ; leaving 
this ill-fated prince a prisoner in Bayonne. 

Previously to his departure, Ferdinand had appointed a supreme 
junta, to direct the affairs of the nation during his absence ; at the 
head of which was his uncle, the Infant Don Antonio. He had 
hardly gone, when Murat addressed to this body [a requisition, 
that the Prince of the Peace should be set at liberty. The junta, 
afraid either to refuse or grant the request, referred him to the 
sovereign. Murat was indignant at the reply — threatened to 
force the prison, and put the troops who guarded it to the sword, 
in case they should presume to offer opposition to his will. The 

the superintendent of the arsenal ; the Grand Equerry and the Duke del Parque 
following in a second equipage, with the same state. A detachment of the 
Guards escorted them, and the sword was presented, by the Marquis of 
Astorga, to Murat ; he, it was said, having been brought up by the side of the 
Emperor, and in the same school, and illustrious for his military talents, was, 
more worthy than any other person could be, to be charged with so precious; 
a deposit, and to transmit it into the hands of his Imperial Majesty."— 



1808.] SEIZURE OF THE SPANISH PRINCES. 37 

junta felt that they possessed no means of hindering that threat 
from being carried into execution; — Godoy was given up to the 
French, and, like his rival Ferdinand, conveyed immediately to 
Bayonne. 

The next removals which took place were of the old sovereigns, 
and Charles and the Queen arrived at Bayonne exactly ten days 
later than their son. 

Of the disgraceful scenes which followed these extraordinary 
movements, it is not necessary to enter into a particular account. 
The world will not readily forget transactions which were marked 
by the most shameless violation of all laws, human and divine. 
A mother demanding the death of her own son, and proclaiming 
her own infamy in hatred to her child, is a spectacle which has 
not often been presented, and such depravity is best passed over 
in silence. 

Meantime, affairs were every day assuming a more alarm- 
ing aspect in Spain. Though there was not, as yet, open 
insurrection in any quarter, cases of individual quarrels were very 
frequent between the inhabitants and the French soldiery ; and 
blood was shed on both sides. Events were in rapid progress 
which brought down eventually that universal opposition to 
French influence, which no efforts were able, ever afterwards, to 
overcome. 

There remained at Madrid, towards the end of April, no 
members of the royal family, except the Queen of Etruria, her 
children, her brother the Infant Don Francisco de Paulo, and 
Don Antonio, the head of Regency ; and the Grand Duke of 
Berg received a letter from Charles IV., desiring that they 
likewise should be forwarded to Bayonne. When this letter 
arrived, the people of Madrid w r ere thrown into a state of the 
most violent excitement, and when the determination of Murat 
with respect to the Regent and his relatives was communicated 
to them, they protested that Don Antonio should not be taken 
from them ; but, in spite of these appearances, the preparations 
for his departure were continued. It was now the 1st of 
May, and for the last two days no post had arrived. On the 
2nd, a similar reply met those who assembled at the post-office ; 
whilst it was rumoured that the royal carriages were already 
harnessed, and that the princes were preparing to set out. The 






38 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. in. 

people ran to the palace, cut the traces, and forced back the 
carriages into the stable-yard. Unfortunately, an aide-de-camp 
of Murat, happening to pass at the moment, they loaded him 
with insults and execrations. The aide-de-camp resented this 
treatment, and words were interchanged for blows. And now 
be°-an a tragedy which Spain will long retain in recollection, not 
only because of the blood of her citizens which was shed, but 
of the results w T hich sprang out of it, and the arduous struggle 
to which it was forerunner. It is sufficient to observe that a 
conflict between the people and the French ensued ; that the 
firm 0, continued for nearly three hours, with considerable slaughter 
on both sides : that it was not till after the most strenuous 
exertions of the authorities, both Spanish and French, that order 
was restored ; and that it proved by no means the least distress- 
in * thing to the people of Madrid, that a combat, which had 
already cost thus dear, should be followed by a multitude of 
military executions.* 

The immediate effect of the operations of this bloody day, was 
to strike with momentary terror the inmates of the capital : a 
sensation of which the French failed not to make the most, by 
circulating proclamations that spoke a language of mingled 
threatening and conciliation. The Infant Don Francisco was 
sent off to Bayonne ; and followed within four- and- twenty hours 
by Don Antonio. The latter, indeed, voluntarily expressed a 
wish to share the fortunes of the King, his nephew. His depar- 
ture was followed by the admission of the Grand Duke of Berg, 
as a member, into the Council of Regency ; and a few days after- 
wards Murat was, by a decree of Charles IV., nominated to fill 
the office of President. 

The news of the insurrection at Madrid reached Bayonne at a 
moment when the Emperor appeared to be busily engaged in an 

* " In the • Memoires d'un Soldat,' the Mamelukes are said to have made a 
great slaughter that day. One of them breaking into a house from which a 
musket had been fired, was run through with a sword by a very beautiful 
girl, who was immediately cut down by his companions. A man who got 
his livelihood by the chase, and was an unerring shot, expended eight-and- 
twenty cartridges upon the French, bringing down a man with each ; when 
his ammunition was spent, he armed himself with a dagger, and, rushing 
against a body of the enemy, fought till the last gasp." — Southey. 



1S08.] MASSACRE AT MADRID. 39 

attempt to reconcile Ferdinand and his parents. Napoleon 
turned these disturbances to good account, and made them a 
handle for loading Ferdinand with maledictions. He accused 
him of being the cause of all this bloodshed, and insisted that he 
should instantly restore the crown to his father, from whom he 
had impiously usurped it. Ferdinand, who at first had displayed 
some courage, sank under the invectives of Napoleon. He not 
only obeyed the mandate, but, in his capacity of Prince of 
Asturias, affixed his signature to the deed by which Charles IV., 
in his own name, and in the name of his family, resigned the 
sovereignty of Spain into the hands of the Emperor of the French, 
A similar proceeding was followed by the rest of the princes. 
They gave up their rights for ever, declaring, in a published 
document, that the Spanish nation could not evince its affection 
for the race in a manner more satisfactory, than by paying a 
ready obedience to the sovereign, whoever he might be, that 
should be appointed to succeed them. 

Whether Ferdinand had foreseen the lengths to which matters 
would be carried, or whether he only expected to be detained for 
a time in captivity in France, does not appear ; but, immediately 
previous to the grand catastrophe, he wrote and despatched by a 
trusty messenger, a letter of instructions to the council of 
regency. In it he declared that his actions were no longer free, 
and that it was impossible for him, situated as he was, to attend 
to the honour of the throne, or the welfare of the country. He 
therefore granted to the junta unlimited powers, permitting it to 
remove whithersoever it would, and in his name to exercise all the 
authority of the sovereign. He recommended that a general 
cortes should assemble with as little delay as possible, for the 
purpose of adopting such measures as might appear most con- 
ducive to the public good ; and he positively required that the 
removal of his person into the interior of France, should be the 
signal for the commencement of hostilities. The letter was 
faithfully delivered to the junta ; but as it reached its destination 
two days later than the official account of Ferdinand's resignation, 
the junta decreed that they were not authorised in paying it 
obedience. On the contrary, they showed themselves the ready 
and willing tools of the Emperor's lieutenant, who had proceeded 



40 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

to order all things in the kingdom as he judged most conducive 
to his master's interests. 

Thefirst and great object to be attained was, to scatter the Spanish 
army so as to render it ineffective, and to secure the fidelity 
of the great cities of Cadiz and Valencia. For this purpose, the 
two Swiss regiments cantoned near Madrid, were incorporated 
with the corps of General Dupont ; the body-guards, with four 
battalions of Spanish and Walloon guards, were placed under the 
orders of Moncey ; directions were given to prepare an expe- 
dition of 3000 men, which might embark without delay for 
Buenos Ayres ; and the Mediterranean fleet, at that time laid up 
in Port Mahon, was required to proceed at once to Toulon, for 
the purpose of joining the French squadron. Many changes 
were likewise ordered in the different garrisons scattered through 
Catalonia and elsewhere ; nothing, in short, was left undone, 
which appeared in the most remote degree calculated to secure 
the absolute subjection of Spain ; and it was even hinted that, as 
soon as that great end should be attained, other and more gigantic 
projects would be undertaken. 



CHAPTER IV. 

General insurrection of the Spanish provinces— The Junta of Seville assumes 
the title of Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies — Expeditions against 
Seville and Valencia — Actions at Alcolia and Baylen — Surrender of 
Dupont's corps — Moncey repulsed from before Valencia — King Joseph 
enters Spain — Battle of Medino del Rio Seco— Arrival of Joseph in Madrid 
— His flight in consequence of Dupont's capture— Expedition fitted out at 
Cork sails for the Peninsula — Sir Arthur Wellesley arrives at Corunna 
and directs his course towards Portugal — Proceedings in that country- 
Mutiny of the Spanish garrison of Oporto — Seizure of General Quesnel — 
Junot's measures to suppress the revolt. 

It has been stated that the details of the eventful 2nd of May 
reached Bayonne on the 10th ; they were not more tardy in 
making their way through all parts of Spain; and the effect 
produced by them, from one end of the kingdom to another, was 



1808.] INSURRECTION THROUGHOUT SPAIN. 41 

the same. From the mountains of Arragon to the pillars of 
Hercules, and from Valencia to Cape Finisterre, there arose one 
loud and simultaneous shout, " Long live King Ferdinand — 
Death to the French !" The people thought not of the defence- 
less state of the country, its frontier towns in the occupation of 
the enemy, its soldiers dispersed, and its arsenals and treasures 
plundered. They saw only the degradation to which they were 
reduced ; and they ran to arms with the alacrity of men deter- 
mined to regain their freedom, or perish in the attempt. 

Whilst in other provinces a general rising took place, distin- 
guished more by the zeal of those who followed, than by the 
prudence of its leaders, a regular form of government, such at 
least as the state of the times would admit of, was organized at 
Seville. On the very day after the insurrection broke out, 
a junta consisting of twenty- three members, chosen from 
the principal men of the province, the nobility, the higher 
clergy, the general officers and members of the municipal body, 
met together, and assumed the title of Junta, and Supreme 
Government of Spain and the Indies. Acting in this capacity, 
the Supreme Junta proceeded to give directions, that in every 
town or village which should contain two thousand householders, 
juntas of six persons should be formed, whose business it should 
be to enlist under the national standard all males between the age 
of sixteen and forty-five. Messengers were likewise despatched 
to the captain- general of Cadiz, to General Castanos, com- 
mandant at the camps at San Roche ; to the cities of Cordova, 
Grenada and Jaen ; and to all the towns and villages near, to 
acquaint them with the resolution which had been formed, of 
delivering Spain, and entreat their best assistance in so just a 
cause. Light vessels were fitted out and sailed, both for the 
Canaries and South America; commissioners hastened to Algarves 
and Alentejo, to request the co-operation of the Portuguese ; and 
war was solemnly declared against France and Napoleon. At 
the same time, proclamations were circulated, inviting all 
Italians, Germans, Poles, Swiss, and other foreigners, to abandon 
the French standard, and take service in the armies of Spain. In 
a word, every thing was done promptly, actively, and vigorously, 
whilst the most perfect order was preserved. 

Wherever the emissaries of the Supreme Junta appeared, they 



42 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

failed not to stir up among the people a spirit in every respect 
accordant to that which animated themselves. In Cadiz, the 
multitude rose upon Solano, whose attachment to Godoy and the 
French continued unabated ; and, having dragged him from the 
house of Mr. Strange, an Irish banker, with whom he had 
taken shelter, they put him to death in a manner most ignomi- 
nious and cruel. Similar scenes were acted in different towns 
of Spain, whilst as yet the fervour of patriotism was too violent to 
be guided by reason ; and not a few, both of Frenchmen and 
their adherents, fell a sacrifice to popular fury. But to the 
honour of Spain, be it remembered, that she had suffered long 
and grievously under her oppressions ; and that those who felt 
the effects of the first effervescence of her wrath, were fewer by far 
in number, than fell in one day under the regulated fusillade of 
the French garrison of Madrid. 

It was, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance for Spain, that the 
first great operations in which her patriot forces embarked, proved, 
most of them, successful. At Cadiz, a French fleet of five sail 
of the line and three frigates, was compelled, after a lengthened 
cannonade, to surrender at discretion. Two expeditions, simul- 
taneously undertaken — one under General Dupont, for the pur- 
pose of securing the obedience of Andalusia ; another under 
Marshal Moncey, designed to establish the new government in 
Valencia — were defeated ; the latter with a loss of a large pro- 
portion, the former at the expense of the whole body of troops 
engaged in it. As these were among the most brilliant services 
performed by the Spaniards during the whole of the war, and as 
they operated powerfully upon its results in other quarters, and 
in after campaigns, it may not be amiss to give a brief and con- 
nected sketch, both of the one and the other. 

Nothing had as yet occurred to attract the attention of the 
conquerors, beyond the murmurs and complaints which resounded 
from one end of Spain to the other, when General Dupont, at 
the head of 6000 infantry of the line, 500 marines of the 
imperial guard, two Swiss regiments in the service of Spain, 
about 3000 cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, all well 
appointed and equipped, set out from Toledo, where, for a month 
back he had established his head-quarters. He was directed to 
rally under his standard as many Spanish troops as he should 



1808.] ASSAULT AND PILLAGE OF CORDOVA. 43 

chance to meet by the way ; and he was to be joined at Seville 
by a brigade of 3000 men detached from the army of Portugal. 
General Dupont knew of no reason why he should entertain a 
doubt of the final success of his enterprise; he was ignorant 
that he was about to enter a country everywhere hostile to him ; 
he therefore moved on without much circumspection, and had 
no scruple about encumbering his columns with a long train of 
waggons and cars. 

Dupont traversed the plains of La Mancha, and reached 
Andujar on the second day; and here the spirited resolutions of the 
Junta of Seville were made known to him ; he was also given 
to understand that his entrance into Cordova would be disputed 
by the whole male population of the province. 

Startled, but not intimidated by this intelligence, Dupon 
proceeded, causing the soldiers to march with greater circum- 
spection, and covering his front and flanks with skirmishers. 
He crossed the Guadalquivir without opposition ; but as he 
approached Alcolia, the point where it was necessary to cross 
again, he found it occupied in force by the Spaniards. A levy 
en masse had been raised, of which the command was intrusted to 
Don Pedro Agostino de Echeverria, lieutenant- colonel, and presi- 
dent of the military council of Cordova, for the suppression of 
crime in the Sierra Morena ; and, supported by 3000 or 4000 
soldiers of the line, it was now prepared to dispute with Dupont's 
army the passage of the river ; but after a short engagement it 
was routed and dispersed. 

Dupont lost no time in following up the success which he had 
obtained. He reached Cordova that night; and, finding the 
gates shut, and preparations apparently making for defence, he 
gave orders that it should be carried by assault. These orders 
were promptly obeyed. One round from the artillery sufficed to 
burst the gates, and the troops rushing in pell-mell, swept the 
streets with a fire of musketry. This was, perhaps, one of the 
most cruel acts of violence committed during the war ; for the 
people offered no resistance, only a few random shots having 
been fired from the windows. But it was deemed prudent, in the 
present condition of affairs, to excite, as far as might be, the 
terror of the Spaniards ; and on this principle Cordova was given 
up to pillage. 



44 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

Though he had so far succeeded in his undertaking, Dupont 
was by no means disposed to consider his present situation as an 
enviable one. Bands of armed peasantry soon began to gather 
together, till they hemmed him in on every side ; and such was 
their audacity, that it became impossible for individuals or even 
small parties to stray to any distance from the camp, without 
running the risk of being killed or taken. On endeavouring 
likewise to open a correspondence with Madrid, he found that all 
means of communication between himself and that city were cut 
off. It is true that his patrols of cavalry, though pushed as far 
as Carlota, on the road to Seville, encountered no enemy ; but 
rumours of numerous masses being in motion, of the advance of 
one corps from the camp of San Roche, of another from Grenada, 
and of a third already forming at Ecija, taught him that one 
such victory as that of Alcolia, was not sufficient to secure the 
submission of a large and populous province. Under these 
circumstances he determined to give up all idea of further con- 
quests, and establish himself at some point which should enable 
him to re- open his communication with his rear, and place 
him in a situation to renew at his own pleasure, offensive 
operations. 

With this view he evacuated Cordova at an early hour on the 
morning of the 16th of June, and reached Andujar, without 
molestation, on the 19th. His next measure was to attempt the 
dispersion of a band of armed peasants, who had assembled at 
Jaen ; and who, more than any others, pressed upon his out- 
posts, and harrassed his foragers. The troops employed upon 
that service found no great difficulty in accomplishing it ; for the 
insurgents were poorly organized, and gave way as soon as 
attacked; but the conquerors went further than their chief 
intended them to go, in punishing what they chose to designate 
rebellion. General Dupont was desirous that the town of Jaen 
should pay dearly for its patriotism ; but he was still more 
-desirous that it should be left uninjured as a place of shelter for 
himself. The victorious detachment, however, committed the 
most horrible excesses, wantonly destroying every morsel of food 
and every cask of wine, which ought to have gone towards the 
sustenance of themselves and their comrades. 

By these movements Dupont so far bettered his condition that 



1808.] ASSEMBLING OF THE SPANISH ARMY. 45 

he was enabled to receive a strong reinforcement under Generals 
Videl and Gobert, and to a certain extent, re-open his commu- 
nications with the capital ; but he was still, as far as ever, from 
being safe. The rumours which had alarmed him whilst at 
Cordova were repeated, with even greater semblance of truth 
till he reached Andujar. It was soon ascertained that levies were 
assembling in every direction around him ; and that, unless the 
passes of the Sierra Morena were occupied in force, he would be 
separated from every corps of French troops in the Peninsula. 
To occupy these passes, however, by detachments from his own 
army, was a measure upon which he w r as afraid to venture — he 
considered himself barely strong enough to maintain his present 
position — to divide his strength would be ruinous — and he 
despatched message after message to Madrid, entreating that he 
might not be abandoned, and stating, in the plainest language, 
both the difficulties under which he laboured, and his apprehen- 
sions respecting the result. Of these despatches a few only 
reached the place of their destination, the remainder being inter- 
cepted and carried to the Spanish generals ; and, as an opinion 
widely different from his own prevailed at head- quarters respecting 
the means already at his disposal, no efforts were made to meet 
his wishes. It was, at the same time, broadly hinted to him, that 
to abandon the enterprise on which he had set out, would prove 
extremely mischievous to the cause — and, as a necessary 
consequence, bring down upon him the displeasure of his 
master. 

Dupont had acquired considerable reputation in the wars of 
Italy and Germany, as a general of division ; but he had never 
before acted as commander-in-chief. Though the junction of 
Videl's division increased the strength of his corps to full 16,000 
men, he remained in unaccountable inactivity. Had he moved 
at once either to the front or rear, it is probable he would have 
carried everything before him ; for it was not till towards the 
middle of July that the junta of Seville succeeded in bringing 
together a force capable of opposing him ; but he was unwilling 
to advance before a further reinforcement, for which he had 
applied to Marshal Junot, should have come up ; whilst to retreat, 
would be to incur the censure of which he had been already 
forewarned, and of which he entertained at least an adequate 



46 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

degree of apprehension. He accordingly contented himself with 
the destruction of the bridges over the Guadalquivir, and the 
erection of a redoubt here and there along its banks ; whilst, by 
occupying Baylen in his rear, and keeping a garrison in the tete- 
du-pont at Mengibar, he persuaded himself that his position 
would be amply secured against any attempts which the insurgents 
could make against it.* 

Whilst he was thus wasting time, the Spanish government 
strained every nerve for the purpose of bringing into the field a 
force adequate, both by its numbers and its discipline, to act on 
the offensive. Early in July, about 30,000 men, the greater part 
of whom were old soldiers, moved towards Andujar. They were 
commanded by Castanos, who had been recalled for the purpose 
from the camp at San Roche ; and they numbered among their 
generals of division two of the most distinguished officers in the 
Spanish service, General Reding and the Marquis de la Coupigny. 
Part of this force encountered at Jaen a French brigade under 
General Cassagne, which had proceeded thither as a sort of 
advanced-guard from the main army, and after a sanguinary 
conflict, compelled it to retire. A position was next taken up 
within cannon-shot of Dupont' s lines ; and there a plan was 
entered into, of which the success proved to be even more com- 
plete than the most sanguine could have possibly anticipated. 

It was agreed that Castanos, with one division, should remain 
where he was, to keep the attention of Dupont, as far as might 
be practicable, fixed upon that single point. In the mean while 
General Reding, at the head of 8,000 men, was to force the tete- 
du-pont at Mengibar, to march upon Baylen, and attack the enemy 

* " Along the line of march, and in the town of Andujar, where he arrived 
the evening of the 18th, Dupont found terrible proofs of Spanish ferocity. 
His stragglers had been assassinated, and his hospital taken ; the sick, the 
medical attendants, the couriers, the staff-officers, in fine, all who had the 
misfortune to be weaker than the insurgents, were butchered with circum- 
stances of extraordinary barbarity ; upwards of 400 men had perished in 
this miserable manner since the fight of Alcolia. The fate of Colonel Rene 
was horrible. He had been sent on a mission to Portugal, previous to the 
breaking out of hostilities, and was on his return, travelling in the ordinary 
mode, without arms, attached to no army, engaged in no operations of war ; 
but, being recognised as a Frenchman, he was seized, mutilated, and then 
placed between two planks, and sawed alive." — Napier. 



1808.] REPULSE OF NAPOLEON^ GENERALS. 47 

there ; and lie was to be supported by the Marquis de la Coupigny, 
who, from La Heguerita and Villaneuva, was to straiten the left 
of the French army ; whilst a corps of 2,000 men, under Don 
Juan de la Cruz, was to push for the Sierra Morena, and block 
up every line of retreat in that direction. 

The plan was carried into execution on the 16th of July. 
Reding assaulted and carried the redoubt at Mengibar, crossed the 
Guadalquivir, and drove in the French posts upon Baylen ; but 
finding that Coupigny had not come up, he fell back again after 
dark, and repassed the river. As soon as Baylen was known to be 
in danger, General Videl, with 6,000 men hastened to cover it. 
He arrived there that night, but he found in it neither friend 
nor foe ; because the Spaniards had already executed their retro- 
grade movement, and General Dufour, who on the fall of Gobert 
succeeded to the command of the French, had evacuated the 
place as no longer tenable. Videl was naturally a good deal 
alarmed at this ; and his alarm became greatly increased when it 
was reported to him that the sound of firing had been heard in 
the direction of Sierra Morena. He made up his mind in a 
moment that Dufour had been driven back upon Carolina, and 
that unless he hastened to support him, the retreat upon Madrid 
would be entirely cut off. Under this persuasion he lost no time 
in despatching a messenger to Dupont, informing him of what he 
meant to do, and then proceeded, without allowing his troops a 
moment to rest, in search of Dufour. 

General Videl reached Carolina on the 17th ; and, on the same 
day, Reding and Coupigny having formed their junction, returned 
to Baylen. They took peaceable possession of it, and instantly 
sending to make Castanos aware of their success, desired to be 
instructed as to their future movements. They were ordered to 
march forthwith upon Andujar, against which the united efforts 
of the whole Spanish army were now about to be turned. 

The troops had hardly taken their stations on the morning of 
the 19th, preparatory to this movement, when they found them- 
selves in the presence of the advanced guard of Dupont's corps, 
which was now in full retreat towards the Sierra Morena. The 
arrival of Videl's dispatch had at length opened the eyes of the 
French General to the real perils of his situation. He saw that 
the point from which he had hitherto apprehended an attack, was 



48 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

comparatively speaking, one of slight importance, and that it 
was from the rear that danger was to be apprehended ; and he 
reluctantly determined to abandon Andujar, and to retreat as far 
at least as Carolina, from whence other operations could be 
undertaken, offensively or defensively, as circumstances might 
point out. 

With this design he moved from the town soon after nightfall 
on the 18th ; but as he carried along with him vast multitudes 
of carriages and waggons, his march was necessarily rendered 
both straggling and slow. Though the head of his column 
quitted its ground at ten o'clock, dawn was beginning to appear 
before the last sections had moved off; and when the moment of 
trial came the former were found to be at the distance of nearly 
three leagues from the latter. It was well for the Spaniards 
under Reding, that Dupont had deemed it expedient to bestow 
so much care upon the preservation of his plunder. Had the 
French moved in compact order, so as to bring the whole of their 
force into action at once, their enemies, however brave and reso- 
lute, could hardly have withstood the shock ; for there was no 
great disparity in point of numbers between them, while the 
advantages of discipline and experience were all in favour of the 
French. Regiment after regiment, and gun after gun were 
hurried into fire as they came up ; the French fought as an army 
always fights which is taken in detail ; and one part was utterly 
destroyed before the other could render assistance. 

About three o'clock in the morning of the 19th, the scouts of 
the French army suddenly fell in with the advance of General 
Reding' s corps. By neither party was the meeting anticipated ; 
but both sides made every disposition which their relative situa- 
tion and the exigencies of the moment seemed to require. 
Dupont felt that, unless he made good his passage at once 
through the force opposed to him, his rear would be assailed by 
Castanos ; and he therefore directed the leading division to 
charge the Spaniards, without waiting for the arrival of their 
comrades. The attack was bravely^ made, but it was no less, 
bravely resisted ; and the affair, after a warm and determined 
struggle, ended in the repulse of the assailants on all points. 
Very shortly, fresh troops arrived, including a battalion of the 
marines of the imperial guard, who renewed the contest with the 



1808.] SURRENDER OF DUPONT. 49 

utmost gallantry ; but neither their numbers nor their physical 
strength, worn down by a night march, and still further dimi- 
nished by the rapidity of their advance to the front, were com- 
petent to carry them successfully through. The Spaniards were 
superior to them in every respect, in numbers, in position, and 
in the quantity and weight of their cannon ; and though the 
French performed prodigies of valour, they were foiled in every 
effort. At last it was felt by all the officers present that their 
case was a hopeless one ; and just as Castanos arrived upon their 
rear, and Don Juan de la Cruz took his ground upon their flank, 
it was determined to request a suspension of arms. The request 
was immediately complied with. In spite of the arrival of 
General Videl's corps, which, as soon as the firing was heard, 
had hastened from Carolina to the assistance of their comrades, 
the negotiation continued : it ended in the surrender of the 
whole French army, to the amount of 14,000 men, as prisoners 
of war. 

The entire course of the Spanish campaigns produced no 
victory so decisive, or so influential in its consequences, as this. 
Not only was Andalusia freed from the presence of the enemy, 
but to the patriots in other quarters a degree of confidence was 
communicated, such as they had not previously experienced ; 
and many an individual, who, up to that moment had wavered 
between his duty and his interests, declared for the cause of 
independence. At Madrid, the news of the victory produced a 
powerful effect, as well upon the French as upon the patriot 
party. The latter, who for some time back had dissembled 
their sentiments, began again to give them vent in national cries 
and acts of petty disturbance ; w T hilst the former exhibited the 
liveliest symptoms of alarm, lest the conquerors should follow up 
their success by marching at once upon the capital. At this 
time Joseph Napoleon was resident in the city : he had entered 
it only two days previously, and had scarcely begun to exercise 
the functions of royalty, when the intelligence came upon him 
like a thunderbolt ; and, though conscious of the evils which 
must necessarily attend the step, he determined to retire for the 
present upon his resources. He quitted Madrid on the 31st, 
and, issuing orders that all his scattered divisions should follow 
him — that the siege of Saragoza, then in progress, should be 



50 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

raised — and further attempts upon Valencia abandoned, he fell 
back, with the utmost precipitation, beyond the Ebro. 

In the mean while, the expedition against Valencia was con- 
ducted . by Marshal Moncey under circumstances not very dis- 
similar to those which attended the progress of Dupont's 
operations. When he quitted Madrid on the 4th of June, 
Moncey was aware that his object was not likely to be accom- 
plished without opposition ; and he took his measures, as an able 
officer might be expected to do, when setting out upon an un- 
dertaking of doubtful issue. The force which immediately 
followed his own, amounted to some 8,000 or 9,000 men of all 
arms ; there were in quarters, along his line of march, two 
battalions of Spanish and Walloon guards, and three companies 
of the King's body-guards, whom he ordered to join him ; and he 
requested and obtained a promise, that General Chabran's divi- 
sion, which consisted of 5,000 men, and which was then stationed 
at Barcelona, should be ordered round to Tortosa, and placed at 
his disposal. With such a force, he naturally concluded that any 
resistance which an armed peasantry could offer, would be easily 
overcome ; and, perhaps, had the whole force assembled under 
his standard, these expectations would not have proved ground- 
less. 

On the 11th, Moncey reached Cuenca, where, instead of a 
-strong brigade of Spanish troops, he found only the skeletons of 
a few companies, the rest having deserted to join the cause of 
the insurgents. He was, as might be expected, both alarmed 
and disappointed at the event ; and he wrote instantly to Madrid, 
to request that a column might move from that place upon 
Albacete, in order to cover his right. Not satisfied, with this, 
he despatched an aide-de-camp to General Chabran, to request 
that he would instantly proceed to Castellar de la Plana, that he 
would there take under his orders the corps of General Requena, 
and hurry forward to reinforce him. This done, he halted for 
eight days, not more to collect his own resources than to enable 
his messengers to reach their several points of destination : he 
then renewed his march, which was conducted throughout with 
the utmost caution and circumspection. 

The insurrection at Valencia had been attended by circum- 
stances of fearful cruelty, hundreds of innocent French inhabi- 



1808.] RETREAT OF MONCEY. 51 

tants falling a sacrifice to the fury of the mob. But it was not in 
this case as in most others, that they who exhibit the greatest 
ferocity against people unable to defend themselves, are the first 
to turn their backs upon danger. The Valencians entered 
zealously into the national cause ; insomuch that, not content to 
await the approach of the French, they marched forward to meet 
them. The first encounter took place at the bridge of Pajazo 
over the Cabriel, and it ended, as might have been anticipated, 
in the defeat of the patriots. A second stand was made among 
the mountains, in the gorge of the principal defile between Siete 
Aguas and Venta de Bunol. This position was occupied by 
2,000 regular infantry, 6,000 or 7,000 armed peasants, and twelve 
pieces of cannon. These patriot bands offered a resolute and 
lengthened resistance ; nor was it till after he had a third time 
beaten his enemies in the field, that Marshal Moncey found 
himself in a situation to summon Valencia. But his summons 
was disregarded — the people were determined to bury themselves 
under the ruins of their city, and, consequently, it became neces- 
sary to carry the place by assault. 

Valencia contained, at that time, a population little short of 
100,000 souls. It was surrounded by a low stone wall, well 
tanked by towers and angles, and covered with a ditch, into 
which, from a canal hard by, water could at any moment be ad- 
mitted. There was an arsenal in it, filled with muskets, swords, 
and other weapons ; and there were a considerable number of 
heavy cannon mounted upon the ramparts. The easy rate at 
which Moncey had advanced, enabled the authorities to turn 
these advantages to account ; and when the French appeared, the 
city was in an excellent condition to receive the threatened 
assault. Of all this the enemy were ignorant ; and, expecting 
that no serious opposition would be attempted, they advanced, 
ut three o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th, in close column, 
to attack. 

The Spaniards were now in that situation which they have 
shown themselves best calculated to maintain. Covered by their 
walls, and amply supplied with ammunition, they poured upon 
the assailants an incessant and heavy shower of musket and 
cannon balls, which swept down whole companies of men, and 
disabled the few light pieces which opposed it. The French 

b 2 



52 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

dashed boldly up to the edge of the ditch ; some of them even 
forced their way within the gates ; but the fire was so tremendous, 
and the obstacles thrown in their way so insurmountable, that 
their disciplined valour availed nothing. Having kept their 
ground, under shelter of the houses in the suburbs, till dark, they 
fell back to their camp, leaving behind them upwards of 2,000 
men in killed, wounded, and missing. 

The result of this day's operations was sufficient to convince 
Marshal Moncey that any further attempts, with his present 
force, upon Valencia, would end only in his own destruction. 
He accordingly determined on a retreat; which, after having 
manoeuvred during the 29th so as to keep the Spaniards in 
doubt as to his intentions, on the 30th, he effected. It was high 
time for him to adopt this measure. Several corps, composed 
partly of regular troops, partly of armed peasantry, were forming 
in his rear ; nor was it till he had overthrown some of these, first 
on the banks of the Xucar, and afterwards in the vicinity of 
Almanza, that he made good his entrance into Albacete. 

Not less gratifying to the friends of freedom was the defence 
which, much about the same time, the city of Saragoza offered to 
the attempts of General Le Febvre* ; and had it not been for their 
fatal discomfiture at Medina del Rio Seco, the Spaniards would 
have had no cause to speak with regret of the issues of their first 
campaign. But that defeat was a severe blow to the patriot 
cause; not only because it opened a way to Madrid to the 
sovereign whom Buonaparte had appointed, but because it 
contributed to prevent a British army from appearing in the 
field at a moment and under circumstances which would have 
rendered its appearance peculiarly fortunate. It will be necessary 

* The inhabitants opposed to him the most determined resistance, placing 
beams of timber against the houses, as a defence against the shells, and 
tearing down the awnings from the windows, to form sand-bags. With these 
they constructed batteries, secured by intrenchments, behind the breaches ; 
and gardens and olive-grounds, wherever in the way of the fire of the gun s 
were levelled. Even the younger among the religious took arms, while the 
elder administered the last offices to the dying, or lent their assistance in 
burying the dead. Women, even the young, the tender, and the delicate 
among them, went fearlessly about amid the iron rain of the artillery, carrying 
refreshments to those who were employed at the guns, or fighting, hand 
to hand with the foe, in the open streets.— Ed, 



1808.] SIEGE OF SARAGOZA. 53 

however, before entering at all into the narrative of that battle, to 
give, in a few words, an account of the transactions which, both in 
England and at Bayonne, were taking place, in connection with 
the mighty contest which had commenced. 

The Spaniards had no sooner raised the standard of indepen- 
dence, than they felt the necessity of applying to England for 
aid. The first deputies who arrived for that purpose, were 
despatched by the principality of the Asturias; and they were 
followed by a succession of envoys from other provinces, 
including that of Seville, where the Supreme Junta had 
established itself. Their reception was such as the nature of 
the business on which they came, and the disposition of the 
people to whom they were suitors, might have authorised them to 
expect. All ranks and classes of men appeared eager to evince 
their respect for the representatives of a nation engaged in a 
struggle, sacred, in the eyes of Englishmen, as the object which 
it sought to attain ; and not the government only, but corporate 
bodies and private individuals, made haste to mark the sense 
which they entertained of the gallantry and devotion already 
displayed in the contest. 

Subscriptions were opened in most of the large towns in the 
kingdom, from which considerable sums were realized, and 
applied to the service of the patriots. All the Spanish prisoners 
taken during the late war were set at liberty : and, being armed, 
clothed, and equipped, they were transported to their native 
shores, that they might assist in the great work of liberating 
their country. Nor did the efforts of Great Britain end there. 
Large quantities of muskets, of cannon, balls, powder, and other 
military stores, were conveyed to different ports of the 
Peninsula, for the purpose of arming a population which 
professed to stand in need of arms only to ensure success ; 
whilst the admirals on the station, as well as the Governor of 
Gibraltar, received orders to communicate with the Spanish 
authorities as often as might be needful, and to lend every as- 
sistance which the latter might require, or the former might be 
able to afford. 

The Spanish deputies had assured the British, that Spain 
required no troops from this country, every Spaniard capable 
of wielding a musket being anxious to take the field. Not- 



54 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

withstanding these declarations, the British government was 
too much alive to the important results which hung upon 
the issues of the struggle, to leave the maintenance of 
it altogether to the undisciplined valour of the patriots ; it 
determined to support them with an army of British soldiers, 
and it resolved that the force employed should be such as — 
without alarming Spanish jealousy or wounding pride, might 
constitute an efficient nucleus round which larger armies might 
gather. 

The first British force which showed itself upon the theatre of 
war, consisted of a small division of infantry and artillery, 
detached, under the orders of Major-general Spencer, from 
Gibraltar. 

Although the authorities at home had issued orders for the 
cordial co-operation of the governor of that place, as well as the 
British admirals on the station, in any movements against the 
French forces, neither Admiral Collingwood nor Sir Hew 
Dairy mple had judged it necessary to wait the arrival of these 
orders. From the first commencement of disturbances in the 
province of Seville, a constant intercourse had been kept up with. 
the chiefs and leaders of the Spanish insurgents ; and, as soon as 
the disposition manifested on the part of the people of Cadiz 
became known, an armament was prepared to support it. 
Major-general Spencer, with several English and two Sicilian 
regiments, amounting in all to about 5,000 men, embarked on 
board of a fleet of transports, and, covered by the squadron of 
Lord Gollingwood, set sail for Cadiz. The proposal of these 
officers to assist in the capture of the French fleet was indeed 
declined — the Spaniards being confident in their own resources, 
and perhaps entertaining some apprehension lest the views of the 
allies might extend further than the aid proposed ; but General 
Morla gladly availed himself of the presence of the British corps 
to cover the rear of Castanos's army, and to secure it against any 
attack from the side of Alentejo, whilst prosecuting the plan of 
operations on which it had embarked. General Spencer, accord- 
ingly, landed his division at Ayamonte, on the Guadiana. By 
this movement he caused the reinforcements which Dupont had 
earnestly requested from Junot, and which had already begun 
their march, to fall back with precipitation upon Lisbon ; and, 



1808]. ARMY LANDS IN SPAIN. 55 

though he steadily refused to commit himself with the Spanish 
columns, while gradually enclosing the French troops at Baylen„ 
their councils, nevertheless, derived additional vigour from the 
knowledge that, in case of reverse, there was behind them a point 
on which they could fall back. 

Whilst the naval and military commanders in the Mediter- 
ranean were thus exerting themselves, an effort was made in the 
north, and made with the most complete success, to restore fo» 
the service of his country one of the ablest officers of which Spain* . 
could at that time boast. A corps of 16,000 veteran troops under 
the Marquess de la Romana, had been employed by Buonaparte^. . 
for a time, upon the banks of the Vistula, and afterwards removed 
to the shores of the Great Belt. There they were distributed at 
different points, when the standard of independence was raised ; 
and one of the earliest measures of the Supreme Junta was to 
issue a proclamation, calling upon them in the name of their » 
country, to return to its defence. A scheme for effecting the 
removal of the soldiers was immediately devised in London ; and, 
the execution of it committed to Vice-admiral Keats, an officer, 
well worthy of the trust. It succeeded to admiration, and 7,000. 
men, with Romana at their head, were transferred from the ranks 
of the enemy, and added, at a moment of peculiar interest to those 
of the patriot army.* 

* " As the horses could not be removed, from the inclemency of the 
weather, and without additional means of transport, they were of necessity 
abandoned, and turned loose upon the beach. A scene ensued, such as 
probably was never before witnessed. The Spanish horses are not mutilated, 
and these were sensible that they were no longer under any restraint of 
human power. A general conflict ensued, in which, retaining the discipline 
they had learned, they charged each other in squadrons of ten and twenty 
together; they closely engaged, striking with their fore feet, biting and 
tearing each other with the most ferocious rage, and trampling over those 
which were beaten down, till the shore, in the course of a quarter of an hour, 
was strewn with the dead and disabled. A few which had been disembarked at 
a distance from the scene, on hearing the uproar, came thundering down over 
the intermediate hedges, and catching the contagious madness, plunged into 
the fight with equal fury. It was deemed unsafe to venture to destroy them, 
as in this case would have been a mercy ; and when the last boats quitted 
the beach, the few horses that remained were seen still engaged in the dreadful 
work of mutual destruction." — Southey. 



56 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

It was not, however, by such assistance alone, that the cause 
of Spain and of Europe could be effectually forwarded ; and to 
such assistance the British government was not disposed to limit 
itself. The wisdom, or rather the necessity, under which England 
lay, of striking a great blow, now that the very field of action 
which she had so long desired was opened to her, could not escape 
the penetration of the most obtuse-minded; and preparations 
were made for carrying on hostilities by land, on a scale which had 
never before been attempted since the commencement of the war. 

In the early part of the summer, and before there had arisen any 
expectation of the events which afterwards occurred, a corps of 
9,000 men had assembled at Cork, under the orders of Lieutenant- 
general Sir Arthur Wellesley. Of General Wellesley' s earlier 
services, and the reputation he had already earned, it is not neces- 
sary in this place to take notice. It is sufficient to observe that 
there was not an officer in the army, to whom both the profession 
and the nation at large would more readily have entrusted the 
command of a force which required courage and ability in its 
direction ; that his past conduct, both in Europe and in India, 
justified all classes in the opinion which they had formed, while 
his selection immortalized the judgment of the minister who laid 
his name before the King for the command. With what view the 
corps in question began to concentrate itself, was not accurately 
known. By some, an attack upon Cuba was spoken of as in 
meditation ; by others, a fresh attempt upon Buenos Ayres was 
represented as more probable ; but, whatever might be the object 
which had originally led to the armament, it was instantly 
abandoned. General Wellesley was directed to proceed, without 
delay, to the assistance of England's new ally ; and, as the northern r 
provinces held out the greatest facilities for a British force to act 
with effect, the port of Corunna was the place selected from 
which to commence operations. 

Meantime, Napoleon was following up, with all the vigour 
of mind which so peculiarly distinguished him, the first steps 
which he had taken towards the establishment of a prince of 
his own blood upon the throne of Spain. The abdication o 
Charles IV., and the resignation of their rights by his family, were 
speedily proclaimed to the world ; and it was further announced 
that the emperor anxious to ensure the glory and integrity of the 



1808.] JOSEPH BUONAPARTE PROCLAIMED. 57 

Spanish monarchy, had waived his own pretensions in favour of 
Joseph, King of Naples. But Napoleon was desirous, not only 
that his brother should reign, but that he should have the appear- 
ance of reigning over a free and contented people ; and the Cortes 
were, in consequence, invited to assemble, to frame a constitution 
which should ensure to the Spaniards the blessing of just laws 
and their equitable administration. 

The proceedings of the body, which, under the appellation of an 
Assembly of Notables, met in obedience to the summons of Buona- 
parte, do not here require notice. We shall only state that, 
towards the end of May, and during the first days of June, there 
arrived in Bayonne upwards of ninety persons, all that could be 
collected out of one hundred and sixty who had been deputed ; 
that they were, with few exceptions, men distinguished for their 
rank, their talents, or for the stake which they held in the country; 
and that, after many sittings and deliberations, they accepted 
Joseph as their sovereign, and drew up the charter which was to 
form the basis of his government. This done, Joseph was pro- 
claimed King of Spain and of the Indies, in due form. He nomi- 
nated his ministers, appointing to office those upon whose fidelity 
he might depend, as well as many whom he trusted, by this show 
of clemency and consideration, to gain over to his party ; and, on 
the 10th of July, surrounded by the members of his council, he 
passed the Bidassoa. 

When Joseph commenced his journey towards Madrid, the 
armies, of Bessieres on the one hand, and of Cuesta and Blake on 
the other, were executing that series of movements which ended 
in the disastrous battle of Medina del Rico Seco. For some time 
previously, the northern provinces of Spain had been the scene of 
numerous skirmishes, and in the course of these, many enormities 
were committed on both sides. As often as a few stragglers from 
the French army fell into the hands of the peasantry, they were 
put to death, with circumstances of peculiar cruelty ; whilst the 
French failed not to avenge these excesses, by giving up to plunder 
every town or village which ventured to oppose their progress. 
On the latter principle, because a few hundred half-armed men 
presumed to defend it, Logrono was severely visited — Torquemada 
destroyed — and Palencia escaped a similar fate only by the haste 
of its dignitaries in giving in their submission. The focus of the 



58 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

insurrection, however, was known to be at Valladolid, a city 
which contained upwards of 25,000 inhabitants ; and against it 
Bessieres, whose head- quarters were established at Burgos, gave 
orders that an expedition should be undertaken. 

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, an old, brave, but headstrong officer, 
commanded, at this time, an assemblage of undisciplined peasantry, 
with whom he determined to make a stand in defence of Val- 
ladolid. He was one of those who, at the commencement of the 
troubles, exerted himself to allay them ; probably because he was 
satisfied that successful resistance was impracticable. As soon, 
however, as he became satisfied that it was the nation which had 
risen in arms, he hastened to make amends for his former back- 
wardness, and entered heartily into a cause which he now regarded 
as that of his country. It is somewhat remarkable, that 
Cuesta w T as among the number of those who held office equally 
under Ferdinand and Joseph. By the former he had been ap- 
pointed captain- general of Castile and Leon, an authority which 
he actually exercised ; whilst, by the latter, he was nominated to 
the vice-royalty of Mexico, at the very moment when his better 
judgment led him to draw the sword against the power which de- 
sired to promote him. 

General Cuesta, with his half- armed rabble, took up a position 
at Cabezon, about two leagues from Valladolid. He was attacked 
there, on the 12th of June, by two divisions of the French army, one 
under General Lassalle, the other under General Merle; and, after a 
short but warm contest, was dislodged and overthrown, with the loss 
of all his cannon, and nearly 1,000 men. The immediate conse- 
quences of this victory were, not only the submission of Valladolid 
to the conquerors, but the occupation of Santander ; the latter being 
a place of which they were peculiarly jealous, because of its excellent, 
harbour. But Cuesta, though defeated, was far from being dis- 
couraged. He withdrew, with the remains of his force, to Bene- 
vente ; where he employed himself in raising new levies, and in 
giving some appearance of organization to those which were 
already enrolled under his standard. 

It was not long before intelligence reached Bessieres, not only 
that Cuesta' s troops were re-assembling, but that a considerable 
army which had been formed under Blake, in the province of 
Gallicia, was about to advance against him. Bessieres issued 



1808.] ARRIVAL OF SIR A. WELLESLEY. 59 

orders for the concentration of all his forces at Palencia, with the 
exception of three battalions, which were left to protect Santan- 
der, and a like number at Vittoria, to keep open the communica- 
tion with France. He himself, likewise, prepared to take the 
field ; and, having learned that Cuesta and Blake were actually 
in conjunction, and that they had taken up a position at Medina 
del Rio Seco, he set out, on the 13th of July, for the purpose of 
bringing them to action.* 

The battle of Medina del Rio Seco was fought on the 14th of 
July. It ended, as the reader knows, in the utter rout of the 
Spaniards ; the victory, however, was not won, till all the 
energies of the conquerors had been brought into play, and 
a heavy loss sustained, in killed and wounded, on both sides. 
The Spaniards appear, even by the confession of their enemies* 
to have fought well on that day ; and their defeat may be attri- 
buted rather to a want of judgment in their leaders than to any 
absence of courage among the troops. Yet were the issues of 
the struggle of the most disastrous nature. Fifteen pieces of 
cannon, and upwards of 6,000 men, were left upon the field; 
whilst the road, as far as the capital, was completely laid open to 
the invaders. But even these, though heavy calamities, were not 
all which may be traced back to the defeat at Rio Seco. It was 
at this unlucky moment that the British army, destined ta 
support the patriot cause, set sail from the harbour of Cork ; and 
its General reached Corunna only in time to be told that there 
was no longer a field for its operations in the north of Spain. 

The army collected at Cork, having completed its arrangements, 
put to sea on the 12th of July. After continuing with the fleet a 
few hours, Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had embarked in a fast- 
sailing frigate, hastened to Corunna, arriving on the 20th. He 

* " The two Generals disagreed in opinion ; Blake dreaded the discipline 
of the French, and would therefore have avoided a general action ; Cuesta 
relied upon the courage of his countrymen, and was eager to engage. He 
took the command, as being superior in rank, and they proceeded, in no good 
understanding with each other, in a direction which threatened Burgos. 
Nothing could have been more comformable to the wishes of the enemy ; and 
Marshal Bessieres, in the expectation of sure victory, marched against them 
with the divisions of Generals Monton and Merle, and General Lasalle's 
division of cavalry." — Southey. 



60 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

lost no time in opening a correspondence with the Junta of 
Galicia. A debarkation somewhere in Portugal was recom- 
mended, and, as the advice accorded perfectly with the tenor of his 
instructions, and with his own views, Sir Arthur prepared to adopt 
it. Having supplied the Galicians with £200,000 in money, 
and assured them of a speedy arrival of a supply of military 
stores, he once more put to sea, and, directing his own fleet to 
follow him thither, sailed for the harbour of Oporto. 

Portugal had preserved an ominous tranquillity, but the storm 
was about to burst, jit was not, however, till the whole of 
Spain was in arms, nor, indeed, till the Spanish troops which 
ccompanied Junot's army had set them the example, that the 
Portuguese ventured to raise the standard of revolt ; but, when it 
was raised, the same spirit of perseverance — the same determina- 
tion to live or die free, appeared everywhere to animate the peo- 
ple of Lusitania. 

Junot persisted in representing — perhaps in believing — that 
the Portuguese were brought completely into subjection, till the 
delusion was suddenly dispelled. In the month of June, two 
detachments, consisting of four thousand men each, were 
demanded from the army of Portugal ; one to support Bessieres, 
by the occupation of Ciudad Rodrigo ; the other to co-operate 
with Dupont in taking possession of Andalusia. The first of 
these, under Loison, having advanced as far as Rodrigo, finding 
the whole country in arms, and the gates of the place shut, 
suspended its operations, and fell back ; the second, under Avril, 
was not more fortunate in its operations. Badajoz had declared 
for King Ferdinand ; the whole of the frontier was in arms ; and 
the Spaniards and Portuguese, of whom a considerable number 
were attached to his division, deserted by whole companies. 
Besides, General Spencer, with his 5,000 English, lay between 
him and the point which he had been ordered to reach — and Avril 
abandoned his enterprise. But such misfortunes were trifling 
when compared to others which followed shortly afterwards. 

No great while elapsed before the agents of the Supreme Junta 
found means to communicate, both to the Spanish corps which, 
under Quesnel, occupied Oporto, and to Caraffa's division in 
Lisbon, the course which events had taken, both at Bayonne and 
at Madrid. The intelligence was received by the troops with the 



1808,] REVOLT OF PORTUGAL. 61 

utmost indignation. In Oporto, they rose at once upon the 
General ; arrested him, with his staff and his escort ; and, having 
given up the city into the hands of the municipal authorities, 
marched to join their countrymen in Galicia. In Lisbon they 
were only prevented from adopting a similar course by the 
promptitude and decision of Junot. Instantly on the news from 
Oporto being communicated to him,he caused the whole of Caraffa's 
corps to be arrested and disarmed ; and, putting them on board 
hulks which lay at anchor in the Tagus, he kept them prisoners. 
But the impetus to a general revolt was given ; the match was 
already put to the train, and no exertions on the part of the French 
functionaries could hinder the explosion. 

On the impulse of the moment, the authorities at Oporto 
threw Quesnel into prison, tore down the French flag, and hoisted 
the national standard in its place. By degrees, however, they 
became alarmed at the boldness of their own proceedings ; and, 
seeing themselves deserted by the Spaniards, began to devise 
schemes for averting the vengeance of the French General. Don 
Luiz d'Oliveira, into whose hands the temporary power had been 
entrusted, betrayed that trust so far as to write, in terms un- 
worthy of a Portuguese, to Junot, and to restore the tri-coloured 
flag to its former position ; whilst he endeavoured, by various 
acts of kindness towards the French, to make amends for the 
violence which they had suffered a few days previously. But in 
other quarters, a spirit had gone abroad which soon renewed, in the 
inhabitants of Oporto, that hatred of their oppressors of which 
they had already given proof ; and the cry of " Death to the 
French — Long live the Regent I" resounded through the streets. 
These cries were speedily followed by a second declaration of 
independence. Oliveira was put to death ; and, a junta having 
formed itself, in imitation of that of Seville, proceeded with the 
venerable Bishop at its head, to issue proclamations, and to call 
upon all to unite against the common enemy. 

The appeal of the Junta was heard throughout the kingdom : 
and it was everywhere responded to. The students at the 
University of Coimbra were among the first to take arms; the 
peasantry of Tras os Montes were equally alert ; Algarve was in 
open revolt, and the Alentejo ripe for insurrection. Junot 
marked the crisis, and endeavoured to avert it. 



62 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. iv. 

His first act was to remit what had not been paid of the 
contribution imposed upon the people. He next affected to take 
the Portuguese troops under his especial care, augmenting their 
pay, discharging their arrears, and pretending to place the utmost 
reliance upon their fidelity and valour. He did his best also, to 
■amuse the inhabitants of Lisbon, by a renewal of processions and 
religious festivals to which they had in former times been accus- 
tomed.* If Junot on one hand conciliated, on the other he 
coerced ; and disaffected districts were subjected to military 
visitations. Loison, who had returned to Lisbon, was despatched 
against Oporto, at the head of three battalions of infantry and 
several squadrons of horse ;| Thomieres, directed to reduce Fort 
Nazareth ; and Kellerman sent to insure the obedience of Villa 
Franca, Alcoentre, and Alcobaca. These are but a few of the 
expeditions which the Duke of Abrantes found it necessary to fit 
out, of which some were attended with success, whilst others, 
failed. But even the successes of the French proved of no solid 
utility to them. As long as an armed force was at hand, a town, 
a village, or even a district, would remain quiet, — the very 
instant after the troops were withdrawn, all again became tumult 

* One of the most splendid of the Portuguese ceremonials, was the pro- 
cession of the Corpe de Deos ; and, with but one interruption, it had been 
annually continued since 1387 ; an image of St. George, in full armour, 
suitably mounted and attended, being a prominent character in the display. 
Junot, however, dispensed with the saint's attendance, and very sacrilegiously 
appropriated his charger for another use. One of the finest horses which 
could be found in Portugal, was selected to bear the saint in the great 
procession, and reserved for that single purpose, as if any other would have 
desecrated it. Junot, however, had taken St. George's horse for himself, and 
rode it every Sunday when he reviewed his troops. — Ed. 

f " Loison promised the Archbishop that his property should not be 
touched. After this promise, Loison himself, with some of his officers, 
entered the Archbishop's library, which was one of the finest in Portugal ; 
they took down all the books, in the hope of discovering valuables behind 
them ; they broke off the gold and silver clasps from the magnificent bindings 
of the rarest part of the collection ; and, in their disappointment at finding so 
little plunder, tore in pieces a whole pile of manuscripts. They took every 
gold and silver coin from his cabinet of medals, and every jewel and bit of the 
precious metals with which the relics were adorned, or which decorated 
anything in his oratory. Loison was even seen in noon-day to take the 
Archbishop's episcopal ring from his table, and pocket it." — Southey. 



1808.] SIR A. WELLESLEY AT OPORTO. 63 

and commotion. Junot saw and felt his embarrassments, and 
the moment which promised to bring these difficulties to a head 
was rapidly approaching, Rumours were in circulation of the 
coming of a British army, and at last it was officially communi- 
cated that a British army had actually landed. 



CHAPTER V. 



Arrival of Sir Arthur Wellesley at Oporto — Conference with the Junta — The 
transports assemble off Mondego, and the troops are landed — Strange 
conduct of General Freire and the Portuguese army — Junot takes mea- 
sures to oppose the progress of the English, and collects his detachments— 
Delaborde retires before Sir Arthur Wellesley — Battle of Rolica— Arrival 
of General Anstruther — March of the British army to Yimiero — Sir Harry 
Burrard arrives — Is visited by General Wellesley ; hut refuses to sanction 
an advance — The British attacked by Junot's army— Battle of Vimiero 

Sir Arthur Wellesley, as soon as he had closed his corre- 
spondence with the Junta of Galicia, and directed the transports 
to rendezvous at the mouth of the Mondego, proceeded in person 
to Oporto, for the purpose of arranging some plan of campaign 
with the government of that place, or, as it then termed itself, the 
Supreme Junta of Portugal. He was received by the bishop, as 
head of the body, with every appearance of cordiality ; and the 
supplies of which he stood in need, including draught cattle, were 
xeadily promised him ; but when he proposed to effect a landing, 
and to co-operate with the garrison in a movement on the 
capital, numerous objections were started to the measure. It was 
suggested that, by landing on some part of the coast, nearer to 
Lisbon, Junot might be attacked before his detachments could be 
called in ; whilst, in case he should move upon Galicia, the Portu- 
guese in Oporto would intercept his retreat. How far Sir Arthur 
was swayed by this reasoning, it would be presuming to pro- 
nounce : a communication from Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, it is 
believed, determined him to seek a point of landing elsewhere ; 
and he followed his transports to the appointed place of meeting 
in Mondego Bay. 



64 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. v. 

On his arrival there, he found that important despatches from 
England were awaiting his arrival. By these, he was informed 
that fresh troops might be expected to join his army every moment; 
one division being already embarked at Ramsgate, under Briga- 
dier-General Anstruther, whilst another was assembling at 
Harwich ; but it was at the same time intimated to him, that 
Sir Hew Dalrymple had received orders to proceed from Gibraltar 
as Commander-in-chief ; that Sir Harry Burrard was nominated as 
second in command, and that Sir John Moore, who had just returned 
from the Baltic with a corps of 10,000 men, was likewise to serve in 
Portugal. In spite of these arrangements however, Sir Arthur 
was enjoined to make good his landing whenever a favourable 
opportunity should offer, and to enter at once upon any series of 
operations, for the successful accomplishment of which he might 
judge himself sufficiently strong. 

In obedience to these instructions, and having conferred with 
Sir Charles Cotton, General Wellesley issued orders for the imme- 
diate disembarkation of his corps at the mouth of the Mondego.* 
A fast- sailing vessel was at the same time despatched, to require 
the immediate junction of General Spencer and his division ; and, 
every arrangement having been made, the landing began. A strong 
west wind and a violent surf rendered this both a tedious and a 
perilous operation, several boats being swamped, and some men, 
both sailors and soldiers, perished among the breakers. After 
four days of severe fatigue, the force — including the division of 
General Spencer, which arrived just as the last division began to 
leave their transports, was disembarked, and the whole British 
army, amounting to rather more than 13,000 men, bivouacked, on 
the 8th of August, on the beach. 

* " I have this day commenced my disembarkation in the river of 
Mondego, because I was apprehensive that any further delay might lead to 
discourage the country, and because I shall experience greater difficulties in 
making the arrangements for the movement and supply of the army when it 
shall be on the shore, than while it shall continue afloat. The landing is 
attended with some difficulties even here, and would be quite impossible if we 
had not the cordial assistance of the country, notwithstanding the zeal and 
abilities of the officers of the navy; and, in all probability, General Spencer 
and the reinforcements from England will arrive before the troops at present 
here shall be on shore : if either should arrive, I propose to continue my 
march. ' ' — Wellington despatch . 



1808.] LANDING IN PORTUGAL. 65 

Whilst the British force was thus employed, General Bernardin 
Freire arrived at Coimbra, with about 7,000 infantry and 600 
cavalry of the Portuguese army, for the purpose of joining and 
co-operating with Sir Arthur Wellesley. These troops, for the 
most part, were wretchedly armed, and their discipline had 
attained to no higher degree of excellence, than usually attends 
raw levies suddenly called out, and as suddenly embodied. They 
were not likely, therefore, to add much to the strength, whilst 
they would draw heavily upon the supplies of the invaders. 
Nevertheless, as it was advisable, upon political grounds, that the 
Portuguese should accompany the English in their present under- 
taking, it was arranged between the Generals, that both corps 
should move in the direction of the capital, and that they should 
form a junction on the 11th or 12th, at the town of Leira. 

In accordance with this arrangement, the advanced -guard of 
Sir Arthur's army began its march on the 9th of August. It 
consisted of some companies of riflemen of the 60th and 95th 
regiments, supported by the brigades of Major-general Hill and 
Major-general Ferguson ; and it was followed on the day after by 
the whole corps. The men marched with sixty rounds of ammu- 
nition, and meat and biscuit sufficient for the consumption of 
three days ; while the column was followed by a string of mules, 
bearing stores of every kind. No troops ever took the field in 
higher spirits, or in a state of more perfect discipline. Con- 
fident in their leader, likewise, and no less confident in themselves, 
they desired nothing more ardently than to behold their enemy ; 
for even thus early in the war, it was the custom of a British 
soldier to admit of no apprehensions as to the issue of a battle. 
The entire strength of the corps was barely 13,000 men— 'its 
cavalry consisted of 200 of the 20th Light Dragoons — the 
artillery, numbering eighteen pieces. 

The troops reached Leira, without having met any opposition, 
and were received by the inhabitants with enthusiasm. On the 
same day, General Freire's corps made its appearance ; but the 
General himself exhibited an abated zeal. He began by 
doubting whether it would be practicable to find supplies for 
both armies on the same line of march ; and he ended by 
requiring, as the price of his adherence to the British standard, 
that Sir Arthur Wellesley should subsist him and his troops from 

v 



66 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. v. 

the stores of the English commissariat. This was a demand 
with which the English General could not, of course, comply. 
He represented that his army, fresh from a voyage, and liable to 
be separated at any moment from its ships, instead of being able 
to furnish provisions to the troops of the country, would, in all 
probability, be compelled to draw upon the country for its own 
supplies ; and expressed his astonishment that any such expect- 
ation should have been formed. The discussion was maintained 
for some time, with much forbearance on the side of Sir Arthur 
Wellesley and obstinacy on that of Freire, and it ended at 
length in the latter declaring his determination to withdraw 
himself entirely from all share in the intended operations. With 
some difficulty he was prevailed upon to leave a brigade of infantry 
and 250 horse.* 

Sir Arthur, although mortified at the conduct of his ally, 
determined to lose no time in prosecuting the undertaking which 
he had begun. From all apprehensions on the side of Spain, the 
intelligence of the victory of Baylen had completely freed him ; 
and he still hoped, notwithstanding the well-known activity of the 
French Generals, that he might be enabled to engage Junot, 
before Loison should have had time to join him. Under this 
persuasion, he renewed his march on the 13th, on the 14th 
reached Alcobaca, the enemy having evacuated it during the 
preceding night, and on the loth his head-quarters were esta- 
blished at Caldas. 

It has been already said that, at the moment when intelligence 
of the landing of the British army reached Junot, his troops were 
scattered over many districts of Portugal. Among other generals, 
Loison and Thomieres, each with a division, had departed from 
Lisbon — the former to observe Alentejo, and relieve Elvas, 
already blockaded by the Spaniards; the latter, to overawe 
Coimbra, and reduce Fort Nazareth. Of these, Thomieres was 
instantly recalled; and his brigade being added to that of 
Delaborde, the latter officer was directed to advance towards 
Mondego, that he might watch the movements of the English, 

. * Freire could not but perceive that a refusal of all assistance to Sir Arthur, 
would be tantamount to a complete desertion of the cause ; he, therefore, on 
the 15th, sent a small detachment of 1400 infantry, and 260 horse, to join the 
British forces. — Ed. 



1808]. MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES. 67 

and, as far as he was able, retard their progress. General Loison 
was likewise called in, but, though he made every possible exer- 
tion, leaving behind him the sick and weary, he failed in joining 
Delaborde in sufficient time to prove serviceable ; for Delaborde, 
in obedience to the orders of his chief, had marched already at 
the head of 6,000 men towards the coast. As the English 
advanced, he gradually fell back, manifesting, however, no disin- 
clination to risk an action, whenever the nature of the ground 
should authorize it ; and it was not long before that opportunity 
was presented. It was the rear-guard of his column which 
retired from Caldas on the evening preceding the day of Sir 
Arthur Wellesley's arrival ; and on the following morning the 
two armies were in sight of one another for the first time.* 

A trifling skirmish had occurred at Obidos on the 15th, 
between four companies of British riflemen and the French 
outposts, in which some lives were lost on both sides, and no 
decided advantage obtained on either. On the 16th, all was 
quiet ; Sir Arthur devoting that day to the arrangement of his 
plans, and to the institution of strict and accurate inquiries as 
to the situation of Loison. He likewise reconnoitered the position 
which Delaborde had taken, and found it to be one of extraor- 
dinary strength and difficulty ; indeed, its selection reflected high 
credit upon the military talents of that officer. 

The villages of Caldas and Rolica are built north and south 
from each other, at the opposite extremities of an immense valley, 
which opens out largely towards the west ; and midway between 
them stands the little town of Obidos, with its splendid aqueduct 
and Moorish castle. Rolica itself crowns an eminence, which 
again is flanked on the one hand by a range of hills, on the other 
by rugged mountains. Immediately in front of it, there is a 
sandy plain, not woody, but studded with firs and shrubs ; and in 
its rear are four or five passes, leading through the mountains. 
This was the situation in which Delaborde awaited the approach 

* " The little town stands boldly out upon an insulated height ; and its old 
castle, the work of the Moors, stamps it with antiquity. Between Obidos and 
Caldas, the country is tolerably level, but interspersed here and there with 
open pine-woods. Laborde. having a much stronger position in his rear, 
retired on the 14th. to Rolica, leaving strong pickets to occupy Obidos and 
the windmill at Brilos, three miles in front." — Life of Wellington. 



68 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. V. 

of the English army. His outposts, driven in from Obidos, 
extended along the plain to the hills on both sides of the valley ; 
and his line was formed on the high ground in front of the 
village, so as that its flanks might rest, the one upon the moun- 
tains, the other upon a steep eminence. Of his force it is not 
easy to speak with confidence, but by Sir Arthur Wellesley it 
was computed at 6,000 men ; and there is no reason to believe 
that his judgment was formed on mistaken grounds. Be this, 
however, as it may, there it stood, presenting a bold front to 
its enemies, and covering the passes by which, in case of a 
reverse, its retreat might at any moment be made good, or a new 
position taken in the mountains. 

Every necessary order having been issued, the troops on the 
following morning stood to arms ; and as day began to dawn, 
marched from the bivouac in three columns of attack. The right 
column, which consisted of 1,200 Portuguese infantry, and fifty 
Portuguese horse, was directed to make a considerable detour, 
and to penetrate into the mountains, for the purpose of turning 
the enemy's left ; it was then to wheel up, and bear down upon 
the rear of Delaborde. The left column, consisting of two 
brigades of British infantry — those of Major-general Ferguson 
and Brigadier- general Bowes ; three companies of riflemen, a 
brigade of light artillery, twenty British and twenty Portuguese 
horse, received orders to ascend the hills at Obidos, drive in 
the enemy's posts on that side of the valley, and turn his right at 
Rolica. It was at the same time directed to watch the motions 
of General Loison, of whose arrival at Rio Major, on the 
preceding night, intelligence had been obtained : and in case 
he should come up, engage him before he should have had an 
opportunity of communicating with Delaborde. The centre 
column, which was composed of four brigades, Major-general 
Hill's, Brigadier -general Craufurd's, Brigadier-general Nightin- 
gale's, and Brigadier- general Fane's, together with 400 Portu- 
guese light infantry, the remainder of the British and Portu- 
guese cavalry, a brigade of nine and a brigade of six-pounders, 
were directed to attack the enemy in front. 

As the distance between Caldas and Rolica falls not short 
of three leagues, the morning was considerably advanced before 
the troops arrived within musket-shot of the French outposts. 



1808.] BATTLE OF ROLICA. 69 

Nothing could exceed the orderly and gallant style in which they 
traversed the intervening space. The day chanced to be remark- 
ably fine, and the scenery through which the columns passed 
was varied and striking ; but they were themselves by far the 
most striking feature in the panorama. Wherever any broken 
piece of ground or other natural obstacle came in the way, the 
head of the column, having passed it, paused till the rear had 
recovered its order, and resumed its station ; and then the whole 
pressed forward, with the same attention to distances which is 
usually preserved at a review. At last, however, the enemy's 
line became visible, and in a few minutes afterwards, the skir- 
mishers became engaged. The centre division now broke into 
columns of battalions ; that on the left pressing on rapidly, 
whilst the riflemen on the right drove in the tirailleurs who were 
opposed to them. At this moment, General Ferguson's column 
was seen descending the hills, in a direction to cut off the 
enemy's retreat — but Delaborde was not so incautious as to 
permit it. The posts which covered his position on the plain being 
carried, he withdrew his troops, with great celerity, into the 
passes. It was evident, indeed, that to these gorges in the 
hills, he had all along looked, as furnishing him with advan- 
tageous battle-ground ; for he instantly assumed a new position, 
presenting a front formidable as ever, because it was better 
protected by the inequalities of the ground. 

Under these circumstances, it became necessary, in some 
degree, to alter the plan of attack. Five columns were formed : 
and to each was committed the task of carrying a pass ; but as 
the ground was peculiarly difficult, and the openings extremely 
narrow, no more than five British battalions, a few companies of 
British light infantry, and the brigade of Portuguese, could be 
brought into action. 

The Portuguese infantry moved on the right, through the 
pass next that, upon the right, through which the light companies 
of Hill's brigade, supported by the 5th regiment, were ordered to 
penetrate. The forcing the third pass was entrusted to the 9th 
and 29th regiments ; the fourth to the 45th ; and the fifth 
to the 82nd. These passes were difficult and defensible. They 
were not only overhung by rocks and groves, affording excellent 
cover to the French light troops ; but, as the troops advanced, 



70 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, v, 

they came upon spaces rough with myrtles and shrubs, which 
unavoidably deranged their order. This was particularly the 
case in that pass which the 29th and 9th regiments had been 
directed to carry ; and the enemy were not remiss in making 
the most of their advantages. Having permitted the column to 
approach almost unmolested, till the leading companies w T ere 
within a few yards of the myrtle grove, the French opened 
suddenly a fire, both from the front and flanks, which nothing but 
the most determined bravery could have resisted. As may be 
imagined, the advance of the column was for a moment checked ; 
but it was only for a moment. Colonel Lake, who led the 
attack, waving his hat, called on the men to follow, and they 
cheered and dashed on. But the enemy, full of confidence in 
themselves and their position, disputed every inch of ground ; nor 
was it till after a considerable loss had been sustained, including 
the gallant officer who had conducted them to victory, that the 
29th succeeded in crowning the plateau. 

They were not yet in line, and the 9th still entangled in the pass, 
when a French battalion advanced boldly to charge. The enemy 
were met with the same spirit which they exhibited themselves,, 
and the slaughter was great on both sides ; but the charge was 
repulsed. It was renewed in a few minutes afterwards, and in 
increased numbers ; for the columns which were ascending the 
other passes being far in the rear, the French were enabled to 
bring a great mass of their force to bear upon this point. But 
the gallant 9th were at hand to aid their comrades ; and the 
enemy were again driven back with slaughter. Nor was an 
opportunity afforded them of repeating their efforts ; for the 
heads of different columns began to show themselves, and the 
position was carried at all points. The enemy accordingly drew 
off his troops, and began to retire in excellent order. Several 
efforts were made to harass him as he fell back, as well by the 
light infantry as by the cavalry ; but his superiority in the 
latter arm, as well as the nature of the country, rendered these 
of little avail. He made good his retreat, leaving behind him 
three pieces of cannon, and about a thousand men, in killed, 
wounded, and missing.* 

* Such was the aspect of affairs, when the order to " halt" was given by a 
British General, and the beaten and flying enemy were thus saved from utter 



1808.] ARRIVAL OF SIR H. BURRARD. 71 

Sir Arthur Wellesley, having followed the enemy as far as 
Villa Verde, on the road to Torres Vedras, halted for the night. 
On the following morning the pursuit was about to be renewed, 
and it seemed as if no check w T ould be given to the ardour of the 
troops till they should have won a second victory, and established 
themselves in Lisbon, when the arrival of a messenger at head- 
quarters caused a suspension of orders already issued. This 
person was the bearer of despatches from Brigadier General 
Anstruther, who, with a large fleet of store-ships, and a re- 
inforcement of troops, was now at anchor off the town of 
Penniche. As it was no doubt a matter of the first importance 
to bring these reinforcements into the line without delay, Sir 
Arthur resolved to move in such a direction as would at once 
ensure their landing, and facilitate a ready junction. With this 
view he directed the head of his column towards Lourinho, which 
place he reached that evening, and on the following day took up 
a position near the village of Vimiero. 

The point at which General Anstruther's brigade was directed 
to land, was the sandy beach at the mouth of the Maceira. 
There, the disembarkation accordingly took place, but amidst 
difficulties of no ordinary nature ; for the surf ran tremendously 
high ; and flying bodies of the enemy's cavalry hovered about, 
as if with the design of cutting off each detachment as it 
touched the shore. The skill and perseverance of the seamen, 
however, triumphed over the former of these dangers : one or 
two boats only being swamped, and half-a-dozen lives lost. The 
whole were got on shore at any early hour on the 20th ; and noon 
had barely passed, when they joined General Spencer's brigade. 

On the very day which saw this division join his army, it was 
announced to Sir Arthur Wellesley that General Aucland was 
in the offing ; and before dark, Sir Harry Burrard arrived in 
Maceira Roads. Sir Arthur lost no time in opening a commu- 
nication with that officer. He went on board the frigate in 
which he was embarked, the same night, laid before him a state- 
ment of affairs as they then stood, and entered into a minute 

destruction. The French rallied, re-formed their scattered forces with 
astonishing celerity, and effected an orderly retreat, re-uniting themselves 
with the shattered masses of their own troops that had previously been 
discomfited and put to the rout. — Ed. 



72 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. v. 

detail of the plans which he had formed, and was prepared to 
carry into effect. He represented to Sir Harry the wisdom of 
resuming the offensive, whilst the British troops were yet flushed 
with recent victory, and the enemy distracted and disheartened ; 
and he proposed to move on the following morning, occupy 
Mafra, and turn the position which he understood the French 
had taken up on the heights of Torres Vedras. Sir Harry, un- 
happily, was not of the school who follow a successful blow by 
bold and rapid operations. The Fabian system then predomi- 
nated with British generals ; and the questions with these im- 
becile commanders was, was there any apology for holding back ? 
and not, were there reasons for pushing on ? Sir Harry found 
pleas enough. He urged, in the first place, that since Sir John 
Moore's corps might be expected on the coast in the course of 
a few days at the furthest, it would be more prudent to remain 
quietly where they were till it should have actually arrived ; in 
the next place, that the army was sadly in want of cavalry, and 
that the horses which dragged the guns were represented as 
being of the worst description. Then again there was the risk 
of losing their supplies, in case they should diverge far from the 
shipping. In vain Sir Arthur, in reply, pointed out the im- 
possibility of remaining quiet ; for that, if they did not advance to 
attack the enemy, the enemy would advance to attack them. It 
was in vain that he represented the great advantages which must 
arise, were Sir John Moore's corps to land in the Mondego, 
march upon Santarem, and cut off the enemy's retreat by Al- 
meida and Elvas. Sir Harry Burrard's mind was made up — he 
would sanction no rash movement with a force as yet incom- 
plete : and, as the senior officer, his will could not be disputed. 
Sir Arthur returned to the camp that night ; and the next day 
gave proof that he had not erred in his anticipations. 

Whilst Delaborde was executing the orders he had received, 
in watching and retarding the progress of the English, Junot 
was straining every nerve to bring into the field a force capable 
of sustaining an action with the British army. With this view, 
the garrisons of Lisbon and the forts in its neighbourhood, were 
drained of every man who was worthy of being withdrawn ; and 
the corps of Loison, Thomieres, and Kellerman, and latterly of 
Delaborde himself, received orders to concentrate without delay, 



1808.] POSITION OF TORRES VEDRAS. 73 

in the position of Torres Vedras. On the 18th and 19th, and 
on the 20th, this was effected. One corps was given to Dela- 
borde, another to Loison, whilst Kellerman took charge of the 
reserve, composed entirely of grenadiers. These arrangements 
being complete, Junot advanced towards Vimiero, where he had 
heard that the British army was encamped. 

The village of Vimiero stands in the midst of a beautiful valley, 
through which the Maceira flows, at the distance of about three 
miles, or something less, from the sea. On either side, the hills 
rise to a considerable altitude, particularly towards the north, 
where a chain of detached heights rears itself, with striking 
abruptness, out of the plain. Over the ridges of these runs the 
high-road, through the hamlets of Fontanel and Ventoza, to 
Lourinho ; and on the eastern side is a deep ravine, at the 
bottom of which stands the village of Toledo. On the north-east 
of Vimiero again, there is a sort of table-land, in part covered 
with shrubs and in part bare, which commands all the ap- 
proaches from the side of Torres Vedras ; and which is itself 
commanded towards the west, by a mass of mountains that 
occupy the whole space between the left bank of the Maceira 
and the sea. Such was the nature of the ground upon which 
the British army bivouacked. 

The greater part of the infantry, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 
4th, 5th, and 8th brigades, with eight pieces of artillery, were 
posted upon the mass of mountains just described ; on the south- 
eastern hill, or table-land, Brigadier-general Fane and Brigadier- 
general Anstruther took their stations; the former with his rifle- 
men and the 50th regiment, the latter with his whole brigade ; 
supported by two-half brigades of nine-pounders and sixes, which 
had been sent up during the night. The high road to Lourinho 
however, and the heights which it crosses, were occupied only by 
a picket, because, no water being in the neighbourhood, Sir Arthur 
intended to quit the ground at sunrise. The village itself was, 
however, fully occupied ; the reserve of artillery and cavalry being 
stationed there. 

Junot quitted the position at Torres Vedras soon after night- 
fall on the 20th; and, having executed a tedious and difficult 
march, through narrow defiles, arrived, about seven o'clock, within 
a league and a half of the British outposts. The ground which 



74 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. v. 

he occupied was, however, completely hidden from the view of the 
English, and he was enabled to form his columns of attack 
unseen; nor was it till a considerable mass of cavalry had 
deployed immediately in front of the picket which observed the 
Lourinho road, that Sir Arthur Wellesley anticipated an action. 
But Sir Arthur, who was never taken by surprise, perceived in a 
moment that the principal attack would be directed where he had 
most cause to apprehend it, and where his line was unquestionably 
the weakest : and he ordered the brigades of Generals Ferguson, 
Nightingale, Aucland, and Bowes successively to cross the ravine, 
and hence, long before the first shot had been fired at the out- 
posts, his left was secure. 

The enemy came on in two columns, supported and flanked by 
skirmishers ; the right, which consisted of about 6000 men, 
moving by the Lourinho road ; the left, about 5000, directing its 
efforts against the table-land. The first onset of both was, as 
that of French troops always is, extremely impetuous ; insomuch 
that on the left of the table land, the skirmishers were fairly 
driven in, and the head of the advancing column presented itself, 
almost without a check, in front of the 50th regiment. The 50th 
— drawn up in line — permitted the enemy to approach till 
scarcely twenty yards divided them ; and then, pouring in a well- 
directed volley, prepared to charge. The enemy stood for a 
moment, as if determined to await the shock ; but the bayonets of 
the British corps were hardly crossed when they began to waver ; 
and, before the rush was made, they broke and fled. Almost at 
the same instant, the 2nd battalion of the 43rd found itself 
vigorously attacked in the town of Vimiero by the lesser column, 
which flanked the greater. The 43rd, having thrown part of its 
body into the church-yard, while part filled the houses, and covered 
the road which led to it, firmly met and repelled every effort 
which was made to dislodge it. A similar result attended the 
attack which took place upon the extreme left of the British line, 
which was conducted, with conspicuous gallantry, by General 
Delaborde. It was repelled with immense slaughter, chiefly by 
the exertions of the 97th and 52nd. 

Meanwhile, a smart contest was going on among the hills 
on the British right, in the direction of the Lourinho road. The 
enemy forced their way in this quarter, as they had done upon 



1808.] BATTLE OF VIMIERO. 75 

the other flank, through the body of skirmishers which covered 
the British line ; nor did they pause until they beheld the 36th, 
the 40th, and 71st* regiments inclose array before them. Their 
line likewise was formed in a moment; and several searching 
discharges of musketry were exchanged at a distance which 
hardly allowed a single bullet to miss its mark. At length, the 
82nd and 29th regiments came up to the support of their com- 
rades, and the word w r as given to charge. One cheer, loud, 
regular, and appalling, warned the French of what they had to 
expect ; but the French were men of tried valour, and they stood 
to the last. This was a tremendous onset. The entire front 
rank of the enemy perished — and the men who composed it w T ere 
found, at the close of the action, lying on the very spots where 
each, during its continuance, had stood. Instantly the line lave 
way; and being pursued with great impetuosity, six pieces of 
cannon were captured on the field. An attempt was, ind< ed, 
made to recover these, at a moment when the 71st and 82nd, 
who had halted in the valley, were lying down to rest ; but it was 
made to no purpose. These regiments only fell back to a little 
rising ground, from whence their fire could be given with greater 
effect. It was given — and once more bringing the bayonet into 
play, they carried everything before them. 

The French fought gallantly in this action. They fought like 
men who had been accustomed to conquer, and had not yet 
learned what defeat was. The grenadiers of their reserve, in 
particular, performed prodigies of valour, advancing under a cross 
fire of musketry and cannon, and never giving way till the bayonets 
of the British troops drove them down the descent. But they 
were routed at all points, and that with a slaughter far greater 
than usually occurs to armies of similar magnitude. Out of 12,000 
or 13,000 men whom they brought into the field, 3000 or 4000 
fell; besides a large proportion of prisoners, of whom several were 
officers of rank. On the side of the British, the total loss- 
amounted to 783, in killed, wounded, and missing; among the 

* The Piper of the Grenadier company of the 71st, when knocked down by 
a musket-shot in the thigh, refused to quit the field ; and, sitting on a knap- 
sack, struck up a pibroch, observing : " De'il hae his soul gin the lads wanted 
music." The Highland Society presented Stewart with a beautiful stand of 
pipes, bearing a complimentary inscription. — Ed. 



76 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. v. 

former of whom was Lieutenant- Colonel Taylor, commanding 
the 20th light dragoons. He was shot through the heart whilst 
leading a brilliant charge, in which his detachment, after commit- 
ting havoc among the enemy's infantry, suddenly found itself beset 
by a whole brigade of French. 

The battle had hardly begun, when Sir Harry Burrard, fol- 
lowed by his staff, arrived upon the field. Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, as a matter of course, proposed to resign to him all 
further responsibility ; but Sir Harry possessed too much judg- 
ment not to perceive that the execution of plans could not be left 
in safer hands than in those of the man who had formed them. 
He accordingly declined interfering in any way, till the result of 
the struggle should be known ; and took upon himself the 
direction of future operations only when the defeat of the 
enemy had been ascertained. 

At this critical juncture, Sir Arthur Wellesley represented to 
him, in the strongest terms, that this was the moment for 
advancing ; that whilst part of the army followed up the beaten 
enemy, part should push on by the nearest road to Torres Vedras. 
He pointed out that such a movement must inevitably cut off the 
French from Lisbon, and either place them between two fires, or 
compel them to begin a ruinous retreat, by the route of Alenquer 
and Villa Franca. He reminded him also, that there was 
no deficiency either of ammunition or provisions in the camp ; 
that the British soldiers were in high spirits and discipline ; their 
enemies disheartened, wearied with their late marches, and almost 
disorganized. All these considerations he urged, upon the field, 
with the warmth and earnestness of a successful officer, and the 
clearness and perspicuity for which he is remarkable. But Sir 
Harry was not to be moved from his determination. He had 
made up his mind already not to quit Vimiero till Sir John 
Moore should arrive — and he saw nothing in the events of the 
day, he said, to cause a change of sentiment. The cavalry, he 
observed, were certainly not strengthened, nor the artillery 
horses improved, b)^ the exertions which they had undergone. 
In a word, he was resolved not to act with what he called preci- 
pitation ; and the British troops were accordingly commanded to 
rest upon their arms. What a picture of English generalship ! 
Imbecility even in success — from one who would stay the onward 



1808.] ENGLISH GENERALSHIP. 77 

march of a victorious army, without a single prudential reason to 
bring forward. What might have been expected had that army- 
encountered a reverse, and in an hour of evil fortune been left 
dependant on a leader who wanted head or heart to follow 
conquest on ? 



CHAPTER VI. 



Inactivity of the British army under Burrard— Arrival of Kellerman at 
Vimiero — Sir Hew Dalrymple takes the command, and enters into a 
treaty with Kellerman — Preparations for a renewal of hostilities — Arrival 
of Sir John Moore's corps — The convention of Cintra condemned by both 
Portuguese and Spaniards — Almeida and Elvas given up — The British 
troops enter Lisbon — Joy of the inhabitants — CaranVs corps restored to 
liberty, and re- armed — The French army sails for France, and the Russian 
fleet for England. 

It has been stated, in the preceding chapter, that among the 
variety of motives which induced Sir Harry Burrard, both before 
and after the victory of Vimiero, to check the advance of the 
British army upon Lisbon, one, and certainly not the least 
influential, was the expectation that every day would bring into 
his camp a reinforcement of 10,000 men, under the command of 
Lieutenant-general Sir John Moore. That corps had embarked 
at Portsmouth so early as the 31st of July ; but owing to a con- 
tinuance of baffling and adverse winds, it was the 19th of August 
before it reached Mondego Bay. 

Having learned from some of the coasting vessels that the 
right of the British army was in position at St. Martinho, Sir 
John Moore did me the honour to desire that I* should proceed 
at once to that point, and communicate to Sir Arthur Wellesley, 
or Sir Harry Burrard, or the officer, whoever he might be, 
in command, the fact of his arrival. In obedience to these 
instructions, I set sail in a light frigate, hoping to reach my 
destination on the following day ; but at an early hour on the 

* Lieutenant-General the Marquis of Londonderry. 



78 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, vl 

20th the breeze died away, and the appearance of the sky and the 
state of the atmosphere indicated a continuance of calm weather. 
Under these circumstances I did not consider it prudent to 
remain on board ship ; a boat was therefore manned, which landed 
me, soon after sunset, at the village of St. Nazareth. 

It was not without great difficulty, and the loss of several 
hours, that I here succeeded in procuring a guide, or the means of 
conveyance ; indeed, my journey to head-quarters was partially 
performed on foot. On this account I failed in reaching Vimiero 
till the 24th, three days after the battle had been fought, and the 
campaign was virtually at an end ; for the heads of departments 
were busily occupied in conducting a negociation, the origin and 
ends of which the following brief account will explain. 

Sir Harry Eurrard, in pursuance of his system of procrastina- 
tion, continued inactive in the position of Vimiero, when, at an 
early hour on the 22nd, Sir Hew Dalrymyple arrived from 
Gibraltar to take the command. Sk Hew was of course ignorant, 
as well of the condition of his own army, and the state of the 
country, as of the means and resources of the enemy ; and could 
form no other judgment respecting what line of conduct it 
behoved him to pursue, than that which his predecessors in com- 
mand might happen to suggest. To gain information, time was 
necessary : and before any definite course had been determined 
on, an event occurred which gave a new turn to the transactions. 
In the evening of the same day on which Sir Hew reached the 
camp, a body of cavalry was observed advancing by the road 
which the enemy had taken in their retreat. The pickets instantly 
stood to arms ; but the alarm was at once allayed, when it was 
perceived that the body in question were bearers of a flag of 
truce. They were stopped, as is usual in such cases, at the out- 
posts, a report made at head-quarters, and an officer sent down 
to ascertain their business. They proved to be the escort in 
attendance upon General Kellerman, despatched by Marshal 
Junot to the British camp. He was bearer of proposals for the 
conclusion of a suspension of arms, as the prelude to the evacua- 
tion of Portugal. 

Various rumours prevailed in the camp, as to the reception 
w r hich General Kellerman' s proposition had received. By some 
it was asserted that it gave satisfaction to all ; and that even Sir 



1808.] FLAG OF TRUCE. 79 

Arthur Wellesley, feeling that the moment for action had passed 
away, had offered no objection to the measure. By others his 
opposition to it was represented as having been both strenuous 
and persevering. Be this, however, as it may, Kellerman was 
conducted, with every mark of respect, to the house where Sir 
Hew Dalrymple resided ; and, after a conference of some duration, 
his first request was granted. An armistice of forty-eight hours 
was entered into, as a preliminary to a more important negocia- 
tion. 

With admirable tact, Kellerman dwelt, in every possible form, 
upon the strength of the French army, and the amount of its 
resources. He spoke of his General as determined to accept 
no terms which should not be, to the most minute tittle, honour- 
able to the French arms ; and represented him as prepared, in 
case matters should be driven to an extremity, to bury himself 
under the ruins of Lisbon. This done, he proceeded to lay 
before the British commanders a string of propositions, rather as 
if they had been suggestions from himself, than official communi- 
cations : for he earnestly desired it to be understood, that he had 
no powers to conclude a treaty, and that his present business was 
simply to ascertain the fact, whether any desire to treat existed 
on the part of the English. The conversation had not, however, 
proceeded far, when either his memory, or his regard to consist- 
tency, forsook him ; for he produced a written document, which 
authorized him to act at his own discretion, pledging the honour 
of his Commander-in-Chief to fulfil any agreement into which he 
might be induced to enter. 

It is hardly necessary to repeat here that the evacuation of the 
whole of Portugal, including the forts of Elvas and Almeida, in 
which the French had garrisons, formed the basis of the negocia- 
tion. To this the enemy would consent only on the following 
conditions : — first, that the French army should, on no account, 
be considered as prisoners of war ; secondly, that the troops 
should be transported, with their arms, baggage, and private 
property, to France, and be at liberty to serve again, either in the 
Peninsula or elsewhere, as soon as they should re- assemble ; 
thirdly, that no individual, whether Frenchman, Portuguese, or 
foreigner, in alliance with France, and who chanced to remain in 
Portugal after the departure of the French, should be molested in 



80 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vi. 

any way, on account of the sentiments which he might have 
expressed, or the line of conduct which he might have pursued, 
during the late occupation; and that all such persons, if they 
desired it, should be at liberty to withdraw from Portugal, with 
all their effects, within a year ; fourthly, that the port of Lisbon 
should be recognised as a neutral port, and the Russian fleet 
which lay there treated as enemies' vessels are usually treated, 
when in the harbours of a neutral power ; and lastly, that all the 
horses attached to the French army, as well as those belonging to 
the cavalry and artillery, as those of the staff, should be conveyed 
to France together with the men. 

When the substance of these proposals began to be generally 
understood, and a rumour got afloat that they had been condi- 
tionally agreed to, the indignation of all ranks and classes in the 
army became unbounded. There was not an individual who 
appeared to entertain a doubt that Junot felt his situation to be 
a desperate one ; and that nothing short of such a feeling would 
have tempted him to treat about an evacuation at all ; whilst the 
terms which he sought to obtain, were pronounced to be abso- 
lutely inadmissible. But that which most powerfully stirred 
up the wrath, at least of the junior departments, was the impu- 
dent endeavour, on the part of the French leader, to stipulate for 
the unmolested departure of the Russian fleet. It was seen 
at once, that his object in introducing that article was of a 
twofold nature; — that he wished both to reconcile his own 
master to the disgrace which his arms had suffered ; and to 
conciliate the good-will of the Russian autocrat, whose squadron 
he hoped to preserve ; and it was earnestly trusted, that the 
British Admiral, to whom reference of course must be made, 
would not give his consent to an arrangement so derogatory 
to the dignity of the British flag. Nor was the general discon- 
tent directed altogether against the details of the convention. 
Murmurs might here and there be heard, condemnatory of that 
excess of caution which had checked a victorious army in its 
career ; whilst a thousand wishes were expressed, that the new 
chiefs arrival had been delayed till a campaign so prosperously 
begun, had been brought to a conclusion. 

Whilst one part of the army thus expressed themselves, there 
were others, (few certainly,) who regretting that advantage 



1808.] CONVENTION OF CINTRA. 81 

had not been taken of the victory of the 21st, were nevertheless 
disj:>osed to view the pending arrangement as a prudent one. In 
their eyes it was a matter of the first moment to deliver Portugal from 
the presence of the French troops, even though the troops thus ex- 
pelled should be immediately available elsewhere. These persons 
had no doubt as to the ultimate results of the campaign, were it 
renewed ; but they saw in the loss of time which a recommence- 
ment of hostilities would occasion, evil which success would not 
compensate. Besides, it was by no means impossible that the 
French, in possession of the commanding position of Torres 
Vedras, masters of Lisbon, and having garrisons in Elvas and 
Almeida, might protract the war till reinforcements should reach 
them from Spain; for, though at the present moment their 
prospects there were clouded, none dreamed that the existing 
state of things would be permanent. Winter was at hand ; 
the resources of the country exhausted ; and to obtain supplier 
from home, might not be at all times practicable. Under all 
these circumstances, they gave assent to the terms of the conven- 
tion, with this solitary exception, that they saw no necessity 
to ' treat with the Russian Admiral through the medium of a 
French Marshal. 

Much anxiety prevailed, when, on the 26th, a letter from Sir 
Charles Cotton arrived, in which he declared his disapprobation 
of that article in the treaty, which referred to the neutrality of 
the Tagus, and the treatment of the Russian fleet. No one now 
entertained a doubt of the immediate renewal of hostilities ; and 
the expectation was not diminished, when the troops received 
orders to take their ground in marching order, at an early hour 
next morning. 

It happened that the fleet, which contained Sir John Moore 
and his division, appeared at this critical juncture in the offing. 
Nothing could have occurred more opportunely ; for, though the 
state of the weather was such as to render a disembarkation 
impracticable at the instant, there was little reason, in August, to 
apprehend a continuance of the gale. When the surf moderated, 
the troops would land of course; press forward to Torres 
Vedras, and occupy that important post, from which the enemy 
had withdrawn to a fortified position at Cabeza. In unison with 
this movement, Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the head of his own 

6 



82 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vi. 

corps, was to advance by his left from Ramalhal to Bucellas, to 
turn the heights of Cabeza, and threaten Lisbon, whilst the 
Portuguese army, taking the coast-road, should straiten the 
enemy by the occupation of Mafra. By these arrangements, the 
French either must fight on their strong ground, under the disad- 
vantage of being assailed from three quarters at once ; or 
retire upon Lisbon, be shut up there, and eventually surrender at 
discretion. All, however, must depend upon the decision at 
which Junot might arrive, when he should be made aware of 
the Admiral's determinations ; and, that time might not be 
needlessly wasted, Colonel Murray, assistant quarter- master- 
general, and Captain Dalrymple, military secretary to the Com- 
mander-in-chief, were instantly despatched to lay these determi- 
nations before him. 

The hope which this sudden obstacle to the conclusion of a 
treaty had excited, was briefly ended. Marshal Junot was too 
well acquainted with his own weakness and the strength of his 
enemy, to break off a negociation so favourable to himself, 
because of the rejection of a single article; on the contrary, 
he consented that the two admirals should settle every ques- 
tion relative to the shipping between themselves, and the 
definitive treaty was signed with as little apparent reluctance, as 
if no Russian fleet had lain in the Tagus. Thus, in the short 
space of seventeen days, the campaign was brought to a conclu- 
sion ; and a kingdom, which previously to its commencement lay 
at the feet of a conqueror, was restored to independence. 

The excitement produced by these arrangements had hardly 
begun to subside, when new sources of uneasiness arose, and that 
too, in quarters from which no cause of uneasiness had been 
anticipated. The Portuguese, though they took care to keep as 
much as possible aloof from their allies whilst perilous attempts 
were to be made, no sooner perceived the turn which affairs had 
taken, than they began to interfere. Freire, who, as soon as 
victory declared for the English, had marched his troops towards 
Lisbon, visited Sir Hew Dalrymple on the day after the con- 
clusion of the armistice, and declared his dissatisfaction with every 
article in the treaty. He complained of the disrespect shown 
to the Portuguese nation, as well in the stipulation that persons 
should not be held amenable for their conduct during the recent 



1808.] CAPITULATION. 83 

usurpation, as because no reference whatever was made to the 
junta of Oporto, or to any other legislative body. To this, Sir 
Hew replied, that the convention was in all its parts a military 
treaty, in which no mention was or could be made either of the 
Portuguese or of the British government ; and he further 
reminded Freire, that in point of fact, no government of Portugal 
existed. The junta of Oporto had indeed assumed to itself a 
superiority over other juntas, as it had been, to a certain extent, 
obeyed by the people of Portugal ; but if a legitimate government 
existed anywhere, it must be sought for in the regency which 
the Prince had appointed ; and he took it for granted that 
General Freire would not acknowledge that adulterated as it was 
with Frenchmen and French agents. He nevertheless requested 
that General Freire would commit to writing all the observations 
which he might desire to make on the treaty in question ; and he 
pledged himself that the utmost attention would be paid to them, 
when the terms of the treaty were in execution. 

This difficulty had scarcely been got over, when other and no 
less serious objections to the convention w r ere started by the 
leaders of the Spanish and Portuguese corps, which at this time 
blockaded the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida. Elvas had long 
been kept in a state of irregular investment by bands of armed 
peasants, whose utmost exertions never went further than to 
poison a well or two where the cattle of the garrison were 
accustomed to drink, or to cut off straggling parties, as often as 
they issued from the town. Before Elvas, the Spanish General 
Galluza, provisional commandant of the army of Estremadura, 
had sat down, in ignorance, perhaps, that a treaty w T as going on 
at the moment of its surrender ; but in positive contempt of 
orders from his own superiors, which required him to begin his 
march, without delay, for Castile. The Portuguese, although 
not satisfied with the tone of the convention, were easily per- 
suaded to subdue their feelings ; and Almeida being given up, 
the French garrison was quietly marched, under a British escort, 
to Oporto. It was not so at Elvas. When a British regiment 
which had been appointed to take charge of the works arrived in 
his camp, General Galluza positively refused to permit its passing 
further. He insisted that the Spanish corps under his command 
was entitled to all the privileges of a besieging army ; and he 

g 2 



84 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vi. 

protested that the French garrison should not pass the ditch on 
any other terms than as prisoners of war prepared to lay down 
their arms. Neither Colonel Ross, the Commissioner, nor the 
battalion which attended him, could, of course, compel an 
alteration in Galluza's sentiments ; but advice was instantly 
despatched to Sir Hew Dalrymple. Although at first incensed, 
Sir Hew consented that Colonel Graham should repair to Elvas, 
with full powers to conciliate the Spanish General. The Colonel 
was, moreover, furnished with 10,000 dollars, as a means of 
enforcing his arguments, should they be violently opposed ; and 
as a last resource, he was required to proceed to Madrid, and lay 
before the Spanish government a statement of the case. All this- 
was as it ought to have been ; but Sir Hew's feelings were too 
violently excited to permit him to stop here. Sir John Hope's 
division of infantry, with two squadrons of cavalry, were ordered 
to cross the Tagus. He was directed to move in a menacing 
attitude upon Elvas ; and, in case things came to the worst, to 
compel, by force of arms, an adherence to the terms of the 
treaty. Fortunately for all parties, this species of interference 
was not needed. The Spaniards, convinced by Colonel Graham's- 
weightier arguments, that no good, but much evil, must arise, 
out of a breach of any compact, however rashly or im providently 
entered into, consented to allow the departure of the garrison 
with its arms and baggage ; and the garrison accordingly pro- 
ceeded, as that of Almeida, under a British escort, to its place of 
embarkation. 

It may not be uninteresting here to record the fate which 
ultimately befel these detachments. Wherever they passed, on 
their route from the forts to the place of embarkation, they were 
met with the revilings of an enraged peasantry; nor was it 
without the utmost difficulty that they were preserved from the 
violence with which they were threatened. By great exertions, 
however, on the part of the escort, they were at length conducted 
to the vessels ; but the troops from Almeida, ordered to take 
shipping at Oporto, had not yet weighed anchor, when an acci- 
dent occurred, which had well nigh proved fatal to them. In 
moving a military chest on board one of the transports it fell to 
the ground, and, bursting open, some church- plate rolled out. It 
was now impossible to arrest the fury of the populace. The 



1808.] THE BRITISH IN LISBON. 85 

ships were instantly boarded, the French disarmed, their baggage 
taken on shore, examined, and plundered ; and, when it became 
apparent that, under the head of private property, the pillage of 
the most sacred edifices in the kingdom was about to be conveyed 
away,* the lives of the whole detachment were placed in immi- 
nent danger. At last however, the native authorities, aided by 
such British officers as happened to be at hand, prevailed upon 
the people to abstain from personal violence ; but to talk any 
longer of the safe departure of these detachments, would have 
been useless. They were disarmed, to the number of fourteen 
hundred, and treated as prisoners of war. 

In the mean while, one division of the British army, under the 
command of Lieutenant-general Sir John Hope, moved into 
Lisbon, and took possession of the different barracks and the 
castle. Shouts and blessings greeted them as they passed along ; 
whilst persons of every rank, from the hidalgo tc the beggar, 
vied with each other in protestations of gratitude and affection. 
The windows were filled with females, who showered flowers upon 
the soldiers' heads, and waved their handkerchiefs in token of 
amity ; whilst the men thronged the sides of the streets, and made 
the air ring with their cries, " Long live the English !" " Death 
to the French !" But the most gratifying spectacle of all which 
met them on the present occasion, was exhibited on the following 

* " They had entered Portugal with so little baggage, that even the 
Generals borrowed, or rather demanded, linen from those upon whom they 
were quartered. Soon, however, without having received any supplies from 
home, they were not only splendidly furnished with ornamental apparel, but 
sent to France large remittances in bills, money, and effects, especially in 
cotton, which the chief officers bought up so greedily, that the price was 
trebled by the competition. The emigration had been determined on so 
late, that many rich prizes fell into their hands. Fourteen cart-loads of 
plate, from the patriarchal church, reached the quay, at Belem, too late 
io be received on board. This treasure was conveyed back to the church, 
but the packing-cases bore witness of its intent to emigrate; and when the 
French seized it, they added to their booty a splendid service for the altar of the 
sacrament, which had been wrought by the most celebrated artist in France. 
Junot fitted himself out with the spoils of Queluz, and Loison had shirts 
made of the cambric sheets belonging to the Royal Family, which were found 
at Mafra." — Southey. 



86 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vi. 

morning, when to the Spanish corps, which had hitherto heen 
detained as prisoners in the hulks, not their liberty only, but 
their arms and accoutrements were restored. 

To render the ceremony as imposing as possible, it was deter- 
mined that it should take place in public, and announcements of 
what was about to be done was everywhere circulated. Great 
crowds were accordingly drawn together on the morning appointed, 
when the Spainards, in number about 4000, assembled in a large 
open space called the Campo d'Ourique, and, forming a hollow 
square, with their generals and other officers in the centre, awaited 
the result. They were not long kept in suspense, ere General 
Beresford — to whom the arrangement of the ceremony had been 
intrusted — followed by a large concourse of British officers, made 
his appearance. Instantly Beresford, having passed along the line, 
and saluted first the general, and afterwards the whole corps, pre- 
sented to the former, with great grace and dignity, an elegant sword, 
and in an animated speech requested that the latter would again 
accept their arms from the King of England, never to lay them 
down till the cause of Ferdinand VII., of Europe, and of humanity 
had triumphed. This address, which was forcibly and well 
delivered, had not yet come to a close, when it was drowned in 
the reiterated vivas of soldiers and inhabitants ; whilst the roar of 
cannon, and the braying of trumpets, echoed from one end of 
Lisbon to another. When the tumult had in part subsided, the 
Spanish General hastened to reply. He spoke evidently under 
the influence of strong feeling. He addressed his men in the lan- 
guage of genuine patriotism ; exhorted them never to forget the 
events of this glorious day ; and ended by declaring that, when- 
ever the people of the Peninsula should cease to bear towards 
England the love and reverence which were due from the 
oppressed to their deliverers, they would prove themselves 
unworthy of a better fate than that which, but for English inter- 
ference would have befallen them. Finally, the troops marched past, 
and the business of the morning was concluded by a grand dejeuner cl 
lafourchette, at which the Spanish officers became so intoxicated 
with wine and joy, as to dance waltzes, fandangos, &c. in their 
boots, swords, and complete field-equipment. 

The rejoicings ^having ended, it became a question of consi- 



1808.] LIBERATION OF PRISONERS. 87 

derable moment how these troops were to be disposed of. Desti- 
tute as they were of money, and of almost every article necessary 
to their efficiency, it was quite evident that they could neither 
proceed nor act, unless funds from the British army were 
advanced ; and the Commander-in-Chief entertained serious doubts, 
whether his instructions authorized him to do so. After a good 
deal of discussion, however, he was at length prevailed upon to 
supply them with 20,000 dollars, in addition to a certain number 
of days' pay, and complete their supplies of arms, ammunition, 
and horses ; and then the question as to their ultimate disposal 
was resumed. The first idea on that head was, that it would be 
advisable to march them off in the direction of Badajoz ; because, 
being composed principally of detachments from different regi- 
ments, of which the main bodies were understood to be in the 
neighbourhood of that place, they might be enabled, when there, 
to join their respective battalions. Preparations were accordingly 
begun with this view ; but ere they were completed, two deputies 
arrived from Catalonia, whose representations caused an immediate 
change in the plans. These strongly pressed upon Sir Hew the 
necessity of sending troops of all arms, but more particularly 
cavalry, into their province. They stated that the Catalonian army 
amounted to 40,000 men, which, though miserably supplied, were 
nevertheless able to cope with the enemy among the mountains ; 
but that in the plains and level country, owing to the presence of 
500 or 600 French cavalry, they could not venture to show them- 
selves. Under these circumstances, they besought the British 
General to send round by sea a corps of 1000 horse and 10,000 
foot, the arrival of which would occasion an immediate rising 
throughout the whole province, particularly in Barcelona and 
other large towns, where nothing but the presence of an over- 
whelming force kept the people in subjection to the French yoke. 
The Spanish corps, being absolutely at his disposal, Sir Hew placed 
it in the hands of the Catalonian deputies — and it embarked in 
a few hours afterwards, and set sail for Catalonia. 

All this while, arrangements were busily making for the trans- 
portation of the French troops to their own country. While the 
few garrisons which they had scatterred through the interior, 
received instructions to march upon Oporto, the main body, 



88 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vi. 

including the corps which had occupied the castle of Lisbon, and 
the forts at the mouth of the Tagus, assembled in one camp, and 
made ready to embark. Much discussion, however, and many 
difficulties arose, as to the construction which each party desired 
to put upon those articles in the convention of Cintra, which had 
reference to the private baggage of the army. The Portuguese 
were naturally anxious that the men who had plundered their 
churches, museums, and even their dwellings, should not be per- 
mitted to carry off that plunder under the head of private pro- 
perty ; whilst the French protested against any search being made, 
or any inquiries instituted into the extent of their baggage. It 
was no easy matter for the British General to steer a proper 
course under such circumstances, keeping, as he desired, a strict 
regard to the sacredness of his own promises. On the one hand, 
he felt that whatever might be the words of the treaty, its spirit 
was not such as to sanction the numerous acts of peculation and 
robbery of which the French might have been guilty ; and he 
stated this with great distinctness to Marshal Junot. On the 
other hand, he saw that in many cases of alleged plunder, it would 
be extremely difficult to identify the property said to have been 
stolen. Thus embarrassed, he took the only judicious step which 
it was in his power to take. A committee of inquiry was appointed, 
before which all claims should be brought ; and the quantity 
of goods restored by its decisions to the rightful owners was 
immense. 

At length, the provisioning and storing of the transports being 
completed, the French army began its embarkation. It took 
place in three divisions ; the first being protected by the two 
last, as they again were covered by the British troops ; and 
before the middle of September the whole had cleared the Tagus. 
The Russian fleet likewise, in accordance with the arrangement 
entered into between Sir Charles Cotton and Admiral Siniavin, 
was taken possession of by the British navy ; and the seamen 
being sent back to their own shores, the ships were forthwith 
removed to England. They were conveyed thither, however, 
not as prizes, but as a deposit, the British government engaging 
to restore them within six months after a general pacification. 
It answered every necessary end to render them for the time 



1808.] RECALL OF SIR H. BURRARD. 89 

innocuous ; and, as Russia had already begun to manifest a desire 
to break off her connexion with France, it would not have been 
productive of any additional benefit, had they been absolutely 
transferred to the English service. 



CHAPTER VII. 



Sir Hew Dalrymple is recalled, and Sir Arthur Wellesley returns to England 
— Sir Harry Burrard resigns the command to Sir John Moore — Prepara- 
tions for an advance into Spain — March through Alentejo — Villa Vicosa — 
March to Elvas — Elvas, Badajoz — Difference of character between the 
Spaniards and Portuguese — Colonel Lopez receives despatches from Cas- 
tanos — Merida — Its antiquities — State of agriculture in its vicinity. 

The events which I have endeavoured to record in the last 
chapter were still in progress, when a variety of changes in the 
arrangements of the British army took place, some of which were 
of the greatest moment. In the first place, Sir Hew Dalrymple 
was recalled, and under circumstances which sufficiently implied 
that the country was not satisfied with the result of the two late 
victories. Sir Arthur Wellesley, likewise, to the sincere regret 
of every Englishman in Portugal returned on leave of absence ; 
and his example was followed by many other officers of all ranks. 
The command devolved upon Sir Harry Burrard ; but to what 
use it would be turned, no one appeared to know. All at once 
our preparations and warlike declarations ceased : there was no 
longer the faintest whisper of a movement ; and we gave our- 
selves up entirely to the amusements and dissipation of Lisbon. 

A state of things such as this could not, however, be of long 
continuance. Rumours began to spread themselves, that Sir 
Harry's sojourn with the army would be brief, and that, as soon 
as he saw fit to return to England, an active campaign would be 
opened. These rumours were not raised upon false grounds. 
Sir Harry's constitution was incapable of bearing up against the 
fatigues of active service ; he therefore applied for leave of 
absence, and obtained it ; and the command then devolved upon 



90 ' STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vtl. 

one, whom, next to Sir Arthur Weilesley, the troops most 
respected and loved — Lieutenant- General Sir John Moore. 

It would be no easy matter to describe the satisfaction which 
all appeared to experience when these arrangements became 
known, or the bustle and activity which every department pre- 
sented. An advance into Spain was now openly talked of; 
and everything went to prove that it would commence imme- 
diately. 

We must return to the surrender of Dupont's army, and the 
abandonment of Madrid by Joseph Buonaparte. The latter had 
only played royalty for two brief days, w 7 hen he was obliged to 
retire from the capital. The whole of the detachments scattered 
through the northern and eastern provinces were hastily called 
in. Garrisons were, indeed, thrown into some of the strong- 
holds, sufficient to man the works, while a post was here and 
there established, merely for the purpose of watching the 
Spaniards, and giving notice of their movements ; but the main 
body, amounting in all to about 45,000 or 50,000 men, concen- 
trated in Navarre and Biscay. Here, a position was taken up, 
the right resting upon St. Sebastian, the centre at Vittoria, and 
the left thrown back as far as Pampluna ; and here, they seemed 
disposed to wait the arrival of those reinforcements, which were 
stated to be moving through France. 

Whilst the above was the disposition of the enemy, it was 
understood that there were in arms, in the Asturias and in 
Gallicia, 60,000 Spaniards under Blake and Romana. Two 
large armies were also formed, one, in the immediate front of the 
French, the other upon their left flank ; and at the head of the 
latter was Castanos. The very best spirit was said to prevail in 
all quarters of Spain ; every Spaniard was, or was disposed to be, 
a soldier. It was asserted that, unless haste were made, there 
would be nothing for the English to effect ; since it seemed in 
the highest degree probable, that before they should be able to 
arrive at the scene of action, the French would be driven across 
the Pyrenees. Such were the cheering communications which 
poured upon the British army ; and it was with hopes naturally 
elated to the highest pitch, that it looked forward to the prospect 
of an advance. 

We were not left long in a state of uncertainty. On the 



1808.] SIR JOHN MOORE IN COMMAND. 91 

6th of October, General Moore received an official despatch 
informing him that his Majesty had been graciously pleased 
to intrust him with the chief command of an army, intended 
to co-operate with the forces of Spain, in the expulsion of 
the French from the Peninsula. The army in question was 
to consist of not less than 40,000 men, namely, of 30,000 
infantry, 5000 cavalry, and artillery and engineers in pro- 
portion. Towards making up this force the army in Por- 
tugal was to furnish 20,000 men, including two regiments of 
cavalry, the 18th, and King's German regiment of hussars ; 
whilst a corps of 15,000 men, under Lieutenant-general Sir 
David Baird, was to embark immediately at Falmouth for the 
harbour of Corunna. Sir John Moore was further informed, 
that a scene of action had been already planned out for him in 
the north of Spain, though it was left to his own judgment to 
name a point of rendezvous on this side of it for the assembling 
of his troops. He was likewise expressly enjoined to move the 
cavalry by land ; but his infantry and artillery he might either 
despatch by sea, or march across the country, as should to him- 
self appear most expedient. Finally, he was instructed to pay to 
the feelings and prejudices of his allies every attention : to pre- 
serve the strictest discipline among his men ; and to keep his 
divisions, as far as might be practicable, together, that they 

I might act, at all times, in one body, and as a field army. It was 
added that, from the Spanish authorities and people, he might 
expect the most friendly reception, and the readiest compliance 

! with his wishes ; whilst, in case of any unlooked-for difficulties 
which it might be essential to remove, he was recommended to 
communicate directly both with the government at home, and 
with the English minister resident at the seat of the central 
junta. 

Immediately on the receipt of this communication, Sir John 
Moore proposed to carry out the wishes of his government. 
After mature deliberation, he determined that it would not be 
advisable to move any part of the army by sea, but that the 
whole, infantry and artillery as well as cavalry, should proceed by 
land. As, however, the roads through Portugal were repre- 
sented to be extremely bad, and as no magazines or depots of 
provisions had been established, he resolved to advance, not by 



92 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vii. 

one route, but by three ; and to unite his columns with that of 
Sir David Baird at Salamanca. But to move beyond the frontiers 
of Portugal, unprovided as he was with draft cattle, and having 
no depots of any kind, was impossible. Though, therefore, the 
troops were put in motion so early as the 13th, it was fully 
understood that the campaign would not be opened before 
November ; and even then, from the aspect of things — from the 
inexperience of our own commissariat, and the supineness of the 
Portuguese — it was extremely doubtful whether anything could 
be done to the purpose. 

The hussar brigade, of which I was put in command, received 
instructions to assemble at Villa Vicosa, a town distant twenty- 
eight leagues from Lisbon, and consequently at no great distance 
from the frontier. We began our march for this purpose on the 
18th of October, and, taking it by easy stages, arrived at our 
mustering-place on the 24th. Here the information was commu- 
nicated to us, that whenever the moment of further advance 
should arrive, the whole army was to proceed in four columns ; 
one under the command of General Paget, by Elvas and 
Alcantara; one under Beresford, by Coimbra and Almeida; 
one under Frazer, by Abrantes and Almeida ; and a fourth 
under Hope, by Elvas, Badajoz, Merida, Medellin, Truxillo, 
Almanza, Oropesa, and Talavera de la Reyna, towards Madrid. 
To the latter column, which was to consist chiefly of artillery, 
with four regiments of infantry to escort it, we were attached. 

Though our marches had been short, and neither men nor 
horses seemed at all distressed on their arrival, we had not 
occupied Villa Vicosa two days, when symptoms of dysentery 
began to show themselves amongst us. The weather, too, began 
to break, and the rain came down with such violence, as to 
induce an apprehension that the wet season had actually set in. 
These would not have been very gratifying occurrences at any 
moment ; but at a time like the present they were peculiarly 
distressing. Nothing, however, remained, but to make the best 
of them. To the sick every possible attention was paid; and, as 
the disease proved not very violent, the labours of the medical 
officers were rewarded by their speedy convalescence. Nor did 
the weather continue, as we begun to apprehend it would, 
obstinately unpropitious. After two days of incessant rain, 



1808.] MARCH INTO SPAIN. 93 

the clouds dispersed ; and, by the 3rd of November, every 
appearance in the sky promised a continuance of sunshine and 
drought. 

The whole of Sir John Hope's corps having by this time 
assembled, and every other arrangement being completed, on the 
5th of November we began our march towards Spain. At first, 
neither the aspect of the country, nor the manners of the natives, 
differed materially from those which had met us in our way, for 
we w T ere still a couple of days' march from the frontier, and the 
Portuguese, more than perhaps any other people, carry their own 
peculiar manners to the extremity of their country. 

We halted at Elvas during the night of the 5th — marched 
next morning soon after dawn — and, passing through a plain of 
considerable extent, crossed the Guadiana at Badajoz, the capital 
of Estremadura. This movement introduced us at once into 
Spain ; and the contrast which was instantly presented to us, 
both in personal appearance and in manners, between the people 
of the two nations, I shall not readily forget. Generally speak- 
ing, the natives of frontier districts partake almost as much of the 
character of one nation as of another, and the distinctions between 
them become, as it were, gradually blended, till they totally 
disappear. It is not so on the borders of Spain and Portugal. 
The peasant who cultivates his little field, or tends his flock on 
the right bank of the Guadiana, is, in his habits and notions, a 
different being from him who pursues similar occupations on its 
left bank ; the first is a genuine Portuguese, the last a genuine 
Spaniard. Nor are they more alike to each other in their 
amities than in their manners. They cordially detest one 
another ; insomuch, that their common wrongs and their common 
enmity to the French, were not sufficient, even at this time, to 
eradicate the feeling. 

It was not, however, by the striking diversity of private 
character alone which subsisted between them, that we were 
made sensible, as soon as we had passed the Guadiana, that a 
new nation was before us. The Spaniards received us with a 
degree of indifference to which we had not hitherto been accus- 
tomed. They were certainly not uncivil ; they poured no 
execrations upon us, nor did they hoot or rudely annoy us ; but 
they gave themselves no trouble to evince any satisfaction at our 



94 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vii. 

arrival. Whatever we required they gave us, in return for our 
money ; but as to enthusiasm, or a desire to anticipate our 
wants, there was not the shadow of an appearance of anything of 
the kind about them. How different all this from the poor 
Portuguese, who never failed to rend the air with their vivas, and 
w T ere at all times full of promises and protestations, no matter 
how incapable they might be of fulfiling the one, or authenti- 
cating the other ! The truth is, that the Spaniard is a proud, 
independent and grave personage ; possessing some excellent 
qualities, but quite conscious of their existence, and not unapt to 
overate them. On the present occasion, too, they seemed to be 
more than ordinarily self-important, in consequence of their late 
achievements — were quick to take offence, even where none was 
intended — and not indisposed to provoke, and engage in broils 
with our soldiers. Not that any serious disturbance occurred 
during our stay ; the discipline preserved in our own ranks was 
too good to permit it ; but numberless little incidents were 
continually taking place, which served sufficiently to prove the 
spirit which actuated the natives. Yet with all this, there was 
much about the air and manner of the Spaniards to command 
regard. The Portuguese are a people that require rousing ; they 
are indolent, lazy, and helpless : we may value these our faithful 
allies, and render them useful ; but it is impossible to highly 
respect them. In the Spanish character, on the contrary, there 
is, mixed up with a great deal of haughtiness, a spirit which you 
cannot but admire, even though it leads to an over-weening 
national estimate of character which too frequently remains 
unredeemed when tried. 

From Badajoz the column departed on the 7 th, reached 
Talavera la Real that night ; and on the following day entered 
Merida. Between these two extreme points, the country is 
almost entirely one continued plain : clear, open, and admirably 
adapted for the operations of cavalry. The accommodations 
which we met with on the way were, moreover, such as we had 
no cause to complain of. In the different towns, all persons who 
happened to possess stables, freely threw them open, and took in 
both men and horses in numbers proportioned to the extent of 
their dwellings ; whilst the alcades had men in readiness to 
conduct the soldiers to their quarters, and to collect, at conve- 



1808. ADVANCE UPON MADRID. 95 

nient points, forage, bread, meat, and wine, ready for delivery. 
Everything was done with the most perfect regard to order and 
precision ; and, though the marches were generally severe, varying 
from twenty- eight to thirty English miles a day, still, as the 
horses were well fed upon barley and straw, there appeared no 
reason to apprehend that they would not be brought into the 
field in good condition ; and at Merida, it may with truth be 
asserted, that the Hussars were not less efficient than when they 
first landed at Cascaes. 



CHAPTER VIII. 



Advance towards Madrid — Rumours of Blake's defeat — Arrival at Naval- 
Carnero— Madrid — State of public feeling there — Want of energy in the 
Spanish government ; exhausted treasury and defective armies — Movement 
of Hope's corps upon Salamanca — Fears lest it should be cut off— Over- 
throw of the Spanish armies, of Blake, Belvedere, and Castanos-— French 
corps at Valladolid — Skirmish at Amvola — Rumour of General Baird's 
retreat — Reflections on the conduct of the war. 



Having passed the night in Merida, with very considerable 
comfort to ourselves, w r e prepared to renew our journey on the 
following morning. Previously to our setting out, however, two 
pieces of intelligence reached us, neither of which had any 
tendency to afford us satisfaction. In the first place, we w T ere 
given to understand that, as we proceeded onwards, though we 
should find at least as good, if not a better, disposition among the 
people, the fare and general accommodations furnished, would 
greatly deteriorate. The country was represented as naturally 
more sterile, and its means, scanty at the best, were said to have 
been exhausted during the recent struggle. A report also, got 
into circulation, that Blake had sustained a serious defeat in 
Biscay, and had retreated, no one knew whither, with the loss of 
3000 men. Reinforcements, likewise, to the French army, were 
stated to have arrived ; and their numbers were estimated at 
60,000 infantry, and from 5000 to 7000 cavalry. All this was 
startling enough, but our course was still a simple one ; we had 



96 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. viii. 

only to follow our instructions, and move in the direction of 
Madrid. 

In the expectations which we had been led to form respecting 
the reception that awaited us, we were not disappointed. The 
people, though supine, were civil ; whilst the treatment which we 
received from them, if in some respects less agreeable than that 
which we have hitherto experienced, was still generous. They 
gave us freely whatever they possessed, and we had no right to 
demand more. We accordingly pushed on in good order and 
spirits, and passing through Medellin, Truxillo, Almaraz, Tala- 
vera del Reyna, and St Ollalo, we reached a temporary halting- 
place, in the town of Navalcarnero. As this place was distant 
from Madrid not more than twenty miles, I determined to quit 
the brigade for a couple of days, for the purpose of visiting that 
city ; and it may not, perhaps, prove uninteresting to the reader 
to lay before him a sketch of the condition, military and political, 
in which I found it. 

The first person whom I made it my business to see was Lord 
William Bentinck, at that time official resident in Madrid. I 
found him disconcerted, at the manner in which all things were 
conducted. The Junta, it appeared, did nothing, or rather were 
doing everything which Buonaparte could have desired. There 
was neither energy nor decision in their councils, no money in 
the treasury, stores of every kind were wanting, and anarchy and 
misrule prevailed in every department. Morla was at this time 
secretary to the committee for the management of military 
affairs, and known to be an able, and, as he was then believed, to 
be an honourable man : but the managing committee itself, was 
as ignorant as it was credulous. In its meetings there was 
abundance of cabal and party spirit, but neither talent nor 
information. Of our own situation, Lord William drew no more 
flattering picture. He was himself totally in the dark, and 
he believed that others were equally so, touching the amount and 
situation of the French army ; he knew only that they were 
in great force, and rapidly advancing. 

These were certainly not the most acceptable communications- 
which might have been made, particularly to one who was 
already aware of the sombre temperament of his leader. Sir 
John Moore was a most excellent, but over- cautious man : he 



1808.] STATE OF AFFAIRS. 97 

had set out with the avowed determination of acting only in 
conjunction with the Spanish armies ; and he would not move at 
all, till the whole of his force should be assembled. Now, if 
there could be one truth more self-evident than another, it was 
this, that to look for adequate support from the Spaniards till he 
should have more decidedly entered upon his great enterprise, was 
useless. The question therefore was, would he, when at the 
head of 30,000 British troops, including a brilliant, fresh, and 
most efficient cavalry, abstain from striking a blow ? There was 
too much reason to apprehend that he would : though the army 
appeared to feel that now was the time to strike; or never. It is 
true, that Buonaparte in person was stated to be either at 
Burgos or Vittoria, and that large masses, both of infantry 
and cavalry, were on their march to join him ; but the force 
immediately up was represented as not exceeding that under Sir 
John. Why not then endeavour to bring an action ? 

On the other hand, the Junta appeared to be in a state of the 
most pitiable alarm, lest Madrid should again fall into the hands 
of the enemy. They teazed General Moore with daily requests, 
that, in case of any reverse, he should fall back, not upon 
Portugal, or towards the north, but upon the capital ; and they 
were particularly desirous that General Hope's corps might be 
detached altogether, to assist in the defence of the city. They 
declared their determination to accept of no terms, nor make 
any submission to the invaders. Madrid, they affirmed, should be 
a second Saragoza ; and if any judgment could be formed from 
the display of enthusiasm exhibited by the lower orders, it 
required but a moderate share of ability and good faith on the 
part of their chiefs to realize the boast. 

I have said that the situation of affairs demanded a decisive 
line of conduct from Sir John Moore ; and that, upon every 
principle of warfare, offensive operations should be taken. Upon 
the first line of operations, there were computed to be, of Spanish 
and English troops, 1 1 6,000 infantry, and about 2,700 cavalry. 
There were the remains of Blake's corps at Reynosa, etsimated 
at 20,000 men; General Baird's corps of 12,000, including 
1,400 cavalry, was on its march from Astorga to Benevente ; 
Moore was with 15,000 at Salamanca ; and Hope's division, of 
5,000 men, at the Escurial, and under orders to move upon 

H 



98 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. viii. 

Salamanca. There was only General St. Juan's corps, estimated 
at 20,000 men, occupying the passes of the Somosierra and 
Guadarama ; whilst the armies of Arragon, commanded by 
Palafox, Omel, and Doyle, united with that under Castanos, could 
not amount to less than 40,000. No doubt the latter force was 
separated entirely from any of the former, for its head- quarters 
were said to be at Saragoza, and its right leaned towards the 
Pyrenees. Its position was also critical — for Blake being over- 
thrown, the enemy seemed to be collecting their entire strength, 
to surround and overwhelm Castanos ; yet the probabilities were, 
that a forward movement, executed with promptitude, might 
defeat that design ; and there would be no risk in advancing to 
Valladolid. Nor was this the only circumstance which called for 
decisive measures. The French, though formidable, were not 
equal to the allies in point of numbers ; they had received a rein- 
forcement of 30,000 only ; the odds were therefore on the side of 
the allies. 

Sir John Moore, however, had many disadvantages to contend 
with. His information, like that of the Supreme Junta itself, 
was most defective — upon public and official reports no confi- 
dence whatever could be placed ; and from private sources of 
intelligence he seemed carefully cut off. It was from his own 
officers alone, from Colonel Graham, Captain Whittingham, 
and others, that he received any communications on which he was 
justified in relying; and all these united in representing the 
Spanish armies as not only half- armed, and equipped, but also 
far from imposing in point of numbers. Corps put down by the 
juntas at 20,000 or 30,000 men, proved, when inspected by these 
officers, to muster barely eight or ten ; and of these, perhaps one 
half were unprovided with muskets. Then, of the position of 
the enemy, no one knew anything. That they were concentrating, 
seemed to be generally understood — their object, to overwhelm 
Castanos. Nor was this all. Dissensions and quarrels had 
arisen, both in the juntas and in the armies. Castanos was 
said to be harrassed in his command by the presence of Palafox, 
and on bad terms with those under him. Romana was true and 
able, but he was at a distance, and had his hands full ; whilst 
Sir John Moore's own position, half-way between us and Baird, 
rendered any immediate movement extremely hazardous to the 



1.808.] POSITION OF THE ENEMY. 99 

one flank or the other. That these circumstances carried great 
weight to the mind of our chief, his future proceedings proved. 
But it is now high time to resume the detail of events as they 
occurred. 

The central junta, all this while, was extremely anxious that 
some British troops should be detached from the main army, for 
the purpose of covering Madrid ; and as General Hope's division 
chanced to be nearest at hand, it was strongly urged upon him, 
that were his corps to unite itself to that of General St. Juan, the 
passes of Somosierra and of the Guadarama would be secured. 
General Hope, however, who was now at the Escurial, would not 
listen to any suggestion of the kind. The orders to join his 
superior at Salamanca were abundantly explicit, unless something 
extraordinary came in the way; and General Hope saw nothing 
either in the immediate situation or future prospects of the 
Spanish capital, to lead him to neglect these orders. Having, 
therefore, halted a few days, to collect his stragglers, and close 
up the cavalry, which had marched at some distance from the rear 
of his column, he made preparations for pushing at once upon 
Salamanca. 

On the 27th, the whole division passed the Guadarama moun- 
tains; and the 18th hussars, with the 71st infantry, reached Villa 
Gastrin, on the opposite side of the Sierra. Next day, the rest 
of the infantry, together with three brigades of guns and the 
whole park reached the same point ; whilst the hussars pushed on 
to Adanero, where they took the duty of the outposts. But, 
though our movements had been so far satisfactory, intelligence 
came in that day, which caused uneasiness to General Hope. It 
was in substance as follows : 

Lord Proby, who had been sent forward by Sir John Moore on 
the road to Valladolid, with the view of ascertaining whereabouts 
the enemy were, and how they might appear disposed to act — 
had proceeded as far as Tordesillas, when a patrol of the French 
cavalry entered the town, and with great difficulty he escaped 
being made prisoner. In spite of this interruption, however, he 
so far effected his object as to be able to report that 600 French 
cavalry, with two field- pieces and two howitzers, were actually 
in Tordesillas, and that they were supported by 600 more who 
occupied Valladolid. The former force, he stated, had advanced 

h 2 



100 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vnr. 

their posts as far as Puerto del Douro and Arnajo, and detach- 
ments from both were scouring the country, levying contributions, 
and acting in every respect as if no troops were in the field to 
oppose them. But this was not all the intelligence which his 
dispatch contained. It appeared that the magistrates of the 
towns and villages near, had received requisitions, accompanied by 
proclamations, from Marshal Bessieres, indicating that he was 
on his march from Palencia, at the head of 10,000 men; that 
lie expected to be in Valladolid on the 24th ; and that he 
expected to find rations and forage along the line of march. 

Such information, and coming from such a quarter, produced 
no trifling stir among the principal functionaries of our little 
corps. Whoever will take the trouble to consult the map, may 
see that the distance from Valladolid to Salamanca is not greater 
than from Villa Castine to the latter place ; and hence, supposing 
the two corps to arrive at their several destinations on the same 
day, there was every probability that Bessieres, unencumbered as 
he was with heavy luggage and artillery, would be able to throw 
himself between us and our point of rendezvous. But if such 
were the case on the supposition of arriving simultaneously at 
Valladolid and Villa Castine, the danger of being intercepted was 
increased should the French Marshal have acted up to the 
purport of his manifestos, and entered Valladolid on the 24th. 
Bad, however, as this was, it was not the worst news that met us 
here ; for on the very same night a courier came in with accounts 
of the disastrous battle of Tudela. That the reader may the 
better understand how this misfortune threatened to affect us, 
it will be necessary to draw his attention, for a few moments, 
from the details of our own proceedings, and make him acquainted 
with the operations of the different Spanish corps, upon whose 
efficiency we had calculated all through. 

Previously to our entrance into Spain, we had been given to 
understand that three large armies, one under Blake and Romana, 
another under Castanos, and a third, which kept up the commu- 
nication between these two under the Conde de Belvidere, were 
manoeuvring in the front and on the flanks of the French line, 
and would probably overwhelm it ere we should be able to 
join them. The manoeuvring of the three corps, however, 
proved to be nothing more than a mere retention of their separate 



1808.] BESSIERES' MANIFESTO. 101 

positions, in which they watched the French, without attempting 
anything offensive. In this state things continued till the 
enemy's reinforcements arrived ; and then it was left to them to 
form their own plan, and to choose their own field of operations. 
The first Spanish General who felt the weight of their prowess 
was Blake ; he was attacked in his position in the debouches of 
Villarcayo, Orduna, and Munjuca ; from which, after a spirited 
and obstinate resistance, he retired upon Espinosa. No time, 
however, was granted him for breathing. On the very day 
after his arrival there, he was again assailed by an overwhelming 
force ; and his army, worn out by fatigue, and destitute of 
provisions and clothing, was utterly dispersed.* It fled in all 
directions, — and the magazines at Reynosa, as well as the 
harbour of St. Andero, were both taken possession of by the 
enemy. 

Whilst the operations which led to this victory were going on, 
Buonaparte himself entered Spain, and fixed his head- quarters, on 
the 8th of November, at Vittoria. His first act was to send 
forward a corps, under the orders of Marshal Soult, against 
the Estremaduran army.f The Conde Belvidere, who com- 
manded, — a young man of great bravery, but deficient in military 
talent, took up a defensive position near Burgos, and awaited 
the approach of the enemy. The consequence was, that, attacked 
in an open country by veteran troops, of which a large propor- 
tion was cavalry, he suffered a complete defeat, upwards of 
3000 dead being left on the field, and the rest scattered, 
beyond the possibility of immediate reunion. Thus were two of 
the three armies, summarily disposed of : it remained now only to 
dispose of the third, nor did any great while elapse ere it also 
was made to succumb to discipline and numbers. 

* The rout was most complete, and fatal. The whole of the artillery, the 
baggage, and the ammunition, were lost, and, save some thousands of miserable 
fugitives, whom Blake afterwards got together at Reynosa, the entire Spanish 
army was dispersed, spreading confusion and dismay throughout the neigh- 
bouring provinces. — Ed. 

f The force under the orders of Belvidere was justly regarded as the 
flower of the Spanish armies. It amounted to about 11,000 infantry and 1200 
cavalry, equipped entirely with British arms and accoutrements ; and with 
these were united nearly an equal number of irregulars. — Ed. 



102 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. vm. 

Castanos was at this time posted in the vicinity of Calahorra, 
and had under his orders the united armies of Andalusia and 
Arragon. Of the numbers which composed that army, it is 
impossible to speak with accuracy ; for the records of Spanish 
history are so overrun with exaggeration, that it would be unsafe 
to rely upon them ; but, from every credible rumour, it could not 
exceed 40,000 men ; and of these, perhaps, one half only were 
adequately armed. As soon as Castanos heard of the fate of 
Blake's and Belvidere's armies, he declared his determination to 
retreat, and to avoid, as long as he possibly could, standing the 
issue of a battle. But Castanos was not left to the guidance of 
his own judgment. He was beset by spies from the central 
junta, which, on all occasions, appeared to distrust its generals, 
in exact proportion to their abilities ; and, contrary to his better 
judgment, he fell back from Calahorra upon Tudela, and there 
risked an action. As he had anticipated, his raw army was 
beaten ; and it was with the utmost difficulty that the General 
could keep together, after the defeat, a force sufficient to form the 
nucleus of another. With this, he retreated hastily to Calatayud, 
where his troops endured all the miseries of famine to the utmost. 

It soon became known that the enemy were moving in force 
upon Segovia ; and though Segovia was occupied by a division of 
St. Juan's army, amounting to 6000 men, under General Aradia, 
it was believed that that would prove a trifling impediment. 
The resistance to be offered by Segovia had already been 
measured, by the facility with which St. Juan might be able to 
defend himself in the Somosierra pass. In case he should 
succeed in holding that, then was General Aradia to hold on to the 
last extremity; but if the Somosierra were carried, then was 
Aradia to fall back at once upon the passes of the Guadarama. 
These were the only roads left open for our retreat, in the event 
of our junction with Sir John Moore being cut off by troops 
moving from Valladolid ; and should they be forced, our situation 
would become desperate. Nothing would remain but to throw 
ourselves into Avila ; where, as it was a fortified place, we might 
maintain ourselves, till Sir John Moore should be able to advance 
to our relief. 

When General Hope began his march from the Escurial, he 
intended to proceed by Adanero to Arrivola, and thence to 



1808.] DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS. 103 

Madrigal, Penaranda, Huerto, and onwards to Salamanca. As 
soon, however, as the above intelligence reached him, he pru- 
dently determined to alter his route, and move by a road con- 
siderably to the left, and of course further from the direct line of 
the enemy's probable operations. The cavalry, accordingly, 
received orders to march on the 30th to Fontiveros, and to 
occupy posts for the protection of the column of artillery and 
infantry, which moved, on the same day, to Avila. On the follow- 
ing morning, the march was resumed, and the road to Penaranda 
taken, where the column arrived without molestation on the 2nd 
of December ; but the main body of the cavalry was still kept at 
Fontiveros, whilst its outposts were extended as far as Adanero, 
Arrivola, Villa Nova de Aroud, Madrigal, Royama, and even to 
Penaranda itself. Thus were the rear and the right flanks of the 
division perfectly secured ; and it was rendered quite impracticable 
for the enemy to harass its movements, without sufficient time 
being gained to provide against emergency. 

It is hardly necessary to say, that my own position was with the 
cavalry. While thus employed, I instituted various inquiries as to 
the nature and strength of the French troops which had shown 
themselves in this quarter ; and I heard that the}^ consisted only of 
portions of a partisan corps, detached at a great distance from their 
main body, and intended to effect no other end than merely to 
spread alarm over the country, and distract people's attention. In 
this they had certainly succeeded ; whilst the chief part of their 
force was moving all the while towards their left, with the design, 
after the defeat of Castanos, of overwhelming St. Juan, and taking 
possession of Madrid. How it came about that they made no 
attempt to penetrate between our columns ; whether the possi- 
bility of succeeding in the effort had not occurred to them, or that 
they considered the other an object of much greater importance, 
I had of course no means of ascertaining. But I did ascertain 
that they had not, from the first, made any movement, either 
partially or generally, which could lead to the supposition, that 
such an undertaking had ever entered into their contemplation. 

We had traversed a large portion of Spain, and during the 
last few weeks had been almost constantly in the immediate 
presence of the enemy ; yet, strange to say, we had never ex- 
changed shots. On the 29th, at night, that event occurred for 



104 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. viii. 

the first time. It might be about midnight, when the videttes 
furnished by the picket at Arrivola, gave an alarm that the 
French were coming on. The troopers mounted and made 
ready, and in a few minutes found themselves attacked by a 
strong party of cavalry ; concerning the nature of which, 
whether it were the advanced-guard of a corps, or a mere patrol, 
they were, unavoidably, ignorant. As nothing was to be gained 
by keeping possession of Arrivola, our people, after skirmishing 
for a few minutes, fell back ; but they were not pursued, and 
they halted for the night at a house upon the road side, distant 
about half a mile from the village. At daylight, they once more 
advanced upon Arrivola. The movement was, of course, made 
with extreme caution ; though for caution, as the event proved, 
there was no necessity ; for the enemy had abandoned the place 
several hours before, having taken time merely to plunder the 
post-office. This was the only event which befell us, from the 
hour of our quitting Lisbon, up to the day of our junction with 
the main body of the army at Salamanca. 

During the 3rd of December, no change took place in the 
position of the cavalry ; its main body continuing at Fontiveros, 
whilst its posts were extended along the flank of the column. 
Nothing, therefore, occurred to interest ; for the enemy made no 
movements. Whilst thus situated, every piece of intelligence 
which came in, attracted attention. The rumours which reached 
us were not, however, in themselves uninteresting. 

We were given to understand that Sir David Baird's column, 
which had landed on the 13th of the preceding month, and 
advanced on the road to Salamanca as far as Astorga, had been 
suddenly ordered to fall back again upon Corunna. The intelli- 
gence excited surprise ; nor could we either guess the motives 
which led to such a measure, or see the necessity which com- 
pelled it. Was it that a retreat had been determined upon, in 
order to save Portugal by abandoning Spain ? Or were we to 
take shipping, and, proceeding southwards to Cadiz, to make the 
south instead of the north of Spain the theatre of our operations ? 
And yet this was not the moment for retreating, unless we 
should be driven to it by a force overwhelmingly superior. Our 
business, on the contrary, was to advance ; and the late disasters, 
so far from taking away that necessity, increased it. 



1808.] FIRST SKIRMISH. 105 

To carry on operations, several modes of action were before 
us. Supposing the Somosierra and the Guadarama passes to be 
defensible by St. Juan's army, and that the remains of Castanos's 
troops should have arrived, as they were reported to have done, 
at Siguenza, on the 30th, all immediate apprehension as to the 
fate of Madrid might safely be laid aside. In this case, Moore's 
column would probably endeavour to unite itself with that of Blake, 
either at Leon, or at any other convenient spot in that quarter, 
Baird's corps directing its march upon the same point ; and, as 
Blake was represented to have still 20,000 men under his orders, 
the junction of the two corps would constitute a formidable 
force, either for offensive or defensive operations. Upon this 
centre, the scattered battalions from the other armies might 
rally ; and then an advance upon Valladolid might be under- 
taken, and a campaign opened, upon a grand scale, in combined 
strength. 

In the next place, and still taking it for granted that the passes 
could be maintained, the British army would run but little risk, 
even if unconnected with any Spanish force whatever, in ad- 
vancing from Salamanca, by Alba de Tormes, upon Madrid. 
There was no force between these two points capable of resisting 
it : and the knowledge that it was in motion to the front, would 
call off the attention of the enemy, and give time to the broken 
Spaniards to rally and collect. And lastly, should matters fall 
out in every respect contrarily ; should the passes of the Somo- 
sierra be carried, and all communication between St. Juan's 
army and the army at Siguenza be cut off ; should Blake's corps 
be so completely broken as to be rendered incapable of re- 
assembling, and Portugal remain inactive, — even in the event 
of all these misfortunes, still there were resources. There was 
nothing to prevent St. Juan's and Castanos's troops from retreat- 
ing rapidly on Cuenca or Valencia, and uniting themselves with the 
Catalonians ; or, passing the Sierra Morena, from collecting every- 
thing around them under the walls of Cadiz ; whilst the British 
army might change ground from the north to the south ; whither 
our shipping could convey us from any ports between Corunna 
and Lisbon. At all events, a precipitate retreat, at a moment 
like the present, would be unpopular. The army had suffered no 
disasters ; it had never come in contact with the enemy ; it was 



106 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, viil 

now in the very centre of Spain, and the eyes not of Spain only, 
but of Europe were upon it. What would be the consequence, 
therefore, were it to abandon the capital without striking a blow> 
and quit the field before it met an enemy ? No doubt the game 
was a deep one ; but it was the last which England had to play, 
and, consequently, it should be boldly played. 

A startling event had taken place — one that threw minor 
matters into the back ground. Napoleon himself was in the field, his 
head- quarters being already at Aranda. It was to be regretted that 
Alexander had not detained him somewhat longer at Erfurth ; he 
had appeared upon the stage too soon — but still, even Napoleon 
was not invincible. Even the immediate presence of that dreaded 
chief appears an insufficient apology for a hasty and inglorious 
retreat. Palafox, Blake, and Cuesta, were continually intriguing 
and caballing against one another ; Castanos had been ruined by 
the presence of spies, and Blake sacrificed to a similar interference. 
As to Romana, his place of sojourn was quite unknown, though 
rumours were in circulation, both that he was about to be placed 
at the head of the Spanish armies, and that he might be daily 
expected at Salamanca, to consult with Moore. No doubt these 
were terrible evils ; so terrible, as to bring upon Spain greater 
danger and greater calamities, than she ran the smallest risk of 
incurring from the effects of the enemy. Yet were they not such 
as to authorize our withdrawal from the scene of action, at a time 
when upon our presence the very existence of the country might 
be said to depend. Besides, there was something so galling to 
the mind of a British soldier in the prospect of flight before he 
was beaten, that no one could think of it with patience. All 
seemed indignant at the suggestion ; and it certainly did appear 
strange, that whilst the women of Madrid were labouring night 
and day to put the city in a posture of defence, a British army 
should leave them to their fate without crossing a sabre, or 
expending a single cartridge. 



1808.] SIR JOHN MOORE'S RESOLUTION. 107 



CHAPTER IX. 

Visit to head-quarters — Interview with Sir John Moore — A retreat deter- 
mined upon — General dissatisfaction of the army — Fresh resolution taken, 
and orders issued to advance — Movement upon Tordesillas — Skirmish at 
Rueda — Moore resolves to attack Soult on the Carrion — The army ad- 
vances — Brilliant cavalry affair at Sahagun — Preparations for battle sud- 
denly countermanded. 

Having good reason to believe that the French were moving 
upon Madrid, and that there was no probability of any attack 
being made upon the posts, I set off at an early hour on the 
morning of the 4th, and reached Salamanca about noon on the 
day following. I took this step in consequence of letters which I 
had received from Sir John Moore, on which I was desirous of 
personally consulting him. 

Having waited upon the General, our conversation naturally 
took the turn into which the present situation of affairs, and the 
position of the army, were calculated to guide it. It was then 
that Sir John explicitly stated to me, that he had come to a final 
determination to retreat. He had called the general officers 
together, he added, for the purpose of acquainting them with his 
decision, as well as with the reasons which led to it; but he had 
neither requested their opinions, nor demanded their judgment. 
He next entered, at great length, into the motives which swayed 
him, reasoning, in conversation, as he reasoned in his lettters, with 
a decided leaning to the gloomy side of the picture. He spoke 
warmly in condemnation of the Spanish government, and of the 
nation generally ; and enlarged upon the absence of all right 
understanding among the generals, as well as upon the absurdity 
of their military movements, which had subjected them all to be 
beaten in detail. He expressed his sincere regret that they had 
notmarched, as they ought to have done, when he first began to 
enter the country, so as to unite themselves with him ; and 
declared that, with a force yet uncollected, and having nothing 
but the remains of defeated corps on his flanks, a choice of evils 
alone remained for him. The determination to which he had 
come at last, was not formed without extreme pain to himself: 



108 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ix. 

but the duty of preserving his army, situated as it now was, pre- 
sented to his mind a consideration paramount to every other : he 
was, therefore, resolved to retreat. 

Though I could not but feel deeply mortified on hearing the 
declaration, I deemed it my duty to say nothing more than ex- 
press a regret that a necessity for the measure should exist, and my 
apprehension of its consequences to the cause. The slightest 
indication of a retrogade movement, would, I feared, produce fatal 
effects ; for Spain and Portugal would fall, and Europe be left 
once more at the feet of the enemy. Then, what would become of 
Madrid, whose inhabitants were enduring the severest privations 
chiefly in the hope of receiving aid from us ? And of Castanos, and 
Palafox, and Blake, all of whom, on the same explicit understand- 
ing, were labouring to re-assemble their scattered troops ? No 
doubt, I added, the General's information was more likely to be 
correct than mine ; but I dreaded the heavy disappointment which 
his proposed step would occasion to the people of England, whose 
very hearts seemed set upon the success of his undertaking ; and 
whose mortification at his failure would be bitter, in proportion to 
the degree of hope with which they saw him embark upon it. I 
then retired with the painful conviction on my mind, that the 
army would commence its regressive movement in the course of 
a day or two at the furthest. 

These feelings of regret were general — and even the General's 
personal staff sought not to conceal their chagrin at the adoption 
of a system which seemed so unsatisfactory. General Hope 
having by this time joined, there were at Salamanca and in the 
neighbourhood full 20,000 British troops, in equipment and dis- 
cipline equal to oppose an enemy's force of even superior 
numbers. General Baird, with a strong reinforcement, particu- 
larly in cavalry, was at Astorga ; nor were there any impediments 
whatever in the way, to hinder him from arriving within six days 
at the furthest. But if it should be deemed unsafe to wait so 
long here, why not move towards him, and concentrate the 
divisions behind the Douro ? Anything, was pronounced pre- 
ferable to a retreat, which, independently of the disgrace which 
it would bring upon the British arms, must expose Madrid to 
destruction, and cause the annihilation of Castanos and Palafox. 
Seldom do men, situated as we were, venture to speak out so 



1808.] GENERAL DISCONTENT. 109 

boldly against the measures of their chief. But murmurings and 
remonstrances were useless ; the die was cast, and it could not be 
recalled. 

In the midst of these discussions, news came from the capital, 
intimating that the Spaniards were prepared to bury themselves 
under the ruins of the city, and perish to a man, before the 
French should enter. In the short space of forty-eight hours 
they had unpaved the streets, and loaded the balconies and flat 
roofs of their houses with the stones, to be hurled on the heads 
of the assailants. A huge trench was already drawn round the 
entire circumference of the city ; numerous outworks were begun ; 
and men and women of all ranks and classes were labouring 
incessantly for their completion. Morla had assumed the chief 
command of the place ; and all were united in one enthusiastic 
resolution to conquer or perish. It is needless to add that the 
annunciation of these tidings served but to increase our discontent, 
and all declared that a retreat w T ould be most disgraceful. 

Notwithstanding these murmurs, of which he was not left in 
ignorance, General Moore exhibited no signs of any alteration in 
his previous resolutions. On the contrary, Lord Paget, who had 
been previously commanded to close up from Astorga with the 
whole of the cavalry, received orders not to march ; and it was 
given out that the retrogade movement would commence on the 
day after the morrow. One cavalry regiment only was summoned, 
but it was called in for the avowed purpose of strengthening the 
hussar brigade, and enabling it to cover more effectually the 
retreat of the column. Thus, on the night of the 5th, the troops 
retired to rest, in the belief that those proud hopes with which 
they had entered this country, were ended. 

Having remained during the night in Salamanca, I departed on 
the following morning to the outposts, which had been drawn in, 
and occupied stations in the immediate front of the city. In a 
few hours, and to my inexpressible satisfaction, intelligence was 
communicated to me that the General had altered his plans. Sir 
David Baird, w r ho had actually begun his retrograde movement 
from Astorga, was ordered to retrace his steps ; and an advance, 
instead of a retreat, was understood to be in contemplation. 
Never has a condemned criminal rejoiced more heartily at the 
receipt of a reprieve, than did the British army when these tidings 



110 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ix. 

got abroad among them. But a few hours ago, and every face 
looked blank and woe-begone; men did their duty, indeed — 
attended to their horses and accoutrements — and performed all 
the other offices which their stations required, mechanically — but 
now all was life and activity, and military duties were executed, 
not only without murmur but with apparent satisfaction. 

Intelligence from Madrid, and a despatch from Mr. Frere, 
encreased the general satisfaction. From these it was collected, 
that the inhabitants of the capital had abated nothing in their 
ardour — that the French had made one assault, in which they 
were repulsed — and that, from the temper of the people and 
the zeal of their leaders, it was anticipated that no better success 
would attend fresh efforts. Such were the news from Madrid ; 
whilst Mr. Frere's letter deprecated any movement to the rear. 
Mr. Frere, probably, was justified. As minister from the court of 
England, he was authorized to give advice respecting the course 
to be pursued by the English General, but Sir John Moore having 
repeatedly solicited his opinion, touching the schemes in agitation, 
his right to speak or write became admitted. 

It was on the evening of the 5th, that a courier was despatched 
with directions to General Baird not to continue his movement 
upon Corunna ; and, on the following morning, a second courier 
brought orders for him to counter-march upon Astorga ; and at 
the same time, Colonel Graham was despatched to Madrid, to 
ascertain the real condition of the city. By a circuitous route, 
Colonel Graham proceeded : and upon the results of his mission, 
and the report which he might happen to bring back, the future 
operations of the army generally depended. 

It was easy to perceive marks of that gloom which at this time 
overshadowed the mind of General Moore. That he was an 
officer of distinction, every one acknowledged during life, and 
posterity will not deny it ; but it was manifest that a fear of 
responsibility neutralized his talents and warped his judgment. 
Sir John Moore had earned the highest reputation as a general of 
division. He was aware of this ; and perhaps he felt no inclina- 
tion to risk it — at all events, he was incapable of despising 
partial obstacles in the pursuit of great advantages. In one 
word, he was not a Wellington. Of this no more convincing 
proof need be given, than proves the fact that, even at the 



1808.] RETREAT COUNTERMANDED. Ill 

moment when preparations for an advance were going on, his 
whole heart and soul seemed turned towards the Portuguese 
frontier : and did any one talk to him of the possibility of gaining 
Valladolid, and then, in case of the worst, of retiring into the 
northern provinces and acting on the defensive, he would answer 
by a declaration that in the north there w T ere no supplies ; and 
that it was a country, in every point of view, most unfavourable 
for military operations. 

From this period up to the return of Colonel Graham, only one 
event occurred of sufficient importance to demand narration. A 
courier, who was carrying dispatches from Bayonne, addressed to 
Napoleon at Aranda, having fallen into the hands of the peasantry, 
was sent in to the head-quarters of the army. These dispatches 
of the army of Portugal, as on its march through Bourdeaux, 
under the orders of Junot, were all written in a style of 
humility quite unprecedented. Their purport, however, ac- 
counted for their tone — for they were entreaties that some 
increase of pay might be granted, the writer being badly pro- 
vided for, now that his Portuguese resources had failed him. 

On the 9th of December, Colonel Graham returned from his 
mission. He had taken the route by Talavera, at which place 
he arrived on the 7th, in time to learn the surrender of Madrid, 
and the murder of St. Juan by his mutinous troops ; and, not 
judging it either prudent or necessary to proceed further, he 
retraced his steps. According to his report, though many re- 
verses had been sustained, still something might be done. It 
was true that the enemy were in possession of the Retiro ; but 
the people had refused to lay down their arms, and there was 
little probability that they would be induced to change their 
intentions. There were, therefore, 30,000 French troops thus 
employed. Of the rest, some had proceeded against Saragoza, 
others against Toledo ; some had taken the road to Valencia, 
and some towards Cadiz. All this appeared to Sir John Moore 
as inviting a forward movement on his part. 

The movement commenced on the 12th, from various points. 
On that day Lord Paget, with the principal part of the cavalry, 
marched from Toro — whither he had moved up in the course of 
the week — to Tordesillas ; whilst the hussar brigade, under my 



112 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ix. 

own orders, proceeded from its ground to Arrivola. The divi- 
sions likewise denied from Alba de Tormes, Salamanca, and 
Ludesma — and on the 14th, a new position was taken up> the 
right resting on Tordesillas, the centre at Alayoz, and the left 
at Toro. In order to render it as secure as possible, the whole 
of the cavalry was placed upon the right of the stream — part 
occupying posts on one side of the river, and part upon the 
other. Lord Paget's corps crossed the stream ; whilst that of 
which I was at the head, distributed itself through different 
towns and villages on the Douro. Thus we had completely 
reversed the order in which, but a few days ago, we stood. 
Then our rear was to the Guadarama — that pass being in the 
hands of our friends, and opposed to the enemy — now we were I 
facing the mountain, and expecting the enemy to debouch from 
the places which we had formerly occupied. 

It was the good fortune of a squadron of the 18th hussars 
to come, at this time, into contact with the enemy. There is a 
small town, called Rueda, situated about half-way between Nava 
and Tordesillas, in which a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, 
with some infantry, were quartered. Having caused it to be 
reconnoitred, and finding that the French seemed quite ignorant 
of our proximity, I determined to surprise them, if possible. 
With this intention, a squadron proceeded against them on the 
night of the 12th; and, having made good our entrance un- 
observed, we soon threw them into confusion. The greater 
number were sabred on the spot, many were taken, and only 
a few escaped to inform General Franceschi, who occupied 
Valladolid with a body of 2000 or 3000 horse, that the British 
army had not retreated. 

When he began his movements, it was General Moore's in- 
tention to advance by Valladolid, unite himself with Romana' s 
army, and threaten the communications between Madrid and 
France. With this view he had taken up his position at Tor- 
desillas, and despatched a messenger with a letter to Romana, 
making him acquainted with his plans.* But on the 14th, a 

* Previously to the commencement of active operations, Sir John Moore 
wrote to the Marquis Romana, to induce him to act in concert, and ascertain 



1808.] RETREAT OF ROMANA. 113 

French officer having been intercepted by the peasantry, the 
despatches of which he was the bearer were brought to me ; and, 
seeing that they were of moment, I lost no time in forwarding 
them to head- quarters. An immediate change of plan was the 
consequence. The army was to move to its left, to effect a 
junction with Sir David Baird; and then, in connexion with 
Romana, if possible, attack Marshal Soult, who, at the head of 
16,000 or 18,000 men, was in position about Valencia and 
Saldanha. 

Whilst the columns of infantry were filing off in the direction 
of Toro and Benevente, the cavalry enjoyed several opportunities 
of trying its strength with that of the enemy. In every instance, 
the superiority of British soldiers was asserted ; and in a variety 
of skirmishes we succeeded in making prisoners of a lieu- 
tenant-colonel, a major, upwards of a hundred privates, and sixty 
horses. It was, in truth, a glorious spectacle to see w T ith what 
perfect confidence of success, the smallest patrol of British horse 
would charge bodies, often doubling themselves in number ; and 
it was no less gratifying to find that mere numerical superiority 
in no instance availed the enemy. 

In the mean time, intelligence came in from Romana, that he 
had actually commenced his retreat from Leon, in consequence of 
the arrangements into which Sir John Moore had entered a few 
days previously, for retiring upon Portugal. Sir John blamed 
Romana severely, and despatched another courier, with a letter 
couched in terms even more pressing than any which he had 
employed before, to request that the Spanish General would 
retrace his steps without a moment's delay. In due course, 
Romana's answer arrived ; and it was to the effect, that he would 
co-operate to the utmost of his power, in any enterprise in 
which the British General should embark. 

So far all w r as satisfactory : but the information which we 
derived from our prisoners, touching the amount of French troops 



the amount of the assistance he could render; nothing could be less 
encouraging than the reply. The Marquis stated his actual strength in men 
at 20,000 but admitted that they were wretchedly equipped ; all were without 
havresacks, cartridge-boxes, and shoes ; and at least two-thirds without 
clothing from head to foot. — Ed. 

I 



114 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ix. 

employed in the Peninsula, was not encouraging. From one of 
these (Colonel Arvignac) we learned that there were, or shortly 
would be, opposed to us ten corps d'armee, each consisting of 
two divisions, or nearly 20,000 men : — Ney and Moncey, in the 
neighbourhood of Saragoza ; Le Fevre and Macelliny moving on 
Salamanca ; Bessieres, at Madrid ; Soult and Lassalle, near 
Placencia ; Junot advancing to Burgos ; Gouvion St. Cyr, in the 
direction of Barcelona; Milhaud, in communication with Le 
Fevre ; and Marmont, whose exact province I have forgotten. 
The cavalry attached to this mass he represented as embracing no 
fewer than thirty- six regiments ; and he affirmed that there were 
full 7000 of the imperial guards then quartered in Madrid. How 
far these statements were to be relied upon, it was of course 
impossible to say ; but of one truth no man could be ignorant,— 
namely, that the enemy's force in the country was enormous,* 
and that our only chance of success lay in beating him in detail. 
But was it probable that we should succeed in this ? Still not a 
man in the army desponded, but all felt their spirits rise as the 
prospect of meeting the enemy became more decided. 

With this feeling predominant, every march which brought us 
nearer the position of Marshal Soult was executed, not only 
without a murmur, but with good- will. On the 1 6th, the head- 
quarters were established at Toro ; on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, 
at Villapondo and Valderosa — and on the 20th we were esta- 
blished at Majorga. Here, Sir David Baird's column joined us ; 
and here we could muster 23,000 infantry, 2,300 cavalry, and 
fifty pieces of cannon. 

Whilst head- quarters were established at Majorga, the cavalry 
and horse- artillery having advanced as far as Monastero Melgar 



* " He counted on his muster-rolls, above 330,000 men, and above 60,000 
horses. Above 200 pieces of field-artillery followed these corps to battle, 
and as many more remained in reserve. Of this monstrous army, 255,000 
men, and 50,000 horses, were actually under arms, with their different 
regiments ; 32,000 were detached, or in garrisons, preserving tranquillity in the 
rear, and guarding the communications of the active force. The remainder 
were in hospital ; and, so slight had been the resistance of the Spanish armies, 
that only 1900 prisoners were to be deducted from this multitude. Of the 
whole host, 213,000 were native Frenchmen; the residue were Poles, Ger- 
mans, and Italians." — Napier* 



1808.] EXPLOIT OF LORD PAGET. 115 

Abaxo, succeeded, on more than one occasion, in measuring their 
strength with the enemy's outposts. Of the skirmishes which 
took place at this time, few were productive of any serious effects ; 
though all tended, in a greater or lesser degree, to increase the 
confidence of our people in themselves, and prepare them for the 
impending struggle. One exploit deserves a lasting remembrance. 

The Monastero Melgar Abaxo is distant about three leagues 
from Sahagun ; in which place a corps of 700 French cavalry 
were cantoned. As they were at some distance from the main 
body of the French army, it was deemed practicable to cut them 
off, and Lord Paget determined to make the attempt. He 
accordingly put himself at the head of the 10th and loth hussars ; 
and, in the middle of a cold wintry night, when the ground was 
covered with snow, set off for that purpose. 

When they had ridden about two -thirds of the way, Lord Paget 
divided his force, and desiring General Slade, with the 10th, to 
pursue the course of the Cea, and to enter the town by that side, 
he himself, followed by the 15th, wheeled off to approach it by a 
different route. It was not long before his Lordship's party fell 
in with a picket of the enemy. The picket was instantly 
charged ; and all, except one man, were either cut down or made 
prisoners. But the escape of one was as injurious, under exist- 
ing circumstances, as the escape of the whole ; for the alarm w T as 
given, and, before the 15th could approach the place, the enemy 
were ready to receive them. It was now broad daylight ; and, as 
our troops drew near, the French were seen formed in what 
appeared to be an open plain, at no great distance from the town. 
The 15 th were wheeled into line in a moment; and, as there was 
no time to be lost, they followed their leader at a brisk trot, with 
the intention of charging ; but, when they were yet fifty yards 
from the enemy, they found that a wide ditch divided them, and 
that the French had availed themselves of other inequalities in 
the ground, of which, when some way off, they had not been 
aware. A pause was made — but one instant served to put the 
whole again in motion. The regiment, wheeling to its left, soon 
found out a convenient spot for crossing ; and, though the enemy 
manoeuvred actively to hinder the formation, they were again in 
line and advancing to the charge, within five minutes from the 
commencement of the check. A few changes of ground now 

I 2 



116 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. ix. 

took place, as each corps strove to gain the flank of the other. 
The British cavalry effected its object ; and, coming down at full 
speed upon their opponents, they overthrew them in an instant. 
Many were killed upon the spot, many unhorsed, and 157 were 
made prisoners, including two lieutenant-colonels. On this occa- 
sion, the English cavalry amounted only to 400 men, whilst that 
of the French numbered 700. 

This brilliant rencontre took place on the 20th ; and on the 
21st the head- quarters of the army were advanced to the spot 
where it occurred. The weather was at this time remarkably 
inclement — a succession of frost and snow having been followed 
by heavy rains ; and the troops, who had performed of late forced 
marches, were in a state of extreme exhaustion. Under these 
circumstances, though conscious that every hour which passed 
was time lost to him, and gained by the enemy, Sir John Moore 
determined to halt a day ; and it was devoted to supply the neces- 
saries which the men needed, and in preparing for the trial 
which was expected. 

So passed the whole of the 21st, and the greater part of the 
22nd of December. Respecting the French, it was understood 
that, out of 18,000 men of which Soult's army was com- 
posed, 7000 were at Saldanha, 5000 at the town of Carrion ; 
whilst the remainder lined the banks of the river, or covered, in 
force, the fords and bridges by which it could be passed. On 
our part, no definite position — none at least deserving of the name 
in a military point of view — had been taken. We were on the 
eve of moving, and therefore our regiments were kept as much 
together, as a regard to shelter would allow ; but, we had selected 
no points d'appui, nor were we particularly prepared to receive 
an attack, should such be made upon us ; we were ready to act in 
any manner which circumstances required. Hospitals were 
established in every convent — and arrangements made for the 
safe and speedy removal of the wounded to the rear; whilst 
nothing was spoken of except the approaching contest, and the 
probable consequences of a victory, which all anticipated. 

The evening of the 22nd was now approaching — and orders 
had been issued for an immediate advance against the enemy. 
The army was to march at eight o'clock at night, in two 
columns, and was getting under arms, when two couriers, one 



1808.] MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY. 117 

from the head- quarters of the Marquis Romana, and the other 
from Los Santos, arrived. They were bearers of sad intelligence. 
The enemy, it appeared, were moving in all directions upon us. 
The corps which had begun its march towards the south, had 
halted at Talavera ; several strong divisions had moved from 
Palencia, and were already in the vicinity of Carrion; the 
Badajoz army had wheeled round, and was in full march on 
Salamanca ; whilst Napoleon himself had set out from Madrid, 
with the avowed intention of making Benevente his next halting 
place.* Sir John Moore felt that this was not the moment, nor 
these the circumstances, under which to risk a battle. He 
believed that Soult would retire before him, to allow time to 
these different divisions to get into his rear ; and he was per- 
suaded that a few days would, in all probability, expose him to 
the risk of being surrounded by 60,000 or 70,000 troops — the 
flower of the French army. With this prospect before his eyes, 
he countermanded the orders which had been issued in the 
earlier part of the evening. The regiments which had begun 
to muster were dismissed to their quarters ; and it was intimated 
that all idea of attacking, at least, for this night, had been 
abandoned. 



* Of the movements of the English General, Napoleon remained in igno- 
rance until the 21st ; and, when it was clearly ascertained that Sir John Moore 
was actually advancing, the deadly hostility towards the British he had so 
of tea and so virulently expressed, seemed additionally increased by the intel- 
ligence. In an instant, the Spaniards, their juntas, and their armies, were 
dismissed from his thoughts ; the different corps were arrested in their 
movements, ten thousand men were left to control the capital, and, on the 
evening of the 22nd, 50,000 men were at the foot of the Guadarama. — Ed. 



1 1 8 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 



CHAPTER X. 

Dissatisfaction of the army — Sir John Moore prepares to retreat— The 
infantry and artillery retire in column, covered by the cavalry — Move- 
ments of the French — Cavalry affair at Majorga— Sufferings on the march 
— Benevente — Brilliant cavalry action — Romana's army — Disorganization 
of the English army — March from Astorga to Villa Franca— Skirmish at 
Villa Franca — Retreat to Lugo — Armies in position three days— Retreat 
upon Corunna — A fleet arrives, and the embarkation commences — Battle 
of Corunna — Death of Sir John Moore — The army embarks for England. 

It would be no easy matter to describe the effect which this 
unlooked-for event produced upon the army. Troops, who had 
panted to meet the enemy, and who, but an hour ago, were full of 
life and confidence, suddenly appeared like men whose hopes were 
withered. Few complained, but all retired to their quarters in a 
state of sullen silence, which indicated, more powerfully perhaps 
than words, the mortification under which they laboured. 

We rose next morning perfectly ignorant and indifferent as to 
the fate that awaited us ; nor were our spirits heightened, when 
hour after hour passed away without any movement either to the 
front or rear. There is reason to believe that Sir John Moore 
himself was undecided on the course to follow. He was imper- 
fectly informed as to the amount of the different corps which 
were advancing against him ; though the natural temperament of 
his disposition induced him to rate these at the highest ; but, he 
was unwilling to retreat, until it should have become indis- 
pensable. Besides, despatches came from Romana, announcing 
that he had advanced with all the disposable part of his army, 
amounting to 7000 men, to co-operate in the projected attack 
upon Soult. It was necessary to countermand this movement, as 
well as to make arrangements with the Spanish General that 
should prevent two armies from incommoding r or coming into 
collision with each other during the retreat — and, in settling this 
point, as well as in preparing the hospitals and stores for speedy 
removal, the whole of the 23rd was spent. 

As the defence of the Gallicias was esteemed by no means 
impracticable, Sir John Moore was desirous of retiring in a 



180 8.] RETREAT OF THE BRIT ISH ARMY. H9 

d^k^tn^wo^^^ take up positions in these 

provVnces;* whilst, at the same time, a retreat should be open 
towards the eoast. To effeet this, it was necessary to cross the 
EsTar which, from his present situation, might be done by three 
font s' He might proceed by Mansilla, at winch point the nver 
Lcros^ed by a bridge ; or by Valencia, where there was onby a 
ferry or J might take the route by Castro Gonsalo, where there 
Ul/ewise abridge, and from whence a road passes direct to 
Benevente. At Mansilla, however, the Spanish troop, were 
already posted, and they had exhausted the country of its supplies ; 
1 as L roads by Valenciaand Castro Gonsalo were bo* open 
it was resolved to use them. Astorga was named as the place 
where the two columns should unite, and a determined stand 
Thould be made ; whilst the Spaniards fell back upon Leon, from 
whence in the event of a battle, they might harass the rear and 
lank of the French. In the mean while, however Romana was 
to keep possession of the bridge of Mansilla while ^defensible 
Preliminaiy arrangements being complete, on the 24th the army 
began to retire in the order which had been as^gned tc -it . 

General Hope, with his own division, and that of General 
Fraser fell back upon Majorga, on the road to Castro Gonsak , ; 
whilst Sir David Baird, at the head of the other column took 
the direction of Valencia. To cover these movements, the 
cavalry received directions to push the patrols towards the Carnon, 
feel the French pickets, and not to quit the position tdl night- 
fall on the 25th, some hours after the reserve and light infantry 
had been withdrawn. Everything, accordingly, was done with 
perfect regularity-the columns made good then march the one 
to Valencia, the other to Castro Gonsalo, without molestation- 

* « Romana visited the British commander, and re fff e ^f t ^ 
nromietv of facing the enemy where they were, a point from whence they 
DTwlvs a' m e re treathy the passes of Mazanal and Foncehadon-passe 
so strong, that a small force might maintain them against -gjS^* 
represented to him also, that the park of artillery was at Ponferreda, where 
a o the hos^s were polished, and there were magazines of corn ; that 
in Villafranca there were more than 2000 sick, with hosp.ta Is ores and 
depots of arms: and therefore it was of the utmost ^iX^ton 
the Bierzo. Bnt Sir John Moore replied, that he had deteimmed npon 
retiring into Gallicia, hecause his troops required rest. -Southey. 



120 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

and at the appointed hour, the rear-guard withdrew, leaving the 
enemy ignorant that a retreat had ever been in contemplation. 

In the meanwhile, Buonaparte was advancing with rapid 
strides from the Escurial. On the 24th, he reached Tordesillas, 
with the advance of his cavalry ; sending strong detachments on 
to Villalpando and Majorga ; and at the latter of these places, 
our troops were again enabled to measure strength with their 
opponents. It was on the 26th, that a considerable force of the 
enemy were seen drawn upon the brow of a rising ground, 
apparently to cut off any stragglers which might lag behind, or 
wander from the ranks. Lord Paget, who was present at 
Majorga, instantly directed Colonel Leigh, at the head of two 
squadrons, of the 10th Hussars, to dislodge them. Colonel 
Leigh, forming his little band into two lines, rode briskly 
forward, one squadron leading, and the other supporting, till 
he had gained the top of the hill. Here the men were com- 
manded to rein-up, for the purpose of refreshing the horses after 
the ascent ; and they did so, under a smart fire from the French. 
But the horses had no sooner recovered their wind, than the 
word was given to charge — and, in five minutes, the French were 
overthrown. Many were killed, many more wounded, and 
upwards of 100 taken prisoners. 

The 10th, however, was not the only cavalry corps which suc- 
ceeded in distinguishing itself. It was remarked by all, that as 
often as the French and our people came in contact, the supe- 
riority of the British cavalry was evident. They seemed to set 
odds at defiance ; and in no instance was their temerity attended 
with defeat. Matters went so far at last, that Captain Jones, of 
the 18th, ventured with no more than thirty men of his regi- 
ment, to charge 100 French cavalry; and he routed them, killing 
fourteen, and making six prisoners. 

Whilst the cavalry were thus in daily contact with the enemy, 
the infantry, covered by two or three light regiments, were march- 
ing over miserable roads, through an exhausted country, and 
exposed to greater hardships than it has frequently fallen to the 
lot of British soldiers to endure. The weather was more severe 
than it had been since they entered Spain ; cold winds blowing, 
and heavy showers of sleet and rain falling; and it was not 
always that the troops could find shelter, even at night, against 



1808.] A SUDDEN ALARM. 121 

their influence. The baggage-mules began to founder, and 
the muleteers, terrified at the prospect of being overtaken by the 
French, left them and fled. In such cases, it was impracticable 
to get the animals along, for they would obey no voice but their 
masters, and were consequently abandoned and lost. Nor were 
these the only evils to which our people were exposed. The 
Spaniards, men in authority or not, either abandoned their 
houses as the British army approached, locking their doors, and 
concealing the little stock of provisions of which they were 
possessed ; or they met our requisitions for food and wine with 
murmurs and complaints, such as they would not have ventured 
to utter before French soldiers. These things increased the 
irritation under which the troops already laboured. They began 
to look upon the Spaniards as enemies, and treat them as people 
unworthy of consideration. This was severely retaliated by an 
enraged peasantry ; and scenes of violence and bloodshed too 
frequently occurred. 

On the 27th of December, the column reached Benevente. 
Benevente is remarkable for an old Baronial castle, which for 
many generations had been the property of the Dukes of Ossuna. 
Near it runs the little river Eslar, across which, at some distance 
from the town, a bridge was thrown, commanded by some hills 
rising abruptly from the opposite bank of the stream. Our 
people had scarcely entered the place, when an alarm was raised 
that the enemy were approaching ; and troops were seen forming 
on the heights beyond. Preparations were instantly made to 
receive them. The regiments assembled at their alarm posts, 
and the cavalry, rushing through the gates, descended to the 
level country, where they could act most conveniently; but 
neither the one nor the other were called into play. The enemy, 
satisfied with thus disturbing our repose, melted away, and 
we returned again to former quarters and original occupations. 
The best precautions were, however, taken, to provide against 
surprise ; the bridge over the Eslar was broken down ; and 
pickets of cavalry were extended all along the bank, to watch the 
fords, and give timely notice of any movement. 

The night of the 27th passed in quiet ; and, at day- light, the 
retreat was renewed. The cavalry, however, had not been with- 
drawn, when movements on the part of the enemy indicated that 



1 22 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

we should not be permitted to escape thus easily. About nine 
o'clock, a body of 500 or 600 horse were observed to try a ford 
not far from the ruins of the bridge ; and shortly afterwards they 
crossed, and formed on our side of the river. Instantly, the rear- 
guard made ready to oppose them ; and, though they mustered 
little more than 200 men, they boldly advanced, under the 
command of Colonel Otway, against the mass, repeatedly charg- 
ing its leading squadrons, and keeping it fairly in check, till Lord 
Paget and the writer of these pages* arrived ; when the former 
hurried up the 10th Hussars, and the latter put himself at the 
head of the detachments already in the field. Many charges 
were now made on both sides, and the squadrons repeatedly 
intermingled, whilst the pickets still continued to give ground, as 
it was intended that they should. But the 10th were now 
in hand ; the pickets saw that they had support, and they 
required no encouragement to dash against the enemy. One 
cheer was given, and, the horses being pressed to their speed, the 
enemy's line was broken in an instant. They fled in great 
disorder to the river, and repassed more rapidly than they had 
passed it, leaving in our hands General Le Fevre, their Colonel, 
with seventy officers and men. This was, however, the most 
serious affair in which we had as yet been engaged : the cavalry 
opposed to us formed part of the Imperial Guard ; they were tried 
soldiers, and fought in a manner not unworthy of the reputation 
which they had earned in the north of Europe. They lost in 
killed and wounded, independently of prisoners, about sixty men, 
while our casualties fell somewhat short of fifty. 

It was said that Napoleon himself was an eye-witness of this 
rencontre, from the opposite heights. Whether there be any 
truth in the report, I know not ; but one thing is certain, that the 
enemy did not venture, for some days after, to oppose themselves 
hand to hand to our cavalry. The column, accordingly, reached 
Astorga on the 30th, having been little harrassed by its pursuers, 
and yet seriously disorganized. Another difficulty occurred ; 
Romana, in spite of General Moore's entreaty to the contrary, 
had fallen back in the same direction with ourselves. The 
consequence was, that all the houses were filled with his people, 

* Lord Londonderry. 




i'U/ / / y.-i,/yu-a,^ny Q^/a^&^y, 



/ / / 



1808.] SUFFERINGS OF THE MARCH. 123 

among whom typhus fever was raging : and the roads literally- 
choked with men, horses, cars, and all the other accompaniments 
of an army, which had foundered or broken down on the march. 

It is hardly possible to conceive men bearing less resemblance 
to soldiers, or having a stronger claim upon compassion, than 
these wretched creatures. They were almost all in a state 
bordering upon nudity — they had no provisions ; their arms 
w r ere, for the most part, useless ; and of ammunition, either for 
musketry or cannon, they were entirely destitute. Nor, to say 
the truth, were our own people in a plight by many degrees 
superior. With us, as with them, provisions had long been 
scanty; and our shoes, the most essential article in a soldier's 
appointments — were, in most instances, w T orn out. Many officers 
had, indeed, brought with them, from England considerable 
quantities of apparel ; and depots of stores had been formed at 
various points, one of which chanced to be Astorga; but the 
mules which carried the baggage of individuals were all knocked 
up, and of the stores deposited in the town little use could be 
made. It is true that the Spaniards were supplied with muskets 
— for of muskets, a large quantity had been collected here — and 
they received as much ammunition as they could carry ; but in 
clothing and provisions they were lamentably deficient, and we 
could not, therefore, supply their wants. They departed accord- 
ingly on the following morning, by Fonubadon into Gallicia, 
having derived from us none of the refreshments of which they 
stood in need, and to obtain which, they had deserted their post 
at Mansilla many days earlier than was necessary. 

The army had hitherto fallen back under the belief Astorga 
would be its resting place, and that here, or hereabouts, battle 
would have been accepted — and this prospect had hitherto kept 
the men in something like a state of subordination. True, they 
had committed various excesses ; they had robbed, plundered, got 
drunk, by the way, and many had fallen into the hands of the 
enemy, or perished from the inclemency of the weather ; yet 
the army w T as perfectly efficient, and required nothing but 
provisions and a few hours' rest, to restore it to the state of order 
in which it was at Salamanca. From the moment that prepara- 
tions were made for a continued retreat from Astorga, this state 
of things terminated. In Astorga, the blowing up of ammunition 



1 24 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

waggons, the destruction of intrenching tools, and the committal 
of field equipments to the flames for a whole division, gave signal 
for all the bad passions of those who witnessed them, to let 
loose ; and, mortifying as it is to confess it, the fact cannot be 
denied, that from that hour we no longer resembled a British 
army. There was still the same bravery in our ranks ; but it 
was only at moments when the enemy were expected to come on, 
that our order and regularity returned ; and, except in that single 
point, we resembled rather a crowd of insubordinate rebels, in 
full flight before victorious soldiers than a corps of British troops 
moving in the presence of an enemy. 

When he began his retreat, it was Sir John Moore's intention 
to fall back upon Vigo, and there embark his army in the trans- 
ports which had been ordered round to receive him. With 
this view, when at Benevente, he had despatched General 
Craufurd, with 3,000 men, along the nearer but steeper road by 
Orense, to prevent any attempt of the enemy to gain ground 
upon him with a light column — he taking the more circuitous 
but better route, by Astorga and Villa Franca. At the former 
place, he was joined by Baird's division. Here, everything, 
whether private or public property, for the removal of which 
means were wanting, was destroyed ; and the army began its 
march on the following morning, under circumstances more 
disheartening than ever. 

The road from Astorga to Villa Franca leads through the 
villages of Torre, Benivedre, Pinferrade, and over a country as 
diversified and striking as will be seen perhaps in Europe. The 
season was remarkably inclement ; the ridges were covered with 
deep snow, and the fields and roads almost impassable — and 
it was impossible to pass it by without feelings of the live- 
liest admiration, with a strong regret that it had not been our 
fortune to wander here when forests were leafy, and hills were 
green. But other causes of regret than scenic dreariness 
oppressed us. The condition of the army was melancholy ; the 
rain came down in torrents ; men and horses foundered at every 
step ; the former worn out through fatigue and want of nutri- 
ment — the latter sinking under their loads, and dying upon the 
march. Nor was it the baggage-animals alone that suffered — 
the shoes of the cavalry horses dropped off, and consequently, 






1808.] DREADFUL SCENES. 125 

they soon became useless. It was a sad spectacle to behold 
these fine creatures goaded on till their strength utterly failed 
them, and then shot to death by their riders, to prevent them from 
falling into the hands of the enemy. Then, again, the few waggons 
which had hitherto kept up, fell, one by one, to the rear; and 
the ammunition was destroyed, and the carriages abandoned. 
Thus were misfortunes accumulated upon us as we proceeded; 
and it appeared improbable, should our present system of forced 
marches be continued, that one half the army would ever reach 
the coast. 

Subordination only requires a beginning, — and, under one 
pretext or another, whole regiments strayed from their colours ; 
and, as often as a wine-house came in their way, scenes of the 
most shocking description ensued. The army moved, as is cus- 
tomary in such cases, by divisions — the main body keeping a 
day's march ahead of the reserve and rear-guard. The former 
reached Benivedre on the 31st, and at an early hour on the 1st of 
January was ordered to leave it. But, when the rear- guard came 
up, the place was full of stragglers, all in a state of desperate 
intoxication.* At this time, the enemy's cavalry, though they 
seldom sought an opportuuity of coming to blows, pressed closely 
on our rear. We rode for miles in sight of each other ; and from 
time to time, our rearmost dragoons would exchange pistol shots 
with their leading files. Under such circumstances, no pause 
whatever could be made, and hence, every one who proved 
unable, either from intoxication or weariness, to push on, was of 
necessity left behind. But the multitudes who lingered in 
Benivedre were so great, that it was not till every effort to rouse 
them had been made in vain, that they were left to their fate. 
Even after the rear- guard had marched, a small detachment of 
cavalry endeavoured to cover them ; nor was it till the enemy were 
seen approaching in force, that the picket retired. Then followed 
a scene frequently described, but imperfectly understood, except- 
ing by an eye-witness. The French dragoons, pursuing our 
patrol, galloped through the midst of a crowd of men, women, 

* Some lay upon the ground, insensible ; some went about exhibiting all 
kinds of foolery ; while others, whom the wine had maddened, threatened 
death to all who came in their way. — Ed. 



126 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

and children, wantonly slashing to the right and left, without 
regard to the age or sex of the object of their fury, Of the number 
who thus fell a sacrifice to their own intemperance, I cannot 
pretend to speak with certainty ; but I know it to have been con- 
siderable ; and I am sure that British troops never looked upon 
a spectacle more appalling than those few presented, who, having 
come up with the column, bleeding and mangled by sabre cuts, 
were, by order of the General, paraded through the ranks as a 
warning to their comrades. 

We reached Villa Franca on the 2nd, having performed a 
distance of sixty miles in two days, Here, the greater part of the 
cavalry took up its quarters — a small detachment only remaining 
with the reserve at Cacabelos. Like Benivedre, this town was 
filled with drunken and disorderly men, by whom the most 
violent outrages had been committed, not only upon the natives, 
but upon our own magazines. A store of wine had been broken 
open, and the wine either drunk or wantonly spilt ; and a con- 
siderable quantity of forage, of which we stood so much in neecL 
was wantonly destroyed. One man was executed here, being 
detected in the act of marauding ; but the discipline of the army 
was by this time too much impaired to be very seriously afTected 
by example. Similar offences were committed wherever oppor- 
tunities occurred ; and with the recklessness of men who fancied 
that their case was desperate. 

The enemy, who since the affair of the 28th had kept generally 
out of reach, showed a disposition on the 3rd to renew their 
system of attacking, A large force of cavalry was seen about 
one o'clock in the afternoon, advancing at a leisure pace, and 
with much apparent caution, moved on Cacabelos. Through the 
middle of the town there runs a small stream, along the bank of 
which part of the reserve was drawn up ; whilst the 95th rifle 
corps, supported by a picket of hussars, occupied a rising ground 
about half a league in advance. The riflemen were commanded 
to fall back, and retreat through the town over a bridge — and the 
greater number had already effected this movement, when the 
French cavalry coming on in overwhelming numbers, our pickets 
were forced to give way, and the French getting in among the 
two rear companies of the 95th, succeeded in making some 
prisoners. The riflemen had hardly recovered their surprise, and 



1809.] POLICY OF SIR J. MOORE. 127 

were barely able to extend in skirmishing order, when a cloud 
of dismounted chasseurs dashed forward, and, crossing the stream 
in every part, commenced a sharp onset upon the village. They 
were met with great gallantry by the 95th, who, retiring slowly 
up the hill in rear of the town, took post among some vineyards, 
and galled them from that shelter. From these, the cavalry 
attempted to dislodge them — they charged boldly up the road, 
and threatened to take the skirmishers in rear — but they were 
driven back by the steady and well-directed fire of the 95th, 
leaving General Colbert, with many other officers and men, dead 
upon the field.* 

The alarm had by this time spread to Villa Franca, and Sir 
John hurried to the scene of action. He had scarcely done so, 
when a heavy column of infantry showed itself on the opposite 
hills, in full march upon our position. The artillery attached to 
the reserve instantly opened upon it : and such was the ex- 
cellence of the practice, that the enemy's column, after a heavy 
loss, withdrew before it had been able to fire a musket. Never- 
theless, Sir John Moore was not desirous of bringing on a 
general action. He had heard of a position near Lugo, of which 
he proposed to take advantage. He neither wished to waste 
time, nor sacrifice lives, in the obstinate maintenance of ground 
to which he attached no value ; and, therefore, the reserve was 
ordered to Villa Franca — the main body to Herrieras — and it was 
followed, at ten o'clock, by the rear-guard, which reached its 
halting-place soon after midnight. 

The country from this point was totally unsuited for cavalry. 
It was universally steep, rocky, precipitous, and covered with 
wood, or so much enclosed with vineyards and mulberry plan- 
tations, as to prevent a single squadron of horse either to form 
or act. The cavalry were accordingly sent on to Lugo, whither 
the infantry and artillery followed, as fast as extreme exhaustion 
and the nature of the road would allow. But they followed both 



* Colbert was so excellent an officer, and so brave a man, that the 95tli 
testified their admiration of his character and their grief at his death, by an 
expression of loud regret. He fell pierced by a rifle-ball, which entered his 
temple. Canova had called him " the modern Antinous," from the exquisite 
symmetry of his person, — Ed. 



128 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. 



painfully and slowly ; for though as many as forty miles were 
performed in one march, that march comprehended, not the day 
only, but the night. This was more than men, reduced to the 
low ebb to which our soldiers had fallen, could endure — they 
dropped by whole sections on the way- side, and died.* It was 
dreadful to know that not men only, but women and children, 
were subject to this miserable fate. By a strange neglect, or in 
the indulgence of mistaken humanity, Sir John Moore's army 
had carried along with it more than the too large proportion of 
women allotted by the rules of our service to armies in the field ; 
and these poor wretches now heightened the horror of passing 
events by a display of suffering, even more acute than that en- 
dured by their husbands. Some were taken in labour on the 
road ; and in the open air, amidst showers of sleet and snow, 
gave birth to infants, which, with their mothers, perished as soon 
as they had seen the light. Others, carrying, some of them, two 
children on their backs, toiled on, and, when they came to look 
to the condition of their burdens, they would probably find one 
or both frozen to death. Then the depth of moral degradation 
to which they sank — their oaths and cries, uttered under the 
influence of intoxication, were hardly less appalling than the groans 
which burst from them, as all hope abandoned them, and they 
lay down to die. The horrors of this retreat have been again 



* " The soldiers who threw themselves down to perish by the wayside 
gave utterance to far different feelings with their dying breath ; shame and 
strong anger were their last sentiments ; and their groans were mingled 
with imprecations upon the Spaniards, by whom they fancied themselves 
betrayed, and upon the Generals, who chose either to let them die like beasts, 
than take their chance in the field of battle. That no horror might be 
wanting, women and children accompanied this wretched army ; some were 
frozen to death in the baggage-waggons, which were broken down, or left 
upon the road for want of cattle ; some died of fatigue and cold, while their 
infants were pulling at the exhausted breast. One woman was taken in 
labour upon the mountain ; she lay down at the turning of an angle, rather 
more sheltered than the rest of the way from the icy sleet which drifted 
along ; there she was found dead, and two babes, which she had brought 
forth, struggling in the snow. A blanket was thrown over her, to cover her 
from sight, the only burial which could be afforded ; and the infants were 
given in charge to a woman who came up in one of the bullock-carts, to take 
their chance of surviving through such a journey."*— Southey. 



1809.] DISASTERS OF WAR. 129 

and again, described in terms calculated to freeze the blood of 
such as read them ; but I have no hesitation in saying that the 
most harrowing accounts which have yet been laid before the 
public, fall short of the reality. 

The march from Villa Franca to Lugo occupied one night and 
two days — the army reaching the latter place on the 5th of 
January. It was a continued skirmish between the rear of the 
British, and the advanced guard of the French, in which the 
latter were invariably repulsed. But, in spite of these advantages, 
the British army became every hour more and more unfit for 
service, and its resources wasted away at every mile. First, 
whole waggon loads of clothing, arms, shoes, and other neces- 
saries, which had just arrived from England for the purpose of 
refitting Romana's army, were met, and after the men had helped 
themselves to those articles of which they stood in need, the 
residue w r as destroyed. Next, two bullock- cars, loaded with 
dollars to the amount of 25,000/. were found to be immoveable. 
The casks, which contained the money, were stove in, and the 
treasure thrown from the road over a precipice.* This w 7 as an 
unwise, and also a useless measure. Had it been distributed 
among the soldiers, there is little doubt that they would have 
contrived to carry it along ; whereas, the knowledge that it lay 
among the cliffs, tempted many men to lag behind, w T ho fell into 
the hands of the enemy, or perished from cold. But every thing 
was done now as if our case was absolutely desperate — and as if 
the utmost that could be expected was to escape with our per- 
sons, at the expense of the whole of our materiel. Guns were 
abandoned, as fast as the horses which dragged them were 
knocked up ; and the very sick and wounded were left behind in 
the waggons, when the bullocks or mules could proceed no 
further. 



* Lieut. Bennet, of the 28th regiment, was appointed to see this order 
carried into execution, with instructions to shoot the first man who should 
attempt to touch the money. The casks were rolled over a precipice, and 
being quickly shattered by the rocks, the good Spanish dollars were liberated , 
and descended in a glittering shower into the abyss. The French advanced 
guard, however, arrived just in time to gather up a few dollars which had 
fallen upon the road. — Ed. 

K 



130 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

I have said that the march from Herrieras to Lugo produced 
a continued series of skirmishes between the rear of one army, 
and the head of the other. For the most part, these were pro- 
ductive of trifling results. But there was one occasion, on 
which the spirits of the troops became powerfully excited — and 
when nothing but the caution of Marshal Soult prevented a 
general action. 

The village of Constantino stands upon the edge of a small 
stream, which runs along a deep and rocky channel, forming the 
bottom of a ravine, which, on either hand, is closed in by hills. 
The hill on the left of the village is ascended from the south by 
an exposed and winding road, tolerably steep and uneven ; whilst* 
on the opposite side, is a long gradual slope, till you arrive at the 
head of the bridge. Sir John Moore was apprehensive that, 
should he permit the enemy to take possession of the summit, 
whilst his own column was yet within gun-shot, the troops 
would be annoyed during their descent ; and he therefore deter- 
mined to dispute the advance of his pursuers, and thus give time 
to the regiments to make good the passage of the river. 

With this view, the rifle corps, supported by a brigade of 
horse artillery, halted on the brow of the hill. The enemy, per- 
ceiving the disposition, and presuming that his troops, should 
they attempt to carry the ridge by assault, would be exposed to 
a murderous fire from the guns opposed to them, halted on the 
declivity of a range of hills opposite, and continued for more than 
half an hour looking at our people. By this time, the column 
had gained the head of the bridge, and the principal danger was 
past ; and the riflemen and artillery were accordingly directed to 
retreat with all possible celerity. The order was obeyed ; but 
they were instantly followed by the French, who came pouring 
down the hill, as the rear companies had effected the passage of 
the stream. Arrangements were instantly made to receive the 
attack which was threatened. The 28th and rifle corps formed to 
defend the bridge ; whilst the 20th, 52nd, and 91st, under Sir 
John Moore in person, took a position on the summit of a hill 
in the rear. Here, likewise, the horse artillery was posted ; and 
all was expectation and anxiety. The enemy came on with 
apparent boldness. His cavalry and tirailleurs attempted to pass 



1809.] ORDERS OF GENERAL MOORE. 131 

the bridge : but they were met, not only by the fire of the 
riflemen, but by a heavy and well-directed cannonade from the 
high grounds. They were driven back ; but in a few moments 
they renewed their efforts, and with similar want of success ; 
and again, after a short pause, the attempt was made a third 
time. Darkness put an end to the skirmish, and they withdrew. 
' At eleven o'clock at night, however, our people abandoned the 
post. The troops were dreadfully harassed by their exertions — 
but not a man sank under them — and before morning the whole 
reached Lugo, where they found the whole army concentrated. 

At Lugo, as has been already stated, General Moore had 
resolved, should the enemy press him hard, to halt and give 
battle. With this design, orders were forwarded to Villa Franca^ 
that General Craufurd should retrace his steps, and General 
Hope's column, which had moved a day's march in advance,, 
should rest at Lugo till the divisions in the rear arrived. These 
orders were transmitted by the hands of Sir John's aide-de-camp,. 
Captain Napier, and were enclosed under cover to Sir David 
Baird, who was requested to forward them to their several places 
of destination. Captain Napier delivered his packet at Nagales, 
and Sir David Baird instantly despatched an orderly dragoon, 
with instructions for General Hope and General Frazer. It 
unhappily fell out that the dragoon got drunk, and the packet 
miscarried ; but the misfortune was not discovered till the fol- 
lowing morning, when fresh orders were instantly sent off. That 
loss of time nothing could repair. General Hope with his divi- 
sion, was already a full day's march beyond Lugo ; and, though 
he wheeled about immediately on the receipt of Sir David's 
communication, he did not arrive at Lugo till after the rear- 
guard had come in ; and even then his troops were so fatigued, 
that their fitness for immediate service was problematical. Many 
of the horses attached to this division dropped dead in the streets ; 
many were destroyed as useless ; and even of the men, more 
than one were known to have perished of absolute exhaustion ♦ 
Nevertheless, as the General had now determined to fall back, 
not upon Vigo, but on Corunna, it was, perhaps, well that the 
detached columns had been called in. General Craufurd, indeed, 
was too far on his way to be overtaken — and he reached Vigo 

k 2 



132 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. X. 



without molestation, embarking there in good order. But, had 
the rest of the army endeavoured to follow him, the probability- 
is, that half its numbers must have fallen by the way. 

The ground upon which Sir John Moore proposed to await the 
arrival of the enemy, was distant about a league, or a league and 
a half, from Lugo. It offered, upon the whole, a tolerably advan- 
tageous position, along the summit of a range of low hills, and 
covered on both flanks by rocks and precipices. Here the 
reserve, under General Paget, took its station ; whilst the rest of 
the army found quarters for the night in the town, and the houses 
and cottages in its vicinity. 

About noon on the 6th, the French columns made their 
appearance, and deployed, as it had been anticipated that they 
would, upon the opposite heights. Immediately, the army got 
under arms, and everything was in readiness, in case of an attack. 
But no offensive operations ensued — and the lines looked at one 
another for some hours, as if each expected the first movement to 
be made by their opponent. At last, as evening began to close, 
all idea of a battle was laid aside. Those to whom the position 
was entrusted, piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac ; whilst 
the rest retired, every regiment, to its quarters. 

The morning of the 7th had scarcely dawned, when the enemy 
showed a disposition, either to attack us in real earnest, or to 
provoke us into a forward movement against themselves. They 
opened a cannonade ; which, though it did little damage, served 
to irritate and annoy the soldiers. The fire was, however, 
speedily returned by the British artillery — and, with such effect, 
that in a few minutes one of the French guns was dismounted, 
and the remainder silenced. These were the only hostilities 
which passed between the two armies during the earlier part of 
the day ; but, towards sunset, columns were observed defiling in 
considerable force towards our left, and at the same time a cloud 
of tirailleurs began a skirmish with the pickets. Sir John 
Moore flew to the threatened spot — and arrived just as a heavy 
column of French troops began to ascend the rising ground, and 
press a wing of the 76th, which held it. The 76th gradually- 
retired till it was joined by the 51st , a regiment in which Sir 
John had served as an ensign, and to which he addressed a few 



1809.] POSITION OF THE BRITISH. 133 

words calculated to remind them of the fact, and expressive of his 
confidence in their valour. The short address was not thrown 
away. After exchanging a few discharges of musketry, our 
people rushed forward with the bayonet ; the enemy did not 
stand the shock, but fled in confusion down the hill, leaving a 
good many killed and wounded behind them. This was the last 
operation on either side ; and the two armies again spent the night 
in anxious expectation of what the morrow r might bring forth. 

Sir John Moore no longer entertained a doubt that the hour 
of trial was at hand. He sincerely rejoiced in the convic- 
tion ; for the prospect of a battle had restored to the army the 
whole of its confidence, and much of its discipline ; and the 
General saw that it was only by beating his pursuers — and beating 
them effectually — that he could free himself from their presence, 
and secure orderly embarkation. The greater part of the night 
was accordingly spent in bringing guns into position, and making 
arrangements which the circumstances of the case required. 

We were in position during the entire day, anxiously desiring 
that an attack would take place ; but hour after hour passed 
away, and the enemy made no movement. On our part, it was 
deemed unsafe to advance, because the French w T ere understood 
to exceed us in numbers, and they occupied ground difficult of 
approach, w-ith every facility for retreating. Another corps, under 
Victor, was known to have halted at Villa Franca, and therefore 
was supposed to be within reach. Under these circumstances, 
nothing remained, except to make the most of the impression 
which our demonstration might have produced upon the enemy — 
the troops remained at their arms till dark — and then, large fires 
having been lighted along the heights, the retreat was recom- 
menced.* 



* " There might be seen the conductors of baggage, toiling through the 
streets, their laden mules almost sinking under the weight of ill-arranged 
burdens swinging from side to side ; while the persons in whose charge they 
Had followed the divisious, appeared undecided which to execrate most, the 
roads, the mules, the Spaniards, or the weather. These were succeeded by 
the dull, heavy sound of the passing artillery ; then came the Spanish fugi- 
tives from the desolating line of the armies. Detachments, with sick or 
lamed horses, scrambled through the mud; while, at intervals, the report of 
a horse-pistol knelled the termination to the sufferings of an animal, that a 



1 34 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

We marched all night, both men and horses suffering dreadfully 
from cold, fatigue, and hunger ; and passing Lugo, arrived at 
Valenuda about ten o'clock next morning. Here, the positive 
inability of the troops to proceed further compelled a halt ; and 
for a few hours, we lay upon the ground, under a pelting rain, 
and totally devoid of shelter. But even this space of time was 
not granted to undisturbed repose. A cry arose, from time to 
time, that the enemy were advancing ; and at each alarm the 
regiments were ordered to fall in. It is needless to say, how 
severely this constant call to arms told upon men already worn 
down by a night-march. Indeed, it is not going too far to affirm, 
that many of the corps which had been most frequently roused 
from their sleep, made ready to renew their march in the even- 
ing, as little refreshed as if they had not halted at all. 

From this time till it reached Corunna, the army saw little of 
the French. We had gained by the late night-march, twelve 
hours upon Marshal Soult — and he was never able to overtake 
us. Yet our journey was, at least for a time, not less harrassing, 
nor disorderly, than what it had been before. When we came 
to Betanzos, at a late hour in the night, so many were found to 
have fallen behind, not only from the leading divisions, but from 
the reserve itself, that to have pursued our progress on the 
following morning, would have been to sacrifice a large portion of 
the army ; and the 10th was accordingly given up as a day of 
rest. By this means, multitudes of stragglers were permitted to 
overtake their corps ; and, though the enemy were certainly 
enabled to recover part of the ground which they had lost, that 
was a matter not to be put in competition with the preservation 
of so many British soldiers. Besides, the only French force 
which succeeded in coming up with us, was a small patrol of 
cavalry, which our rear-guard had no difficulty in keeping in 
check. The advantages resulting from the day of rest were there- 
fore great. 

At length the coast appeared, and Corunna, with its citadel 

few days previously, full of life and high in blood, had borne its rider, not 
against, but over the ranks of Gallic chivalry. The effect of this scene was 
rendered more striking, by the distant report of cannon and musketry, and 
more gloomy by torrents of rain, and a degree of cold worthy of a Polish 
winter." — Leith Hay. 



1809.] VICINITY OF CORUNNA. 135 

the towers rose upon our view. But the harbour, in which we 
had expected to find a large fleet at anchor, was occupied only 
by the coasters and fishing-boats which usually shelter there. 
Though intelligence of the alteration in our plans had been sent 
off some days previously, and the Admiral used every exertion to 
bring the shipping round, a continuance of adverse winds had 
rendered the effort abortive ; and it was only after an interval of 
some days that the fleet arrived. Most sincerely did every one 
now regret that a battle had not been fought ; for it w r as quite 
manifest, that to embark without fighting was out of the 
question. We had left behind us innumerable positions ; on any 
one of which, an army, such as ours, might have maintained 
itself against twice its numbers. In the vicinity of Corunna, no 
favourable ground existed. There were, indeed, positions here — 
several of them very respectable, and one positively commanding 
— but to occupy these, as they ought to be occupied, would 
require a force greater than ours ; whilst to occupy them imper- 
fectly, would be irregular. Still, there was no help for it ; and 
our General instantly set about making the best dispositions 
which circumstances permitted. 

The leading brigades arrived in Corunna on the afternoon of 
the 11th ; and the night was passed — one division in the town — 
another in the suburbs, and the reserve, partly at the villages on 
the St. Jago road, and partly in El Burgo, near the bridge over 
the Mero. That bridge was of course destroyed, as well as 
another some little distance further up the river ; and strong 
pickets were posted beside their ruins, to check any attempt on 
the part of the enemy to repair them. But the ground which, 
in case of battle the troops were to occupy, was not marked out 
till the morning of the 12th, when the following arrangements 
were made. 

There is a range of heights, or rather of swelling knolls, 
which form an amphitheatre round the village of Elvina, at the 
distance of perhaps a mile, or rather more, from the town of 
Corunna. Upon these Sir John Moore resolved to draw up his 
army ; for, though there was a much more formidable range 
a mile or two further in advance, his numbers were inadequate 
for its occupation. He accordingly, stationed General Hope's 
division upon the left, posting it along a ridge which commanded 



136 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

the Betanzos road, and which sloped away, with a rearward 
inclination towards Elvina. At this place, Sir David Baird's 
division took up the line, covering the hills which still bend in, 
and extend to a valley which divides this range from another on 
the opposite side of the Vigo road. Across that valley, the rifle 
corps threw itself in extended order ; and it was supported by 
Frazer's division, which covered the road to Vigo, and protected 
a principal approach to Corunna. The reserve, under General 
Paget, took post at a village, about half a mile in the rear of 
General Hope. 

These arrangements were not complete, when the enemy made 

their appearance, moving in force along the opposite bank of the 

Mero ; but there was no exchange of shots, nor any design 

manifested to try the strength of our position. The same state 

of inaction continued during the 14th, except ing, that on that 

day the artillery which w r as attached to General Hope's column, 

maintained a short but warm contest with some of the enemy's 

pieces ; and that a magazine, containing four thousand barrels of 

gunpowder, which had been lately brought from England, was 

blown up. It exploded with a force which shook the ground like 

an earthquake, and threw the inhabitants of Corunna into the 

utmost consternation. On the 15th, the fleet began to appear in 

the offing ; whilst the enemy moved forward a body of troops, 

for the purpose of occupying the height on which the magazine 

had been constructed. A little skirmishing was the consequence ; 

but, as the height in question was in no degree valuable to us, 

the riflemen who had held it, were withdrawn. About the same 

time, some companies of the 5th regiment made an attempt, 

under their commanding officer, Colonel Mackenzie, to possess 

themselves of a couple of field-pieces, which the enemy had 

advanced somewhat too far upon our left. The attempt, though 

boldly made, failed ; and Colonel Mackenzie, who conducted it, 

was killed. Thus were the two armies in sight of one another, 

during three whole days, without any serious disposition being 

exhibited to bring matters to the issue of a battle. 

In the mean while, Sir John Moore was busily employed 
embarking the sick, the wounded, the women and children, and 
all such stores of ammunition as yet remained. This was effected 
with great regularity during the afternoon and night of the 14th ; 



1809.] BATTLE OF CORUNNA. 137 

and, on the following day, the bulk of the artillery, for which our 
ground was not adapted, was likewise withdrawn. The cavalry, 
after destroying the remainder of their horses, had gone on board 
some time before ; so that nothing now remained except the most 
efficient of the infantry in position. On the 16th, therefore, as 
all appeared to be quiet in the French lines, orders were issued for 
the gradual retreat of the different divisions ; and the boats of the 
fleet were collected in the harbour, and along the beach, to receive 
the regiments on board as fast as they should arrive at the water's 
edge. But, about noon, just as the General had given his final 
directions, and had mounted his horse for the purpose of visiting 
the outposts, an alarm was spread that the enemy were in motion. 
Sir John flew to the front, expressing his high satisfaction at the 
intelligence ; and arrived just as our pickets were beginning to 
skirmish with the tirailleurs, which, en masse, covered the advance 
of the French army. 

The enemy attacked in four columns, two threatening the right 
of our position ; whilst a third bore down upon the centre, and a 
fourth manoeuvred to occupy the attention of the left. It soon 
became apparent that Soult's main object was to turn our right, 
which was decidedly the weakest point of the position. It was 
defended by Lord William Bentinck's brigade, consisting of the 
4th, 42nd, and 50th regiments ; having the brigade of guards in 
their rear, under Major-general Warde. In order to secure these 
against being turned, General Paget was ordered to advance 
instantly with the reserve, and throwing himself upon the right 
of Lord William, take post in the foremost line ; whilst General 
Baird made ready, after he should have checked the force which 
threatened his own position, to succour both by a flank move- 
ment of General Manningham's brigade against the enemy. The 
left column, only, had to keep its ground, and resist any effort 
which might be made to force it. 

The first attack of French troops has long been noted for 
impetuosity ; nor was it less impetuous on the present day than 
on other occasions. Our advanced posts were driven in ; and the 
columns of attack moved forward with every demonstration of 
courage, covered by a cloud of skirmishers, and supported by 
a continued and well-directed fire from eleven pieces of artillery. 
As they drew near, these columns partly deployed into line ; and it 



138 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

soon became apparent that they extended far beyond the extreme 
right of the British position. But our troops seemed to despise 
this advantage ; and, instead of waiting upon their own ground to 
receive the shock, they advanced to meet the enemy. The 4th 
regiment, with admirable celerity, wheeling back its right wing, 
and presenting a front in two directions. Nor was the slightest 
impression made upon them, either by the cannonade, or the 
appearance of a whole corps of infantry, which seemed as if 
determined to make their way between our people and Corunna. 
Sir John Moore was close to the 4th when it executed this move- 
ment. He expressed his approbation, crying, " This is exactly 
what I wished to be done !" — and feeling that men who could act 
with so much coolness in the presence of a superior force, were 
not likely to give way because a General quitted them, he rode 
off to see that in other parts of the field a similar spirit was in 
operation. 

The French and English armies were separated from each other 
by a number of enclosures ; to pass which both parties seemed 
equally anxious — and a few moments sufficed to bring them into 
contact. The village of Elvina, which had been occupied by a few 
light troops, was indeed carried, and the enemy pressed on, with 
high courage, and in great force ; but their advance was checked 
by the 50th regiment, which not only drove them down the slope, 
but pursued them through the village of Elvina, and to a con- 
siderable distance beyond it. It was on this occasion that both 
majors, Napier and Stanhope, were lost to the service ; the former 
being severely wounded and made prisoner, whilst the latter was 
killed. 

The action had now become extremely warm along the whole 
line. The 42nd, after receiving and returning several volleys, 
crossed its bayonets, and, supported by a battalion of guards, 
repulsed a strong body of the enemy, which had endeavoured to 
possess itself of the heights on the left. The charge was an 
exceedingly brilliant one ; and Sir John Moore was in the act 
of watching it, when a cannon-shot struck him on the left shoulder, 
and beat him to the ground. Previously to this, Sir David 
Baird had been compelled, by a severe wound in the arm, to quit 
the field ; and the regiments were therefore left, in a great mea- 
sure, to the guidance of their own courage and the management 



1809.] DEATH OF MOORE. 139 

of their respective commanding officers. But, to use the words 
of the gallant soldier who succeeded to the command, " the 
troops, though not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they 
had sustained, were not dismayed ; but, by the most determined 
bravery, not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain 
ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had 
brought up fresh troops in support of those originally engaged." 

His efforts to force our right being foiled, Soult endeavoured 
to turn it, and advanced a column to the rear unobserved. His 
design was discovered at once ; and General Paget, moving 
forward with the reserve, met the column in the most gallant 
style, drove it back with heavy loss, upon its original position, 
and the right of the British army became the assailants. The 
enemy were broken and dispersed ; they desisted from all further 
attempts, and took ground considerably to their right. Nor were 
they more successful in the efforts which they made to penetrate 
the centre, and break the left. At these points the ground was 
greatly favourable to the British : and as the troops showed the 
same firmness which distinguished their comrades to the right, 
the issue was never for a moment doubtful. For about half an 
hour, indeed, the French were in possession of Betanzos, from 
which their fire fell heavily upon the 14th regiment; but from 
that point they were speedily dislodged ; and, when darkness put 
an end to the fighting, they had been repulsed, with heavy loss 
on all points. 

Sir John Moore received his mortal wound * whilst animating 
the 42nd regiment to the charge, in an early stage of the action. 
The tale already has been told of his death, nor is it probable 
that it will soon cease to retain a place in the memory of the 
people of this country. It is sufficient to observe, that not all 



* " The shoulder was shattered to pieces ; the arm was hanging by a piece 
of skin ; the ribs over the heart, broken and bared of flesh, and the muscles 
of the breast torn into long strips, which were interlaced by their recoil from 
the dragging of the shot." — Napier. 

" He was removed in a blanket by six soldiers, who evinced their 
sympathy by tears ; and, when a spring waggon came up, and it was proposed 
that Sir John should be transferred to ir, the poor fellows respectively 
objected, 'as they would keep step and carry him more easily.' Their 



140 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. x. 

the consciousness of victory, cheering and gratifying as that is, 
was capable of alleviating, in the slightest degree, the grief of 
the army for the loss of its chief. Perhaps the British army has 
produced some abler men than Sir John Moore ; it has certainly 
produced many who, in point of military talent, were and are 
quite his equals ; but it cannot, and perhaps never could, boast 
of one more beloved, not by his own personal friends alone, but 
by every individual that served under him. It would be affec- 
tation to deny that Sir John Moore, during his disastrous retreat, 
issued many orders in the highest degree painful to the feelings 
of honourable men, who felt that their conduct had not merited 
them. His warmest admirers have acknowledged this, and his 
best friends have lamented it; but, in all probability, no one 
would have lamented it more heartily than himself, had he lived 
to review, in a moment of calmness, the general conduct of this 
campaign — because there never lived a man possessed of a better 
heart, nor — in ordinary cases — of a clearer judgment. 

It would be superfluous to enter into anything like a review of 
the merits of this our first military effort in the Peninsula. The 
truth is, that Sir John Moore, with many of the qualities requi- 
site to constitute a general* was deficient in that upon which 
success in war must demand. He wanted confidence in himself — 
he was afraid of responsibility — he underrated the qualities of his 
own troops, and greatly overrated those of his adversary. Yet 

■wishes were attended to, and the dying General was conveyed slowly to his 
quarters in the town, occasionally stopping the bearers to look back upon the 
field, whenever an increased firing arrested his attention. All hope was over 
— he lingered for a little, talking feebly, but collectedly, to those around, and 
dividing his last thoughts, apparently, between his country and his kindred. 
The kindliness of his disposition was, in death, remarkable. Turning to an 
aide-de-camp, he desired to be remembered to his sister — and, feebly pressing 
Colonel Anderson's hand, his head dropped back, and he died without a 
struggle."— Life of Wellington. 

* He always rose between three and four in the morning, lighted his 
fire and candle by a lamp, and wrote till breakfast hour. Afterwards, he 
received commanding officers, transacted business, and then rode out to view 
the troops, or reconnoitre the country. His table was plentiful, his guests 
varying from fourteen to twenty ; with these he talked familiarly, drank a 
few glasses of wine, returned to his orderly business, and was in bed by ten 
o'clock.*' — Memoirs of Sir John Moore, 



1809.] EMBARKATION OF THE ARMY. 141 

let justice be done ! He acted under circumstances at once diffi- 
cult and trying. He was harrassed by being made, in some 
degree, dependant upon the opinions of others : whilst he was 
from the first, destitute of support from the authorities of the 
country. Sir John Moore was a brave and high-spirited soldier. 
He preferred the honour of his army to its safety ; and by pre- 
serving the one, he provided for the other also. 

On the fall of Sir John Moore, and the removal of Sir David 
Baird from the field, the command devolved upon General Hope ; 
who conducted everything with that judgment and coolness which 
peculiarly distinguished him. Though successful in the battle, 
he did not consider himself authorized to depart from the plan 
upon which he knew that the late commander of the forces had 
intended to act. The enemy had no sooner retired than he 
renewed the preparations for embarking the troops — and the 
boats being all in readiness, at ten o'clock that night, brigade after 
brigade filed silently down to the beach. The embarkation was 
covered by Major-general Beresford, at the head of 2,000 men — 
who occupied the land-front of Corunna — and by Major-general 
Hill's brigade, which held the promontory, in rear of the town. 
It went on during the night with great celerity, and without any 
interruption from the French ; but on the following morning a 
corps of light troops pushed towards the town, and seized the 
heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour. No attempt 
was, however, made to molest the covering brigades. The 
situation of General Beresford, under the walls of the place, was 
indeed such, as to place it in a great degree beyond the reach of 
danger ; and the Spaniards protected our movements to the last. 
General Hill's brigade was, accordingly, withdrawn at three o'clock 
on that afternoon ; and finally, as soon as darkness set in, the last 
division quitted its ground, and was received in perfect safety on 
ship-board. 

Thus, without any other interruption than arose from a feeble 
cannonade, directed against our shipping, was the whole of the 
British army, including its sick, its wounded, its artillery, its 
stores, and even its prisoners, conveyed from the coast ; and the 
first campaign of Britain in the Peninsula closed honourably, 
though disastrously. 



142 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [_ CHAF - xr - 



CHAPTER XL 

Consequences of the campaign — Napoleon departs for Germany — Invasion of 
j Portugal by Soult — He defeats the Portuguese and Spaniards at Monterrey, 
and enters Chaves — Oporto carried by assault — Lapisse fails to reduce 
Ciudad Rodrigo, and joins Victor — Battle of Medellin — Sir John Cradock 
and Marshal Beresford make preparations to oppose Soult — Sir Arthur 
Wellesley embarks at Portsmouth ; reaches Lisbon, and makes arrangements 
to take the field. 

In spite of its disastrous termination, the first campaign of the 
British troops in Spain were not unproductive of benefit to the 
general cause. The attention of the enemy being turned mainly 
towards the north, an opportunity was given to the southern 
provinces of repairing the injuries sustained by the defeats of 
Blake, Castanos, and Belvidere ; of that opportunity they were 
not altogether neglectful, and the remains of the beaten armies 
were collected and re- organized, and fresh levies set on foot. 
Palafox, Cuesta, the Duke del Infantado, and the Marquis de 
Palacia, appeared each at the head of a corps ; while Romana, 
retreating towards the Portuguese frontier, endeavoured to rouse 
the energies of Gallicia. 

But the event to which the Peninsula owed its escape from 
immediate conquest, was the unlooked-for arming of Austria, 
and consequent departure of Buonaparte to another scene of 
operations. He had scarcely returned to Madrid from his move- 
ment against Sir John Moore's army, when intelligence of the 
rising storm in the north reached him ; and he found himself 
under the necessity of leaving to his marshals the completion of 
that triumph, of which he had persuaded himself that he should 
have been the achiever. Having once more seated his brother 
on the throne, and amused himself and his adherents by the pro- 
mulgation of a few decrees, he took the road to France ; whither 
he was followed, on the 22nd of January, by the division of 
imperial guards, amounting in all to fifteen thousand men. 

Such was the state of Spain, while in Portugal all was alarm 
and dismay. There remained in or about Lisbon, a corps of 
10,000 or 12,000 British soldiers, under the command of Sir 



1809.] STATE OF PORTUGAL. 143 

John Cradock, upon which alone the smallest confidence could 
be reposed ; for, though the Portuguese were still as far as ever 
from being reconciled to a foreign yoke, they were without 
officers, without discipline, and without confidence. General 
Beresford had, when he received his appointment as commander- 
in-chief, set steadily to the task of re-modelling the Portuguese 
army, by introducing into each battalion a system of drill and 
internal arrangement, similar to that which existed in British 
regiments ; but a revolution so complete could not be effected in 
a moment, nor were its beneficial consequences felt till a later 
period of the war. The only means of defence, independently 
of Sir John Cradock's division, which Portugal could oppose to a 
fresh invasion, consisted of a corps under Silveira, mustering in 
all about 6,000 men, of which one- half only were regulars — the 
Lusitanian Legion, organized by Sir Robert Wilson — Beresford's 
levies, then in progress of organization — the garrison of Oporto, 
made up almost entirely of volunteers ; and bands of ill-armed 
peasants, whose want of order would necessarily incapacitate 
them from acting with effect in the field, though their indi- 
vidual courage might render them formidable as guerillas and 
partidas. 

This was the state of Portugal, when three corps d'armee 
from the French army prepared to invade it. Having reduced 
Corunna and Ferrol, and secured the tranquillity of Gallicia, 
Soult set forward in the direction of Tuy, with the design of 
penetrating through the province of Tras os Montes, seizing 
Oporto, and advancing direct upon Lisbon. To aid him in this 
attempt, Victor was commanded to manoeuvre on the side of 
Badajoz, and send forward a strong column which should unite 
itself with Soult's army in the capital. As these two points of 
attack were, however, at a distance from one another, General 
Lapisse was directed to connect them by occupying the country 
between the Douro and Almeida, by the reduction of Ciudad 
Rodrigo. Here he was to remain till the fall of Oporto ; after 
which he was to unite himself with Victor — when both having 
covered Soult's movement to Lisbon, and seen the imperial eagles 
hoisted there, were to countermarch upon Andalusia, and complete 
its subjugation. 

In accordance with these plans, Soult began his march ; his 



144 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xi. 

place in Gallicia being taken by Ney, and the fourth corps. 
Soult reached the Minho without encountering any obstacles 
besides those which a w T asted district necessarily occasioned ; 
and he made ready to pass the river in a flotilla of fishing-boats, 
which had been collected together for the purpose. But the 
river was wide and rapid ; his sailors unskilful ; and the opposite 
banks, being in possession of some armed peasants under General 
Freire, with a couple of six-pounders, his flotilla was either sunk 
or swept away. He therefore gave up the attempt as impractica- 
ble, and, turning to his left, marched at a quick pace upon Orense, 
where there is a bridge. Here his passage was made good ; and 
here information reached him that Romana, with a body of 
Spaniards, and Silveira, at the head of his Portuguese, were 
drawn up near Monterrey, for the purpose of opposing his 
advance upon Chaves. He hastened to give them battle, defeated 
them with considerable slaughter, and removed to Chaves the 
hospital and magazines, which he had previously established at 
Orense. His next movement was upon Oporto ; where the spirit 
of discord, and even mutiny, which prevailed among the garrison, 
not less than the want of judgment exhibited by the authorities 
in putting the place in a position of defence, made its reduction 
a certainty. 

Nor was the resistance offered by the garrison of Oporto more 
serious than Soult had anticipated. Having overthrown a tumul- 
tuary force, which ventured to oppose him at Braga, he arrived 
before the city on the 23rd of March, and on the same day 
demanded its surrender ; but the summons was rejected. A long 
line of open outworks covered the place, too extensive to be 
defensible. These were attacked at three o'clock in the afternoon 
of the 24th, and carried at a rush ;* and within an hour the 
French soldiers were in possession of the streets. Three or four 

* " Two battalions broke through the barriers of the city, poured into the 
streets,and penetrated to the bridge, driving before them a terrified and helpless 
crowd of men, women, and children. These unhappy fugitives rushed wildly 
on the bridge. The nearest boats gave way to the pressure, and sunk with 
their wretched burden. The cries of these poor creatures were stifled by the 
waters ; and the spectacle was so fearful, that the Frenchmen in pursuit 
paused in the work of death, and exerted themselves to save as many as they 
could." — Sherer, 



1809.] PLUNDER OF OPORTO. 145 

thousand regulars and militia either escaped or surrendered ; the 
Bishop crossed the Douro, and never paused till he had reached 
Lisbon ; and the town was given up, during three whole days, to 
indiscriminate plunder. Several ships were in the harbour, laden 
with the property of individuals, which they had hoped to have 
removed ; but northerly winds prevailing, they could not put to 
sea, and became, of course, a prey to the conquerors. 

Established here, Soult proceeded to make the people of 
Portugal acquainted with the nature of the commission which 
he bore, and the extent of the powers with which he had been 
intrusted. He issued proclamations, calling upon the peasantry 
to return to their homes, and threatening with the severest 
punishments all such persons as should be found with arms 
in their hands. He assured the inhabitants of Lisbon that the 
hour of their deliverance from the bondage of England had 
arrived, and invited them to place themselves and their city, 
under the protection of an officer who had the honour to appear 
among them as the Emperor's representative ; and who, in his 
capacity of go vernor-in- chief, would pay the strictest attention 
to their prejudices, and secure to them the enjoyment of just 
laws and personal liberty. Finally, he denounced vengeance 
against all who should provoke it by bootless opposition. 

In the mean whille, Victor and Lapisse were each carrying on 
a series of operations. Lapisse appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo 
with a corps of 6,000 men, and endeavoured, by a coup-de-main, 
to make himself master of it ; but he was repulsed, and being 
unprovided with battering guns, he did not renew the attempt. 
On the contrary, he marched to his left in search of Victor, 
leaving no force behind to keep open his communications with 
Soult; who, consequently, was completely isolated in his new 
position at Oporto. Victor employed himself in pursuing, from 
place to place, the army of Cuesta ; — from Talavera to Truxillo, 
and afterwards to Merida and Medelin. Here, the Spanish 
General, to save Badajoz, determined to offer battle — and an 
action was accordingly fought in an open plain which surrounds 
the latter town, on the left bank of the Guadiana. The result 
was most disastrous, although in this affair the Spanish infantry 
behaved well. They had gained ground upon the enemy, and 



146 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xi. 

were pressing forward with great gallantry, when a sudden panic 
seized the cavalry, and it fled from the field without striking a 
blow. The French broke in upon the Spanish left, and turned 
it, and all became confusion and dismay. The Duke of Albu- 
querque, who commanded on the right, endeavoured to form his 
division into columns, and to retire in good order ; but the rout 
was complete ; and the loss, in killed, wounded, and taken, was 
greater by far than any Spanish army had sustained from the 
commencement of the war.* 

Cuesta retired towards Llerena, over plains of immense extent, 
with scarcely any cavalry to protect him — and yet Victor, who 
was particularly strong in that arm, attempted no pursuit. 

Things were in this state, when the British government came 
to the wise determination of making another great effort for the 
deliverance of the Peninsula. For this purpose large bodies of 
troops were collected along the coast; consisting partly of the 
regiments which had returned from Corunna, and partly of others 
which had not yet seen service ; and these, as they became 
severally complete, were sent off to Lisbon. 

Among the first who arrived at the scene of action, was 
Major-general Hill. On the 6th of April, he reached Lumias, 
where Sir John Cradock had fixed his head-quarters. General 
Hill, it was said, suggested active measures, and he was sup- 
ported by Beresford's council ; and it was agreed that the 
combined British and Portuguese army should move forward, 
the enemy at this time, being in a state of perfect inaction, 
having discontinued the few demonstrations of a further advance, 
which, on first entering Oporto, they had made, and contented 
themselves with pushing their outposts to the banks of the 
Vouga, while the main body took post between that river and the 
Douro. 



* " The French soldiers, while their strength would permit, continued to 
follow and strike, until three-fifths of the whole Spanish army wallowed in 
blood. Six guns and several thousand prisoners were taken. General Frias, 
deeply wounded, fell into the hands of the victors ; and so utter was the 
discomfiture, that for several days after, Cuesta could not rally a single 
battalion of infantry, and his cavalry was only saved by the speed of the 
horses." — Napier, 



1809.] APPOINTMENT OF SIR A. WELLESLEY. 147 

Such was the general posture of affairs, when Sir Arthur 
Wellesley, to whom, by an extraordinary effort of the war- 
minister of the day, the chief command in Portugal had been 
intrusted, embarked with his staff for the seat of war. To that 
staff it was the writer's fortune to be attached, in the capacity of 
adjutant-general. The vessel got under weigh from Portsmouth 
on Saturday, the 16th of April, with a stiff breeze blowing 
ahead, and had not proceeded beyond the Isle of Wight, when, in 
striving to pass a bank which runs out from St. Catherine's 
point into the sea, the ship missed stays ; this occurred again and 
again, the vessel, every time, falling off to leeward, until the 
breakers were seen at a stone's -throw from the bow. At this 
most critical moment the wind, which had hitherto been blowing 
on shore, suddenly shifted, carried the vessel off the land, and 
blew steadily afterwards until Sir Arthur Wellesley anchored in 
the Tagus, on the 22nd of April, after a passage of six days.* 

No time was lost, either by the commander of the forces, or by 
those immediately attached to him, in endeavouring to make 
themselves thoroughly acquainted, as well with the situation and 
amount of our own resources, as with the arrangements and 
designs of the enemy. The whole of the British corps had 
moved already in three columns, and was to assemble, on the 
24th, at Leiria. Of the Portuguese, two battalions remained at 
Abrantes, whilst the remainder, with Marshal Beresford, were 
collected at Thomar ; and so strenuous and unremitting had been 
his exertions, that they were already estimated at or about 
15,000 men. But it was not from their numbers only that the 
Portuguese troops promised to prove formidable. Warmly 
attached to their English officers, and reposing unbounded con- 
fidence in them, they had applied of late with so much ardour to 



* A wonderful effect was produced upon the British army by the presence 
of their favourite leader. All speculations upon merely defensive movements, 
or upon the probable duration of their stay in the country, ceased at once. 
Active service was looked forward to as a thing that must inevitably follow ; 
and the general inquiry was merely as to how soon the troops might be in 
readiness to march. The Portuguese welcomed Sir Arthur with every 
demonstration of delight, seeming to consider that victory was now assured to 
them.— Ed. 

l2 



148 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xi. 

their military education, that some were already in fit state 
to take the field ; and it required only a little experience, as well 
as a more extensive intermingling of Englishmen in their ranks, 
to put them on a level with the best troops of Europe. Nor 
was it less satisfactory tQ find that the interior economy of these 
battalions had been brought to a state of perfection in keeping 
with their external appearance. Both men and officers had 
learned to mess in the English style ; the pay of the soldiers 
had been increased ; and the mischievous system which heretofore 
had enabledcaptains of companies to defraud their troops, was 
abolished. Every thing went on satisfactorily, and held out a 
promise that the Portuguese army would soon become not only 
efficient in the field, but orderly and well regulated in its can- 
tonments. 

With respect to the^enemy, a variety of rumours were afloat, 
out of which it was not easy to determine which of the many 
had a greater appearance of probability than the rest. Those 
in circulation as to the strength of Soult's and Victor's corps, 
led to an opinion, at head- quarters, that the former could not 
have at his disposal above 12,000 effectives, nor the latter more 
than double that amount. It became, therefore, a question, 
whether an attempt upon Victor would not be preferable to an 
operation in the north. On the one hand, it was quite evident 
that, we r e Victor destroyed, the great game would be played at 
once f )r Soult could not venture to remain at Oporto ; and even 
Madrid would probably be evacuated. On the other hand, it 
might be attended with hazardous consequences to leave the 
capital open, and Soult in our rear. These were matters which 
required mature consideration ; and Sir Arthur Wellesley could 
not arrive at a sound conclusion on the subject until he had 
consulted with Beresford and Cradock. In the mean while, that 
time might not be wasted, the most active preparations were set 
on foot, to render the troops moveable in any direction, and at 
the shortest notice. The commissariat arrangements, which had 
fallen into miserable confusion, were once more placed in train ; 
mules, bullocks, and such cars as seemed likely to be wanted, 
were put in requisition ; and flying depots of hospital and other 
stores were disposed in order for immediate transport. All these 



1809.] ACTIVE OPERATIONS. 149 

matters went to satisfy the troops that they should not long 
remain inactive ; and the promise they held out was realized in 
due time. 



CHAPTER XII. 



Disposition of the allied troops — They assemble at Coirnbra, and are re- 
viewed — State of the French army changed by the defeat of General 
Lefevre — Sir Arthur Wellesley arranges his plans, and the brigades are 
commanded to move. 

Sir John Cradock being at this time afflicted with severe 
illness, failed in reaching Lisbon as early as could have been 
wished ; but Marshal Beresford, on whose report great reliance 
deservedly was placed, came in without the loss of an hour. He 
spoke in high terms of the Portuguese troops, and expressed 
himself sanguine as to the result of any operations which might 
he undertaken. Under these circumstances Sir Arthur Wellesley 
determined to take the field at once ; and the following is a brief 
outline of the general arrangements entered into in consequence 
of that determination. 

The British troops, with the exception of one brigade of 
infantry and one of cavalry, under General Mackenzie, were 
ordered to assemble, with as little delay as possible, at Coirnbra, 
and take up the line of the Mondego. They amounted, including 
two brigades of Germans, to 17,000 effectives — the detached 
corps mustering 2700 men, about one-half of which was cavalry. 
These were to be joined by a portion of the Portuguese army, 
which was so distributed, that in each brigade one Portuguese 
might take its place between two British battalions. By this 
disposition, the fidelity, and to a certain extent, the gallantry of 
the allies, would be secured ; for, should they exhibit any dis- 
position to desert their colours, they might at any moment be 
annihilated by the corps which hemmed them in. The army, 
thus arranged, would amount in all to about 20,000 men — 6000 
of which were allotted to act as a separate corps under Beres- 



150 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xii. 

ford ; and it was understood that its first operation would be 
turned against Soult and the French force in Oporto. 

In the mean time, a division of 12,000 men, composed en- 
tirely of Portuguese, w T ith the exception of the two British 
brigades already mentioned, was to take post, under General 
Mackenzie, at Santarem and Abrantes. 

Having put matters in train, the head-quarters of the British 
army quitted Lisbon ; and halting at Pombal on the 1st, 
arrived at Coimbra on the 2nd of May ; and here, as in the 
capital. General Wellesley was received with a degree of en- 
thusiasm which strongly marked the confidence of all classes in 
his abilities. 

It has been already stated that one brigade of infantry, and 
another of cavalry, placed under the orders of Major-general 
Mackenzie, were detached on a particular service. The regi- 
ments composing the latter, were the 3rd and 4th heavy dragoons, 
brigaded under General Fane, and the 2nd and 24th regiments 
of foot. The remainder of the army formed seven brigades of 
infantry of the line, two brigades of Germans, one brigade of 
guards, and one brigade of light cavalry. 

The command of the cavalry, which consisted of the 14th, 
16th, and 20th British, and the 3rd Light Dragoons of the King's 
German Legion, was given to Major-general Cotton ; whilst a 
brigade of guards — the 1st Battalion of the Coldstream, and 
1st of the 3rd Guards — were strengthened by a company of 
riflemen from the 5th battalion of the 60th, and commanded by 
Brigadier- General H. Campbell. Major-General Hill was at the 
head of the first brigade, the Buffs (3rd), the 66th, the 48th, 
and a company of the 60th. Major- General Tilson had the 
third brigade, composed of five companies of the 60th, the 88th, 
1st battalion Portuguese Grenadiers, and the 87th. The 5th 
brigade, comprising the 7th, 1st batallion 10th Portuguese, the 
53rd, and a company of the 60th, was placed under Brigadier- 
General A. Campbell. Brigadier-General Cameron commanded 
the 7th brigade, which consisted of the 9th, 2nd batallion 10th 
Portuguese, the 83rd, and a rifle company. The sixth brigade 
composed of the 1st batallion detachments, 1st batallion 16th 
Portuguese, and the 29th, was under the orders of Brigadier- 
General R. Stewart. The 4th brigade, consisting of the 2nd 



1809.] STRENGTH OF THE ARMY. 151 

batallion detachments, 2nd batallion, 16th Portuguese, the 97th, 
and a rifle company was commanded by Brigadier- General 
Sontag ; whilst the 2nd brigade, including the 27th, 45th, and 
31st, were under Major- General Mackenzie. The Germans 
were divided into two brigades, under the respective orders of 
Brigadier- Generals Longthwert and Drieberg ; the whole being 
commanded by Major- General Murray. 

In addition to these arrangements, four major-generals, — 
namely, Sherbrooke, Payne, Lord William Bentinck, and Paget, 
received local rank as lieutenant-generals during the continuance 
of the service, that they might severally take command of such 
divisions as the General-in-Chief should from time to time see fit 
to consolidate. At the head of the adjutant-generals' department 
Brigadier- General Stewart* was placed, and Colonel Murray, 3rd 
Guards, acted as Quarter-master- general. 

His troops being thus distributed, Sir Arthur Wellesley 
proceeded to consider his plan of the campaign. 

Without particularizing the positions of the French army, 
which would only weary the reader, it will be sufficient to detail 
the opening movements of the British General. Marshal Beres- 
ford received instructions to proceed from Coimbra with his own 
corps, and some Portuguese troops, which, under Sir Robert 
Wilson, occupied Vizeu, as far as Lamego ; to cross the Douro 
there, and join General Silveira in Amarante. As soon as this 
movement should have been effected, and a detached column 
established in the province of Entre Douro e Minho, the force 
from Coimbra was to advance, by the great roads of Vouga and 
Avouros, upon Oporto. In the mean while, Beresford's corps, 
descending the Douro, was to seize every boat which lay along its 
shore, and so arrange them, that the means of crossing might be 
had, so soon as the divisions should reach the river. The pro- 
babilities were, that Soult, finding himself beset on all hands, 
would not attempt a resistance which he must perceive would be 
in vain ; but, in case his obstinacy should get the better of his 
prudence, the Douro was to be passed at every hazard, and 
without delay. 

Everything was in readiness for carrying these arrangements 

* The writer of this narrative, now Marquis of Londonderry. 



152 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xn. 

into force, when, on the evening of the 4th, a despatch from 
Silveira arrived, to inform Sir Arthur Wellesley of a severe defeat 
which he had sustained at the town of Amarante. The enemy, 
it appeared, favoured by a dense fog, attacked him there on 
the 2nd, forced the bridge over the Tamega, and took eight or 
nine pieces of cannon. He was now falling back, with the remains 
of his corps, upon Lamego, in presence of several bodies of 
French troops which had crossed the Douro. In addition to this 
intelligence, a rumour reached us, that the enemy had evacuated 
Viana, Villa de Conde, and other places on the coast ; it was 
reported, moreover, that he was busily employed in the destruc- 
tion of stores and magazines in Oporto, and numerous 
preparations were said to be going on for the immediate 
abandonment of the city. All this information coming at once, 
could not but occasion a change in our plans. It was manifest 
that Soult would not submit to be quietly surrounded ; on the 
contrary, that he meditated either the removal of the seat of 
war by circuitous marches to the Tagus, there to be supported 
by some movements on the side of Victor, or designed to attempt 
an escape out of Portugal by the Tras os Montes. The latter 
scheme was justly regarded as by many degrees more probable 
than the former ; because, to bring his army across the Douro, 
and advance by Lamego, would be to leave us upon his flank ; 
and it was resolved that no time should be lost in striving to 
defeat it. 

At this period, serious discontent prevailed in the ranks of the 
French army. There existed in them a secret society, the members 
of which, under the title of Philadelphes, bound themselves by 
oath to attempt, whenever a favourable opportunity should occur, 
the abolition of the imperial dynasty, and the restoration of a 
democracy in France. Soult's corps was not free from men of this 
description, at the head of whom was an adjutant-major. This 
personage was in constant communication with Sir Arthur Wel- 
lesley, to whom he proposed a scheme for seducing the soldiers 
from their duty, and arresting his general ; and though he was 
received with all the caution, and treated with the reserve which 
prudence required, still there was that in his manner and mode 
of acting which commanded attention. From him we learned that 
a spirit, almost mutinous, was at work in Oporto ; that the hos- 



1809.] BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE RANK. 153 

pitals were crowded with sick ; and that but one feeling pre- 
vailed among all ranks, that unmitigated dislike to particular 
service in which they were employed. It will readily be believed 
that such information increased our anxiety to be beforehand with 
the enemy, of whose design to evacuate Portugal it was impossible 
any longer to entertain a doubt. Preparations were accordingly 
made to lead the army, in two divisions, directly upon the Douro, 
— one moving by Aveira, and the other by Vouga ; whilst Beres- 
ford, preceding it with his advanced-guard a single day, should 
move by Vizeu upon Lamego. 

Some time was, however, required to bring up the various 
regiments and brigades from their detached stations; and this 
interval was spent, partly in putting the commissariat into a state 
of greater efficiency, and partly in smoothing down certain 
awkward feelings which had unhappily arisen on the score of 
rank. There was a considerable jealousy, on the part of some of 
our senior officers, with respect to the stations to which the Por- 
tuguese commission might advance their juniors, whilst acting 
with the combined armies. General Beresford furnished a case in 
point, who, though inferior in the date of his British appointment 
to several local lieutenant-generals, took rank as a field-marshal 
in Portugal, and commanded as such, the advance of the allied 
forces. To obviate this, it was necessary to explain, that Por- 
tuguese rank could not be permitted to have weight only as 
long as both British and Portuguese troops were under their 
present leader ; but that, in case of any vacancy in the supreme 
command, he would of course succeed, whose British rank 
happened to be the most elevated. Nor was it ever intended that 
a senior British officer should act immediately under his junior, 
notwithstanding the station which the latter might temporarily 
fill : and hence care was taken that no man should be appointed 
to a command in Beresford's corps, who was not, in point of 
fact, his junior in the British service. Other difficulties arose as 
fast as these ceased, touching the mode of paying the officers 
attached to Portuguese battalions ; and it was only by an exercise 
of clear judgment and firmness, that our chief was enabled to set 
them all at rest. 

As the troops began to an ve in and around Coimbra, the 
difficulty of finding forage for the horses and mules increased 



154 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xii. 

seriously. The markets, however were good — the inhabitants 
freely supplying every article of provision at a moderate price ; 
but the expense of supporting the army was enormous. It was 
calculated that the British troops alone circulated through 
Coimbra a sum of not less than £10,000 per day ; and that 
the whole money spent by the allies exceeded £100,000 per 
week. 

On the 5th of May, the army being at length assembled, a 
grand review took place ; and a most imposing and magnificent 
spectacle it presented. The whole of the troops were, indeed, 
in the highest state of discipline and efficiency; and appeared 
animated by one spirit — an ardent desire to meet the enemy. 
Nor were they kept long in a state of suspense. On that very 
evening, definite plans were arranged ; and, on the following 
morning, it was understood that the columns would be gin to 
move. 

As the intention of turning Soult's left by way of Lamego and 
Amarante still held good, Beresford, to whom that office was 
intrusted, received orders to march at day-break on the 6th. He 
was to be followed on the morning of the 7th, as previously 
arranged, by the brigades of General Tilson and Fane. On the 
same day, Cotton, at the head of the 14th and 16th light 
dragoons, supported by General Stewart's brigade of infantry, 
was to move upon Mullanda, to arrive at Adigal on the 8th, 
followed by the King's German Legion. General Hill's brigade 
was to march on the 6th, to reach Aveira on the 8th ; and the 
head-quarters were to move on the same day towards Adego and 
the Vouga. Such were the orders issued on the evening of 
the 6th ; prefatory to the opening of a brief but brilliant cam- 
paign. 



1809.] MARCH TOWARDS OPORTO. 155 



CHAPTER XIII. 

The army advances towards the Douro — The enemy attacked and driven from 
Albergaria Nova — Affair of Grijon — Passage of the Douro, and defeat of 
Soult. 

The dawn of the /th of May was breaking, when the advanced- 
guard of the army, accompanied by General Cotton's brigade of 
cavalry, began its march in the direction of Oporto. It pro- 
ceeded leisurely, and was followed by the whole of the army, in 
two columns, of three divisions ; two of which, under Generals 
Paget and Payne, moved by the Vouga road, whilst the third 
advanced upon Aveira, under General Hill. The latter movements 
did not, however, take place till the 9th — the main body halting 
during the 8th, in order that Beresford, who set out on the 6th 
for Vizeu and Lamego, might be enabled to reach his destination 
in time, and take possession of Amarante, when we should begin 
to show ourselves in front of Oporto. It was intended that, on 
the evening of the 9th, Hill should embark at Aveira, where boats 
were prepared for the purpose, and that he should make good 
his landing at Ovar, on an early hour on the morning of the 10th. 
On the latter day, Cotton was directed to beat up the enemy's 
posts between the Vouga and Oliveira, opening, by this means, 
a communication with General Hill ; and he was to be supported 
in the undertaking by Generals Stewart and Murray, who, with 
their respective corps, received directions to pass the Vouga, and 
move on Albergaria Nova. 

In the mean while, Sherbrooke and Cameron were to follow, so 
that the latter embarking at Oveiro on the evening of the 10th, 
might reach Ovar on the 11th. Then Cotton and Hill, whose 
junction, it was calculated, might by that time be effected, were 
to march rapidly upon Villa Nova ; and it was hoped that the 
celerity of the movements would be such as to secure the bridge 
at all events, even should they fail in cutting off the rear-guard 
of the enemy. This was the more necessary, as the bridge at 
Villa Nova formed the only means by which we should be enabled 
to pass the Douro; and were it to be broken, a very serious 

M 



156 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xiii. 

obstacle to the ultimate success of the expedition would thus be 
created. 

It has been said that the advanced-guard, accompanied by- 
General Cotton's division of cavalry, began its march on the 
morning of the 7th. The corps in question consisted of two 
brigades of infantry, one British and one German — with two 
brigades of artillery — one of sixes, the other of threes. It 
reached the village of Andeja on the evening of the 8th ; and 
finding that a body of the enemy, consisting of two regiments of 
cavalry, with some infantry and guns, were cantoned in Albergaria 
Nova and the adjacent villages, a scheme was devised for sur- 
prising them. With this design, the troops passed the Vouga 
soon after it became dark, when General Cotton, diverging from 
the beaten track, set off with the cavalry by a road which led 
round the villages to the right. Whilst he was executing this 
movement, the infantry and artillery, led by General Paget, pre- 
pared to make their way over some difficult ground, called the 
pass of Vouga. Having halted for about two hours, in order that 
Cotton might have time to get well up, and to make his disposi- 
tions, they resumed their march, Colonel Trant, with his 
Portuguese, undertaking to transport the guns through the most 
rugged parts of the pass. It unfortunately fell out, however, that 
the obstacles opposed to the progress of the artillery were 
greater than had been anticipated ; and the morning of the 9th 
broke before the pass was cleared. This necessarily retarded both 
the infantry and the cavalry ; in addition to which, the guides on 
whom Cotton had relied, mistook the proper road. The conse- 
quence was, that when our cavalry arrived, not in the rear, nor 
on the flank of Albergaria, but in its front, they found the enemy 
drawn up to receive them, their horse being in line upon an open 
plain, covered by a body of riflemen ; whilst a party of infantry 
occupied a pine-wood on their flank. 

Cotton had not anticipated this reception ; he halted his people, 
and remained stationary ; and was thus situated when Sir Arthur 
Wellesley arrived with the infantry. The latter were instantly 
directed to advance ; the British, under Paget, passing through 
Albergaria; and the Portuguese, under Trant, through some 
hamlets on the left ; whilst the cavalry, forming the centre, 
pressed upon the open space between both villages. The British 



1809.] PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY. 157 

and Portuguese infantry pushed on without a halt, under an 
exceedingly brisk fire, which was as briskly returned ; but the 
cavalry were not so fortunate. The position was carried with 
little loss. The enemy retreated hastily, and our advanced- 
guard passed the night at Oliveira ; the guards and the remainder 
of the column taking quarters at Albergaria. 

At an early hour on the lith, the march was renewed; but 
we had not proceeded far, when a strong body of the enemy, 
amounting to 4,000 or 5,000 infantry, with four regiments of 
cavalry, appeared in our front. They occupied a commanding posi- 
tion upon some hills beyond the village of Grijon, and seemed 
determined to defend it. Sir Arthur Wellesley saw, in a 
moment, that the height upon which the enemy rested his left 
could be turned, and took his measures accordingly. Without 
halting the column, he ordered General Murray, from the rear of 
the advance-guard, to move round by the right, throwing, at the 
same time, the 16th Portuguese into a pine-wood on the left. 
The latter were intended rather to distract the enemy's attention 
than themselves to attempt anything serious ; whilst General 
Paget, supported by two battalions in reserve, manoeuvred upon 
their front. A very heavy firing immediately began; but the 
enemy no sooner observed the judicious movement round their 
left, than they abandoned their strong ground, and fled. Upon 
this, our troops were again thrown into column, and the march 
resumed as if nothing had happened ; every movement being made 
with the same coolness, and in as perfect order, as on a 
field-day. 

As soon as we mounted the heights from which the French 
had just been driven, the rear was observed retiring in great con- 
fusion ; and it occurred to me that a good opportunity was fur- 
nished of making a successful charge. Sir Arthur Wellesley 
instantly acceded to my proposal, and, two squadrons being 
intrusted to me, we galloped forward in sections along the road, 
and overthrew, by repeated attacks, everything which stood in 
our way — our prisoners alone amounting to upwards of 100 men. 
The enemy, upon this, halted, formed their infantry on the 
heights of Carvalhos, which commanded the road, and checked 
the pursuit of the cavalry. An orderly was immediately des- 
patched to the rear, to request that greater force might be sent 

m 2 



158 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xiii. 

up : and, in the mean while, the squadrons wheeled off to the right, 
and threatened the enemy's left, by a road which ran in that 
direction. This movement alone, had the desired effect. Before 
the additional troops could arrive, the enemy were once more in 
full retreat, and the heights of Carvalhos were abandoned. 

In this manner we continued our journey, marching and fight- 
ing, without any intermission, from nine in the morning till five in 
the afternoon ; for the march of the column was never for an 
instant delayed because the advance-guard happened to be 
engaged. At last, however, we halted for the night ; the advance 
bivouacking on the ground where it stood, and the guards occupy- 
ing Grijon and Carvalhos ; while the head- quarters of the army, 
established itself in the convent of Grijon, where the French 
generals breakfasted that morning. Marmet, Thomieres, Dela- 
borde, and Franceschi, had been opposed to us ; and some said 
that Soult himself was probably on this side of the Douro. Nor 
was it less satisfactory to learn that Hill had landed at Ovar. 
He was followed by Cameron ; and both were already in com- 
munication. 

The next day's march exhibited the " tokens true" of war — 
cottages unroofed and in ruins ; gardens and enclosures laid 
waste, and the most wanton destruction of everything destruc- 
tible, marked the route by which the enemy had retired. But we 
fell in with none of his parties. Soult had withdrawn his whole 
force across the Douro in the night, and broken down the bridge. 

About ten o'clock in the morning, the advanced-guard, con- 
sisting of two brigades of infantry, with two squadrons of the 
14th dragoons, arrived at the village, or rather suburb, of Villa 
Nova. It was joined here by General Hill's corps, which, 
marching from Ovar along the sea- shore, overtook us at the 
entrance of the place. We found, as we expected, that the bridge 
had been destroyed ; and that Soult had taken the precaution to 
remove every boat to the opposite side of the river. Under these 
circumstances, it became no easy matter to surmise how the 
passage was to be effected ; though every one felt that effected it 
must be, and that speedily. We were yet hesitating what course 
to pursue, when Colonel Waters, of the Portuguese service, by 
whom the destruction of the bridge had been reported, was 
ordered to gallop forward, and secure the means of transport at 



1809.] PASSAGE OF THE DOURO. 159 

any risk. That intelligent officer instantly proceeded to the 
river's bank — and at a spot where it forms a curve, opposite to 
the Convento da Cerra, and where, at the distance of a mile and 
a half from Oporto, its course is concealed by a thick wood, — he 
found a small boat hidden among the bushes ; and standing near 
it were the prior of the convent, and three or four peasants. The 
latter, partly at his entreaty, and partly by the exhortations of the 
prior, were persuaded to leap with him into the little skiff, and 
make directly to the opposite bank, where there lay, upon the 
mud, four large barges, of which they made themselves masters. 
The deed was a daring one, for patrols of the enemy passed 
to and fro continually ; but they returned with their prizes un- 
observed. General Paget, with three companies of the Buffs, 
instantly embarked ; and, crossing the river without a moment's 
delay, took possession of some houses on the opposite bank, 
before the enemy were aware of their intentions. They had not, 
however, taken their ground many minutes, when the French, 
awaking as from a trance, advanced to dislodge them. A 
severe action now ensued, in which our troops resolutely main- 
tained themselves, in spite of odds the most overwhelming; 
nor was the slightest impression made upon them, till fresh com- 
panies arrived to their support, and all chance of defeat was 
ended. 

In the mean while, our people on the opposite side planted 
guns upon the Convent height, from which a plunging fire was 
opened upon the enemy's columns. General Murray, too, who 
had been detached with his division to a ferry higher up, was 
fortunate enough to gain possession of as many boats as enabled 
him to pass over two battalions of Germans, with two squadrons 
of the 14th; and these, showing themselves upon the enemy's 
left, the latter immediately retreated from the bank of the river. 
In an instant the Douro was covered with boats, which the 
inhabitants hastened to convey across for our accommodation ; 
and the 29th, the two remaining battalions of Germans, and the 
guards, were all passed over from Villa Nova. We were now in 
complete possession of the town, the enemy flying in all direc- 
tions.* Their principal retreat was, however, upon the road to 

* " If General Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered 



160 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xiii. 

Amarante, which they covered with infantry, cavalry and artillery, 
all in the greatest confusion ; and thither they were pursued by 
the dragoons from General Murray's corps, under my orders, 
with the gallant Colonel Hervey, of the 14th, who unfortunately, 
lost his arm in this skirmish. The slaughter was great, for a 
panic had evidently arisen ; and as we followed them a consi- 
derable way, repeated opportunities of charging to advantage 
were furnished. At last we were recalled ; and the w T hole army 
assembled to recover from its fatigues, in the city. 

The passage of the Douro is considered, justly, one of the most 
brilliant of Wellington's exploits. To cross a wide and rapid 
river, in the face of a formidable enemy, even with the assistance 
of an adequate supply of boats and pontoons, requires no trifling 
degree of courage and of management ; but on the present occa- 
sion the passage was made good in spite of difficulties under 
which few would have attempted it. So little, indeed, did Souh 
anticipate an attempt of the kind, that he directed his undivided 
attention to the sea ; and when reports were brought to him, that 
the British troops were crossing from Villa Nova, he refused, at 
first, to credit them. But Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that the 
very boldness of his plan went far towards securing its success ; 
lie felt, moreover, that upon the promptitude of his movements, 
the safety of Marshal Beresford's corps in a great degree de- 
pended ; and he made up his mind to hazard somet ; i th er 
than permit such an opportunity of striking a blow to escape him 
altogether. The evening was not far advanced, when the sound 
of firing ceased, and the most perfect order, consistent with a 
scene of universal rejoicing, prevailed in Oporto. Our head- 
quarters were established in the house which Soult had occupied, 
where we found every preparation for a comfortable dinner, the 

crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete ; but he suffered column 
after column to pass him, without even a cannon-shot, and seemed fearful 
lest they should turn and push him into the river. General Charles Stewart 
and Major Hervey, however, impatient of this inactivity, charged with the 
two squadrons of dragoons, and rode over the enemy's rear-guard, as it was 
pushing through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond. Laborde was 
unhorsed, Foy badly wounded ; and on the English side, Major Hervey lost 
an arm ; and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, were 
obliged to fight their way back, with loss."— Napier. 



1809.] JUNCTION OF SOULT AND LOISON. 161 

French marshal having quitted the place so lately as two in the 
afternoon, long after his dinner had been ordered. We had no 
time for relaxation ; orders were issued for putting the army in a 
condition to resume the pursuit with as little delay as possible ; 
and, on the morrow, the columns were again in motion. Of the 
night advantage had been taken to bring up and pass along the 
whole of the artillery, waggons, and commissariat stores ; and 
when the dawn of the 13th appeared, General Murray's brigade 
was in a condition to march. It set out accordingly on the 
road to Amarante ; and the guards, with the rest of the infantry, 
prepared to follow in the evening. 

Whilst we were thus carrying every thing before us on the 
banks of the Douro, Marshal Beresford, with his detached corps, 
was not idle. Arriving at Villa Real on the 9th, and being there 
strengthened by the junction of Silveira's troops, he began his 
march on the following morning, in the direction of Amarante. 
On the 11th, his advance, under Silveira, reached that place, 
where a slight skirmish occurred with the division of General 
Loison ; but the latter retreated immediately, taking, as it was 
believed, the road to Oporto. Of these events Beresford took 
care to inform us : whilst he himself marched rapidly in pursuit 
of Loison, fearful lest his junction with Soult should render the 
latter too strong for us. By this time, however, Soult was over- 
thrown, and in full retreat ; the consequence was, that his corps 
fell in with that of Loison, at Penafiel, on the evening of the 
12th; and both prepared to continue, in conjunction with each 
other, a confused and a disastrous flight upon Spain. 

There were two routes before Soult, by one or other of which 
he must necessarily retreat, if he desired to preserve any of the 
materiel of his army. Either he should make for Galicia, by 
Ponte de Lima, Valencia, and Tuy ; or, as was more probable, 
endeavour to reach Valladolid, by Chaves — and it was requisite, 
on our part, to provide against both contingencies. For this purpose, 
instructions were forwarded to Beresford, on the 13th, directing 
him, in case the enemy should abandon Amarante, to move 
upon Chaves, and to make himself master of that line of opera- 
tions — while our corps were to march in such order, as would at 
once press upon the rear of the fugitives, supposing them to hold 
to the Amarante road. General Murray, accordingly, pressed 



162 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xiii. 

forward in the direction of Penafiel, followed, on the morning of 
the 13th, hy the Hanoverian Legion and a squadron of cavalry. 
On the 14th, the rest of the army took the lower road 
towards Barcelos and Valencia. On the 15th, authentic intelli- 
gence reached us that the whole of the French force was 
retiring upon Chaves, after it had burned and destroyed the great 
bulk of its stores, and even its artillery, in Penafiel. An im- 
mediate alteration of plan was the consequence. Whilst the 
cavalry, the guards, and General Cameron's brigade, advanced as 
far as Braga, the remainder stopped short at Villanova de Fame- 
licao ; and, the lower road being entirely abandoned, all were 
instructed to move towards Chaves. Thither, therefore, the 
whole strength of the army directed itself ; and it was con- 
fidently anticipated that great events must follow ; for no one 
could doubt that the French army would here suffer complete 
defeat, provided Beresford's corps should have succeeded in occu- 
pying Chaves, in their front. 

In the meanwhile a variety of rumours respecting the present 
and future undertakings of the enemy in Spain, were hourly 
pouring in. Ney was reported to have withdrawn from Lugo, 
and to have moved in the direction of the frontier ; whilst Bes- 
sieres was stated to have detached from Valladolid a strong force, 
for the purpose of acting against us. Then came letters from 
Victor to Ney, which our flying parties had intercepted, bearing 
date at Merida, on the 29th of April. From these, it appeared 
that Victor had, by King Joseph's orders, opened a communi- 
cation with the junta of Seville, from which he expected the 
most favourable results. 



1809.] soult's retreat. 163 



CHAPTER XIV. 

Sir Arthur Wellesley follows the French army — Skirmish at Salamonde — 
Soult makes for Orense, and the pursuit is abandoned — The allies counter- 
march on Coimbra, where a reinforcement of 5,000 men reaches them — 
Movement towards the south— Communications opened with Cuesta — His 
plans for the campaign opposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley — The army 
becomes sickly, and distressed for money and stores. 

Though no man could feel more acutely than our gallant 
leader, that his energies were sadly cramped for want of means ; 
and though the arrival of at least 10,000 fresh troops was an 
event for which he, in common with his followers, rather wished 
than hoped, he determined that nothing should be wanting 
on his part to make the most of the force already at his 
disposal. 

Having ascertained, on the night of the 15th, by a report from 
General Murray, who, with the Hanoverians, had followed the 
enemy from Penanel to Guimaraens, and was now in communication 
with us from that place, that Soult was destroying his artillery 
and stores, and that the utmost distress prevailed in the French 
ranks, Sir Arthur Wellesley came to the conclusion, that to 
pursue any further with the whole of his force, would be to 
harrass the men to little purpose. It was evident, that Soult 
had made up his mind to retreat in a direction where no army 
could pretend to follow him and preserve its organization. 
Whilst, therefore, he directed Murray to fall from Guimaraens 
into our line of march, under the impression that men in a 
desperate situation might even yet make a desperate attempt, 
he commanded Hill, with the four brigades of which he was at 
the head, to halt at Braga ; and he did so, both because he still 
looked to a countermarch upon the Tagus, and determined not to 
waste his resources among the barren mountains of Galicia ; 
for, that Soult would make for the mountains, no one could 
doubt — as he had disencumbered himself of everything calcu- 
lated to retard his progress, not excepting the plunder of Oporto 
and the caissons which contained the spare musket- ammunition 



164 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xiv. 

for his soldiers ; and was in full march towards the pass of the 
Sierra de Montalegre.* 

In consequence of these arrangements, the advance of our 
army began its march at an early hour on the morning of the 
16th, and came up, towards evening, with the enemy's rear-guard 
near the village of Salamonde, about four leagues from Braga, on 
the road to Chaves. The enemy were posted upon strong heights 
in front of the village, having in their rear the river Cavade, 
over which are thrown two bridges, f There are two roads, 
one of which passes through Ruevaens and along the tops 
of some lofty mountains beyond it — whilst the other leads to 
a by-path, which, after penetrating, by a shorter cut, through 
the valley, winds into the main road, over the hills. Though 
the brigade of guards was the only portion of our force at hand, 
the General resolved to attack ; and one moment spent in recon- 
noitering, satisfied him as to the best means of proceeding. There 
was an exceedingly high and steep hill upon the enemy's left, 
which they had occupied in force ; their right being likewise on a 

* " Not a moment was to be lost ; already the British outposts began to 
appear, and the thunder of their horse-artillery was heard at no great dis- 
tance. The energy of the French General, however, now fully aroused, was 
equal to the crisis. He instantly resolved to abandon his artillery, ammu- 
nition, baggage, and make his way, with all imaginable expedition, across 
the mountains to the Braga road. This resolution was immediately adopted ; 
all the powder which the men could not carry, was blown up, near Penafiel, 
on the morning of the 13th; and the French army, abandoning its car- 
riages, rapidly ascended the valley of the Souza, by roads almost imprac- 
ticable, even for the cavalry; rejoined Loison at Guimaraens, and, continuing 
its passage over the mountains, and leaving Braga on its left, at length 
regained the great road at San-Joad del Rey, a short way beyond that 
town." — Alison's History of Europe. 

f Soult succeeded in forcing one of these, in a very remarkable manner. 
He selected the most resolute and daring of his officers, gave him a hundred 
picked men, and orders to force the bridge. Major Dulong, upon whom this 
duty devolved, fully justified his leader's choice. Taking advantage of a 
storm that was raging, and preserving dead silence among his men, he 
reached the bridge. A narrow wall was all that now remained of it ; and 
beneath this, foamed and whirled a raging mountain torrent. Dulong crept 
over it, with eleven of his followers. One only was lost in the flood ; the 
remainder, falling suddenly upon the astonished guard, and favoured by the 
darkness, obtained possession of a fort, which a handful of determined men 
might have held against almost any number. — Ed. 



1809.] A PANIC. 165 

hill, and covered, in front, by a deep ravine. The latter 
point was not assailable, but the former appearing to Sir 
Arthur Wellesley to be capable of being turned, he instantly 
despatched the riflemen, supported by three companies, to make 
the attempt. The guards were then formed in column on the 
road, covered by two three -pounders — and w T ere directed, as soon 
as the light troops should show themselves on the brow of the 
hill, to charge. 

As the ground over which the riflemen were compelled to pass, 
chanced to be peculiarly broken, a considerable detour was neces- 
sary, and some time elapsed before they reached their destination : 
but their arrival was no sooner perceived, than the guards ad- 
vanced. The enemy made no attempt at any serious resistance. 
They gave their fire, indeed, as soon as the head of the column 
came within range ; but immediately abandoned their ranks, and 
fled in the greatest confusion. We pursued them through the 
village with all the eagerness of men who have barely seen an 
object which they are anxious to overtake ; but the darkness 
came on fast, and none could say exactly by which of the two 
roads they had retreated. At last, a large mass was described 
upon the lower bridge, passing in a state of absolute disorgani- 
zation. Upon these the guns were got to bear ; and before they 
could clear the defile, considerable execution was done.* Our 
infantry, however, were soon obliged to abandon the pursuit; 
and we returned to the village, where, in a few miserable hovels, 
stripped and plundered of everything portable, we passed the 
night. 

At early dawn on the following; morninsr, we again made 
ready to advance ; and, as day-light broke, were able to discover 

* " It was a bridge with a low parapet, over a deep ravine, and so narrow 
as not to admit two horsemen abreast. The enemy had driven away the 
peasants who were attempting to destroy it, but a fire was kept up upon 
them by others, from the crags of that awful pass ; and upon the report of 
some cannon, fired by the advanced guard of the pursuers upon their rear, 
the French were seized with panic; many threw down their arms, and ran ; 
they struggled with each other to cross the bridge, losing all self-command ; 
and the British advance, when they arrived at the spot, found the ravine 
on both sides choked with men and horses, that had been jostled over in the 
frantic precipitancy of their flight."— Southey. 



10(3 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xiv. 

that terrible havoc had been made at the lower bridge. The 
bodies of 400 or 500 men and horses lay there ; some killed by- 
cannon-shot, others precipitated headlong into the river, whilst 
baggage of every description, cars, waggons, and even knapsacks, 
all loaded with plunder, blocked tip the bridges, and rendered 
them quite impassable. The same species of encumbrances filled 
the little streets. Articles of the greatest value, such as silver 
cups, rich tapestry, and cloth of gold, ]ay strewed about in the 
mud ; and it seemed as if the enemy had totally lost heart, and 
relinquished everything to preserve life and liberty. One ad- 
vantage they obtained by this hasty abandonment of property — 
the roads were so completely encumbered as to render our passage 
disorderly and slow ; and we were, in consequence, obliged to 
halt that night at Ruevaens. 

During the three last days, the rain had come down in torrents ; 
and our men, who were continually exposed to it, by night as well 
as by day, began to exhibit symptoms of suffering from their hard- 
ships. On this account, as well as because it was now ascertained 
that Soult, instead of moving upon Chaves, had turned off from 
Montalegre to Orense, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to relin- 
quish the pursuit, for Beresford had anticipated the instruc- 
tions sent to him, and was already in possession of Chaves ; so 
that all that could be done to intercept the flying enemy, had been 
effected. 

The sufferings and losses of Soult's army had been equally 
severe. The whole extent of their route was strewed with the 
carcases of mules, horses, and even men, who, unable to keep up, 
had been left behind ; the horses and mules being killed or 
hamstrung, and the men either dead, or in a state of the most 
pitiable exhaustion. Broken carriages, tumbrils, guns, and every 
thing capable of rendering an army efficient, met us at every 
step. Nor was it by such marks alone that their line of march 
could be pointed out. Every village, hamlet, or cottage, which 
they passed, was wantonly set on fire, till the sky became ob- 
scured during the day by volumes of smoke, and illuminated 
at night by the blaze of burning dwellings — while, on the inha- 
bitants, they exercised the most wanton cruelty. But these 
outrages were not unpunished. Such of the peasantry as escaped, 
collected together in groups, and hung upon the rear and flanks 



1809.] SUFFERINGS OF THE FRENCH. 167 

of the retreating army, and every straggler who fell into their 
hands, was put to death under circumstances of terrible atrocity. 
It was no uncommon thing to come upon French soldiers lying by 
the road- side, not dead, but fearfully mutilated ; whilst such 
corpses as bore marks of violence, seemed to have died under 
lingering torture. Our retreat from Sahagun had been bad 
enough — few retreats, perhaps, in modern times, have been more 
harassing — but the retreat of Soult through the mountains of 
Galicia must have been fully as disastrous. His loss in men 
alone could not have fallen short of 4,000 or 5,000 — whilst his 
whole materiel was destroyed; and even of the troops who 
escaped, the probability was, that one-half would become denizens 
of the hospital. Yet is Soult deserving of the highest praise for 
the celerity and talent with which his flight was conducted. 
True, the army, after it should reach a place of safety, must, 
like the Spanish armies, be re- organized before it could 
pretend again to take the field ; but the French Marshal was 
entitled to all the praise we liberally bestowed upon him, for 
having, at the expense of any sacrifices, extricated himself from 
his difficulties. 

It will not be necessary to record minutely the progress of the 
army during its retrograde movement. The pursuit w T as finally 
abandoned, and I arrived, on the 28th, at Coimbra, where head- 
quarters were established dying a few days, and a short respite 
granted to the weary soldiers. Their sufferings in the mountains, 
though cheerfully borne at the moment, began now to take effect 
upon them; and not a few, particularly the younger and less 
seasoned, fell sick. Rest was therefore desirable, and it was 
pleasing news to learn that a reinforcement of 5,000 men had 
landed, and that they might be expected to join us in a week. 

Of our own future movements, no one, except the Commander- 
in-chief, knew anything ; nor had he, as far as I could learn, as 
yet determinately fixed upon them. Officers were, indeed, sent 
to Cuesta, with intelligence that Sir Arthur Wellesley was ready 
to co-operate with him in an attack upon any French corps which 
might be situated between Lisbon and Seville ; but, at the same 
time, they were instructed to make the Spaniards aware that any 
promise beyond this could not be given. Portugal was our field ; 
and to move from it altogether, would be to abandon the post which 



168 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xiv. 

the British army was required particularly to protect. Still, our 
chief was willing to attempt as much as his numerical strength 
and the nature of his instructions would permit ; and if Victor 
would but remain where he was, a great blow might possibly be 
struck at him. In this case, we should march to Thomar and 
Abrantes, throw a corps on the left bank of the Tagus, communi- 
cating on its right with Cuesta's left ; and, detaching a division 
along the right bank, to destroy the bridge, it w T as not impossible 
that Victor might be surrounded. 

It so happened that, at the moment when these dispositions 
were talked of, news reached us, not only from the north of Spain, 
but from the Danube. We read of the ruinous defeat of the 
Austrians, in a paper printed at Madrid, and read it with the 
feelings of deep regret which it was calculated to excite. Yet 
there was a good deal to cheer us in the rumours which came 
in from Galicia. It was said that, w T hilst Kellerman had united 
his corps to that of Ney, and both were marcing into the Astu- 
rias, against Romana, 4,000 French troops, out of the 7,000 which 
had been left to secure Galicia, had surrendered, at Lugo, to 
one of Romana's generals. St. Jago, likewise, was reported to 
have fallen. 

After a necessary period of repose, on the 7th of June the army 
resumed its march, and took up its head- quarters, on the same 
evening, at Abrantes. Here more correct reports relative to the 
motions of Victor, reached us. He had not withdrawn, as had been 
represented, to the north of the Tagus, but was busily concentrating 
in the neighbourhood of Merida, as if with the design of passing 
the Guadiana, and attacking Cuesta previously to our arrival ; and 
this was considered the more probable, because the news of Ney's 
successes in the Asturias must, by this time, have reached him. 

Lieutenant- colonel Bourke, of the Quarter-master-general's 
department, had been sent, some time before, to General Cuesta's 
head- quarters atFuente del Maestro, for the purpose of concerting 
with him a joint plan of operations against the enemy in Estre- 
madura. The day after our arrival at Abrantes, letters arrived 
from Colonel Bourke, bearing date the 4th and 6th of June, in 
which he informed us that Cuesta was afflicted with severe ague, 
and hence all his communications had been made through Major- 
general O'Donaghoe, chief of the staff. These, however, proved 



1809.] STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES. 169 

so far satisfactory, that three propositions were submitted for Sir 
Arthur Wellesley's consideration, concerning which it was at the 
same time stated that Cuesta gave a decided preference to the 
first. 

In the first place, it was suggested that the whole British force 
might move from Abrantes upon Elvas and Badajoz, and, uniting 
itself with the Spanish troops, make a joint attack upon Victor; 
whilst Cuesta should detach General Venegas, with a corps of 7,000 
men, by Llerena, through the mountains towards Talavera, which 
force, turning the enemy's left, and heading them in their retreat, 
would enable the combined armies to annihilate them by falling on 
their rear. At the same time, Cuesta would detach a second 
corps from Badajoz towards Plasencia, so as to threaten their 
right ; and he professed to be capable of sparing both detachments, 
and of still bringing 18,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, to the 
assistance of the British. In case this plan should not be adopted, 
it was proposed, in the second place, that the English army should 
move, en masse, to Alcantara, and press from thence upon the 
enemy ; whilst the Spaniards following them closely, should take 
Merida by assault, and make themselves masters of all the artillery 
and stores which might be laid up in that place. Lastly, it was 
submitted that we should march upon the Teitar and Almazar, 
and equally threaten the enemy's right and rear. All these pro- 
posals, it is necessary to observe, were made on the supposition 
that the enemy's head-quarters were at Caceres, and that their 
troops were cantoned partly there, and partly at Merida and the 
villages near. 

The force immediately under Victor was estimated at 26,000 
men. There was, over and above, a corps at Ciudad Rodrigo, of 
13,000 infantry, and 3,000 cavalry, under Sebastiani; but the 
roads of communication between these corps were both incon- 
venient and circuitous. Should they attempt to unite, with 
artillery and baggage, Sebastiani must march round by Madrid ; 
and should they choose the mountain path, the junction might no 
doubt be effected, but it would be at the expense of all the 
materiel of one, if not both corps. Besides these, with a body of 
4,000 men in Madrid, and about 1 ,000 in other garrisons between 
the capital and the frontier, there was said to be no French force 



170 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xiv 

•capable of being brought immediately against us, to interrupt 
whatever operations our Commander-in-chief should determine on. 

To all these plans Sir Arthur Wellesley saw serious objections, 
and he immediately wrote to Cuesta, pointing out the causes of 
his dissent. 

It is probably needless to add, that the Spanish and British 
generals differed on the present occasion, not more in their views 
touching the subject immediately before them, than with reference 
to the operations which they expected were to follow. Whilst 
Cuesta desired, above all things, that the armies of the two 
nations should be united, that they should fight side by side, and 
follow up to the utmost any advantages which they might obtain, 
Sir Arthur Wellesley was guided by other motives, and restricted 
his designs to a narrower, but a much safer and surer field. 
The Spaniard was eager to see his allies fairly committed, and 
his native country made the theatre of their glories ; — the English- 
man felt that, by the tenor of his present instructions, so bold a 
policy was not authorized. The deliverance of Portugal, and 
the repulse of the enemy from Estremadura, were the two objects 
which he was required to keep in view ; and he limited his 
present designs to the furtherance of these, by the destruction of 
Victor's army. 

In the mean while, news came from the north, that Ney and 
Soult, having united their corps, were engaged in the siege of 
Vigo ; and that, as soon as that place should fall, they were 
preparing once more to cross the Minho, and carry the war into 
the north of Portugal. Such an occurrence would naturally lead 
to changes in our arrangements. It would now become abso- 
lutely necessary for Marshal Beresford, who had accompanied us 
so far with three Portuguese brigades, to return for the defence 
of the provinces, and to relinquish the intention, which he enter- 
tained, of penetrating, along with us, into Spain. The fact is, 
indeed, that he was best placed at Oporto. 

It has been stated, that our effectives never exceeded, at 
this period of the war, 20,000 men. Even now, with the addi- 
tion of the 5,000 lately joined, we barely reached that number ; 
for our men had become extremely sickly, and, as the summer 
advanced, and the heat increased, sickness increased also. It was 



1808.] STATE OF THE ARMY. 171 

not, however, the number of our sick alone which rendered us 
thus inefficient ; we were destitute of a variety of articles 
absolutely necessary to fit us for a campaign. Our shoes were 
generally worn out, and no supply had reached us ; and, worse 
still,* the military chest was quite exhausted. There was not a 
regiment in the army, to which many months' pay was not due ; 
and, what w T as infinitely more distressing, there were no funds in 
the country from which to obtain a supply. Yet, in spite of all 
this, not a murmur or complaint could be heard. Generally 
speaking, our immediate supplies were ample ; that is to say, 
the men received, for the most part, their full allowance of pro- 
visions ; and they were so thoroughly satisfied w T ith the honour of 
the government which they served, that they entertained no 
doubts as to the ultimate settlement of their balances. On the 
contrary, the very best spirit prevailed ; nor is it going too far to 
affirm that, under their present leader, the troops would have 
borne any privations, and have undertaken any services. 

* " I trust that £100,000 will have been sent immediately after you 
received my last letter, and that you will send £200,000 more as soon as 
possible. I borrowed from the merchants of Oporto all that I could get ; 
but the sum was very small indeed, and we are in the greatest distress/' — 
Coimbra, oOth May. 

" Nothing detains me now but the non-arrival of the money. It will 
hardly be believed, and I am ashamed to tell it, that the money which left 
Lisbon on the 15th of this month, is not yet arrived." — Air antes, June 2nd. 

" I should now be ready to move into Spain in two or three days, if I had 
any money ; but the distress in which we are, from want of that necessary 
article, will, I fear, render it impossible for me to move till I shall receive a 
supply." — Abr 'antes, June Wth. — Wellington Despatches. 



N 



172 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xv- 



CHAPTER XV. 

The British army moves towards Victor, who withdraws across the Tagus — 
Sir Arthur fixes his head-quarters at Plasencia — He visits Cuesta, and 
is shown the Spanish army hy torchlight— Allied army put in motion, 
and Victor's posts driven across the Alberche — Preparations for attacking 
Victor — He effects his escape — Dissatisfaction of Sir Arthur Wellesley 
with the conduct of the Spaniards — He is compelled, by the indolence of 
Cuesta, to remain inactive. 

In the last chapter it has been stated that Cuesta sent in three 
proposals for the consideration of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and that 
Sir Arthur had objected to the whole of them. No great while 
elapsed ere we were given to understand, by letters from Colonel 
Bourke, that the Spaniard remained obstinately attached to his 
own opinions. On no account whatever would he agree to act 
as Sir Arthur Wellesley suggested ; and the only alteration to 
which he would consent was that, after having joined him at 
Badajoz, we should direct our march upon Caceres, in order 
to threaten the enemy's right ; whilst he moved by Merida to 
Talavera. 

Meantime, however, Victor had taken alarm, and commenced 
his retreat towards the Spanish capital. His whole army was 
withdrawn across the Tagus ; and Cuesta, as soon as he 
began to move in pursuit, saw the wisdom of Sir Arthur Wel- 
lesley's proposal, and agreed to it. Preparations were accordingly- 
made for advancing upon Plasencia ; but whilst these were in 
progress, advice arrived that the French armies in the north had 
occupied Orense ; and Beresford was, in consequence, compelled 
to resign his command and hurry off where his presence was of 
more importance, namely, between the Douro and the Minho. 

Acting on preconcerted plans, we reached Castello Branco 
with the head- quarters of the army, when accounts were received 
that Joseph had marched from Madrid, at the head of 5,0C0 men, 
to join Victor, and that the latter had taken a strong position at 
Talavera. Sebastiani, likewise, was reported to be in motion 
towards the same point : whilst Cuesta had suddenly checked his 



1808.] MARCH TOWARDS THE ENEMY. 1/3 

advance, and, leaving a corps at Argaterem, had fallen back upon 
the Tagus at Almaraz. To counterbalance these rumours, it 
was stated that General Venegas was in close pursuit of Sebas- 
tiani, and that he might be confidently expected to form a 
junction with Cuesta from the opposite side of the river. We 
were also given to understand, that several corps from the 
north were marching towards Salamanca or Valladolid, and that 
their patrols had appeared at Lenares and San Estevan, places 
as near to Plasencia as Castello Branco. This was not a matter 
of surprise to us ; for we saw that, if Victor should entertain 
serious notions of risking a battle on this side of Madrid, the 
latter movements were absolutely necessary to secure him against 
being turned. But the grand question was, whether he would 
risk a battle at all ; and, in case he was willing so to do, whether 
we would accept the challenge. On the arrival in camp of all 
the battalions and detachments whose landing had been officially 
reported, our force in the field could not fall short of 30,000 men. 
Cuesta had under his orders 38,000 ; but they were, for the 
most part, raw levies, and could not in any respect, be depended 
on. Of the French force, on the other hand, all reports agreed 
in stating that it amounted to at least 45,000 or 50,000 men, 
and would it be prudent, under such circumstances, to stake the 
issues of the campaign upon one battle ? The point was a 
delicate one to determine ; but we all felt that our destinies were 
in the hands of one who was quite competent to guide them. 

The army resumed its march, and, on the last day in June, 
fixed its head-quarters at Castello Branco. Here we halted but 
a brief space of time, and then, entering Spain by way of Zarza 
la Major, reached Coria on the 5th of July. Intelligence reached 
us here, that General Craufurd, with his brigade from England, 
had quitted Lisbon on the 28th, and hence, their arrival in the 
camp might daily be expected ; while other regiments, from 
Ireland and the islands, were stated to have landed. 

Victor's corps, amounting in the whole to about 27,000 
effectives, had, in the meanwhile, taken post at Talavera, and 
occupied a position so formidable, that any attempt at turning 
could be only made by moving in force upon Avila. On the other 
hand, Cuesta, who at first had pursued at a quick pace, but who 

n 2 



1 74 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xv. 

became alarmed when he found that we were not immediately in 
his rear, getting entangled between the two rivers ; returned to 
his old position on the left bank of the Tagus, from whence, 
keeping possession of Almaraz with his advance, he scoured the 
country in all directions with his cavalry. He was not, however, 
regardless either of us or of the means by which our communi- 
cations might be rendered most direct and secure ; for he had 
already established a bridge over the Teitar, and was busily 
engaged in the construction of two more across the Tagus ; one 
in the vicinity of Almaraz, the other below the point where the 
waters of the Teitar and the Tagus meet. Whilst these move- 
ments were going on, Sebastiani had advanced from Toledo, with 
the design of attacking Venegas ; but the latter fell back to 
Villanova de la Fuente, and drew Sebastiani after him to Con- 
suegra. Thus were Victor and Sebastiani as completely separated 
from one another, as Venegas was from Cuesta. 

With respect to other points, the corps of Ney and Soult were 
reported to have assembled at Zamora, to the number of 23,000 
or 24,000 men ; whilst Mortier was in force at Valladolid. The 
latter piece of intelligence we acquired from General Franceschi, 
the officer to whom our hussars had been so frequently opposed 
during Sir John Moore's campaign, and who had since com- 
manded the light cavalry and advance of the northern army. He 
was proceeding from his quarters at Toro, by way of Tordesillas, 
for the purpose of visiting his friend, Marshal Mortier, when he 
was attacked, near the ferry, by a friar and ten Spaniards, and 
himself and his aide-de-camp made prisoners. The gallant friar 
was in the act of conveying him across the mountains, in order to 
present him to the Supreme Junta at Seville, when the head- 
quarters of our army chanced to be at Zarza la Major, by which 
means we were enabled to hold some conversation with him. 
He appeared dreadfully out of humour with his evil fortune* 
repeatedly ejaculating, " O ! comme c'est pitoyable pour un 
general d'hussars d'etre pris par un capucin 1" Yet, French- 
man-like, he met all our advances with the greatest frankness 
and candour. Upon his person were found letters, which gave a 
very deplorable account of Soult's present situation and future 
prospects. His army was stated to be perfectly disorganized — and 



1809.] CAPTURE OF A GENERAL. 175 

the whole country round to be in a state of the most alarming 
revolt. 

The news from the south-east, which arrived about the same 
time, was not however, so favourable. There, Blake, pushing 
forward with his accustomed rashness, had suffered a great defeat 
— and the French were said to be gaining ground, in consequence, 
in every corner both of Catalonia and Arragon. 

On the morning of the 6th, the head- quarters of the army 
moved from Coria to Galesto ; and on the 8th they were 
established in Plasencia.* From this point Sir Arthur Wel- 
lesley determined to open a personal communication with 
Cuesta; and the 10th was selected as a convenient day for the 
purpose. As the events arising immediately out of this determi- 
nation had a great deal of interest at the time, and as its more 
remote consequences bore powerfully upon the issues of the war, 
I shall take the liberty of recording, at some length, most of the 
particulars attending our remarkable journey. 

Having set out from Plasencia, for Cuesta' s head- quarters, we 
were met at a flying bridge, of which I have already spoken as 
thrown across the Teitar, by a squadron of Spanish hussars. 
The hussars, who belonged to the regiment of Villa Viciosa, were, 
upon the whole, well mounted and equipped ; and we afterwards 
discovered that they had been selected to escort us because their 
appearance was superior to that of any other corps in the Spanish 
army. Unfortunately, however, in conducting us towards the 
bridge of boats upon the Tagus, our guides lost their way, and 
darkness had, in consequence, set in before we approached the camp. 
This was the more to be regretted, as Cuesta had drawn out his 
whole force for Sir Arthur Wellesley's inspection. The troops 



* " Plasencia, a large town in the centre of fertile plains, surrounded by 
mountains. Plasencia must ever be celebrated, from the circumstance of the 
Emperor Charles V. having selected it as the place of retirement to which he 
dedicated the last years of his eventful and brilliant life ; nor does it appear 
that, in the whole extent of his Spanish territories, a more favourable spot 
could have been chosen, either with reference to climate, beauty of situation, 
or retirement of position. If ever there was a retired city, it is Plasencia. 
Its cathedral is a fine building, but not of first-rate magnificence." — Leith 
Hay. 



176 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xv. 

had been under arms during four hours, in momentary expecta- 
tion of our arrival : whilst the poor old man himself, though still 
lame from the effects of his bruises at Medellin, remained on 
horseback at their head, during the greater part of that time. 

Our arrival at the camp was announced by a general discharge 
of artillery, upon which an immense number of torches were 
lighted, and we passed the Spanish line in review by their blaze. 
The effect was very singular. As the torches were held aloft, at 
moderate intervals from one another, they threw a red and 
wavering light over the whole scene, permitting, at the same 
time, its minuter parts to be here and there cast into shade ; 
whilst the grim and swarthy visages of the soldiers, their bright 
arms and dark uniforms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often 
as the flashes fell upon them. Then there was the frequent roar 
of cannon, the shouldering of fire- locks, mingled with the brief 
word of command, and the rattling of accoutrements and arms, as 
we passed from battalion to battalion : all these served to interest 
the sense of hearing to the full as much as the spectacle attracted 
the sense of sight. Nor was old Cuesta himself an object to be 
passed by without notice, even at such a moment and under such 
circumstances. The old man preceded us, not so much sitting 
on his horse as held upon it by two pages, — at the imminent 
hazard of being overthrown whenever a cannon was discharged, 
or a torch flared out with peculiar brightness. Indeed, his 
physical debility was so observable as clearly to mark his total 
unfitness for the situation which he held. As to his mental 
powers, he gave us little opportunity of judging ; inasmuch as he 
scarcely uttered five words during the continuance of our visit. 

In this manner we passed about 6,000 cavalry, drawn up in 
rank entire, and not less than twenty battalions of infantry, each 
consisting of perhaps 700 to 800 men. These formed but one 
portion of the army, the rest being either at the bridge of 
Arzobispo, or in position along the Tagus ; and they were all, 
with a few exceptions, remarkably fine men. Some, indeed, were 
extremely young — too young for service — particularly among the 
recruits which had lately joined ; but, take them for all in all, it 
would not have been easy to point out a better made, stouter, or 
more hardy-looking body of soldiers in the service of any nation in 



1809.] REVIEW BY TORCHLIGHT. 177 

Europe. Of their appointments, it is not possible to speak in 
the same terms of commendation. There were, indeed, some 
battalions whose arms, accoutrements, and even clothing, might 
be pronounced respectable; but in general they were very 
deficient, particularly in shoes. It was easy to perceive, like- 
wise, from the attitude in which they stood, as well as from the 
manner in which they held their arms, that little or no discipline 
prevailed among them; and hence that, in general, they could 
not be regarded in any other light than as raw levies. Some corps 
there doubtless were, such as the Irish brigades, a battalion or 
two of marines from Cadiz, and the remnants of their grenadier 
battalions, which deserved a higher military character ; but speak- 
ing of them in the aggregate, they were little better than bold 
peasantry, armed partially like soldiers, but completely unac- 
quainted with a soldier's duty. This remark applied fully as 
much to the cavalry as to the infantry. The horses were many 
of them good, but their riders manifestly knew nothing of move- 
ment or discipline ; and they were, as well on this account as on 
the score of a miserable equipment, quite unfit for general service. 
The artillery, again, was numerous, but totally unlike, both in 
order and arrangement, to that of other armies ; and the generals 
appeared to have been selected according to one rule alone, 
namely, that of seniority. They were almost all old men, and, 
except O'Donaghoe and Largas, evidently incapable of bearing 
the fatigues, or surmounting the difficulties of one hard campaign. 
It was not so with the colonels or commanders of battalions, who 
appeared to be young and active, and of whom we had every 
reason to believe that many were rapidly learning to become 
skilful officers. 

The place at w T hich we paid this visit, and witnessed these 
events, was called Casa del Puerto ; where the head- quarters of 
the Spanish army were established in a w T retched hovel. We 
alighted here after the review had ended, and, as soon as we 
entered, Cuesta, who seemed quite overpowered by fatigue, 
retired to rest, but he returned again at eleven o'clock to supper, 
and remained with us till past midnight. He sat, however, 
as he always did under similar circumstances, in profound silence, 
neither seeking to take a share in the conversation, nor, ap- 



178 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR MAR, [chap. xv. 

parently, paying the slightest attention to it. I was much, 
struck with this singularity of mariner, and enquired of those 
around me whether it were assumed ; but they all represented it 
as being perfectly natural, and gave rather a curious account 
of the aged chief. Everything, it appeared, went on, throughout 
the army, rather in his name than by his orders. Cuesta was a 
person of no talent whatever ; but he was a brave, upright, and 
honourable man, full of prejudices, obstinate to a degree,* and 
abhorring the French with the hatred of personal rancour. On 
the latter account, the Spaniards reposed unbounded confidence 
in Cuesta ; and they did so the more readily, as he never failed 
to put to death every traitor that fell into his hands. Cuesta 
never gained a victory, yet he was constantly eager to fight ; 
and when the battle began, he was always to be found in the post 
of greatest danger. That, however, was a matter of very little 
moment ; for he gave no orders except to push on ; and as to 
arrangement, or the mode of executing manoeuvres, they were 
things quite unknown in his army. It was said that the Brigadier- 
general Quiske, Cuesta' s military secretary, was a man of some 
talent. Him, however, we did not see ; but O'Donaghoe struck 
me as being clever and sensible, but an intriguer and politician. 
Respecting the rest of the generals, it was impossible to form an 
opinion, as Cuesta seemed unwilling that they should hold 
any conversation with us. It is true, that he presented them 

* " My correspondence with General Cuesta has been a very curious one, 
and proves him to be as obstinate as any gentleman at the head of any army 
need be. He would not alter his position, even to ensure the safety of his 
army, because he supposed that this measure might be injurious to himself, 
notwithstanding that this alteration would have been part of an operation 
which must have ended in the annihilation of Victor's army, if he stood our 
attack ; or, in his retreat through the mountains to Arzobispo, with the loss 
of all his cannon and baggage, if he went away." 

" I hope I acted right in giving way, more particularly as the operation 
was to be carried on in Spain, and the argument used to me was, that the 
safety of Cuesta's army depended upon my compliance. The best of the 
whole story is, that Cuesta, in a letter of the 27th of May, which I did not 
receive till after I had written to him to propose my plan of operations, 
proposed to me the same plan, with very little alteration. ,, — Wellington 
Despatches. 



1809.] CONFERENCE WITH CUESTA. 179 

one by one to Sir Arthur Wellesley, the ceremony taking place 
after breakfast on the 11th — but no words were exchanged on the 
occasion, and each retired after he had made his bow. 

The ceremony having been gone through, Sir Arthur Wel- 
lesley and Cuesta withdrew, at the request of the former, to an 
inner apartment, where they held a conference which lasted four 
hours. I heard that O'Donaghoe, who assisted his general, was 
the chief speaker, and that Cuesta was, as usual, almost silent. 
When it came to a close, dinner was announced ; and we sat 
down, about three o'clock, to about forty dishes, the principal 
ingredients in which were garlic and onions. Our meal did not 
occupy much time, and on Cuesta retiring, as was his custom, to 
enjoy his siesta, we mounted our horses, and rode out into the 
camp. By this means we were enabled to see more of the regi- 
ments separately, than we had seen during the torch-light review. 
We saw, however, nothing which raised them in our estimation, 
and we returned at a late hour, fully convinced, that if the deli- 
verance of the Peninsula was to be effected, it must be done, not 
by the Spaniards, but by ourselves. 

At an early hour next morning we took leave of Cuesta, and 
set out on our return to Plasencia. The old Spaniard brightened 
up as we bid him farewell, embracing us, while he repeated, over 
and over again, that he was fully satisfied with the result of the 
interview. On our arrival at head- quarters, orders were issued 
for the troops to hold themselves in readiness to march at a 
moment's notice. 

The object for which we were now in a state of preparation, 
was nothing less than an advance towards Victor's army in its 
position at Talavera. To render this movement as decisive and 
as little doubtful as need be, it was resolved that, whilst Cuesta 
pushed him in front, both his flanks should be threatened at the 
same time, the right, or principal flank, by us, and the left 
by the Spanish corps under Venegas, from the southward of 
Madrid. 

We remained quietly in our camp till the 17th, giving the 
Spaniards time to put their several columns in motion ; but on 
that day we began our march, and, passing the Teitar, occupied, 
on the 18th, Talaguela, and the rivulet of Talamora. On the 
19th we arrived at Castinello and Casa de los Somas, pushing 



180 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xv, 



an advanced guard as far as St. Julien ; and on the 20th we 
entered Oropesa, where one day's halt was determined on. On 
the 21st, Cuesta and his people passed through the town ; 
upon which occasion Sir Arthur Wellesley took an opportunity 
of exhibiting to the Spaniard 20,000 British troops under arms. 
Cuesta expressed himself much gratified by the spectacle ; but 
the display was scarcely concluded, when he hurried forward, and 
arrived, the same evening, with that portion of his army which 
marched from the bridge of Almaraz, by the great road through 
Naval Moral, at Villada. The several corps had now assumed 
their respective stations ; and it was determined, on the 22nd, to 
drive in those divisions of the enemy which occupied Talavera, to 
their position on the left bank of the Alberche. 

On this occasion the Spaniards took the high road towards 
Talavera, whilst the British were directed to move upon the enemy's 
left by a parallel road through the mountains, in the direction 
of San Roman. As soon as the former began their advance, 
the French showed their cavalry in the plain in front of the 
town ; which not only checked the Spaniards, but caused them 
very needlessly and very clumsily to deploy. This done, instead 
of endeavouring to drive back the enemy, which, with their 
superior cavalry, they might easily have effected, our allies com- 
menced a heavy cannonade, which lasted, without producing any 
effect, till our troops began to show themselves on the right. 
Then indeed, the enemy retired with precipitation ; and, abandon- 
ing Talavera, and the ground immediately about it, they betook 
themselves to their principal position on the opposite side of the 
stream. 

On the 23rd, the enemy were seen in position behind the 
Alberche, and occupied ground which, had the river been 
impassable, might have been considered extremely formidable. 
As, however, this was not the case, and as there were several 
fords in the stream, by which both the right and the centre of 
their line could be threatened, it seemed extraordinary that Victor 
should remain where he was, with 20,000 men. It is scarcely 
necessary to add, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was anxious to take 
advantage of an occurrence on which he could hardly have calcu- 
lated. Yet here, again, difficulties presented themselves. Sir 
Arthur had repeatedly complained to Cuesta, that the Spanish 



1809.] DISPOSITIONS FOR ATTACK. 181 

authorities had neglected to furnish the necessary supplies which 
had been promised, and without which the allied army would be 
seriously inconvenienced — and he felt himself called upon to 
inform the Spanish General, that though he would see him with 
his army across the Alberche, yet, in justice to his own troops, 
and to the king whom he served, he would not advance one step 
further into the country, till all the articles for which he had so 
repeatedly made requisition, should be supplied. 

The discussions lasted to the evening of the 22nd ; but it was 
finally determined by Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the 23rd, that a 
general attack should be made upon the enemy at day- break the 
following morning. On this occasion two divisions of British 
infantry, and one brigade of cavalry, were to pass the fords of 
the Alberche, so as to assault the heights on the enemy's right, 
while the Spanish cavalry, supported by a column of infantry, 
under the Duke of Albuquerque, was to pass a ford opposite the 
centre of the position, leaving to Cuesta in person, assisted by 
Generals Zayas and Eguia, the charge of carrying the bridge and 
battery on the left. Two divisions of British infantry, with two 
brigades of cavalry, were to remain on the plain in rear of 
Albuquerque's column, as a support to the whole. 

Cuesta received the suggestion with his accustomed dry 
civility, but desired time to consider and digest it. He spent the 
greater part of the night in deliberation, and at last gave his 
assent. In the meanwhile, some guns were pushed across the 
bridge at Talavera, for the purpose of assisting in the dislodge- 
ment of the enemy from their batteries on the left, and in 
advance of their position. As our troops had a circuitous march 
to execute, the space granted for repose was necessarily brief ; 
and at two o'clock in the morning all were under arms. On 
reaching the Alberche we found that the enemy had escaped — 
neither troops nor baggage remained : the huts alone bore testi- 
mony that they had been there so recently. 

On the morning of the 24th, it was my fortune to proceed with 
two squadrons of cavalry, in front of Cuesta' s army, as far as St. 
Olalla. There we had a smart skirmish with the rear- guard of 
the enemy, as they were quitting the town — and I was enabled 
to ascertain that the main body had fallen back to Torrejos, by 
the Toledo road. From that point, it would be easy to double 



182 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvi. 

round towards Madrid, or to retire by Aranjuez upon Arganda, 
and thence, to the southward of Siguenza ; where, being joined 
by Sebastiani, and in communication with Suchet, they might 
continue their march to Tudela. In the latter case, Venegas* 
corps could hardly avoid a defeat from the united armies of 
Victor and Sebastiani, as it was then supposed to be at Fuente- 
Duena, or Arganda. It was ascertained that Sir Robert Wilson's 
corps had reached Escalona, and that the enemy, alarmed for 
their right, had detached a division to occupy the Guadarama 
pass. Besides these, other communications here reached us. One 
was to the effect that Joseph had evacuated Madrid, and was 
concentrating all the force which he was able to collect upon 
Burgos : another, that the French nation were weary of the war, 
and that their troops would shortly be withdrawn from Spain. 
The last rumour was more feasible than the preceding, and we 
saw some reason to credit it; Sebastiani had never formed a 
junction with Victor ; and the inference was not an unfair one, 
that he had found ample occupation in La Mancha. 



CHAPTER XVI. 



Cuesta follows the French— Is driven back in confusion — Battle of Talavera — 
Sufferings of the British army after the action, and its consequent retreat 
on Portugal. 

Whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley halted at Talavera, sending two 
divisions, under General Sherbrooke, across the river to Casa 
Leguas, Cuesta followed closely upon the steps of the French 
army. The latter, however, were not, as the old man fondly 
believed them, in full retreat, but were merely falling back upon 
their reinforcements. Sebastiani was now in Toledo, from 
whence, leaving 3,000 men to garrison the place, he had set out 
to meet Victor ; and Joseph and Jourdan, having formed a 
junction, were also hastening to support him. 

The total amount of the force thus brought together, fell 
little short of 50,000 men. The junction of the several corps 



1809.] JUNCTION OF THE FRENCH FORCES. 183 

d'armee took place at Torrejos ; and, as soon as it was effected, 
Victor wheeled round, and attacking Cuesta's advance, which 
had proceeded as far as Olalla, drove it back upon the main body, 
and compelled the whole to retreat with precipitation to the plain, 
extending between the position which the French had formerly oc- 
cupied and the Alberche. The retreat was disorderly,* and must 
have ended in the total rout of the Spaniards, had not General 
Sherbrooke, with the division on the left, covered them. This 
effected, the English General withdrew over the ford into the camp 
at Talavera, leaving Mackenzie's division to keep possession of a 
convent and wood, on the right bank of the Alberche. 

Such was the state of affairs on the evening of the 26th, and 
it was certainly not promising. Cuesta lay upon a river, into 
which, in case of defeat, he must be driven ; and he appeared to 
have made no arrangements whatever to meet an attack, with 
which he was threatened. Sir Arthur Wellesley had, fortunately, 
for some time, been examining, with an eagle's glance, the country 
about Talavera, and he discovered an excellent position. Here 
he determined to draw up the armies ; and his orders were issued 
with so much coolness and perspicacity, that every battalion, 
Spanish as well as English, stepped into the very spot which his 
foresight had marked out for it. 

The town of Talavera is situated upon the northern bank of 
the Tagus, and extends so closely to the river's edge, that there 
is hardly any space left vacant between the buildings and the 
water. In front, and lying slightly to the left, there is a small 
but commanding height, upon which a heavy Spanish battery 
was constructed, and which constituted a point d'appui to the 

* "From amidst clouds of dust, disorderly chattering assemblages of 
half-clad, half-armed men, became occasionally visible; again, regiments march- 
ing in perfect order ; cavalry, staff-officers, bands of musicians, flocks of sheep, 
and bullocks ; artillery cars, carriages, and waggons, varied the animated 
confused, and singular scene on which we gazed— forgetting, for the time, 
that all this was intimately connected with our very existence. The Spanish 
army, notwithstanding this confusion, had not the appearance of being pressed 
by the enemy in its retreat ; nor did the scene we now witnessed differ 
much from that it would have presented under more favourable circum- 
stances. The battalions marched in their best order ; but, with all this 
qualification, it was still a Spanish army — ill-commanded, ill- appointed, mode- 
rately disciplined, and, in most respects, inefficient. 5 '— Leith Hay. 



184 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvi. 

right of the Spanish forces — the two armies being drawn up in 
one continuous line, of which the English held the left, and the 
Spaniards the right. The British extended from the town to the 
mountains of Talavera, which form part of the Sierra de Gata, 
and, running parallel with the Madrid road, enclose, on one side, 
the vale of Plasencia. The extreme left took post upon a bold 
height in the direction of Alataza de Segusella — protected in front 
by a ravine, and flanked by a deep valley — on the opposite side 
of which the mountains rose again in increased altitude, and 
swept away in one uniform line. The Spanish troops were 
arranged among some olive-groves, and along a road, the 
embankment of which supplied them with an excellent parapet, 
their left resting upon a little hill two miles distant from Talavera. 
A portion of their cavalry was stationed here to support their 
left ; and Zayas kept possession of the rising ground. 

Upon that height our right leaned, and a strong redoubt had 
been begun, for the purpose of increasing its defensibility ; but it 
was not sufficiently advanced, to add to the security of the troops 
who were in position there. These consisted of the fourth divi- 
sion, under General Campbell, next to whom came the guards ; 
who were succeeded in the alignment by Cameron's brigade 
and the Germans — as these were by Mackenzie's and HilFs. 
The last-named division held the extreme left of all, being 
posted on a commanding eminence. Two brigades of British 
cavalry, one heavy and one light, were in the valley on the left of 
this height ; one brigade, under General Cotton, taking post on 
the right, in rear of Campbell's division; while the Duke of 
Albuquerque, with a cloud of Spanish horse, supported our cavalry 
on the left. Such were the general arrangements for the occupa- 
tion of the defensive position which the allied armies had selected; 
and, at an early hour on the morning of the 27th, they began to 
take their ground. 

The movements were made without annoyance, and all ap- 
peared to be going on as well as we could have wished when, at 
noon, General Mackenzie's division was suddenly attacked at the 
convent and wood on the right bank of the Alberche, by two 
strong columns of the enemy. They came on so suddenly, and 
with such impetuosity, as to throw the 87th and 88th regiments 
into some confusion ; and when Sir Arthur Wellesley reached 



1809.] BATTLE OF TALAVERA. 185 

the ground, they had succeeded in penetrating between the two 
brigades of which Mackenzie's division was composed. The 
consequence was that, for some little time, we were unable to 
discover the position which one of these brigades had taken up, 
and it required some exertion on the part of the officers to restore 
order. At last, however, the 31st and 45th, supported by the 
60th regiment, were got in hand, and they covered the falling 
back of the other regiments, from the wood to the plain, in fine 
style. Here the cavalry was in readiness to support them ; and 
from that moment, began a regular and well-conducted retreat, 
which was continued leisurely and orderly along the heights, 
towards the left of the position which the army had designed to 
seize. 

The enemy, nothing daunted by the steadiness of our people, 
continued to press them, and a partial action ensued along the 
whole front of the line — and, towards evening, it became serious. 
The enemy, appearing then to observe the importance of the 
height upon which the left of the army rested, made a desperate 
effort to possess it. Forming his infantry into close columns of 
battalions, and covered by a tremendous cannonade, he advanced, 
at double quick pace, to the assault. Mackenzie's division, having 
been withdrawn to the rear, was forming at the moment in the 
second line, but the attack was met by part of General Hill's 
division ; and they proved themselves quite adequate to the task. 
The 48th, the 1st battalion of detachments, and the 29th, pouring 
in a volley, rushed forward with the bayonet ; and three com- 
panies of the latter corps drove the enemy from the ridge they had 
attained. It was indeed a splendid charge, and one upon the 
issues of which much might have depended ; for had the height 
in question been carried, the strength of the position would have 
been sapped. It was not however, made without a heavy loss 
to the brave troops engaged ; the enemy fought nobly, and we 
had to lament, when darkness put an end to the contest, 800 
in killed and wounded, among whom were several valuable officers. 
That night we lay upon our arms in momentary expectation of 
an attack, the cavalry resting beside their horses, and the infantry 
on the ground which they had occupied during the day ; but no 
attack was made. Ac dawn, however, the enemy once more put 
themselves in motion— the height upon our left was still the 



186 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvi. 

grand object of their desire, and that they prepared to carry with 
all the force they could bring against it. 

At five o'clock on the morning of the 28th, two strong columns 
of chosen troops, the grenadiers of Lapisse's division, formed in 
front of the height in question. The formation was masked by a 
furious cannonade, under cover of which the columns pressed 
forward ; and desperate and numerous were the efforts they made 
to crown the summit. But nothing could exceed the gallantry 
and steadiness of the brave men who opposed them. The brigades 
of Tilson and R. Stewart were here ; they permitted the enemy y 
again and again, almost to top the ridge, and then roughly 
deforced them with the bayonet, till, disheartened by so many 
repulses, they retreated altogether, leaving the ground covered 
with their dead. Had our cavalry been at this moment suffici- 
ently forward in the plain, they might have made a terrible 
impression, for the enemy retired in immense confusion ; and 
opportunities of charging occurred, such as could not have been 
by possibility, overlooked ; but, unfortunately, the cavalry were 
too far in the rear. The broken masses, however, of the enemy, 
were thus enabled to reform themselves, and withdraw in 
tolerable order. 

The fighting had been maintained, without any intermission, 
from five in the morning till half-past eight, and the slaughter on 
both sides was extensive, but the enemy's loss in killed and 
wounded vastly exceeded ours ; and, what was not less flattering, 
his troops appeared dispirited and dismayed. They made no 
further movement during the next three hours, and the sound of 
firing ceased throughout the field. At this juncture it was a 
question whether we should advance, and in turn become the 
assailants, or remain quietly where we were, and await the result. 
It was a fortunate circumstance that Sir Arthur Wellesley deter- 
mined on following the latter course — for, about half-past eleven, 
heavy clouds of dust were discerned, announcing the approach of 
the French, and a renewed attack upon the different points of our 
line. They had now T ascertained the exact station which the 
English army occupied — and rightly judging, that if it were 
shaken, the Spaniards would fall an easy prey, they bore down 
upon it with the whole weight of their force. Four heavy 
columns, each strongly supported by artillery and cavalry, came 



1809.] TREMENDOUS ONSET. 187 

on ; the first, against that part of the line where the British and 
Spanish troops joined ; the second, against the guards and 
Cameron's brigade ; the third, against the Germans and Mac- 
kenzie's division ; whilst the fourth, protected by a mass of cavalry, 
moved up the valley on the left of General Hill. It may be neces- 
sary to observe here, that Hill having received a severe wound in 
the early part of the morning, had quitted the field ; and that 
the command of the troops which occupied the often- contested 
height, had devolved upon General Tilson. 

The advance of French columns is invariably announced by a 
general fire of artillery throughout the whole extent of their 
position ; and the ordinary custom was not omitted. A mur- 
derous cannonade spread havoc among our ranks, whilst the 
columns, covered as usual by clouds of tirailleurs, pressed for- 
ward with firmness and regularity. Our people had received 
instructions to reserve their fire till the enemy should have 
closed— -and, after giving it with effect, to bring the bayonet into 
play immediately — and these orders were obeyed to the letter. 
The heads of the enemy's columns were close upon our line 
before a musket was discharged, and then a crashing volley was 
delivered with a precision which must have astonished those 
against whom it was directed. A conflict now ensued, more 
desperate — because more completely hand to hand — than possibly 
the annals of modern warfare record. General Campbell's divi- 
sion, on the right, not only repelled the attacking column, but, 
rushing on them when broken by its fire, drove them before it in 
gallant style ; and, charging a battery from which it had suffered 
severely, took, at the point of the bayonet, thirteen pieces of 
cannon. The enemy, however, were veteran troops, accustomed 
to be broken and to recover their ranks again ; and, as our sol- 
diers could not venture far in pursuit, the fugitives were enabled 
to rally, and resume the offensive. What might have been the 
consequence of a renewed assault, it were hard to say. 
The captured guns, at ail events, would have been recovered ; 
but, just as the French were preparing to rush forward, they were 
taken in flank by a regiment of Spanish cavalry, and again 
overthrown. 

In the meanwhile, the second and third of the French 



188 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvi. 

columns, reckoning from their left, bore in full weight upon our 
centre, and made a desperate effort to pierce it. They were met 
and beaten back with the same gallantry which marked the 
opposition of General Campbell's corps; but the guards, eager 
to emulate the example of the 7th and 53rd regiments, pushed 
on, unfortunately, somewhat too far in pursuit. The enemy were 
not slow to take advantage of this. Observing a chasm in our 
line, they threw in a tremendous fire upon the Germans, who, for 
an instant, were thrown into confusion. Here the battle, for some 
minutes, was most obstinate, and probably, doubtful ; for the 
enemy's right column had withstood and repulsed a charge of 
Anson's light cavalry, and, had he promptly availed himself of 
the advantage, a result might, perhaps, have occurred different 
from that which crowned the operations of this glorious day. 
But Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was everywhere, saw how matters 
stood. He ordered up the 48th, which had been held in reserve, 
to support the broken Germans and cover the retrogade move- 
ment of the guards ; and that regiment, by its steadiness, 
retrieved the disorder. The Germans were speedily rallied — 
General Sherbrooke reformed the guards — and the French were 
beaten back, with terrible slaughter, from every point which they 
had assailed. 

At this moment our troops were successful in all parts of the 
field, and it needed but a forward movement on the part of the 
Spaniards, to render the victory of Talavera the most decisive of 
any upon record. Had it been possible to bring them up from 
the right of their line, to gain by rapid marching the Alberche, 
on which the enemy's flank appeared, one half of the French 
army must have been sacrificed. But, unfortunately, this could 
not be done. The Spaniards, miserably disciplined, and totally 
unaccustomed to change their formation in the face of an enemy, 
were immoveable. There they stood, as they had been originally 
drawn up ; and to attempt any manoeuvre, however simple, would 
have served only to throw them into confusion, without being 
productive of any good effect. The consequence was, that the 
enemy were enabled to commence and to continue their retreat 
in excellent order, carrying oif with them much of their artillery, 
the whole of their wounded, and the greater part of their 



1809.] 



INTREPID CONDUCT OF THE 48TH. 



189 



materiel. We could not venture to follow, for even yet they 
more than doubled us in numbers ; and they escaped in better 
plight than usually attends an army which has suffered a repulse 
so decided and so bloody. 

The loss of the British army in this action was severe, and it 
was occasioned chiefly by the murderous and overwhelming fire 
of the French artillery. From that, several regiments, which 
can hardly be said to have been personally engaged at all, 
suffered nearly as much as others which bore the brunt of the 
contest. Out of 19,000 men, which formed the whole of the 
force engaged, upwards of 4,000 were killed or wounded;* and 
among them were many officers, whose services, at a juncture 
like the present, could ill be spared. Generals Mackenzie, Hill, 
and R. Campbell were wounded, and placed hors -de -combat — 
and Brigade-major Beckett, an excellent officer, attached to the 
guards, with Majors Fordyce and Gardiner, were killed. With 
respect to the enemy, it was not easy to form an accurate notion, 
but their loss must have exceeded ours by at least a third. 
Many rated it higher — none below this amount. The Spaniards 
suffered but little, as few of their corps chanced to be under 
fire ; but it is no more than justice to state, that the little these 
had to perform, they performed well. Some artillery, which they 



* " Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the 
command of Lieutenant-general the Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., in 
action with the French army, commanded by King Joseph Bonaparte in 
person, at Talavera de la Reyna, on the 27th and 28th July, 1809." 





Officers. 


Sergeants. 


Rank 
a d file. 


Horses. 


Total loss of of- 
ficers, non-com- 
missioned officers 
and rank and file. 


Killed 

"Wounded .... 
Missing 


40 

195 

9 


28 

165 

15 


789 

3553 

629 


211 

71 

159 


857 

3913 

653 


Total 


244 


208 


4971 


441 


5423 



Wellington Despatches. 
o 2 



190 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvi. 

had upon our left, was excellently served ; and their cavalry 
regiment, called 'the King's', charged very gallantly. 

We bivouacked that night upon the field of battle, having 
removed our wounded into Talavera, and established there an 
extensive hospital ; and, on the following morning, were joined 
by General Craufurd's brigade from Lisbon, consisting of the 
43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments.* Had it arrived only a few 
hours earlier, more might perhaps have been done ; but it came 
up at a moment when our successes were not sufficient to recon- 
cile us to our position; for we were in a state bordering on 
want. Nothing had been done, and nothing seemed about to be 
done, by Cuesta or the Spanish Government, to afford supplies : 
our bread was all expended — and cattle, which hitherto had been 
found in abundance, were now wanting. The enemy still showed 
troops upon the left of the Alberche ; and the Spaniards, afraid 
to approach them unless we were at their side, crowded still 
upon us, and drained the country of everything. Nor was this 
all. Whilst it was yet doubtful whether Venegas had reached 
Aranjuez, a corps of French troops was reported to have advanced 
from Alba de Tormes as far as the pass of Banos, on the road to 
Plasencia, with the design of cutting us off from Portugal, while 
Sir Robert Wilson had also fallen back from Escalona, and was 
now upon our left. In a word, though we had won a great 
victory, our situation was only so far improved, that we 
were for the moment free from an overwhelming force in our 
front. 

* " The regiments, after a march of twenty miles, were bivouacked for the 
night, when intelligence reached their commanding officer, that Sir Arthur 
Wellesley was on the eve of a battle. After a short halt, the brigade got 
under arms, with a fixed determination to share the glory of the coming 
field. As they advanced, Spanish fugitives, hurrying off in crowds, informed 
them that the struggle was already ende'd, that the English army was totally 
defeated, and Sir Arthur Wellesley killed. Indignant at this shameful scene, 
the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity of their pace ; 
and, leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours they accom- 
plished a march of sixty -two English miles. To estimate this extraordinary 
effort made by these splendid regiments, it should be recollected that it was 
executed in heavy marching order, over a country where water was scarce, 
and beneath a burning sun. As a march, none on military record has 
exceeded it." — Napier. 



1809.] CRAUFURD'S FORCED MARCH. 191 

During the 30th and 31st, all things remained as previously, 
except that the enemy disappeared entirely, and our wants be- 
came every day more urgent. The utmost exertions of our 
commissariat were unable to procure even a moderate supply of 
bread, and meat was hardly in greater abundance. Rumours, 
likewise, of Soult's approach from the north, became every hour 
more rife — nor could the hope that Venegas must have got well 
round to the right of Madrid, allay the apprehensions which 
that reported movement had created. At last, on the 1st and 
2nd of August, authentic intelligence reached us, that from 
Venegas we had nothing to expect ; for that Soult, having carried 
the pass of Banos, which had been entrusted to a corps of Spaniards 
under the Marquis del Reyno, but which they had deserted without 
striking a blow, was already in Plasencia. He had entered 
that town on the 1st; and, having been reinforced from Sala- 
manca, or during his march from the northward, and supplied 
with artillery and stores from Madrid, had appeared there at the 
head of 14,000 men, inferior, in point of equipment, to no 
portion of the French army. This was a startling piece of 
news, and Sir Arthur Weliesley lost no time in seeking a con- 
ference with Cuesta. 

On the present occasion, the Spanish commander suggested 
that the British army should be divided ; that one-half should 
proceed, with a portion of his troops, against Soult; and the other, 
with the remainder of his army, march in pursuit of Victor. To 
this proposition, Sir Arthur Weliesley would not agree ; but 
proposed, in turn, to march with the entire British army against 
Soult, provided Cuesta would remain at Talavera, and secure his 
rear. Cuesta consented to the arrangement ; and our troops, in 
consequence, marched, upon the 3rd, from Talavera to Oropesa. 

But we had hardly taken ground, when advices arrived from 
Cuesta, stating that he had intercepted a friar carrying despatches 
from Jourdan to Joseph, addressed to Soult. In the former, 
an accurate and precise detail was given, not only of our force, 
but of all our previous intentions up to the 28th; a species of 
knowledge which could have been obtained only by treachery ; 
whilst a narrative of the late battle was added, which, for the 
story of a Frenchman, exhibited wonderfully few deviations from 
the truth. The latter contained orders for Soult to press forward, 



192 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvi. 

assuring him that his movement must separate the British from 
the Spanish forces ; that he would be supported by Ney, who had 
been directed to march from Castile ; and that, whilst they 
marched upon our flank, Joseph would again take the offensive, 
and threaten our front. It was added, that Joseph had placed 
his force in a central situation about Barga, near Torrejos, to 
keep Venegas in check, and arrest any advance which we might 
endeavour to make from Talavera. 

Cuesta was dreadfully alarmed at this information, and, giving 
orders for the evacuation of Talavera, made ready to follow our 
march to Oropesa without delay, though aware that he must 
thereby sacrifice the whole of our wounded, and that too, when 
no enemy was in sight. This was a most galling arrangement, 
and, though literally encumbered with cars, the heartless Spa- 
niard refused to spare us more than seven for the brave men who 
had fought and bled for his country. The abandonment of the 
town was, as may be imagined, a heart-rending scene. Such of 
our poor soldiers as were in a condition to move at all, crawled 
after us, some still bleeding, and many more with their wounds 
open and undressed. By indefatigable exertions, and by sacri- 
ficing a great quantity of baggage, Sir Arthur Wellesley got 
together forty cars, which enabled us to bring forward about 
2,000 men ; but there were still hundreds left behind, all of 
whom, had Cuesta acted with humanity, w T ould have been pre- 
served. It may be easily believed that such a scene, added to the 
extreme distress which scarcity of provisions occasioned, cast 
a damp upon our -spirits which we had not anticipated, and 
which certainly ought not to have been the consequence of a 
victory, hardly won indeed, but singularly splendid.* 

* The conduct of the Spaniards and their General was most atrocious. At 
a time when the British army subsisted upon no other rations than half a 
pound of wheat, unground, each man, per day, with a few ounces of flour and 
a quarter of a pound of goat's flesh twice in the week, the Spanish authorities 
audaciously asserted that the British were actually over -supplied, while 
Cuesta accused them of robbing the peasantry. Such also was the misery 
endured at this period, arising from the want of forage, that hundreds of 
horses had either perished or become unfit for service ; and the guns were, in 
consequence, nearly unhorsed ! After the battle of Talavera, where British 
bl°od had flowed in rivers on behalf of Spaniards, although Cuesta had more 



1809.] EVACUATION OF TALAVERA. 193 

As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley was made acquainted with 
Cuesta's determinations, he remonstrated in strong terms against 
the impolicy and cruelty of the measure ; but his remonstrances 
were disregarded. During the night of the 3rd, the Spaniards 
came pouring in upon us like a flock of sheep ; and a scene of 
noise and confusion ensued beyond conception. At the same 
moment intelligence arrived that Soult had passed the Teitar, 
and that his advanced- guard was already entering Naval Moral. 
The bridge of Almaraz must, therefore, either have been destroyed 
by the Spanish peasants, or be in the hands of the enemy ; and 
hence we were reduced to the alternative, either of fighting our 
way through Soult's corps, or of returning over the bridge of 
Arzobispo, and taking up the line of the Tagus. 

The greater part of the Spanish army arrived at Oropesa during 
the night of the 3rd ; but it was the morning of the 4th before 
Cuesta himself came in. Sir Arthur Wellesley instantly waited 
upon him, and represented that, situated as the allies now were, 
the only step which they could venture, in common prudence, to 
take, was to assume the line of the Tagus, and to remain there 
in a defensive position, till stores could be collected, and some 
feasible prospect of acting on the offensive be discovered. Cuesta, 
however, was opposed to a retreat. He was quite satisfied that a 
second battle would end as advantageously for us as the first ; 
and he gave his voice decidedly for risking it. Sir Arthur 
Wellesley told him plainly, that he would not sacrifice the army 
of which he was in command, and issued orders for an immediate 
march towards Arzobispo. They were promptly obeyed ; and 
we passed the bridge as the enemy's patrols began to appear in 
sight. 

The path which leads from Arzobispo, through the pass of 
Mesa d'Ibor, into the great road from Almaraz to Truxillo, 
Merida, and Badajoz, had been represented to us as wholly 
impassable for artillery. We found it extremely bad; but we 
nevertheless contrived to drag our guns along, and, by dint 
of extraordinary exertions, reached Toralida, among the moun- 
tains, on the 5th. We remained there only during the night, 

horses than lie required, he refused Sir Arthur "Wellesley's request for ninety, 
to replace those which had been killed !— Ed. 



194 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvii. 

and, resting at Mesa d'Ibor on the 6th, we arrived on the 7th, at 
Deleitosa. Here took place a halt of two days, of which the 
troops stood greatly in need ; for though our journeys had not 
been remarkable for length, they had been accomplished in the 
face of numerous and severe difficulties. 



CHAPTER XVII. 



Defeat of Cuesta's Army at the bridge of Arzobispo — Victor enters Talavera 
— Wilson's corps worsted at the Puerto de Banos — Sir Arthur Wellesley 
takes up the line of the Tagus — Cuesta superseded, and Eguia succeeds in 
the command — Distresses of the British Army, and extraordinary conduct 
of Eguia and the Spanish government — Sir Arthur Wellesley retires upon 
the Guadiana — General Arrezaga and the Duke del Parque defeated — 
Successes of the French in Andalusia — Fall of Gerona and Astorga — 
Massena assumes the command in the Peninsula — The British army moves 
towards Almeida, leaving Hill's corps at Abrantes — Preparations for the 
campaign. 

We resumed our march on the morning of the 11th, and 
arrived that day at Jaraicejo, a place about three leagues from 
the former position. Here we paused for some time, sending the 
cavalry as far to the rear as Truxillo, and occupying Almaraz and 
the Puerto de Miravete with two divisions ; but the head-quarters 
were established in Jaraicejo, and the main body of the army 
cantoned in the villages round. 

The first rumour which reached us, was of a defeat which the 
Spanish army had sustained, on the 8th, at the bridge of 
Arzobispo. It appeared that Cuesta, having fortified the bridge, 
and leaving two divisions of infantry, with one of cavalry, under 
the Duke of Albuquerque, to defend it, returned, on the night of 
the 7th, to Paraleda de Garben, where better facilities for housing 
and covering the troops existed. He had scarcely departed, when 
the enemy appeared in force on the opposite bank, and employed 
themselves, totally disregarded by the garrison of Arzobispo, in 
searching for a ford. This they succeeded in discovering, about 
two or three hundred yards above the barricade, and they sent 
over a column of cavalry, supported by infantry, which, falling 



1809.] RECALL OF CUESTA. 195 

upon the Spaniards during the heat of the day, took them wholly 
by surprise. They were put to the rout in a moment, with the 
loss of twelve pieces of cannon ; and, had the French followed with 
the vigour which usually characterised them, the Spanish army 
must have been entirely dispersed. 

With respect to the enemy, again it was understood that 
Victor had entered Talavera, where he behaved with the utmost 
humanity and kindness to our wounded ; whilst the armies from 
the north had retrograded upon Plasencia. Of the exact posture 
of the latter we were, however, ignorant ; but we ascertained, at 
the same time, that a division had moved back as far as the Puerto 
de Banos, to intercept Sir Robert Wilson. This officer had fallen 
in from Escalona, upon our left. When we began our retreat 
towards Arzobispo, there were no opportunities of communicating 
with him, or of drawing him off; and he had now penetrated, in 
pursuit of us, to the Puerto de Banos, whither the French corps 
hastened to attack him. Sir Robert Wilson could neither decline 
the battle, nor very successfully maintain it. In artillery he was 
quite deficient, the whole of his guns having accompanied our 
train, and his men were considerably harrassed by repeated 
marches. But they offered a stout resistance, and, when at length 
they were forced to yield, made good their retreat on Ciudad 
Rodrigo. This they did, not as armies usually retreat, in compact 
bodies and covered by their skirmishers, but by utterly dispersing, 
and again uniting at the particular point of rendezvous which, pre- 
viously to their rout, had been determined upon. 

In the meanwhile Marshal Beresford, with his Portuguese, was 
in position at Zarza, whither General Craufurd, at the head of 
four British regiments, hastened from Castello Branco to join 
him. The Marshal was confident that he was capable of arrest- 
ing, upon the frontier, any French corps which might attempt to 
penetrate into Portugal ; and that he could easily contrive to keep 
it in play till we should be enabled to arrive, by way of Abrantes, to 
his assistance. We still retained command of the great road to 
Seville : and, by keeping the enemy in doubt touching our future 
intentions, we hindered him from directing his undivided attention 
to other points ; while, also, our retreat was secure, and an escape 
to the Spaniards, as far as Monasterio, was practicable. 

Matters were thus circumstanced, when the recall of Cuesta 



196 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvn. 

from the command of his army was announced — and the guidance 
of the troops devolved, as a matter of course, on General Eguia, 
the next senior in rank. An idea had prevailed, that the com- 
mand would be conferred on Albuquerque, or be offered to 
Sir Arthur Wellesley ; but the surprise of the former at Arzobispo 
was supposed to have stood in the way of one of these arrange- 
ments ; and to the other, the national pride of the Spaniards 
opposed an insuperable obstacle. Forage became scarce — sickness 
increased — and we had beasts of burden neither for the transport 
of the wounded nor even for the carriage of ammunition. 

During the first few days of our sojourn at Jaraicejo, we were 
tolerably well supplied with bread ; and, cattle being plenty, we 
had no cause to complain ; but, as no regular system of furnishing 
the army had been entered into with the Spaniards, this state of 
comparative abundance was not of long continuance. But it was 
not in our own immediate neighbourhood alone, that affairs 
assumed every day, a more unpromising aspect. Intelligence 
reached us that Venegas had suffered two great defeats from 
Sebastiani. strengthened by two divisions from Victor's army; 
that the first had occurred at Aranjuez, on the 5th ; the second 
on the 11th, at Almoriand. 

All these circumstances convinced us, that our stay in the 
position of the Tagus would be brief. Sir Arthur Wellesley had 
already declared his conviction that, even in the event of Spain's 
subversion, Portugal could be defended. Into Portugal he 
accordingly prepared to move, for there, in comfortable canton- 
ments, the health of the sick might be restored, and the 
strength of his weary and convalescents re-established. 

In pursuance of this determination, the army broke up from its 
position on the 20th, and, not being harassed by the enemy, made 
good its retrogression, in five marches, by Truxillo, Meajadas, 
Medellin, and Merida, upon Badajoz. Here Lord Wellington 
proposed to halt ; and the troops were disposed in cantonments 
along the line of the Guadiana, in a position which at once 
secured their further retreat, should it become necessary, upon 
Lisbon, renewed their communications with Beresford, left open 
the means of again advancing into Spain, and furnished them 
abundantly with forage and provisions. But the sickness which 
had raged so long, instead of abating, increased in violence, till, 



1809.] BATTLE OF OCANA. 197 

before many weeks had passed away, there were computed to be 
not fewer than 8,000 or 9,000 men in the hospital. 

The army remained here, notwithstanding the inconveniences 
to which it was subjected, till towards the middle of December ; 
during which period Lord Wellington was quietly preparing, in 
his rear, measures for the construction of that stupendous line of 
works, which more than once baffled the efforts of the French 
armies, and proved the salvation of the Peninsula. 

In the meanwhile the Spaniards, with their accustomed want 
of prudence, were rushing, at all points, into collision with the 
enemy, and continued suffering defeats. Eguia had not filled his 
new office many days, when, leaving Albuquerque with 10,000 or 
12,000 men to watch the banks of the Tagus, and straiten the 
French foraging parties there, he hurried away to the support of 
Venegas. The latter, however, was already superseded, and 
General Arrezaga commanded in his stead. He was an impetuous 
and rash officer ; and finding himself, on the arrival of Eguia, at 
the head of 50,000 men, he conceived that no French army 
would be able to make head against him. In the misplaced 
confidence which animated their leader, the Spanish troops largely 
partook : they required to be led immediately to battle, and 
Arrezega, unfortunately, complied with their wishes. He led his 
columns forward to the plains of Ocana, near Aranjuez, where he 
was attacked by Marshal M or tier, at the head of his own and 
Sebastiani's corps, and defeated with terrible loss. The enemy 
boasted of having taken 20,000 prisoners, and represented the 
number of slain at 4,000 : probably these were exaggerations ; 
but that the Spanish army was annihiliated, admitted of no 
doubt.* 



* Arrezaga's battle-ground was miserably ill-chosen. It formed part of an 
open plain, and was crossed by a deep ravine, which divided his forces, and 
rendered the severed masses alike incapable of assisting each other in case of 
defeat, or of following up their advantage if victorious. A terrible discom- 
fiture ensued ; 10.000 men, entirely without means of retreat, yielded them- 
selves prisoners en masse, and of the remainder, scattered and driven over 
the plain, great numbers were killed. The French, when wear}* of destroying 
unresisting men, recommended the fugitives, as they came up with them, to 
return to their homes, and resume the peaceful occupations they had aban- 
doned, war being evidently a trade entirely uusuited to them. — Ed. 



198 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvn. 

This disaster took place upon the 17th of November: it was 
succeeded by another hardly less ruinous, which occurred in a 
different part of the country, on the 28th of the same month. 
The Duke del Parque, at the head of a corps of some 20,000 
men, had for some time back kept his ground in the vicinity of 
Ciudad Rodrigo ; where, being joined by Sir Robert Wilson, he 
endeavoured, in a desultory war of posts, to harass and confound 
the enemy. His immediate opponent had been Ney; but that 
officer, indignant at the appointment of Soult to the chief com- 
mand of the French armies, which, on the recall of Jourdan, had 
taken place, requested and obtained permission to return to Paris. 
He was succeeded in his trust by Marshal Marchand who, 
holding the Spaniards in utter contempt, hastened to bring the 
Duke to action. A battle was accordingly fought on the 18th of 
October, upon the heights of Tomames ; and, owing to the im- 
provident impetuosity of the French leader, it ended in favour of 
the Spaniards. The enemy fled to Salamanca, whither the Duke 
instantly followed, entering the place on the morning following 
the very night in which General Marchand found himself under 
the necessity of precipitately abandoning it. 

Delighted with the applause of the people of Salamanca, and 
regarding his victorious followers as invincible, Del Parque 
remained inactive in his advanced position, till the corps which 
he had beaten received reinforcements from Valladolid, when it, 
in turn, became assailant. At Carpio, took place a trifling affair, 
not unfavourable to the Duke ; but the enemy only retired upon 
their strength ; and it soon became evident that a force was 
opposed to him, which he could not hope successfully to with- 
stand. He accordingly retreated towards Alba de Tormes, where 
he took a position, and, on the morning of the 28th, was attacked 
with great impetuosity. The Spaniards being worsted, and 
compelled to abandon their strong ground, retired for a while upon 
Tomames, in tolerable order; but, just as the scene of their former 
victory began to open, a body of French cavalry charged their 
rear, and threw them into utter confusion. They thought no 
more of resistance, but, casting away their arms, fled in all direc- 
tions among the mountains. 

By these two victories, the last remnants of the Spanish 
army were destroyed ; and the French were left at liberty 



1810.] PORTUGAL AGAIN THREATENED. 199 

to push their conquests into the southern parts of Spain, and to 
threaten Portugal through the province of Beira. Of the former 
of these opportunities they hastened immediately to avail them- 
selves. Joseph put himself at the head of the army which was 
destined to overrun the kingdom of Andalusia ; and, having under 
him Soult, as his major-general, with Victor, Mortier, and 
Sebastiani, each in command of a corps, he moved towards the 
passes of the Sierra Morena. Hither, the fugitives from the battle 
of Ocana had fled. But neither they nor their leader had recovered 
from the dismay which that defeat occasioned, and offered but 
slight resistance to the invaders. The passes were carried, 
without even halting the columns; and, on the 21st of January, 
1810, the intruders' head-quarters were established in the town 
of Baylen. 

Constant successes attended the French arms in the south, 
and their operations were hardly less fortunate in the east or in 
the north. In the east, Gerona, after enduring the miseries of a 
protracted siege, was reduced ; and the army of Blake, defeated 
in more than one encounter, found itself in no condition to keep 
the field, and was fain to retire into the fastnesses with which 
Catalonia abounds, leaving the towns and level country in pos- 
session of the French. In the north again, Astorga, after a 
gallant resistance, was compelled to capitulate ; and the French 
were understood to be in full preparation for a fresh invasion of 
Portugal. To render this the more decisive, reinforcements were 
poured in from Bayonne in great numbers ; and Marshal Massena 
was stated to be on his way from the Danube, for the purpose of 
taking upon himself the chief command of the troops by which 
the conquest of the Peninsula was to be effected. 

Affairs were in this most unpromising state, when Lord 
Wellington, alarmed for the safety of Lisbon, determined upon 
abandoning his position on the Guadiana, and taking up another, 
which might enable him to watch the progress of any force that 
might sit down before Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida. With this 
view, the troops were put in motion on the 15th of December, 
and after a march that, with occasional halts, occupied twenty- 
one days, established themselves on a new line, which in an 
extended and not wholly connected manner, covered the frontier 
between the two rivers, the Ta°:us and the Douro. The advance, 



200 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvii. 

under General Craufurd, consisting of the first battalions of the 
43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments, the 1st and 2nd regiments of Por- 
tuguese cacadores, detachments from the 15th and 16th light dra- 
goons, the 1st hussars King's German Legion, and one brigade of 
horse artillery, took post in front of Almeida, and sent patrols as 
far as Ciudad Rodrigo ; whilst General Hill, with a division, 
remained on the south of the Tagus, to watch the motions of any- 
French force which might be disposed to act against Badajoz, or 
threaten Lisbon through the Alentejo. Head- quarters were fixed 
first at Vizeu, from whence they were afterwards removed to 
Celerico. The cavalry, with the exception of those already 
specified, and a few squadrons necessary for relieving the out- 
posts, found cantonments at Abrantes, Santarem, Thomar, &c. ; 
and the park of artillery was established at Vizeu. The Por- 
tuguese troops had their head-quarters at Thomar; and were 
stationed partly in that town, and partly in the adjacent villages, 
as convenience or necessity pbinted out. 

The first good effect resulting from this change of situation, 
showed itself in the rapid recovery of the sick, and the restoration 
of such as were already convalescent. The country into which 
the troops were now moved, is as salubrious as any in the Pe- 
ninsula ; and as, they contrived to obtain comfortable quarters, 
neither the cold of winter, nor the variable temperature of the 
spring, were felt. Provisions, likewise, proved abundant ; and 
forage was at least less scanty than it had been, either a t Jaraicejo 
or Badajoz. On all these accounts, both Lord Wellington and 
his followers had ample reason to congratulate themselves on the 
movement which had been made ; whilst the condition of both 
the French and Spanish armies — the former too formidable to be 
attacked with any prospect of success — the latter dispersed and 
broken, if not absolutely annihilated — left no ground to regret 
the state of temporary inactivity which they were compelled to 
endure. 

Meantime, though both Lord Wellington and the French 
generals might have appeared to be passing the first months of 
the year in a state of inaction, neither the one nor the other 
suffered a day to escape without turning it to some account. 
Lord Wellington, contented to keep the enemy as long as pos- 
sible in check, was devoting a large share of his attention to the 



1810.] MOVEMENT UPON LISBON. 201 

fortification and armament of the Lines at Torres Vedras ; whilst 
the greatest exertions were made, both by him and Beresford, to 
put the regular army and the militia of Portugal into a state of 
efficiency. Reinforcements accordingly came in, until he saw 
himself at the head of at least 27,000 British, and full 31,000 
Portuguese, troops of the line. The fortress of Almeida, likewise, 
upon which, as well as upon Ciudad Rodrigo, much reliance was 
placed for baffling and retarding the advance of the French army, 
was put in a state of excellent defence. The old walls were 
repaired, fresh outworks added, and, a garrison of 5,000 men 
being thrown in, with ample stores of every description, and 
a British officer, Brigadier- general Cox, at their head, no doubt 
was entertained that it would make an obstinate resistance. 
That Ciudad Rodrigo would hold out for any length of time, no 
one ventured to hope. The Spaniards were, indeed, full of pro- 
testations ; they spoke of burying themselves under the ruins of 
the place, and rivalling the glories of Zaragoza and Gerona ; but 
as yet they were not invested ; and to boast of what they would 
do, doing, in the end, nothing, was no uncommon practice among 
our allies. 

The army remained in this situation till the summer of 1810 
was far advanced, holding in command the main approaches 
through Beira. and carefully watching the others. It occupied 
all this while the position of Guarda, of which Lord Galway has 
spoken as presenting the only defensible line between Lisbon and 
the frontier ; and, though Lord Galway lived in an age w T hen the 
military science had not arrived at the perfection which it has since 
attained, he cannot be said to have overrated greatly the excellence 
of that line. We were now distributed over the ridges, and along 
the descent of the Sierra de Estrella ; a range of rugged mountains, 
which extend from Coimbra to Guarda, and end at last in the 
extensive plains of Castile. By this means we cut off all ap- 
proach by the two great roads which run north and south of the 
Sierra, and which alone are passable to an army which moves 
with its materiel and guns. Our advanced posts were pushed 
beyond Almeida, and covered by the Aqueda and Coa ; both of 
which are in winter formidable from their depth of water and 
rapidity of current, and in summer, not easy of passage, in conse- 
quence of the acclivity and ruggedness of their banks. Our right 



202 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvii. 

was protected by the Tagus, watched by Hill's corps at Abrantes; 
whilst our left could be threatened only from the side of Oporto, 
where we had no reason to apprehend that the enemy meditated 
any inroad. Thus we were justified in considering ourselves 
secure, so long as the Tagus should continue unfordable ; and, as 
this chanced to be the case up to a period quite unprecedented, 
we held our ground even beyond the season when we might fairly 
have anticipated either a voluntary advance, or a compulsory 
retreat. 

In the meanwhile there were collected, so early as the month 
of May, in our front, not fewer than three corps d'armee. One, 
under Ney, composed of three divisions, another, under Keller- 
man, of two divisions, and a third, containing a like number of 
divisions, under Junot. Besides these, General Montiniere was 
understood to be in Valladolid, with 9,000 infantry and four 
regiments of cavalry : and Massena had arrived, and taken upon 
himself the command of the whole. If the several divisions be 
estimated at 10,000 each— and no accounts which we received 
rated them at less — then would the total of the force immediately 
opposed to us amount to 80,000 men. To this we could oppose 
no more than 28,000 British, and about 30,000 Portuguese 
troops ; and the latter being, for the most part, as yet untried, 
absolute confidence could not be reposed in them. 

During the early months of spring, though the enemy were in 
considerable force in the vicinity of Cuidad Rodrigo, they made 
no serious attempt to besiege the place. Occasionally, indeed, 
they did here what Mortier was in the habit of doing at Badajoz — 
put themselves in motion, as if with a view to commence opera- 
tions ; but our advanced corps w r as no sooner reported to be in 
march, than they retired. It was at such times, and under such 
circumstances, that parties found an occasional opportunity of 
exchanging a few shots with the enemy ; and the cacadores were 
enabled to satisfy their comrades in the British ranks, that when 
the hour of the grand effort came, they w T ould not be found 
wanting. 



1810.] FINANCES. 203 



CHAPTER XVIII. 



Low state of the finances of the British army, and apprehensions entertained 
respecting the issue of the war — Massena opens the campaign by investing 
Ciudad Rodrigo — Skirmishes at the outposts — Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo — 
Affair of cavalry — Rumours of Massena's intended operations, and dispo- 
sitions to meet him. 



Whilst these things were going on, events daily occurred, 
some of them calculated to excite our spirits, and increase our 
hopes. Among the agreeable incidents just referred to, may be 
noticed the arrival at head- quarters of Lieutenant-general Sir 
Brent Spencer, an officer to whose merits every one bore testi- 
mony. In addition to this, assurances poured in upon us, that 
large reinforcements, both from Sicily and North America, were 
on their way ; whilst numerous desertions from the French army 
served to convince us that the enemy's troops, in spite of the 
proclamations and professions of the generals, were far from find- 
ing themselves comfortable in their present situation. From the 
month of January to the month of May, 1810, there came in 
nearly 500 men, all of them fully armed, and not a few bringing 
along with them their horses and appointments. 

Among the sources of uneasiness, again, to which we were 
subject, none affected us so seriously as the low state of our 
finances, and the difficulty which we felt in recruiting them. 
The army was universally in arrear for subsistence ; many regi- 
ments had received nothing during several months ; and at one 
period there were but a few thousand dollars in the military 
chest. Now, in a country where nothing was, or could be 
taken, without being paid for, and where the people, accustomed 
to look with suspicion upon the paper-money issued by their own 
government, scrupled in receiving our promissory- notes ; our 
expenditure amounted on an average to 30,000/. monthly — and 
we drew daily rations for 40,000 men and 12,000 animals ; yet 
at no time were we able to collect in our own neighbourhood 
more than 150,000/. ; and the remainder was consequently 



204 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xviii. 

brought, at a heavy loss and with immense labour, from Cadiz and 
Gibraltar. 

Meantime, the enemy were vigorously collecting their means, 
and preparing to open the campaign with a force which might 
bear down all opposition on the part of Lord Wellington and his 
army. Massena, who had paid a short visit to Salamanca, 
returned to Valladolid, for the purpose of hurrying forward to the 
frontier every battalion and company which could be spared. 
Columns were accordingly reported to be on the advance from 
the Asturias and Galicia, whilst the Estremadura corps, strength- 
ened by a fresh division of 5,000 men from Cadiz, was stated to 
be approaching Badajoz in force. As yet, however, the only 
direct indications of active operations being at hand, were found 
in the frequent movement of cavalry patrols along our front, and 
their daily attempts to discover fords by which the rivers might 
be crossed. With these, when they became too daring in their 
approaches, our outposts would from time to time skirmish ; but 
nothing was done upon a great scale, nor had we any ground to 
surmise upon what plan Massena intended to act. 

In the meantime, a few changes took place in the disposition 
of portions of our troops. Leiutenant-general Payne, to whom 
the cavalry had hitherto been intrusted, returned home, and 
Lieutenant-general Cotton succeeded to the command. The first 
division of infantry likewise, was transferred to General Spencer 
from General Cotton ; but the position of the army continued 
unaltered up to a late date in the summer ; nor w r as it till the 
month of May was considerably advanced, that the enemy 
showed any disposition to molest it. 

His arrangements being at length complete, Massena prepared, 
at the head of the 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps, to invest the fortress 
of Ciudad Rodrigo. For this purpose, he pushed on several strong 
divisions, which, driving in our patrols and flying posts, esta- 
blished two bridges across the Agueda, and took possession of 
some commanding heights that lay between our position and the 
town. It was not without the deepest reluctance that Lord 
Wellington came to the conclusion, that any attempt on his part 
to interrupt the progress of the siege, could be productive of no 
good. In point of numbers alone, the enemy surpassed us by a 
third ; and their troops were all admirably disciplined, ably com- 



1810.] INVESTMENT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. 205 

manded, and inured to war. Of our force, on the other hand, 
the larger proportion were new levies, which looked well, no 
doubt, upon parade, but which, never having, as yet, come under 
iire, could not be expected to behave like veterans. Under these 
circumstances it was determined, to the grief both of our General 
and his followers, that our attitude of watchfulness must still be 
preserved — and, to render it the more imposing, head-quarters 
were transferred to Almeida. 

No great while elapsed, however, before the inconveniences 
attending this latter arrangement were found to overbalance any 
benefit which could arise out of it. By taking post at Almeida, 
Lord Wellington was doubtless at hand to direct every manoeuvre 
which the advance might be required to make, and to observe with 
greater facility the movements and operations of the enemy ; but, 
on the other hand, he was in continual and imminent danger. 
Should our pickets, by accident, suffer a surprise, and their 
supports be overthrown, he might, before sufficient warning had 
been given, find himself shut up within the walls of Almeida, and 
■exposed, with the fortress itself, to the risk of capture. These 
were serious considerations ; and they induced him, after having 
spent a few days only in his advanced situation, to withdraw to 
Alverca, six leagues in the rear. 

The French troops, having driven in our patrols and flying 
posts, established themselves between Ciudad Rodrigo and the 
British army. This movement was effected early in June, and it 
completed the investment of the place, which had been begun as 
far back as the 26th of April. At first, the several divisions which 
closed around the city attempted nothing more than an occasional 
and irregular bombardment ; whilst they intermitted from time to 
time in the strictness of their blockade, as often as the appearance 
of an advance on our parts, led to the belief that we had deter- 
mined to raise the siege. Now, however, matters assumed a 
different aspect. The corps above alluded to consisted of 30,000 
men ; it was commanded by Marshal Ney, and, taking post upon 
some high and advantageous ground, appeared determined to cover, 
with effect, operations which were conducted both with firmness 
and science, and, being supported by 38,000, under the immediate 
orders of Junot, to whom the prosecutions of the siege was more 

p2 



206 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvm. 

immediately intrusted, felt itself secure. Nothing, therefore, 
remained for either party to perform, except to watch the progress 
of an undertaking in which both were equally interested. 

In the meanwhile, the siege of Rodrigo* was proceeding with a 
languor which gratified not less than it surprised us. The enemy 
broke ground before the place on the 11th of June, and on the 
25th their batteries opened. Though the means of the assailants 
were known to be ample, and little hope of being relieved existed, 
the resistance offered by the garrison was such, as to place them 
on a level with the brave defenders of Zaragoza and Gerona. 
They obstinately disputed every inch of ground, making frequent 
sorties, and attacking the covering and working parties in the 
trenches ; whilst they kept up from the ramparts an unceasing 
fire, which occasioned a heavy loss, both of life and materiel, to the 
besiegers. It was a galling thing to us, that we were compelled 
to be mere spectators of so much bravery. The sound of their 
very musketry could be heard within our lines ; and yet we 
could only admire their heroism, and lament our inability 
to second it. And it is but fair to acknowledge that the 
gallantry of General Hervasti and his brave garrison excited our 
admiration the more decidedly, as we had looked for no such 
exertions at their hands. Of the former we had been led to 

* " Ciudad Rodrigo is built on a rising ground, on the right bank of the 
Agueda, and has a double enceinte all round it. The interior wall is of an 
old construction, of the height of thirty-two feet, and is generally of bad 
masonry, without flanks, and with weak parapets and narrow ramparts. The 
exterior enclosure is a modern fausse-braie, of a low profile, constructed so 
far down the slope of the hill as to afford but little cover to the interior wall ; 
and, from the same defect of the rapid descent of the hill, the fausse- 
braie itself is very imperfectly covered by its glacis. On the eastern and 
southern side, there are ravelins to the fausse-braie; but in no part is 
there a covered way, nor are there any counter-mines. Without the town, 
•at the distance of 300 yards, the suburbs were enclosed by a bad earthen 
entrenchment, hastily thrown up. The ground without the place, is generally 
flat, and the soil rocky, except on the north side, where there are two hills, 
called the upper and the lower Teson ; the one, at 180 yards from the works, 
rises nearly to the level of the ramparts ; and the other, at 600 yards distance, 
to the height of thirteen feet above them. The soil on these hills is very 
stony, and, during open weather in winter, water rises at the depth of six 
inches below the surface."— Jones's Journal of the Sieges. 



1810.] ASSAULT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. 207 

think as of a weak old man, who would rather anticipate the 
wishes of Massena than disregard his summons ; whilst from the 
latter, especially under such a chief, we expected nothing. 

Ciudad Rodrigo was also far from being either a very regular 
or strong fortification. It was surrounded by a wall, and the wall 
was made up, in many parts, not of embankments or masonry, 
but of rubbish. An army of not less than 60,000 men lay around 
it, largely provided with ammunition, stores, a battering- train, 
and intrenching tools ; and the works were pushed on by 
thousands of men in each relief, all of them well skilled in the 
duties in which they were employed. The garrison, on the other 
hand, was composed of less than 4,000 soldiers ; and the 
inhabitants, including women and children, barely amounted to 
5,000. At last, in spite of the most strenuous exertions of 
the defenders, a practicable breach was made, and the enemy 
advanced to the assault, in the night between the 30th of June 
and the 1st of July. 

They were met on this occasion with the same devoted bravery 
which had so often foiled them in the trenches. Blue-lights, 
hand-grenades, and missiles of every description, were showered 
down upon them when covering the glacis and crowding the 
ditch ; and they were repulsed with a loss more heavy than many 
general actions might have occasioned. But the enemy were not 
to be foiled. They renewed their attack, causing science and 
skill to perform the work which bravery had failed in effecting ; 
and it soon became apparent that not all the gallantry of Hervasti 
and his troops, would be able to continue the defence of the 
place many days. 

The British army, the while, was resting in its position, and 
watching with deep anxiety and bitter regret, the gradual but 
certain fall of the city and its defenders, for, as the siege drew 
towards a conclusion, the enemy became every day more and more 
pressing ; and encounters at the outposts were events of constant 
recurrence. Of these, the greater number produced no other 
results than enabling a few individuals on both sides to display 
their gallantry ; but one affair of serious importance was unex- 
pectedly transacted, 

On the 3rd of July, General Craufurd reviewed his division ; 
and, for the purpose of impressing the enemy with a false notion 



208 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvnr. 

of its strength, he caused the regiments to be drawn up in rank 
entire. The spectacle was not lost upon the French Marshal, 
who, with the view of ascertaining exactly the amount of our 
force between the Agueda and the Coa, and perhaps to convince 
the besieged that they had nothing to expect from us, ordered a 
reconnoissance to be made. It took place the following day — and 
brought on an affair which, under all circumstances, might far 
better have been avoided. 

At an early hour on the morning of the 4th, the enemy were 
observed in motion, with five regiments of cavalry, some battalions 
of infantry, and several guns. They passed the Azava at sun-rise — 
and their cavalry, driving in our advanced videttes, came on with 
great rapidity, three regiments on the direct road from Gallegos 
to Almeida, and two by a path to the left, with the view of 
turning our right flank. There were two pieces of cannon, of the 
horse- artillery, stationed at a small brook, about half a mile to 
the rear of Gallegos. These instantly opened upon the French 
column ; but, though the fire was well directed, and evidently 
galled them, it did not succeed in stopping them. Our cavalry, 
in the meanwhile, formed in rear of the guns, sending out three 
or four squadrons, with the hussars, to skirmish ; and rather a 
sharp contest took place near a bridge which crossed the brook. 
The French made a dash to secure it, and passed some officers,, 
with about thirty or forty men, to the other side ; in accom- 
plishing which, however, as the bridge was extremely narrow, 
they were compelled to defile from column. An opportunity was 
thus afforded of attacking them to advantage, which was not 
permitted to escape. Captain Crack enbourg ; of the German 
hussars, an officer of gallantry and high character, saw in a 
moment the predicament into which they had thrust themselves. 
He instantly drew out two squadrons of the hussars, and, charging 
the body which had crossed the bridge, cut down their officer, and 
drove the rest, with the loss of several killed and wounded, back 
upon the column. The affair was accomplished in an instant — - 
but the promptitude and vigour which characterized its execution, 
merited and received the approbation of all present. The brave 
men were saluted by the cheers of their comrades as the} 
returned, and the officer's name was honourably mentioned at 
head- quarters. 



1810.] ATTACK OF CAVALRY. 209 

Notwithstanding this momentary success, the enemy's force, 
especially in cavalry, was too great to be successfully resisted, and 
the light division retired. It was with some difficulty, indeed, 
that the troops contrived to carry off the guns ; for the French, 
having discovered other parts by which the brook could be crossed, 
pressed upon them in overwhelming numbers. But both artillery 
and cavalry fell back in good order ; and, being supported by the 
infantry, whose fire from among the rocks and woods told heavily, 
they suffered but little. By this movement, however, Gallegos, 
Almeida, and the ground occupied on the preceding day, were 
given up ; and a new position was assumed immediately in front 
of the town of Almeida, and in rear of Fort Conception. 

From this date up to the 1st, no event of any moment occurred. 
The fire from the fortress having destroyed some of the enemy's 
magazines, they were compelled to intermit the siege till fresh 
supplies could be brought up ; and the garrison were not slow in 
turning the breathing-space to good account, by repairing, as fast 
as their means would allow, the injuries sustained by their walls. 
All this was prodigiously in our favour. Could the opening of 
the campaign be delayed till autumn was drawing to a close, 
little doubt existed that it would produce no results capable of 
seriously affecting the tenure of the country ; for then the fields 
would all be bare — the roads impassable — and everything as 
much against the invader, as advantageous to the invaded. 
It was to delay, indeed, that we mainly looked for our best 
prospects of success ; and, should Almeida hold out, after the 
example of Ciudad Rodrigo, our fondest wishes would be 
accomplished. Then might we retire, with perfect confidence, 
either to Ponte de Marcella, or by a different route to the 
intrenched position at Torres Vedras ; and from either of these 
strong-holds we might look down, in perfect security, upon the 
French troops perishing in our front. How different might have 
been the issue of the war, had Massena succeeded in com- 
mencing vigorous operations whilst yet the entire summer was 
before him ! 

The enemy having supplied the ammunition which had been 
expended, resumed their efforts against Ciudad Rodrigo ; and on 
the 10th of July, a second and more formidable breach was 
effected. The columns of attack were already formed — they had 



210 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xvm. 

even taken their stations in the trenches, and were waiting for 
the word to advance, when General Hervasti, seeing that all hope 
of relief was at an end, hung out a white flag, and proposed a 
capitulation. It is said that Ney, by whom the force actually 
employed in the siege was commanded, refused to grant any other 
terms than those of unconditional surrender ; but that Massena, 
more generous, consented that the troops should march out with 
the honours of war, and that the officers should retain their 
swords and baggage. Be this as it may, the place surrendered, 
and one obstacle to the advance of the French army into Portugal 
was removed.* 

On the morning after Ciudad Rodrigo fell, an affair took place 
between a portion of our light division and a party of the enemy, 
which gave rise, at the time, to a good deal of speculation. The 
enemy's patrols were in the daily habit of visiting the several 
villages and hamlets in our front, and of committing in them acts 
of barbarity and grievous plunder. General Craufurd determined, 
if possible, to put a stop to this ; and he made arrangements, on 
the night of the 10th, for cutting off the next party which should 
show itself near his pickets. With this view he took with him 
six squadrons of cavalry, amounting to upwards of 600 men ; and 
set off, soon after nijdnight, in the direction by which he expected 
that they would advance. General Craufurd's object was to 
arrive, before daylight, with a portion of his cavalry in their rear, 
and to attack them in front with the main body, which should be 
drawn up for the purpose. Unfortunately for the success of his 
enterprise, he lost his way, and, instead of pushing sufficiently to 



* " A daring exploit marked the fall of Rodrigo. When all hope that the 
fortress would be relieved was over, the Governor urged Julien Sanchez to 
attempt an escape, as he might render service in the field, but none within 
the fortress ; and the guerilla chief daringly effected it. The lancers were 
directed to hold themselves in readiness ; and, a little before midnight, 
Sanchez collected his troops in the Plaza; the two of his company that were 
married men, took their wives behind them. They sallied out, and their 
leader, in the spirit of Scanderberg, instead of contenting himself with merely 
effecting his own retreat, charged a post of cavalry, routed them, and carried 
away eight prisoners, with their horses. The two w r omen were armed with 
pistols ; and one of them, by name Maria Fraile, saved her husband, by 
shooting a dragoon who was about to attack him on one side." — Southey. 



1810.] FALL OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. 211 

the left, fell in with the French patrol at a moment when he was 
least prepared to take advantage of the meeting. The enemy's 
force did not exceed 30 cavalry and 200 infantry ; but they were 
advantageously posted in an open space, just beyond a narrow 
defile ; and to reach them it was necessary to thread that defile in 
a long line. The consequence was, that though the hussars, 
who led, formed up in succession as they got through, and 
charged their opponents with great gallantry, they effected 
nothing more than the dispersion of the handful of horse ; for the 
infantry had time to form a square, and not all the efforts of our 
people succeeded in breaking it. The hussars rode bravely up to 
the bayonets, but were repulsed by a volley closely thrown in, 
which killed or wounded upwards of a dozen men. The re- 
mainder wheeled off, and, pursuing the French cavalry, made way 
for a squadron of the 1 6th. These galloped forward, but also 
took to the left, and, leaving the infantry uninjured, joined in 
pursuit of the cavalry. When the last charge was made, the 
French square were without fire, every man having discharged his 
piece, and none having been able to load again ; but when a third 
attempt was made, they were better prepared to receive it. It 
fell to the lot of Colonel Talbot, of the 14th, to lead this attack. 
It was made with daring intrepidity ; but the enemy remained 
perfectly steady, and, reserving their fire till the bridles of the 
horses touched their bayonets, gave it with such effect, that 
Colonel Talbot and several of his men were killed on the spot. 
The rest drew off, upon which General Craufurd, despairing of 
success by the exertions of cavalry alone, despatched an orderly 
to bring up a detachment of the 43rd, which chanced to be at no 
great distance. 

Whilst this was doing, the enemy's little column began its 
retreat, which it conducted with singular steadiness and great 
order. The 14th dragoons, seeing this, prepared to launch 
another squadron against it ; and it was already in speed for the 
purpose, when Colonel Arenschild, of the hussars, observed 
cavalry advancing both in front and flank, and checked the 
movement. It was much to be regretted afterwards that he took 
this step, for the horse which alarmed him proved to be detach- 
ments from our own people, on their return from pursuing the 
enemy's dragoons, the whole of whom they had captured. The 



212 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xviii. 

French infantry lost no time in availing themselves of the inde- 
cision of our cavalry. They marched on, and returned to their 
main body, without having lost a single prisoner, or suffered in 
killed or wounded. 

The fate of Ciudad Rodrigo was hardly authenticated, when 
we heard that Regnier had been ordered to cross the Tagus, and 
that he was in full march to form a junction with Massena, by 
way of Almaraz and D'Alameta. General Hill immediately- 
adopted a policy correspondent with that of the enemy, by 
moving upon Villa Velha. These manoeuvres, it is scarcely 
necessary to add, led to varied conjectures as to the course 
which the enemy w r ould pursue, subsequently to the capture of 
Almeida. 

From the superior strength of Massena' s army, no well- 
grounded hope could exist that Lord Wellington would be 
enabled to arrest their progress, or offer to them any steady front, 
till we should have taken up the fortified line at Torres Vedras. 
Of that line, and of the state of defensibility in which it now 
stood, it may be necessary to take a little notice. 

The position of Torres Vedras forms the gorge, or neck of a 
peninsula, at the extremity of which the city of Lisbon is placed. 
It measures from the mouth of the Zezandra, on the sea, 
to Alhandra, on the Tagus, about twenty- five English miles ; 
and it embraces in its profile every species of ground calculated 
to assist the operations of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Along 
this line were erected, at convenient distances, no fewer than 
108 redoubts, differing in dimensions according to the extent 
of the ground allotted for them, and the purposes which they 
were severally intended to serve ; and the whole were armed with 
a train of 420 pieces of ordnance of the heaviest calibre. To 
protect these redoubts, and to give to their occupants ample space 
for offensive as well as defensive operations, mountains were 
perpendicularly scarped, rivers were dammed up, and inundations 
formed ; whilst of the roads which one crossed the isthmus, 
many were cut up and destroyed ; and many more, adapted to the 
movements of troops, were made. The truth is, that art, in the 
present instance, only filled up the outlines, which nature had 
already drawn, of a battle-field as formidable as ever was occu- 
pied by troops. But the strongest positions must always have 



1810.] TORRES VEDRAS. 213 

their weak points ; and even the lines of Torres Vedras, though 
approaching as nearly to the impregnable as it is possible for 
lines to do, were not without their assailable corners. In some 
places the redoubts were unavoidably placed at intervals from 
one another so considerable, that, should there not be powerful 
reserves at hand, and moveable columns to block up the chasms, 
the enemy might, without loss or difficulty, penetrate between 
them. This was peculiarly the case on the flanks, in the space 
between Mafra and the sea on the one hand, and between Torres 
Vedras and the Tagus on the other ; and, as ill luck would have 
it, these very spaces were, above all others, the most favourable 
to the operations of an attacking force. The front of the centre 
was completely covered by Monte Junto, which, extending its 
ramifications to the very works, would necessarily render the 
enemy's movements in that direction both tedious and difficult ; 
but the two flanks were without such shelter, and must therefore 
depend much upon the valour of those who occupied them. Of 
that, however, no doubt could be entertained : and hence we felt 
that, in falling back thither, we were withdrawing to a stupen- 
dous fortification, which nothing but a regular siege, of which the 
duration was incalculable, could possibly reduce. The sole risk, 
indeed, which we ran, was from want of supplies. Were the 
French themselves amply provisioned, and were the Alentejo to 
be occupied, as it was probable that it would, by Mortier's corps 
from Valencia, then, indeed, an army of 60,000 men, thrown back 
upon a city containing at least 250,000 inhabitants, could not, 
it was to be apprehended, hold out many months ; but on these 
heads we saw no reason to be apprehensive. The enemy, we 
were -well aware, carried few supplies with him. We had taken 
care already, to hinder any from being provided by the country 
into which he was about to enter ; and, above all, the sea was open 
to us. Though, therefore, there was something not flattering in 
the idea of retreating to the remotest corner of the Peninsula, we 
prepared to retire thither with the feeling that it was "reculer 
pour mieux santer ;" and we looked forward with confidence to 
the moment which should enable us once more to resume the 
offensive. 



214 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xix. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

Preparations proceed, and plans are formed — The light division attacked at 
Almeida — General movement of the British army towards the rear— Inde- 
cision of Massena — Difficulties against which Lord Wellington was called 
upon to struggle — Almeida besieged and taken — The garrison enter the 
French service — The British army retires upon Busaco. 

The intervening period between the 11th and 18th of July, 
1810, was spent in receiving reports, and making dispositions. 
We learned that the account of the march of Regnier's corps, to form 
a junction with Massena and act in connexion with him, was cor- 
rect. Regnier had already arrived at Coria and Moraliga — and had 
opened a communication with the General- in- chief, by Abego and 
the pass of Perales. To render it the more secure, Massena 
turned to his left, whilst at the same time he threw to his right a 
corps which established itself at San Felice. Regnier' s move- 
ment naturally drew our attention to that quarter — and General 
Hill was ordered from Villa Velha to Castello Branco, where he 
arrived on the 20th. 

That Massena was about to attempt one of two momentous 
undertakings was certain. He would either strengthen Regnier 
and render him superior to Hill, with the view of moving imme- 
diately upon Castello Branco, and forcing our right ; or he was 
manoeuvring to join him, by the pass of Perales, and then, with 
very superior numbers, attack us on the Coa. There was little 
ground for doubt as to which of these arrangements would prove 
most advantageous to us. In case he should adopt the former 
plan, there was a risk of Hill being disabled, in which case our 
situation in the position of Guarda would become precarious ; 
whilst in the event of any disaster befalling us here, Hill must 
retreat upon the Zezere, and we follow, with all the speed of 
which we were capable. Were he, on the other hand, to collect 
his whole force in our front, Hill might be brought up to our 
line in three or four marches, and other benefits might arise out 
of a battle on the Coa, such as would not probably attend a 
similar operation at a point nearer to the capital. These con- 



1810.] MOVEMENTS OF MASSENA. 215 

siderations combined to produce a hope that Massena would 
choose the bolder and more perilous course of assaulting our 
position above the Coa. 

It has been stated, that the light division under General 
Craufurd, to which the care of furnishing the pickets was 
assigned, fell back, after the affair of the 4th, to a position 
between Almeida and Fort Conception, where it fixed its head- 
quarters, and established its infantrj 7 at a little village called 
Valdelamula. Our people remained here in quiet for some days, 
the enemy making no demonstrations of a move ; but, on the 
morning of the 1 6th, the infantry were still further withdrawn, 
and took shelter under the guns of Almeida. Lord Wellington 
had positively prohibited all fighting on points further in advance 
than the Coa. His orders to General Craufurd, which, that they 
might not be misunderstood, had been twice distinctly repeated, 
were, that he should by every means avoid an action ; and that 
as soon as he became aware of the approach of an enemy, he 
should retire, with ample space between, to the opposite bank of 
the river. Craufurd, however, conceived that the French would 
respect the fortress of Almeida, that they would not push him 
very rapidly, and hence that he would be able at any moment to 
make a regular retreat. He accordingly resolved to wait the 
arrival of the French column, and then fall back, slowly, orderly, 
and with some resistance, in their presence — and no great while 
elapsed ere the prudence of his determination was put to the 
test. 

On the 21st, the enemy entered, without opposition, Valde- 
lamula, St. Pedro, and Villa Formosa ; upon which the garrison 
was withdrawn from Fort Conception, and the fort blown up. 
Another pause of three days ensued, after which a force com- 
posed of twenty-five squadrons of cavalry, 10,000 infantry, and 
a correspondent train of artillery, pushed forward in the direc- 
tion of Almeida. General Craufurd was advertised of this 
movement at an early hour on the morning of the 24th. The 
resolution which he had formed, however, of holding his present 
position, remained unshaken — and, instead of retiring, he drew 
up his division in line, resting his left upon Almeida, and 
having his right, as well as his rear, covered by the Coa. 



216 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xix. 

Here he prepared to give battle ; and here, before many hours 
elapsed, he was attacked in force. 

There were three British pickets, two of infantry and one of 
cavalry, about half way between Villamula and Almeida. The 
sun had not yet risen on the 24th, when they found themselves 
assailed by the enemy's skirmishers, which in whole swarms 
covered the advance of the columns of cavalry and infantry. 
Our people retired, but they retired slowly and in good order, 
disputing every inch of ground ; and both suffering themselves, 
and causing their assailants to suffer. The skirmish was the 
more interesting, as it is impossible to conceive any ground 
better adapted for a rencontre of the kind — an extensive plain, 
intersected continually by hedges, stone walls, and enclosures, 
stretching all the way from Villamula to the Coa ; and it was 
through this that our soldiers fell back, retaining each successive 
fence till the superior numbers of the enemy compelled them to 
abandon it. During the continuance of this skirmish, the French 
cavalry made more than one attempt to cut off portions of the 
British infantry, and they were sometimes too successful. A 
division of hussars dashing forward into a part of the plain more 
open than the rest, threw themselves between the intervals in a 
company of the 52nd, and, in spite of a heavy fire with which 
they were saluted, succeeded in making prisoners of an officer 
and about fourteen men. 

The skirmishers being now driven in, the French prepared to 
follow up their successes, by vigorously assaulting Craufurd's 
position. They bore down in close column upon his centre, 
where the 95th, with two Portuguese regiments, were posted ; 
and, in spite of a desperate resistance — particularly from the 95th 
and one of the foreign battalions, pierced it. By this time our 
cavalry had withdrawn to the opposite side of the Coa, and, 
our infantry being in some disorder, affairs assumed rather an 
unpromising aspect. Craufurd, accordingly, determined upon a 
retreat ; but it was undertaken under ticklish circumstances ; 
and not executed without heavy loss. The only route open to 
General Craufurd's division, was by a bridge across the stream ; 
which, as it lay upon a level considerably beneath the ground 
now occupied by the enemy, was exposed to a heavy fire from 



1810.] PASSAGE OF THE COA. 217 

their guns. Thither, however, it was necessary to proceed — 
and thither regiment after regiment moved, covered in succession 
by the corps in the rear, and, last of all, by a body of skirmishers. 
The French made several brave attempts to force the bridge ; 
they charged tow r ards it repeatedly, as our people w T ere descending, 
and endeavoured to push a body of their cavalry across in our 
rear ; but, the opposite bank rising abruptly, and being covered 
both with artillery and infantry, they were, on each occasion, 
stopped.* At length the firing ceased ; and Craufurd, having 
halted on his new ground till evening, retreated, under cover of 
the darkness, to a position within four leagues of Alverca. 

There can be no doubt, that in this skirmish the British troops 
fully supported their character for gallantry and coolness ; but 
it was to be regretted that the action had taken place at all. It 
was not wisdom in us, to waste strength in partial encounters, 
particularly when these must be followed, as in the present 
instance, by a retrograde movement; and of this Lord Wel- 
lington was fully satisfied, as he had explicitly forbidden any 
affair to be wantonly incurred. Yet was Craufurd an officer of 
singular ability and bravery, and even here did as much, or per- 
haps more, than most men in a similar situation could have 
performed. But I know that considerable dissatisfaction was 
felt at head- quarters when the report of the affair came in. 

The 25th and 26th were spent by us in a state of quiet — but 
on the 27th, the French pushed forward several strong patrols as 

* " A drummer, and an officer in a splendid uniform, leaped forward 
together, and the "whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the ravine 
at first deceived the soldiers' aim, and two-thirds of the passage was won ere 
an English shot had brought down an enemy ; yet a few paces onwards, the 
line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading French section fell as 
one man ! Still the gallant column pressed forward, but no foot could pass 
that terrible line ; the killed and wounded rolled together, until the heap rose 
nearly even with the parapet, and the living mass behind, melted away rather 
than give back. 

" The shouts of the British now rose loudly ; but they were confidently 
answered ; and, in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than the 
first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range was better 
judged, and, ere half the distance was won, the multitude was again torn, 
shattered, and slain ; ten or twelve men only succeeded in crossing, and took 
shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river." — Napier. 



218 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xix. 

far as the river Pinhel. As it was not intended to risk a general 
action here, we should, of course, fall back to avoid it. It was 
accordingly resolved to march some leagues to the rear, and, having 
opened free space for the British troops, by sending on the 
Portuguese brigades in front, to establish the head-quarters at 
Celerico. 

This place, situated at the head of the gorges of the Estrella, 
presented a post of much greater strength and importance to an 
army threatened by superior numbers, than the extended line on 
which it had hitherto acted, where it was liable to be forced at all 
points. Nor was this all. By falling back, in good order, upon 
Celerico, we had it in our power to despatch the whole of our 
divisions, which must necessarily retire by the same road, at 
perfect leisure, and with proper intervals between them ; because, 
having the start of the enemy by several marches, the latter would 
find it a hard matter to overtake or annoy us. 

As soon as this determination was formed, no time was lost 
before it was carried into effect. The cavalry, amounting in all 
to twenty-four squadrons, were moved up to Alverca, where they 
held themselves in readiness to cover the retreat. The light 
division marched to Celerico ; the first to Penhancas ; the third to 
Carapentra, Fares, and the villages near. The fourth division 
continued to occupy Guarda, because it was deemed essential to 
retain that place for some time longer, to keep open the commu- 
nication with Hill, whose corps was still at Alalay ; but General 
Cole received instructions, in the event of our retrograding beyond 
Celerico, to retire by a mountain road and rejoin us. 

When we began our retrogression, it was with a full assurance 
on our minds, that a few days, at the furthest, would throw some 
light upon the enemy's plans. To our great surpise, however, 
day after day elapsed, and they still continued inert and 
undecided as ever. Almeida, though invested, was not threatened 
with a siege, neither were corps in movement against us ; and yet 
a full fortnight had passed since the affair with Craufurd's 
division on the Coa, and a month since Ciudad Rodrigo sub- 
mitted. There was of course, but one line of policy for us to 
pursue ; we could only wait, with patience, till Massena should do 
something ; whereas it appeared as though the French Marshal 
was either completely at a loss how to proceed, or that his 



1810.] CONDUCT OF MINISTERS. 219 



means and resources were inadequate to the objects in contem- 
plation. 

Whilst our bodies were kept at rest, our minds were occupied 
by rumours, which came in from different parts of the country. 
We heard, one day. that Regnier had advanced to Castello Branco, 
and that Hill had fallen back upon his strong position at Lar- 
gedas. There had been a little skirmishing on this occasion ; 
and the Portuguese cavalry had been brought into play, and 
acquitted itself well. Next we w r ere informed that the peasantry 
were forming bands of guerillas, and that they had already killed 
several straggling parties of the enemy in the vicinity of Guarda. 
But the most pleasing intelligence of all which reached us at 
this time, reported the success which Silveira's followers had 
obtained over a body of French troops at Parba de Sanatrice. 
A Swiss battalion in the French service had, it appeared, attacked 
the Spanish post. The Spaniards gave way, and fled ; but a 
body of Portuguese militia belonging to Silveira's corps, advanced 
against the enemy, and shut them into the town. Having sus- 
tained a blockade for some days, the enemy surrendered upon 
terms ; and they were sent, to the number of 400, to their own 
country, on condition that they w T ould not serve again in the 
Peninsub . 

Though it scarcely falls within the plan of the present narrative 
to touch upon affairs purely political, it may be observed, that 
Lord Wellington found himself, at this critical juncture, beset 
with many other difficulties than those which originated in the 
insufficiency of his force, and the superiority of the enemy. All 
responsibility was thrown upon his shoulders. The instructions 
which he received were generally so expressed, as to leave him 
ground for doubt respecting the course which w r ould be most 
agreeable to the home government ; whilst hints were thrown out, 
that he ought to look above all things to the preservation of the 
force intrusted to him. In few words, the ministers were alarmed 
at the crisis to which affairs had been brought, and their conduct 
was guided by their fears. Nor was the government of Portugal 
to be depended upon. A variety of intrigues were going on, 
augmented and renewed from time to time by arrivals from the 
Brazils ; and a thousand impediments were thrown in the way of 

Q 



220 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xix. 

every useful suggestion, provided it happened to come from the 
English General or his friends. It is not going too far to affirm, 
that a British commander has never stood in a predicament more 
harassing and unsatisfactory than that occupied by the Duke of 
Wellington during the summer of 1810; and that probably not 
an individual in the service of the crown, could have overcome the 
difficulties which eternally presented themselves, except the man 
who struggled with and subdued them. 

The indecision which had marked the enemy's movements 
ceased ; and, on the 14th of August, 1810, they sat down before 
Almeida.* On the following day, ground was broken ; but the 
works proceeded slowly — and the 25th arrived before the first 
batteries were constructed. At one point, however, owing to the 
faulty nature of the fortification, the approaches had been pushed, 
without much interruption from the fire of the place, even to the 
foot of the glacis. But the breaching-batteries were erected at a 
prodigious distance, and came in only with the line of the first 
parallel, far beyond the proper range of shot. Almeida, regarded 
by the Portuguese as one of the principal bulwarks of their 
country, was garrisoned at this time by two regiments of militia 
and one of the line, which were placed under the orders of Briga- 
dier-General Cox, an officer of merit and resolution ; and 
it was expected that the resistance would not fall short of, 
however it might exceed, that offered by the feebler fortress of 
Rodrigo. 

Lord Wellington, as soon as he learned that the enemy had 
begun the siege, once more moved from the position which he 
had occupied previously to the late retrogression, His object in 

* " This fortress, although regularly constructed with six bastions, ravelins, 
an excellent ditch and covered way, was extremely defective. The ramparts 
were too high for the glacis ; and from some near ground, on the side of the 
attack, the bottom of the ditch might be seen. An old square cas'le. built 
on a mound in the centre of the town, contained three bomb-proofs, the 
doors of which were not secure ; but with the exception of some damp case- 
ments in one bastion, there was no other magazine for the powder. Colo : el 
Fox was Governor, and his garrison, composed of one regular and two militia 
regiments, a body of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about 
1090 men/ 5 — Napier. 



1810.] FALL OF ALMEIDA. 221 

this was not only to encourage the garrison to a desperate defence, 
by creating the hope of a speedy relief, but to draw off the troops 
whenever the place should become untenable, avoiding, at the 
same time, a general action. But the garrison did not do its 
duty — it yielded on the first appearance of calamity. 

The enemy's batteries opened at long range on the 26th ; and 
in the evening of that day, a magazine, in which was deposited 
the chief part of the powder in the place, unfortunately blew up. 
It happened that some cars were in the act of conveying ammu- 
nition from the building, when a shell exploded at the door, and, 
the loose powder having ignited, the fire was communicated to the 
whole depot, and it instantly exploded. This was indeed a heavy 
calamity ; and Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford, in their 
public despatches, attributed to it, and to it alone, all the events 
which followed. But the conduct of the garrison was suspicious. 
It was no sooner known that the principal magazine had been 
destroyed, than the whole of the officers, with the Tenente Rey, 
or second in command, at their head, proceeded to Governor Cox 
in a body, and insisted upon his instantly surrendering. General 
Gox warmly remonstrated against the measure, and ordered them 
to repair to their several posts, informing them that he intended, 
as soon as affairs should become desperate, to cut his way through 
the enemy's lines, and join Lord Wellington. The officers with- 
drew in evident displeasure ; but when the Governor came forth 
to instruct the soldiers in the duty he expected from them, he 
found that all had laid down their arms, and that there was not a 
man willing to obey his commands, or follow his steps. Under 
such circumstances, but one measure remained for him to adopt. 
He accepted the terms offered by the French through the Marquis 
D'Alorna ; and, on the following day, being formally summoned, 
he reluctantly surrendered. 

The French army entered Almeida on the 2Gth, and the gar- 
rison being paraded before him, Massena behaved towards them 
with a degree of good policy, not generally pursued either by 
himself or his brother marshals. From the militia he exacted 
nothing more than a solemn assurance that they would not again 
take arms against the French, and then dismissed them to their 
homes — whilst to the soldiers of the line he offered various 

q2 



222 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xix. 

advantages, provided they consented to take service under the 
banners of Napoleon. To the eternal disgrace of the persons 
thus tampered with, all, both officers and men, embraced the pro- 
posal — and passed over, without the slightest reluctance, to the 
ranks of the enemy. True, it was industriously given out that 
the measure in question had been adopted with one view only — 
namely, that they might be preserved from certain captivity in 
France, and find opportunities of again deserting to their coun- 
trymen; but it is hardly necessary to observe, that no one 
dreamed of again placing reliance on men who could thus set all 
honourable and proper feeling at defiance. 

It has been mentioned that the Marquis D'Alorna took part in 
this negociation. D'Alorna was a Portuguese of talent, though a 
determined and uncompromising partisan of the French. When 
they entered the country before, under Junot, he declared warmly 
in their favour; and, having been governor of the province of 
Beira, was enabled to render them important services. It is but 
fair to state, however, that D'Alorna's treachery arose, not from 
motives of personal ambition, but out of hereditary abhorrence of 
the reigning family, from whom his ancestors had suffered great 
oppression. Many of them had been beheaded as traitors, when, 
according to his statement, they had committed nothing deserving 
of the punishment ; and thus, the hatred engendered by such 
cruelties, descended, like an heir-loom, from father to son, till it 
broke out, at length, in the person of the present Marquis. 

When the fall of Almeida became known, Lord Wellington 
lost no time in retracing his steps, and placing his divisions in the 
position which he had assumed previously to the late advance. 
They had not, however, long resumed their station, when they 
were obliged once more to abandon it ; for the enemy, advancing 
on the 1st, with a few squadrons of cavalry and some infantry, 
attacked and drove in our outposts at Alverca. Lord Wellington 
would not risk a general action here, he was desirous, on the 
contrary, of stretching further to the rear, to bring his divisions 
into closer communication with Hill, and to be nearer to the 
position of Ponte de Marcella, should necessity require him to 
take it up. He accordingly issued orders for the whole army to 
fall back, and fixed his head- quarters, on the following day, at 



1810.] DESERTION OF A GARRISON. 223 

Gouvea. By this movement he kept in check any troops which 
might endeavour to advance from Sahugal hy Covilhos, and he 
secured Hill and himself from being turned by the fortified posi- 
tion of the Zezere. 

At this interesting crisis, the respective strength of the rival 
armies stood thus : — the estimates respecting the French, were 
generally drawn from the reports of deserters, who are disposed 
rather to overrate than underrate the strength of the party whom 
they have abandoned ; but at this time we discovered, from inter- 
cepted returns, that the effective strength of Massena's three 
columns amounted, in round numbers, to rather more than 70,000 
men. Our effective strength stood thus : — Of British infantry there 
were in the field, 23,868 ; of British cavalry, 2,870 ; of British artil- 
lery, 2,000; making a total of 28,738: of Portuguese, there 
were 21,712 infantry, 1,696 cavalry, and 1,000 artillery; the 
grand total of the allied army being 53,136. But of these 
full 25,000 were at a distance, some under Hill, others under 
Leith, so that we took up our ground at Ponte de Marcella with 
little more than 28,000 men. We took it up, however, in such 
time as to authorize a well-grounded expectation, that before any 
serious attack could be made, they would be enabled to join. 

As soon as it was positively ascertained that the French were 
passing the Mondego with their third column, Lord Wellington 
threw two divisions, the light and the fourth, to the north bank 
of that river. In the meanwhile, the first division, consisting of 
six British and two Portuguese brigades, advanced from Coimbra 
to Mealhada, on the great road to Oporto. The third division, 
(Picton's), with the cavalry under Cotton, were thus the only 
force left on the southern side of the Mondego ; and they were 
posted, the one behind the Alva, the other in front of the Ponte 
de Marcella. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to add, that the latter 
corps were left in these situations, to keep open the communica- 
tion with Hill and Leith ; and that they received orders to follow 
the rest of the army across the river so soon as these officers should 
have joined. 

Meanwhile, rumour was on the wing. We heard that Romana, 
having improvidently quitted his strong-hold, and advanced as 
far as Puente de Castro, between Seville and Badajoz, had risked 
an action with Mortier, and suffered a severe defeat. So com- 



224 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xx. 

plete, indeed, was it represented, that nothing except the 
distinguished gallantry of a corps of Portuguese cavalry, which 
Lord Wellington had lent Romana, saved the Spanish army from 
annihilation. The battle was stated to have been fought on the 
15th; and, as Mortier was represented to he following up the 
fugitives with vigour, it became a question, whether he might not 
arrive in time to assist Massena, by threatening our right from 
Alcantara, or even from Abrantes. Lord Wellington, however, 
disregarded the report, and continued to issue his commands, and 
arrange his plans, with unbending firmness ; and all things went 
on as coolly and orderly as if no such rumour had reached us. 



CHAPTER XX. 

Battle of Busaco — The Allied army retire upon Torres "Vedras, followed by 
the French — Description of the Lines — Review of the campaign — Con- 
dition of the two armies — Lord Wellington receives reinforcements. 

It has been stated, that the whole of the troops which com- 
posed the French army of Portugal, advanced in pursuit of us, 
by columns of corps, between the Mondego and the Douro. 
Instead, however, of continuing their march by these distinct 
routes, they struck into a single line, and proceeded in one 
immense body, along the Vizeu road, on the right bank of the 
Mondego. The road thus selected, is one of the worst in Por- 
tugal, and presented at this time so many difficulties to the 
transport of guns and wheeled carriages, as to be almost 
esteemed impassable. Yet by that road the French troops pushed 
forward — and, although they were followed by an enormous train 
of carriages and artillery, they made their way with rapidity and 
order — while we retired from Celerico, and took up fresh ground 
in the vicinity of Gouvea. The first division was placed at Meal- 
hada, on the great road which leads from Coimbra to Oporto ; 
the fourth occupied the left of the position of Busaco, which it 
was now arranged to take up ; whilst the third, leaving sufficient 



1810.] BUSACO. 225 

room for the first to form between, in case the attack should be 
made exclusively on the heights — unsupported by any attempt to 
turn our flank, took post in continuation of the line thus marked 
out. Such were the general movements up to the 25th ; it 
remains now to describe the ground on which Lord Wellington 
had determined to risk an action. 

The position of Busaco consists of one huge mountain, which 
extends from the edge of the Mondego to the great Oporta 
road, and supports upon its summit the convent of Busaco, 
inhabited by monks of the order of La Trappe.* It measures 
nearly sixteen miles in w T idth from the right, where it eases itself 
ofT by gradual falls towards the Mondego, to the left, where it 
ends in a variety of tongues of land, each as lofty, craggy, and 
rugged as itself. It is covered in front by gorges of indescribable 
depth, and defiles barely passable for sheep. The principal 
inconvenience attending it as fighting- ground arose out of its 
extent ;f for it was manifestly too capacious to be safely occupied 
by 60,000 men ; whereas, a military post should be as easy of 
egress as difficult of access, and its flanks, as well as its 
centre, w r ell secured. But, where ground is too extensive, the 
latter object can never be perfectly attained ; and in the present 
instance we could not but feel that any serious endeavour to turn 



* " It is the only place in that kingdom where the bare-footed Carmelites 
possessed what, in monastic language, is called a desert ; by which term an 
establishment is designated, where those brethren, whose piety flies the 
highest pitch, may at once enjoy the advantages of the eremite and 
the discipline of the cenobite life, and thus indulge the heroism of ascetic 
devotion in security. The convent, surrounded by an extensive and almost 
impervious wood, stands in what ma) 7 be called the crater of the loftiest 
part of the ridge ; its precincts, which included a circumference of about 
four miles, were walled in. Within that circuit were various chapels and 
religious stations ; and on the summit of the mountain, which is within 
the inclosure, a stone cross was erected, of an enormous size, upon so huge 
•a foundation that 3,000 cart-loads of stone were employed in constructing 
its base. The cells of the brethren were round the church, not in a regular 
building, but accommodated to the irregularities of the ground." 

f " To form some idea of the great extent of the position at Busaco, it is 
only necessary to state that, after 50,000 men had been placed upon it, a 
space of nearly two miles intervened from the left of General Leith's corps to 
the right of the third division standing next in line." — Leith Hay, 



226 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xx 

our left by the Mealhada road, must, in the end, be attended with 
success. Strange to say, however, Marshal Massena, — an officer 
whose reputation came second to that of no marshal in the French 
service — made no effort of the kind. On the contrary, he led 
his columns through the passes above described, and up the face 
of heights approximating very nearly to the perpendicular, and 
thus devoted them to destruction, from the hands of men strongly 
posted on the summits. 

On the 25th, the enemy's advanced guard took possession of 
Santa Comba Dao, and pushed on to Martigao, where Craufurd 
was posted. As it w T as Lord Wellington's wish that no affair of 
advanced guards should take place, instructions had been issued 
for the light division to retire, on the first alarm, to the mountain 
of Busaco ; and the movement was executed with admirable pre- 
cision in the presence of the enemy.* On the 27th, at day- break, 
all arrangements were complete, and the army was all drawn up 
in the following order. 

On the right stood the second division, commanded by Hill, 
guarding the declivities towards the Mondego, and flanked by the 
stream. Next to it came General Leith's corps — then General' 
Picton's, the third division — next, General Spencer's first 
division — then General Craufurd's light division — and last of all 
upon the extreme left, stood the fourth division, under the com- 
mand of General Cole. The cavalry were sent to the plains in 
front of Mealhada, where there was room to act ; and the artil- 
lery distributed at different points, according as ground or advan- 
tageous range directed ; and, on the following morning, soon after 
these dispositions had been made, the enemy advanced to the 
attack.f 

* Craufurd, however, would have held the position he had taken, though 
the enemy were fast advancing, in overwhelming numbers. But Lord Wel- 
lington, coming up, immediately withdrew the division, directing the manoeuvre 
in person, and covering the retreat with the 52nd and 95th, the cavalry, and 
a troop of horse artillery. — Ed. 

*f " Nothing could be conceived more enlivening, more interesting, or more 
varied, than the scene from the heights of Busaco. Commanding a very 
extensive prospect to the eastward, the movements of the French army were 
distinctly visible ; it was impossible to conceal them from the observations of 
the troops stationed along the whole range of the mountain ; nor did this 
appear to be the object of the enemy. Rising grounds were covered with 



1810.] BATTLE OF BUSACO. 227 



At six o'clock in the morning, two heavy columns were seen to 
approach ; the one along the road, so as to fall in with the light 
division, the other through a defile, in the direction of Picton's 
post. Both attacks were made with great spirit and determina- 
tion ; but the latter was evidently that upon which Massena 
mainly relied, and to ensure the success of which he had taken 
every imaginable precaution. It was entrusted to an elite corps, 
and headed by three of the most distinguished regiments in the 
French army; the 32nd, 36th, and 7Uth. These were placed 
under the command of General Merle, an officer who had 
acquired a high reputation from his behaviour at Austerlitz ; and 
they certainly gave proof that neither they nor their leader had 
won a name which they were not w r orthy to wear. They 
pressed forward with a gallantry which drew forth the hearty 
plaudits, not of their friends only, but of their enemies ; and in 
spite of as heavy a shower of grape, round shot, and musketry, 
as it is easy to imagine, actually gained the summit. They 
gained it, too, in good order, for they were formed in an instant 
after the ascent was won. But there was no support in their 
rear; and the 45th British, with the 8th Portuguese, met them 
most gallantly. The contest was warm, but short ; the 88th, 
arriving to the assistance of their comrades, instantly charged, 
and the enemy were borne over the cliffs and crags with fearful 
rapidity, many of them being literally picked out of the holes in 
the rocks by the bayonets of the Connaught Rangers. The 
troops employed in this attack consisted of two divisions of the 
corps of Regnier, one of which, under Merle, suffered the 
defeat described, whilst the other remained in reserve in the defile* 

Whilst this attack was made on Picton's post, two divisions 

troops, cannon, or equipages ; the widely-extended country seemed to contain 
a host, moving forward or gradually condensing into numerous masses, 
checked in their progress by the grand natural barrier on which the allies 
were placed, and at the base of which it became necessary to pause. In 
imposing appearance, as to numerical strength, there has been rarely seen 
anything comparable to that of the enemy's army, from Busaco ; it was not 
alone an army encamped before us, but a multitude ; cavalry, infantry, artil- 
lery, cars of the country, horses, tribes of mules with their attendants, 
sutlers, followers of every description, crowded the moving scene upon which 
Lord Wellington and his army looked down."— Leith Hay. 



228 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xx. 

of the corps of Marshal Ney, one commanded by Loison, and 
the other by Mermot, bore down in like manner upon that part 
of the position held by the light division. Both of these divi- 
sions took part in the assault, a third being left in reserve ; and 
they advanced with great intrepidity over half the ascent, 
exposed to a trifling fire from a few pieces of cannon. The 
43rd, 52nd, and 95th, were in line — and they permitted the 
enemy to approach till less than one hundred yards divided them; 
and then, one volley from right to left, coolly and deliberately 
given, thinned the ranks of the assailants ; after which, the light 
troops cheered, and rushed forward with the bayonet. Never 
was rout more complete than that which followed the move- 
ment * The enemy, unable to retreat and afraid to resist, were 
rolled down the steep like a torrent of hailstones driven before 
a powerful wind ; and not the bayonets only, but the very hands 
of some of our brave fellows, became in an instant red with the 
blood of the fugitives. More brilliant or more decisive charges 
than those executed this day by the two divisions which bore the 

* " The brigade of General Simon led the attack ; and, reckless of the 
constant fusilade of the British light troops and the sweeping fire of the 
artillery, which literally ploughed through the advancing column, from its 
leading to its last section, the enemy came steadily and quickly on. The 
horse-artillery worked their guns with amazing rapidity, delivering round 
after round with such beautiful precision, that the wonder was, how any body 
of men could advance under such a withering and incessant cannonade. But 
nothing could surpass the gallantry of the assailants. On they came ; and, 
in a few moments, their skirmislurs, breathless and begrimed with powder, 
topped the ridge of the Sierra. The British guns were instantly retired; 
the French cheers arose, and, in another second, their column topped the 
height. General Craufurd, who had coolly watched the progress of the 
advance, called on the 43rd and 52nd to " charge!" A cheer, that pealed 
for miles over the Sierra, answered the order, and 1,800 British bayonets 
went sparkling over the H}row T of the hill. The head of the French column 
was overwhelmed in an instant ; both its flanks were lapped over by the 
English wings, while volley after volley, at a few yards distance, completed 
its destruction, and marked with hundreds of its dead and dying, all down 
the face of the Sierra, the course of its murderous discomfiture. Some of the 
light troops continued slaughtering the broken columns nearly to the bottom 
of the hill, until Ney's guns opened from the opposite side, and covered 
the escape of the relics of Simon's division. ,, — Victories of the British 
Armies. 



1810.] CHARGE OF THE 43RD AND 52ND. 229 

brunt of the action, were, perhaps, never witnessed ; nor could 
anything equal the gallantry and intrepidity of our allies 
throughout, except, perhaps, the hardihood which had ventured 
upon so desperate an attack. 

The loss of the French in these encounters was estimated at 
between 5,000 and 6,000 men ; while ours fell considerably short of 
1,000. But, as one of their corps, that of Junot, had not yet been 
engaged, we naturally expected a repetition of the attack on the 
following morning. In this, however, we were deceived. Massena 
had already erred sufficiently in risking one attempt to force the 
heights ; and he had been taught a lesson not to be speedily 
forgotten. Instead, therefore, of again directing his troops 
against our impregnable rocks, he was observed, soon after day- 
light on the 28th, drawing off from the late points of attack, and 
moving, with his entire force, upon the Mealhada road, with the 
evident intention of turning us. For that movement we were 
prepared ; and, as we never calculated upon retaining Busaco after 
it should be executed, we made ready to abandon the high 
grounds, and continue our retreat. As soon, therefore, as the 
dusk of the evening set in, we denied by our left, throwing Hill's 
division once more across the river ; whilst the rest of the corps, 
marching, during the 29th, on Decentecio and Mealhada, took up 
the line of the Mondego on the 30th. 

As it was not Lord Wellington's design to risk a second 
battle on the Mondego, the army was put again in motion 
on the 1st of October; and the head-quarters, having halted at 
Redenha that night, came, on the 2nd, to Leira. During these 
marches, the divisions of the army were kept as near as possible 
to each other : the right, retiring by the main road, pushed directly 
upon Leira ; the left, passing the river somewhat lower in its 
course, came in, under the guidance of General Spencer, to the 
same line of march near Pombal. By these arrangements one 
wing was ever at hand to support the other, had circumstances 
occurred to require it. 

The army rested in Leira till the morning of the 5th, when 
Lord Wellington, having ascertained that the enemy were coming 
on in force, gave orders that the retreat should be resumed. 
This was done, along the two great roads which lead to Lisbon 
by Rio Major and Alcobaca — and, on the same evening, head- 



230 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap.xx. 

quarters were established in the last- mentioned place ; but, though 
no skirmishing occurred, nor any serious hardships fell to our lot, 
it was altogether one of the most distressing marches which any 
individual in the army was ever called upon to perform. The 
proclamations which had been issued, requiring the inhabitants to 
abandon their homes as we fell back, were generally attended to, 
and crowds of men, women, and children ; the sick, the aged, and 
the infirm, covered the roads and fields in every direction. 
Mothers might be seen with infants at their breasts, hurrying 
towards the capital ; old men, scarcely able to totter along, made 
way chiefly by the aid of their children ; whilst the whole way- 
side soon became strewed with bedding, blankets, and other 
household furniture, which the weary fugitives were unable to 
carry further. During the retreat of Sir John Moore's army, 
numerous heart-rending scenes were brought before us ; for then, 
as now, the people — particularly in Galicia — fled at our approach; 
but they all returned, sooner or later, to their homes, nor ever 
dreamed of accumulating upon our line of march, or following 
our fortunes. The case was different here. Those who forsook 
their dwellings, forsook them under the persuasion that they 
should never behold them again ; and the agony which such an 
apprehension appeared to excite, among the majority, exceeds 
any attempt at description. 

Whilst we were thus conducting ourselves, marching with 
deliberation, and sweeping before us all the resources of the 
country, the enemy had advanced as far as Leira, and seemed 
disposed to follow us up with vigour. Their videttes entered 
Leira about a couple of hours after our rear-guard quitted it, and 
they had, in consequence, before them a choice of two roads to 
Lisbon, one by the Tagus, the other by the sea. But on both 
we were equally well prepared to receive them, as the arrange- 
ment of our forces will show. 

It has been stated above, that in continuation of the retreat 
from Leira upon the lines, the head-quarters of our army were 
established, on the evening of the 5th, at Alcobaca. From 
Alcobaca a further falling- back was made upon Torres Vedras and 
Rio Major ; and from the latter of these places the troops began, 
on the 10th, to move into the position. On that day General 
Hill's corps, which had returned from the Ponte de Marcella 



1810.] MARCH UPON TORRES VEDRAS. 231 

upon Thomar, arrived at Villa Franca ; and on the following 
morning every division occupied the ground marked out for it, 
and all were in readiness, at a moment's notice, to assume the 
posts which they might be required to defend. 

Before Lord Wellington occupied and garrisoned the matchless 
lines he had constructed, the first measure he adopted was to 
cause an excellent road to be made on the south side of the 
Mondego, which extended from Celerico to Ponte de Marcella, 
and beyond it to Coimbra. His next step was to provide against 
the delays and confusion to which the enemy, who moved in a 
single continuous column, were subject. For this purpose, as he 
had determined not to risk an action on the frontier, he took the 
precaution to throw his divisions and brigades along the great 
gorge, extending from Celerico to the Alva ; and he so arranged 
them, that, when the army began to move, the troops followed 
one another by stages, in the utmost regularity, and without any 
of that bustle which a march en masse unavoidably occasions. 
Possessed of these advantages, Lord Wellington saw, clearly 
enough, that it was in his power, in the event of Massena's 
advance by any single road, to cross the Mondego with his 
whole force, and to throw himself, whenever he chose, between 
the enemy and Coimbra. As soon, therefore, as Massena's 
designs were satisfactorily ascertained, he fixed, with a master's 
eye upon the banks of the Dao and the Criz, as the proper spots 
at which to cast impediments in the way of the French ; whilst 
he should perform the arduous and enterprising operation of 
throwing the entire of his infantry, artillery, and stores, by 
wretched fords, and still more wretched bridges, across a river of 
no ordinary dimensions or difficulties. 

All this was admirably accomplished. The bridges on the 
Dao and the Criz were destroyed w r ith astonishing celerity. 
Craufurd and Pack, with the advanced guard, were thrown 
across at Santa Comba Dao, and the rest of the army accom- 
plished a very brilliant manoeuvre with the utmost accuracy and 
perfection ; for not a gun got out of its place during the con- 
tinuance of the march, and, when the moment of inquiry arrived, 
everything was found in the exact spot which it had been intended 
to occupy. 

During the last week of our retrogression the rain fell in unin- 



232 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xx. 

terrupted torrents ; flooding all the plains, cutting up the roads, 
and swelling every mountain stream to a roaring cataract. In 
spite, however, of the difficulties thence arising, and nothing 
daunted by the numerous privations which threatened to befall 
his army in an exhausted country, Massena continued his march ; 
driving us back upon our strength, our resources, our magazines, 
and our provisions, whilst his own were suffering continual 
diminution, and his communications with the rear becoming daily 
more and more insecure. The truth is, that both parties were 
now committed to a desperate game. On our side the chances of 
success were, doubtless, infinitely greater than on the side of the 
enemy, inasmuch as our position was excellent, our troops were 
fresh and in high spirits, our supplies were abundant, and the 
capital, in our rear, was tranquil ; but we could not conceal from 
ourselves that the game was still desperate, as well with us as with 
them. Were we, by any fatality, to suffer a defeat ; w T ere the 
French to force our lines, and make themselves masters of our 
entrenchments, through the imbecility or treachery of their 
defenders, or through any other of those accidents to which war 
is ever liable, the chances were, that neither army nor ships 
would ever escape from the Tagus. We were, therefore, in the 
situation of men about to make their last throw, and to stake 
upon it, not temporary prosperity, but actual existence. 

In the mean while Lord Wellington, wdiose exertions were 
unintermitting, and whose activity of body and mind surpassed 
all that could have been expected from him, was receiving, every 
hour, fresh encouragement to persevere in the judicious system 
which he had adopted. For some time back he had been very 
urgent with his own government to send reinforcements ; and 
he was gratified by the arrival in camp of six battalions from 
England, and four from Cadiz ; amounting, in all, to between 
7,000 and 8,000 men. By this happy addition, the effective 
strength of the British army was increased to 33,000 soldiers ; 
whilst the sum total of its strength upon paper fell not short of 
41,000. Nor was this the only addition which he received to his 
force at a moment so critical. He prevailed upon Romana, 
whose continuance on the southern frontier had been productive 
of no serious advantage, to join him with as large a portion of his 
corps as he could venture to remove ; and there came in, m conse- 



1810.] THE BRITISH LINES. 233 

quence, about 3,000 men, the elite of the Spanish army, under 
that officer. Thus, with 33,000 British, 30,000 Portuguese, and 
3,000 Spaniards, the allied army could muster nearly 70,000 
men ; of which the comparative insufficiency of some of its parts 
was more than compensated by the nature of the ground which it 
occupied, and the admirable manner by which every part of this 
mountain position that nature had left approachable, was rendered 
invulnerable by human labour and ingenuity.* 



CHAPTER XXI. 



Massena halts before the Lines, which are industriously strengthened — Lord 
Wellington, alarmed for Abrantes, sends a corps across the Tagus — For- 
tifies a new position on the south side of the harbour — The enemy construct 
boats on the river— Retire to Santarem, and take up a position — The allies 
follow — Various movements of detached bodies. 

Little occurred in our immediate presence particularly 
deserving of notice, for some time after we finally took up the 
position of the Zebreira. At first, indeed, a few affairs of cavalry 
took place, most of which ended in our favour ; but latterly this 
force was removed to the rear, as well because their services were 
not needed, as because they could be better supplied with forage, 
than among the rugged denies in front. There were also two 
partial rencontres of infantry ; one in which some Portuguese 
regiments, attached to General Cole's division, behaved well, 
whilst retiring from Ribaldusa towards Guaxara; and another, 
which gave to the 71st regiment, assisted by a company of the 

* Besides the works thrown up in the lines, rivers were obstructed in their 
courses, and allowed to flood the country ; trenches, from whence the infantry 
might pour a destructive fire upon the enemy, were cut, and flanked by artil- 
lery commanding the approaches to them. The entrances to ravines were 
closed by works of the most formidable kind, and roads blocked up and 
approaches impeded by similar means ; while within the lines, communica- 
tion was facilitated in. every possible manner. Mines also were prepared, 
and telegraphs erected upon different points along the heights, to allow of 
almost simultaneous communication throughout the entire line.— Ed. 



234 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxi. 

£)5th and a few Germans, a brilliant opportunity of distinguishing 
themselves. On the 14th, a strong body of French troops attacked 
a redoubt at Sobral, which the 71st w T ere appointed to hold. 
That gallant regiment not only repulsed the assailants, but, follow- 
ing them beyond the lines, drove them, in their turn, from a 
work which they had begun to construct on a height opposite, 
and kept possession of the ground which they had gained. 
These, however, were the only instances in which large bodies of 
men came into contact. The picquets, particularly on the right, 
would, from time to time, engage, and a good deal of desultory 
firing was the consequence ; but such skirmishes produced no 
results, and were productive of but few casualties. The only 
person of note that fell on either side, was the French General 
St. Croix, who was killed by a cannot-shot from one of our gun- 
boats, as he was reconnoitring. He was an officer of distinguished 
gallantry and high character — one of the best in the cavalry of 
the Emperor ; and we sincerely lamented the sorry manner in 
which a brave soldier, who came with honour and safety through 
the perils of Austerlitz, Essling, and Wagram, had lost his life, 

But though all remained quiet in our camp, and in that of the 
enemy, the latter were beginning every day to experience more 
and more severely the difficulties of the undertaking in which 
they had embarked. Their communications became hourly less 
and less open : sickness began to spread itself through their 
ranks ; the stock of provisions which, in spite of our exertions to 
prevent it, they had, on our first arrival, contrived to discover, was 
rapidly wasting ; and desertions were exceedingly frequent. A 
corps of Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant and General 
Miller, entered Coimbra on the 7th, where they captured a con- 
siderable depot of stores, as well as 4,000 sick and wounded, who 
had been lodged there in hospital. This done, they made ready 
the bridge over the Mondego for destruction ; and then, pushing 
their cavalry towards Condeixa, harassed Massena's rear with 
continual skirmishes. 

There fell into our hands, during this interval, several letters ; 
some of instruction to Massena from Napoleon ; others, on private 
business, between Massena and his brother marshals. Many of 
these were curious and interesting documents ; and those of the 
former class showed that the sources of information open to the 



1810.] DEATH OF ST. CROIX. 235 

enemy were more ample and more correct than could have been 
supposed. 

From the tenor of these communications, we were led to 
believe that Massena had embarked in a series of operations which 
his judgment condemned ; and that he now found himself reduced 
to the mortifying alternative of either risking all upon the chances 
of a battle, or of remaining where he was, in spite of the numerous 
privations to which he was subject, till fresh instructions should 
reach him from Paris. Had he confined his views, previously to 
his defeat at Busaco, to the north of Portugal, taking up the line 
of the Mondego for the winter, and detaching a corps to occupy 
Oporto, he would have made himself master of a portion of the 
country ; and, making the most of his successes at Ciudad Rodrigo 
and Almeida, would have obtained credit for having accom- 
plished a tolerably brilliant campaign. But that opportunity 
was gone by. He had been repulsed at Busaco ; he had passed 
the Mondego, with the perfect knowledge that his communica- 
tions would become at every step more uncertain — he saw the 
whole militia of Portugal rising in his rear, and yet left his sick 
at Coimbra, without a sufficient garrison to protect them. He 
had done all this, not that he might follow us with vigour, for the 
pursuit was so deliberate that all our stragglers and almost all 
our baggage escaped uninjured ; and now he lay perfectly inactive 
in our front. 

The advanced parties of the Portuguese being pushed on as far 
as Leira, and the garrison of Abrantes seriously incommoding 
the French, the latter moved in force upon Salvatierra, where 
they succeeded in establishing a bridge across the Tagus, and so 
laid open to themselves the province of Alentejo. This might be 
for the purpose of securing those supplies which were no longer 
to be had from the north ; but, taken in connexion with a rumour 
which prevailed of an intended attack upon Abrantes, it appeared 
to us that Massena was anxious to keep the Alentejo open, as a 
line by which his escape could be secured. Abrantes, however, 
was so well supplied and garrisoned, as to leave us little ground 
to apprehend any misfortune there, unless, indeed, it were 
attacked by a greater force than the enemy could well spare 
from our front. With the firm conviction, however, on his mind, 

R 



236 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxi. 

that things were working as advantageously as he could desire, 
Lord Wellington determined to adhere to his defensive system. 

Neither the time of our soldiers nor that of our chief was, 
however, wasted in idleness. The former were busily employed 
in the construction of new works, wherever their erection appeared 
at all desirable, and in giving additional solidity to those already 
thrown up ; till the lines became as perfect a [specimen of a 
fortified position as it was possible for nature and art to produce ; 
while the latter was indefatigable in his exertions to bring his army 
into a condition of general efficiency. The Portuguese being now 
thoroughly amalgamated with the British troops, learned from 
them all those lessons which in after campaigns they turned to so 
excellent account ; and Beresford, to whom the entire merit of 
their first training is due, was in consequence relieved from all 
further responsibility in field operations. Every day brought its 
improvements, and the General was rewarded for all his trouble 
by the conviction that he might place implicit reliance upon his 
allies. 

Nor was Lord Wellington inattentive to 'the comforts, or 
even luxuries, of his followers. Provisions were abundant ; there 
was no w r ant of wine ; and sports and amusements went on as if 
we had been, not at the seat of war, but in England. Officers 
of all ranks, and in every department, from the Commander-in- 
chief down to the regimental subaltern, occasionally enjoyed field- 
sports — hunting, shooting, and fishing. The men, too, had their 
pastimes when not employed. In a word, seldom has an army, 
occupying ground in the face of an enemy, enjoyed so many 
hours of relaxation, or contrived to unite so completely the 
pleasures of country life with the serious business of war. 

It has been already stated that a variety of intercepted letters, 
as well private as official, fell into our hands. Among others, we 
were fortunate enough to become possessed of Massena's account 
of the battle of Busaco, given in a demi-official communication 
addressed to Berthier. It was a curious despatch — but contained, 
upon the whole, more of truth and candid admission than were 
usually to be found in French reports of actions. He acknow T - 
ledged that he had been repulsed in both attempts upon our 
position, with the loss of 4,000 men, besides a large proportion 



1810.] RETIREMENT OF THE ENEMY. 237 

of his best officers, whom he requested Berthier to replace with- 
out delay ; and he stated the force with which he had attacked, 
almost exactly as it had been represented by Lord Wellington. 
Where alone he fell into error, was in representing Regnier's 
corps as having been opposed by a " colonne serree," of 20,000 
men under Hill ; whereas it is very well known to every military 
man in our army, that close columns were a mode of formation of 
which Lord Wellington constantly disapproved. He had suc- 
ceeded in overthrowing them at Vimiero, Talavera, and Busaco. 
But it was then so much in favour with the French generals, that 
they put no faith in any other method of fighting ; and probably, 
when Massena wrote his detail, he believed all that he was 
writing. 

So passed the time, from the beginning of October, when we 
took up our ground at Torres Vedras, to the middle of November, 
when we were called upon to quit it. Circumstances occurred 
which convinced us that the enemy were terribly distressed. De- 
sertions from their army occurred daily ; indeed, we received as 
many as 250 deserters in one week. Latterly, however, these 
became less frequent, and, strange to say, several instances of the 
kind occurred amongst ourselves. 

On the 13th of November, advices reached us that a reinforce- 
ment of 15,000 or 20,000 men was on its way to join the army 
of Massena ; that it had already passed the frontier ; and that the 
advance had arrived that day in Sabugal. At the same time we 
were perfectly aware that the enemy had for some time back been 
busily employed in the construction of a multitude of boats at 
Santarem ; and that these, with many already built, which had 
fallen into our hands, were mounted upon wheels, and put in a 
condition to be transported overland to any point where they 
might be needed. Whilst we were wavering between the belief 
that Massena meditated a retreat, and the notion that he very 
possibly might be disposed to make an attempt upon the fort at 
Lisbon, from the opposite bank of the Tagus, intelligence came in 
that not a man was to be seen, either at the outposts, or along 
the whole position. The French army broke up, it appeared, on 
the night of the 14th ; but whether in full flight, with a view to 
abandon Portugal, or merely for the purpose of taking up a win- 

r 2 



238 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxi. 

ter's line, no one appeared to know. The movement was alto- 
gether as sudden as unlooked-for and it threw us, for a time, into 
a state of amazement, which set all our speculating propensities 
in full play. 

The most general opinion was that Massena intended to 
attempt the reduction of Abrantes by bombardment and assault. 
It was therefore believed that the French army designed to place 
itself in position behind the Zezere ; from whence it might oppose 
a formidable barrier to any efforts for the relief of a fortress, the 
possession of which would be of incalculable advantage to them, 
whenever they should find themselves sufficiently strong to ad- 
vance upon the capital. 

Abrantes had long been put in an excellent state of defence, 
and it was garrisoned by no fewer than two regiments of the line 
and three of militia ; had it been left, therefore, entirely to 
its own resources, there was every prospect of its holding out 
vigorously. This, however, was not the first occasion on which we 
had been alarmed for its safety ; and measures had in consequence 
been adopted, which placed it beyond the risk, not only of cap- 
ture, but of insult. General Fane, with a brigade of Portuguese 
cavalry, accompanied by several guns and a howitzer, had been 
passed over the Tagus from Lisbon, with orders to march along 
the southern bank of the river, and to destroy, if possible, any 
boats in progress of preparation at Santarem or elsewhere. He 
had obeyed these orders, and kept up a long and warm cannonade 
on the enemy's incipient flotilla ; but his howitzer having been 
disabled, his round-shot proved of little utility : and as no attempt 
was made with the Congreve rockets, which now, for the first 
time, might have been brought into play, the enemy succeeded in 
completing the task which they had begun, and in furnishing 
themselves with ample means to cross the rivers at their pleasure. 
This was certainly unfortunate, seeing that all the bridges had 
been carefully destroyed in the rear ; and they were, to a certain 
degree, hemmed in between unfordable streams on one hand, and 
impassable lines on the other. Fane, finding his exertions pro- 
fitless, went into cantonments. He was opposite to Santarem* 

* A city placed upon a height rising abruptly from the Tagus, and ex- 



1810.] ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES. 239 

when the retreat of the French began— and accordingly in a situa- 
tion to rencter to the garrison of Abrantes, in case of an attack, 
the most powerful and opportune assistance. 

The enemy's movement commenced from the right of the line 
from Ribaldeira, Sobral, and Villa Franca ; consequently the first 
alarm was given by Campbell's division upon our left. Lord Wel- 
lington instantly wrote to Admiral Berkeley, to request that he 
would send up the launches and boats of his fleet, in order that 
means might be at hand to pass over Hill's, or any other corps 
which might be selected, to the left bank of the Tagus. At the 
same time, Craufurd's division was ordered to advance from the 
Arruda heights to Alenquer ; and Hill's, from Alhandra to Villa 
Franca, with directions to feel their way further to the front. On 
the 15th, it was discovered that the enemy were moving bodily, 
on the great road by the Tagus, a small detachment only being 
left to protect the lesser road which leads by Alcantara and Rio 
Major to Santarem. 

As soon as this was known, Spencer's division pushed into 
Sobral and Alenquer ; whilst Craufurd, pressing forward from the 
latter place to Villa Nova and Azembaja, discovered the enemy's 
rear- guard in position between it and Cartaxo. These last- 
mentioned movements occurred on the 16th: on which day like- 
wise the head-quarters were transferred to Alenquer. A halt was 
ordered to take place on the 17th, in order that time might be 
granted for the arrival of intelligence from General Fane, whose 
situation gave him excellent opportunities of watching the move- 
ments of Massena's columns. 

The report arrived in due time, and it appeared that the enemy 
were continuing their retreat from Santarem, and that nothing 
more than a strong rear-guard remained behind for the purpose 
of covering the movement. The position of Santarem is exceed- 
ingly formidable — and it cannot be turned except by a large army 
and a lengthened detour. It was matter of surprise that Massena 
had not offered battle on that line, more especially as his aban- 



tremely difficult of access. In front of it is a range of rather low eminences, 
and between these and the former, extends an open flat, part of which is a 
marsh, wholly impassable, while the remainder is traversed by deep water- 
cuts, and covered with reeds and sedges. — Ed. 



240 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxi. 

donment of the ground left us at liberty to look to the protection 
of Abrantes, and to throw a force there that might act with effect 
upon the enemy's flank, under cover of the place. Under these 
circumstances, Lord Wellington determined to establish his head- 
quarters at Santarem, push Craufurd further in front, and to bring 
up the whole of his army in the same direction, except Hill's 
corps, which, crossing the river at Velada in boats, and returning 
again by the bridge below Abrantes, would be able to harass and 
impede the enemy's communications, and render great assistance 
in our projected operations. As Massena possessed but a single 
bridge across the Zezere, he must move his entire army in one 
column, and it would be difficult either to do so with rapidity, or 
secure an unmolested retreat. 

The troops being put in motion for these several purposes, it 
was discovered that Fane's first report respecting the enemy's 
designs was incorrect, and that they had assumed the position 
from which he thought they had retired. The advance, under 
Craufurd, found Santarem occupied by what appeared at first only 
a strong rear-guard, but which proved, in the end, to be the second 
corps, which had there taken up its cantonments. Upon this, 
the head- quarters, attended by Spencer's division, were estab- 
lished at Cartaxo ; Cotton's cavalry were sent forward to join the 
light division ; Anson's brigade took the road to Aleventre and 
Rio Major ; the fourth and fifth divisions occupied Alenquer and 
Sobral ; whilst the sixth remained stationary at Ribaldeira, and 
the third at Torres Vedras. 

Our army had not long taken up its new alignment, when it 
was satisfactorily ascertained that the enemy were strengthening 
and disposing themselves for the double purposes of securing 
comfortable winter quarters, and protecting, from the side of 
Abrantes, all such supplies and reinforcements as might be on the 
way to join them. Whilst the second corps garrisoned Santarem, 
the eighth took possession of a line of cantonments on the right, 
extending by Torres Novas all the way to Thomar. Here part 
of the sixth corps was established ; and about 4,000 infantry, 
with 300 cavalry, passed the Zezere, for the purpose of establish- 
ing a tete-de-pont ; for the bridge, it appeared, was already all 
but complete, though boats continued to be constructed in San- 
tarem, and were hourly in movement towards the river. With 



1810.] NEW ALIGNMENT. 241 

respect to the reinforcements, their advance was reported to be at 
Pinhel, whither they had arrived after sustaining a sharp action with 
the corps of General Silveira. The latter, having come upon them 
at Valvarde, somewhat by surprise, succeeded in killing 300, and 
taking many prisoners ; but, as the enemy were reported to 
amount to 15,000 men, Silveira could not venture to follow up 
his success. On the contrary, he prudently retired behind the 
Douro, as soon as he had struck his blow ; and the French, 
leaving a detachment to watch him, pushed on with the main 
body in the direction of Massena's army. From all these par- 
ticulars, we were led to the conclusion, that Massena entertained 
no design of evacuating Portugal ; but that he would remain 
where he was, till the junction of fresh troops, and the arrival of 
a more favourable season, should enable him once more to act 
upon the offensive — and thus affairs continued, without the occur- 
rence of any event calculated to interrupt our tranquillity, to a late 
date in December. 

As had been expected, 5,000 men reached Massena's canton- 
ments, forming part of a considerable division, which the advance 
of Drouet's corps, and its occupation of the posts upon the fron- 
tier, had permitted to move towards the front. The remainder 
followed their leading brigades, but, after reaching the Zezere, 
retreated again, with the loss of many hundred men, through the 
operation of parties of guerrillas upon their rear and flanks. For 
some days they were not heard of ; but at length a report came 
in, that a corps had made its appearance on the Coa, and that, 
having crossed that stream, it was in full march towards the front. 
The report added, that it consisted of 1 6,000 men, and that its 
march was conducted with great deliberation, as if to protect a 
convoy. 

In the mean while, the French Marshal was waiting anxiously 
for advices from Paris, whither he had dispatched General Foy, 
some weeks previously, with a statement of the situation and 
prospects of his army. 

Such were the state and prospects of the allied army, during 
the winter of 1810. On the side of Abrantes all was safe; the 
French having resolved not to besiege it ; whilst Silveira, who, on 
the approach of the reinforcements, had retired across the Coa, 
was again in readiness to act on the rear of the enemy. Mean- 



242 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxii> 

time, Trant and Bu cellar were on the alert at Coimbra ; and 
Wilson, retreating from Espinhel, had thrown himself, with his 
corps, on the other side of the Mondego. The latter move- 
ment, was a subject of regret to us, inasmuch as it deprived us 
of our readiest and surest source of intelligence, which could 
henceforth be obtained only by circuitous routes ; but it was 
made under the impression that a further continuance in Espinhel 
would be hazardous. With respect to the French, they, like 
ourselves, rested quiet. Their position was, as I have already 
stated, a good one, and it was now greatly improved by their 
obtaining permanent possession of one bank of the Mondego ; 
by which not only their flank, but all their marches from the rear 
were tolerably secured. But there were a variety of causes at 
work to disturb this state of apparent tranquillity, and the spring 
had hardly set in, ere they came powerfully into operation. 



CHAPTER XXII. 



State of the southern frontier — Soult's advance against Badajoz — Capture of 
Olivenca, and investment of Badajoz — Mendizabal defeated, and Badajoz 
taken — Campo Mayor reduced — Massena retreats into Spain Beresford 
marches towards Badajoz — The Allies pass the Guadiana, reduce Olivenca, 
and invest Badajoz— Lord Wellington gives directions for the siege — Is 
recalled to the north, where the army remains in position round Fuentes 
de Honor. 

Whilst the allied army lay in the lines of Torres Vedras, and 
its attention was turned to the defence of Lisbon, Soult, having- 
assembled about 13,000 or 14,000 men in the south of Spain., 
advanced on Badajoz, to effect a diversion on the side of Alentejc* 
and open a communication across the Tagus with Massena — and 
Ballasteros and Mendizabal, who, on the departure of Romana, 
commanded in that quarter, found themselves unable to oppose 
him. The former, accordingly, moved to his right upon Salva- 
tierra and the lower parts of the Guadiana; whilst the latter, 
leaving seven battalions, with a brigade of field artllery, in 



1811.] CAPTURE OF ST. CHRISTOVAL. 243 

Olivenca, retreated across the river. Olivenca was not a place of 
much strength ; and, had it been so, the neglect of Mendizabal 
to lay in supplies, would have rendered the strength of its forti- 
fications profitless. It was blockaded on the 11th of January — : 
and, on the 22nd, famine compelled the garrison to surrender. 

Having taken measures for rendering Olivenca a place of arms 
in support of his future operations, Soult detached Mortier's 
corps, on the 26th, to invest Badajoz. It was completed, on 
the left of the Guadiana, by the infantry ; whilst the cavalry, 
under General Latour Maubourg, patroled the right. Ground 
was broken on the 28th, and an attack directed against the 
Pardaleras outwork, which was battered from the Sierra del 
Viento, enfiladed from a parallel 250 yards distant, and breached 
on the 11th of February. On the same night, it was stormed, 
with very little opposition. 

So soon as Soult's movement was known. at Cartaxo, Lord 
Wellington despatched his Spanish corps into the Alentejo, to 
co-operate with Mendizabal for the protection of that frontier, 
and pointed out a position to the north of Badajoz, having its 
right protected by Fort St. Christoval, and its front covered by 
the Gevora, as the best which the Spanish army could take up. 
Unfortunately, the brave Romana, who had obtained and merited 
our confidence and respect, was unable to accompany his corps — 
for he was labouring under a severe malady, which, on the 27th 
of January, terminated his existence. But the division made 
good its position; the post recommended w r as taken up on the 
9th of February ; and it proved a constant source of anxiety to 
the besiegers, and of confidence to the besieged, by covering the 
introduction of numerous supplies into the place. The enemy, 
of course, felt its importance, and determined to carry it ; and 
the improvidence of the Spanish General furnished the oppor- 
tunity. 

It happened that a howitzer or two, from the opposite bank 
of the river, were enabled to throw a few shells into the Spanish 
encampment, which, without doing much mischief, harassed and 
annoyed the men. Mendizabal, to get rid of the nuisance, 
moved the whole army to its left, completely out of the protection 
of Fort St. Christoval. The enemy perceived his error, and lost 
not a moment in availing themselves of it. . Mortier established 



244 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxii. 

a flying bridge upon the Guadiana, above the town, and crossed 
over in the night of the 18th; whilst 6,000 men from the 
besieging army, forded the Gevora, and attacked the Spaniards at 
daylight. The resistance was as trifling as might have been 
expected from bad troops deprived of all the advantages of 
position ; and, out of 9,000 infantry, and a brigade of Portuguese 
cavalry, only 3,500 escaped ; 3,000 fled to Badajoz, where they 
were shut up with the rest of the garrison ; whilst 500 retired 
upon Elvas, under Carlos de Espana. 

The siege was now carried on with renewed vigour, and, the 
Governor being killed, the command devolved upon General Imaz, 
an officer who felt no disposition to emulate the renown of 
Palafox and Alvarez. A breach, exceedingly imperfect, was no 
sooner effected, than Imaz proposed a capitulation ; and, on the 
11th of March, at a moment when he knew, from telegraphic 
despatches, that Massena was in full retreat, and that forces were 
on their way to relieve the place, he marched out into the ditch 
9,000 troops, who laid down their arms to a similar number of 
French infantry, with some 600 or 800 cavalry, the total amount 
of the besieging army. Had the slightest resolution existed in 
the breast of the man, Badajoz would have been preserved. 

Mortier next invested Campo Mayor, with a corps of 5,000 
infantry, and 600 cavalry. Campo Mayor is a large frontier 
town, supplied originally with tolerable fortifications ; but they 
had been sadly neglected, and were, of course, falling to decay. 
5,000 men is the smallest number which should garrison it : 
but at present it was held by no more than 200 militia, under 
the command of Major Tallaia, of the Portuguese engineers. 
That officer's means in cannon and stores were as feeble as his 
force ; there were but five pieces of artillery serviceable on the 
ramparts ; and yet he compelled the enemy to proceed against 
him with all the order of a siege. Nor was it till a practicable 
breach had been formed in the body of the place, that he would 
listen to any proposal of surrender. At last, however, seeing his 
defences ruined, and the enemy prepared to storm, he stipulated 
for a delay of twenty-four hours, in the hope that relief might 
arrive ; and, none appearing, he reluctantly gave up the town on 
the 23rd of March 

In the mean while, affairs were drawing rapidly to a crisis on 



1811.] SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR. 245 

the north side of the Tagus. Though their change of situation 
conduced considerably to the comforts of Massena and his army, 
it was quite impossible that a country, already exhausted, could 
support long the burden which 50,000 or 60,000 men, besides horses 
and other animals, laid upon it ; and of this the French General 
was well aware. His troops became every day more and more 
sickly; provisions more scarce, and forage was not to be pro- 
cured. The reinforcements too, for which he had waited so 
long, came not up to his wants or his wishes. Indeed, the fresh 
regiments marched into his lines were not sufficiently numerous 
to fill the casualties of war — and the moment for offensive 
operations had passed away — and, soon after his assumption of the 
position at Santarem, he began to prepare for a retreat. Parties 
were continually employed upon the Zezere, constructing bridges, 
and throwing up works for their defence ; his sick and wounded 
were gradually and quietly transferred to the rear ; and, in the 
beginning of March, 1811, there remained in his camp, besides 
some heavy artillery of little value, only the men and horses fit 
for duty, with as many stores, guns, and tumbrils, as appeared 
necessary for use. Everything was done with great address — and, 
except the fact that two bridges, instead of one, were now upon 
the Zezere, we were kept in profound ignorance as to his pro- 
ceedings, and continued, to the last, to cast anxious glances 
towards Abrantes, for the safety of which we conceived that there 
were still some grounds of apprehension. 

On the night of the 5th, Massena ended uncertainty, and 
decamped from Santarem, taking a position round Pombal, as if 
desirous of leaving the result to a general action. 

On the 6th of March the head-quarters of the allied army 
were established at Santarem, and dispositions made for pursuing 
the enemy, and dislodging him when he had taken post. General 
Stewart's brigade passed the Zezere, and advanced with the 
4th, the 6th, and part of the 1st divisions, towards Thomar, 
where the French seemed at first disposed to collect in force; 
whilst the light division, supported by the 1st German huzzars 
and royal dragoons, proceeded at a quick pace towards Pombal. 
At Thomar, no encounter took place, the enemy retreating, on 
the appearance of our people, towards the Mondego; but at 
Pombal there was some fighting, and hopes were at one moment 



246 



STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxii. 



entertained that there would be a good deal more. Our leading 
brigade came up with the fugitives on the 9th, and succeeded, 
alter a brief but smart skirmish, in capturing about two hundred 
prisoners; and on the 11th, dispositions were made for brin^n- 
the enemy to action, by the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and lT-ht 
divisions. But Massena, instead of waiting to be assailed, broke 
up during the night and fell back, covered by the whole of 
Montbrun's cavalry, the 6th corps of infantry, and part of the 
8th, m the direction of Redinha. On the 12th, a strong rear- 
guard was seen posted at the end of a defile, in front of the 
village. It was immediately attacked by three divisions of 
infantry, by General Pack's Portuguese brigade, and the cavalry; 
and, after an obstinate resistance, driven through the defile. It 
next retreated to some high and broken ground, where it again 
showed a front; but from this position also it was compelled to 
retire with some loss; and finally, it withdrew to Condeixa, where 
the mam body had established itself. 

The enemy's force assembled here consisted of the 6th 8th 
and 9th corps; of the whole of Massena's army, in short, except 
the 2nd corps, which continued still at Espinhel. The ground 
which they occupied was singularly commanding; and, as it could 
not be attempted in front, without sacrifice of lives much greater 
than either his feelings or policy would warrant, Lord Wellington 
made arrangements for turning it. The third division, under 
Picton, made a tedious detour to the right, and threw itself 
upon the left of the enemy's line, which instantly broke into 
column of march, and fell back. Similar movements were 
effected, with similar results, during several successive days ; and 
the enemy, diverted from his original intention of passing part of 
his force over the Mondego at Coimbra, continued his retreat, in 
a single continuous column, along the road which winds between 
the river and the Sierra de Estrella. The consequence was, that 
he passed over little else than a succession of admirable positions ; 
and, as he took care to cover his marches with his best cavalry,, a 
force of infantry never short of ten thousand men, and only one 
brigade of guns, admirably horsed, his retrogression was con- 
ducted in good order, and with as little loss as could well befall 
an army whilst executing a manoeuvre of the kind. 

On one occasion only were the French in danger of being 



1811.] massena's retreat. 247 

dragged into a general action, at manifest disadvantage. Whilst 
crossing the Coera, the allies pressed so closely upon them, that, 
to save his main body, Massena was content to sacrifice a con- 
siderable portion of his rear-guard, which, halting to be attacked, 
was cut to pieces; whilst the columns escaped, with the loss of 
some artillery and baggage. It is, however, extremely probable 
that all Massena's precautions would have failed to preserve him, 
had it been possible to transport stores and provisions as rapidly 
as our troops were capable of marching; but, on the 19th, it was 
found that the columns had outstripped their supplies, and a halt 
of some days was necessary, to give the latter time to overtake 
them. 

It is sufficient to observe that Massena finally escaped to a 
position on the Spanish side of the Agueda, after having exhibited 
numerous proofs of capacity in directing the movements of a 
retreating force, and leaving behind him some sad memorials of 
the absence of all humane feelings among his soldiery. The line 
of the enemy's march could, indeed, be everywhere traced by the 
smoke of cottages, hamlets, and towns, which they reduced to 
ashes ; and even those which escaped the ravages of the flames 
were left in a state of total dilapidation. As to the acts of personal 
violence which they committed, the Portuguese must cease to 
feel as men commonly feel, if they ever forget the conduct of an 
army, which entered their country with the warmest protestations 
of friendship, and in whose promises of protection too many were 
tempted to place reliance. Even the towns which had given 
shelter to the head- quarters of the French generals were not 
spared. Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, were all sacked on 
the evenings previous to their evacuation ; the convent of Alco- 
baea was burned to the ground ; the Bishop's palace, and the 
town of Leiria, shared the same fate ; and, in a word, it seemed 
as if these men had resolved to make a desert of a country which 
they had failed to conquer ; and that the war, which they pro- 
fessed to wage only with the English and their armed partisans, 
had been turned against its peaceable inhabitants. 

The last stand which the enemy made on the present occasion, 
took place near Sabugal, and proved highly honourable to the 
British arms. On the 3rd of April, the second corps was seen 
in position, with its right immediately above the bridge and town 



248 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxii. 

of Sabugal, and its left extended along the road to Alfayates, so 
as to command all the approaches from the fords of the Coa 
towards the upper part of the town. Lord Wellington made his 
dispositions to attack it in front, flank, and rear, at the same 
moment ; and, but for the unfortunate occurrence of a sudden 
shower of rain, it would have been, in all probability, annihilated. 
But, though it escaped being surrounded, it did not effect a retreat 
without a severe loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. After 
this heavy check, Massena withdrew entirely into Spain ; Al- 
meida was blockaded ; and Lord Wellington, leaving Sir Brent 
Spencer to conduct that service, hurried oft towards Badajoz, 
where his presence was seriously needed. 

It has been stated that Marshal Beresford was already moving 
to raise the siege of Badajoz, and arrest the progress of Soult in 
that quarter, when the unexpected concentration of Massena's 
forces at Pombal induced Lord Wellington to recall him. On 
the 17th, however, when all hope of fighting a general battle was 
laid aside, the Marshal prepared to resume his original under- 
taking ; and, putting himself at the head of the 2nd and 4th 
British, and General Hamilton's Portuguese division, with the 
13th light dragoons, some heavy cavalry, and two brigades of 
artillery, he crossed the Tagus at Tancos. Marshal Beresford 
proceeded, by Oralo and Portalegre, to Campo Mayor, where he 
arrived on the 25th. The enemy had just evacuated the town; 
and a considerable convoy of artillery, ammunition- waggons, and 
strings of loaded mules, were seen travelling under the escort of 
three battalions of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, towards 
Badajoz. An immediate pursuit w r as ordered — and the allied 
cavalry was not long in overtaking the convoy, which made ready 
to receive them. General Latour Maubourg, who commanded 
on the occasion, formed his infantry into two solid squares, which 
he supported by placing his cavalry on the right ; but a brilliant 
charge from two squadrons of the 13th, in which a similar force of 
Portuguese took part, overthrew the French cavalry, and gave 
to the allies momentary possession of the entire convoy. The 
ardour of pursuit, however, carried the conquerors too far. They 
followed the flying cavalry under the guns of Badajoz, and 
suffered, in consequence, some loss ; whilst they gave to the 
squares an opportunity of retiring in good order, and against them 



1811.] BADAJOZ. 249 



they could not, in their scattered state, make any impression. 
The consequence was that, before any portion of the British 
infantry was enabled to come up, the whole of the convoy escaped 
within the gates, leaving only a single howitzer, with one or two 
ammunition-waggons, in the hands of our dragoons. 

The enemy having thus withdrawn from the right bank of the 
Guadiana, it became an object of consideration to ascertain how 
that river might be passed, in order that Badajoz might be 
blockaded. There were but two bridges, one at Merida, the 
other at Badajoz ; and both were in possession of the French ; 
whilst the only practicable ford, — and that, too, during the present 
season of the year, practicable for cavalry alone, — lay under the 
guns of Fort Juramenha. Upon it, however, as the sole channel 
of communication between different sections of our army, no reliance 
could be placed ; for the first flood would close the passage up, 
by rendering the ford, for a time, impassable. A bridge upon 
tressels was accordingly directed to be formed ; whilst five 
Spanish boats, with four pontoons, in store at Elvas, were con- 
verted into rafts, to be used, when circumstances should require, 
as flying bridges. 

The troops were, accordingly, rafted over, on the 5th, 6th, 7th, 
and 8th. On the latter day, Marshal Beresford established his head- 
quarters at a small village on the left bank of the river. He 
had hardly done so, when an attack was made upon the place, 
and the cavalry picket was surprised and destroyed ; but a com- 
pany of infantry, which were in reserve to support them, came 
up, and the enemy were driven off with loss. 

Before the arrangements could be completed, the enemy 
were enabled to fill in their trenches, rebuild the breaches, and 
throw provisions and ammunition into Badajoz. This done* 
Mortier returned towards Seville ; but he endeavoured to cast 
an additional impediment in the way of our projected siege, by 
placing a garrison of 400 men in Olivenca. The numbers thus 
shut up, though neither adequate to make a proper defence, nor 
very formidable when considered as a post upon our flank, were 
not altogether to be neglected ; and Marshal Beresford accord- 
ingly resolved to commence his operations by making himself 
master of Olivenca. 

The care of conducting this attack was entrusted to General 



250 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxii. 

Cole, who sat down before the place on the 11th. On the 1 5th, 
the batteries being in readiness to open, the Governor was sum- 
moned, and honourable terms offered, in case he should be 
disposed to capitulate ; but, as these were rejected, the firing 
began, and, before noon, a practicable breach was effected. The 
Governor, in his turn, proposed terms of capitulation, but was 
refused. The firing was resumed, and in half an hour the place 
surrendered at discretion. General Cole then hastened to join 
Marshal Beresford, who, having established a bridge of casks 
over the ford at Juramenha, and secured it by a tete-de-pont, 
capable of containing 1,500 men, was now in position at St. 
Martha. Here the corps established itself; and from this point 
the investment of Badajoz was completed. 

On the 20th of April, Lord Wellington arrived from the north, 
and gave directions for the immediate commencement of active 
operations against Badajoz.* A speedy reduction was required, 
for if a greater space of time than sixteen days of open trenches 
were allowed — besides the period requisite in preparing materials 
—Soult would be able to collect a sufficient force to relieve it. On 
the other hand, seldom has a siege been undertaken, in modern 
times, with resources less adequate, in intrenching tools, ammu- 
nition, or battering-guns. Lord Wellington had ordered a 
supply of everything from Lisbon, and it had been amply 
prepared; but when the stores were put in motion, it was found 
that means of transport were wanted ; and hence, not one- tenth 
of the materiel promised ever reached the camp. Notwithstanding 

* "The town of Badajoz contains a population of about 16,000; and 
within the space of thirteen months, experienced the miseries attendant upon 
a state of siege three several times. The first was undertaken towards the 
end of April, 1811, by Lord Beresford, who was obliged to abandon opera- 
tions, by Soult advancing to its relief, and which led to the battle of Albuera, 
on the 16th of May. The second siege was by Lord Wellington in person, 
who, after the battle of Fuentes d'Onora, directed his steps towards the 
south, with a portion of the allied army. On the 10th of June, the siege 
was again abandoned, Soult having a second time advanced, in combined 
operation with the army of Marmont from the north. The third siege, 
again undertaken by Lord Wellington in person, was begun on the 17th of 
March, 1812, and continued without interruption till the 6th of April, when 
the place fell by assault, after a most determined and gallant resistance on 
the part of the French."— Mackie. 



1811.] FUENTES DE HONOR. 251 

these disadvantages, the engineers steadily proceeded to effect the 
reduction of the place ; and the preliminary steps to the breaking 
of ground before the Pardaleras, the Castle, and Fort Christoval, 
were taken on the 22nd of April. Having given directions for 
the future conduct of the besieging force, and recommended to 
Marshal Beresford, in case of any attempt on the part of Marshal 
Soult, to risk an action, Lord Wellington departed from the 
Guadiana, and arrived at the position in the vicinity of Almeida, 
just in time to meet the danger with which his troops were 
menaced. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 



Battle of Faentes de Honor — Investment of Almeida — The garrison blow up 
the place, and escape — Massena retires into Spain, and Wellington into 
cantonments — Seige of Badajoz — Raised by the advance of Soult — 
"Wellington sends off reinforcemenis to Beresford, and sets out to join him 
— The Marshal's corps assemble in position at Yalverde. 

Ox the 1st and 2nd of Ma}^ large bodies of French troops 
were observed to pass the Agueda and the Azava, and make a 
movement, as if with the design of threatening our communica- 
tions, and, if possible, of effecting the relief of Almeida. Towards 
the evening of the 3rd, the sixth corps showed itself, in three 
lines, on the ridge which overhangs Fuentes de Honor,* in a 
direction parallel to that occupied by us ; and they shortly after- 
wards opened a heavy cannonade, which they followed up by a 
desperate assault upon the village. Lieutenant- colonel "Williams, 

* A village placed in a valley, on the left bank of the Dos Casas. On one 
side extends a morass, bounded by a thick wood ; on the other, the ground 
is undulating, and the surface rocky. A portion of the village crowns the 
summit of a ravine rising abruptly from the river ; and here, the old chapel 
and some houses being difficult of access, were capable of making a respect- 
able defence. — Ed. 



252 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxill. 

who commanded a battalion of light companies, gallantly sus- 
tained the attack for some time ; but it was found necessary, at 
last to support him with the 71st, under Colonel Cadogan, as 
it again was supported in succession by the 79th and 24th 
regiments. The battle had not lasted long, when Colonel 
Williams received a wound, which compelled him to quit the 
field, and things were in some disorder; but at this moment 
Colonel Cadogan pressed forward with the 71st, and, driving the 
enemy, with the bayonet, from all the ground which they had 
won, restored the fortune of the day. It is scarcely necessary 
to add, that the 71st were ably supported by the 79th and 
24th ; and that upon the senior officer, Colonel Cameron, of the 
former corps, the command of the whole devolved. 

Though checked in their first advance, the enemy repeatedly 
renewed their attack, bringing up fresh troops ; and on every 
occasion they were driven back with a heroism which has never 
been surpassed. The French fought, however, with great 
gallantry, and more than once stood to be bayoneted in the main 
street of the village ; but their success, whenever obtained, lasted 
but a moment — and they were instantly swept away by a 
desperate charge from the men whom they believed were beaten. 

As may be readily imagined, the dawn of the 4th had not yet 
appeared, when the whole of our line got under arms, and waited 
anxiously for a renewal of the combat. Day broke, how- 
ever, without disclosing any disposition, on the part of the enemy, 
to resume the offensive ; and, as hour after hour stole on, a belief 
arose that nothing more would be attempted. In this persuasion 
we were confirmed by the report of several deserters who came in, 
and from whom we learned that Massena, overawed by the 
obstinacy of yesterday's resistance, had resolved to attempt 
nothing further till he should be reinforced by a body of the 
imperial guard, which was understood to be on its march to join 
him. These statements seemed correct ; clouds of mounted and 
staff officers might be seen, riding, from to time time, along the 
opposite ridge, and examining our dispositions, while, as evening 
approached, w T e observed no inconsiderable addition to the 
enemy's cavalry, particularly to their hussars and lancers, arrive. 
Of the latter description of troops we could not muster, at present, 



1811.] BATTLE OF^FUENTES DE HONOR. 253 

more than 1,500 or 1,600 in the field; and the total amount of 
our effectives, including Portuguese of all arms, fell short of 
30,000. On the side of the enemy, the cavalry were computed 
to exceed 4,000 ; whilst the sum of the effectives amounted to 
45,000 men. 

At three o'clock on the morning of the 5th, our advanced 
parties announced that the enemy's column were in motion ; and 
before six they commenced a desperate attack on the village of 
Fuentes de Honor, and upon the 7th division, which occupied a 
wood and some broken ground on the right of the line. In Fuen- 
tes, the assailants were met with the same spirit of determined 
resistance which had frustrated all their efforts |on the 3rd ; and 
if for a moment they made an impression, they were deforced 
immediately from the ground which they had won.* On the 
right, things looked more threatening. It was here that they 
employed the mass of their cavalry, which came on, strongly 
supported both by infantry and guns ; and a severe loss was ex- 
perienced on our part before a final check was given to the 
progress of men, who fought like troops habituated to victory 
and unaccustomed to defeat. 

The first attack fell upon General Sontag's brigade which had 
been especially directed to defend the wood, but which, over- 
whelmed by numbers, retired, after a gallant and obstinate 
resistance. Our cavalry, seeing this, and anxious to cover the 
retreat of their comrades, quitted a very commanding and yet 
open position on which they had been drawn up, and descended, 
with two or three pieces of horse- artillery, into the low ground. 
It was an unfortunate movement, and opened to the enemy the 
only prospect of permanent success which they enjoyed during 
the day ; for they immediately occupied the heights in force, and 
pressed our people so vigorously, that it was found necessary to 
give to this part of the line a new direction. The light division, 



* During a moment, the enemy had possession of the village ; but their 
triumph was of short duration, Colonel Wallace led his own regiment, 
supported by the 71st and 88th, to the charge. For an instant, the com- 
batants were engaged hand to hand ; hut the best soldiers of France were 
unable to withstand the Connaught Rangers and the Highlandmen. The 
Imperial Guard gave way, and fled. — Ed. 

s2 



254 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxiii. 

which had advanced to support the cavalry, finding the post 
already evacuated, wheeled to the right, and made arrangements 
to protect a fresh movement of General Houston's division, 
which was executed in masterly style. They drew up in square 
of battalions, received and repulsed repeated charges of the 
French cavalry, and then marching through our own squadrons 
sustained a heavy cannonade. Meanwhile no formidable 
force of British dragoons could be brought together, for our 
inferiority in that arm was too decisive to warrant any grand 
display ; but a few squadrons charged from time to time, through 
the intervals of the squares, accordingly as opportunity offered. 

The right was appuyed upon a strong hill, on the summit of 
which stood an old tower : and the enemy, finding that the new 
alignment had been taken up without the slightest disorder, 
paused before they ventured to assail it. Their successes 
bad amounted to nothing more than the occupation of some 
ground, which, at the commencement of the action, had been 
held by us — but they had never broken our ranks, and they were 
as far from turning them as ever ; whilst, in the direction of 
Fuentes de Honor, upon which a variety of attempts had been 
made, they were beaten back at all points. They had attacked 
it in front and flank, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry ; but 
the steady valour of the 71st and 79th regiments, supported by 
the 24th, set all their efforts at defiance ; and now, after several 
hours of severe fighting, not the slightest impression was made. 
Massena seemed to feel that our troops were made of more 
obstinate stuff than he had anticipated, and towards evening 
he relaxed in his exertions. His columns on our right halted ; 
those which had been employed in the assault on Fuentes drew 
off; and the whole army prepared to bivouac, in the order in 
which it stood at the close of the action. Similar arrangements 
were entered into on our side. The pickets were stationed 
along the front of the position, and large fires were lighted across 
the ridge ; while both parties lay down to rest, with a confident 
assurance on their minds that the battle was intermitted only till 
the return of daylight. 

We were, as usual, under arms before dawn appeared ; but it 
brought about no such results as we had anticipated. The 



1811.] SIEGE OF ALMEIDA. 255 



enemy were before us, indeed, in the same force and attitude 
as they had assumed on the preceding evening ; but they 
exhibited no disposition to renew the struggle ; whilst we were 
content to retain the defensive. The dawn of the 8th showed 
their columns in full retreat ; and, towards noon, it was satis- 
factorily ascertained that they had taken the road to Ciudad 
Rodrigo. Massena, with his whole army, reinforced by every 
battalion and squadron which he had been enabled to bring up 
from Castile and Galicia, was thus foiled by three divisions of a 
divided force ; he was compelled to retreat before men over whom 
he had calculated on obtaining an easy and brilliant victory ; and 
Almeida, for the relief of which he had shown himself deeply 
interested, was left to its fate. 

The loss experienced during the operations of these two days 
was very considerable ; for the actions, although partial, were 
maintained with obstinacy on both sides. It fell chiefly upon the 
1st, 3rd, and 7th divisions of infantry, and upon the cavalry, 
and amounted to nearly 1,600 men. That of the enemy was 
much greater, and, on a moderate computation, amounted to 
3,000. They left 400 dead in the village of Fuentes de Honor 
alone, and a large proportion of prisoners fell into our hands. 

We now return to Almeida. On first entering the province, 
the British general caused the fortress to be reconnoitred, with 
the view of ascertaining whether it could be carried by a coup- 
de-main. As, however, it was found too formidable for any such 
attempt, and as the army was not possessed of a battering train, 
or other materials for the conduct of a regular siege, he was, per- 
force, obliged to content himself with its investment ; and con- 
fident hopes were entertained, that famine would do the work of 
war. It had now been blockaded some time, and its stock of 
provisions, original scanty, was drawing rapidly to an end; 
it was therefore of the utmost importance not only to prevent 
fresh supplies from being thrown in, but to hinder the garrison 
from escaping. With this view, Massena's columns had no 
sooner abandoned their ground, than the sixth division, on whom 
the duties of the blockade devolved, were commanded to resume 
their posts, and they marched back, for that purpose, to their 
late cantonments. 

General Campbell, a zealous and enterprising officer, was 



256 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxiii. 

desirous that the blockade should be entrusted entirely to himself ; 
and, being ambitious of the honour of reducing this important 
place, he requested and obtained permission to conduct all details 
without any interference. The result proved that he was incom- 
petent to the duty he had undertaken, and that his incaution led 
to results mortifying to himself, and annoying to the whole army. 
Instead of covering the left face of Almeida, the banks of the 
Agueda, and the bridge at Barba del Puerco, these points were 
left unguarded. He posted a brigade at Junca and Malpartida, 
threw back General Pack to Cinco Velhas, and watched the right 
face of the town, from which no movement was likely to be made 
with any probability of success. Of Barba del Puerco, in parti- 
cular, it behoved him to be excessively jealous, because, through 
it ran the most direct road towards the enemy's outposts. 
Indeed, so conscious were all parties of this, that, on the 11th, the 
4th regiment, from Sir William Erskine's division, was ordered 
up to take possession of the heights above that place. But 
the arrangement came too late — for matters were already in 
train, unfortunately, for an attempt, the success of which, whilst 
it speaks nothing in favour of our prudence, must ever redound 
to the honour of General Brennier, the brave man who con- 
ducted it. 

A little before midnight on the 11th, an immense explosion 
was heard in the vicinity of the fortress. Soon afterwards 
General Pack, who chanced to be at Malpartida with the pickets 
of his brigade, spread an alarm that the place was blown up, and 
that the French garrison was marching in good order towards 
Barba del Puerco. General Pack's pickets offered as much 
resistance as they could ; but the enemy broke through, 
and, passing along the flank of the reserve, our people were 
unable to arrest their progress, even for a moment. General 
Pack sent immediately to General Campbell, who, on the first 
noise, had hurried from his quarters ; but the latter hastened to* 
the front, leaving no positive orders behind him, and came up 
whilst his own troops were dispersed and in disorder. Great 
delay occurred in consequence, in bringing them to the threatened 
point ; whilst the 4th regiment failed in its attempts to head the 
flying garrison. Brennier was thus enabled to lead his troops, in 
a close and compact column, from Almeida to the Agueda, with- 



1811.] RETREAT OF BRENNIER. 257 

out having experienced any serious molestation by the way. 
General Pack, by great exertions, contrived to hang with a few of 
his men upon the enemy's rear, and pointed out, by the flashes 
of his musketry, the exact path which they had taken ; but 
Brennier's conduct was cool and soldier-like, and not the slighest 
sympton of confusion was manifested throughout the night. He 
had given positive directions to his soldiers, from the instant of 
their quitting the town, to continue their march in profound 
silence ; however heavy might be the fire of the besiegers, they 
were not to return a shot ; and, when daylight arrived, in case 
they should find themselves surrounded, they were to make an 
opening wherever they best could, with the bayonet. No com- 
mands could have been more punctually obeyed. The sound of 
a voice was not heard among them ; and they never once returned 
the desultory tiraillade with which General Pack's men endea- 
voured to gall them. 

Having reached the Agueda, they made a halt, in order that 
the stragglers might regain the column. This measure afforded 
an opportunity to the 36th, 2nd, and 4th regiments to close upon 
them ; and as the French, when they resumed their march, 
mistook their way by diverging a little too much to the left, these 
regiments were enabled to reach the bank of the river just as the 
fugitives were crossing the bridge at Barba del Puerco. A 
destructive fire was immediately thrown in, by which between 
100 and 200 men were mowed down ; whilst two squadrons of 
the royals, having flanked them, succeeded, in conjunction with 
Pack's Portuguese, in securing 10 officers and 200 prisoners. 
Thus, about one-third of the garrison of Almeida was cut off. 
But the remaining two-thirds effected their escape, not less to the 
astonishment of Massena than to the regret of Wellington, and 
it seemed that this untoward event were a set-off against the 
advantages of Fuentes de Honor. 

General Brennier left Almeida in a state of sad dilapidation. 
On examining it, next day, we found that three out of the five 
bastions which it comprised, had been blown to atoms ; the 
crests were thrown down into the ditch ; and the stones of 
which they had principally been composed, were hurled, by the 
violence of the explosion, in all directions, and to great distances 
Whether the foundations were materially shaken, we had not the 



258 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxiii. 

means of immediately ascertaining ; but the revetments and 
ravelines were untouched, and the main outline of the rampart 
and ditch remained entire. The other two bastions had not been 
injured, the mines having, by accident, failed to explode. Yet 
was the whole a complete ruin ; and, though we judged that it 
might be so far restored as to be rendered secure against a coup- 
de-main, we saw plainly enough, that to put it again in a state 
of defence, and render it capable of withstanding a siege, would 
require much time, much labour, and much money. 

The sensation produced by the escape of the garrison, and the 
destruction of Almeida, in time, subsided. The French it was 
confidently asserted, had retired upon Salamanca, Zamora, and 
Toro ; Massena had received his recall from Paris ; and Marmont, 
of whose junction we had previously received accounts, was now 
in chief command. 

As soon as Almeida fell, Lord Wellington began to direct his 
attention to the campaign in the south, and made ready to assist 
Beresford, not only with strong reinforcements, but with his own 
counsel and presence. Forthis purpose, he put two divisions, the 3rd 
and the 7th, under Generals Picton and Houston, in march towards 
the Guadiana, directing them to move by Campo Mayor. The 
rest of the army was then ordered into cantonments ; the sixth 
division at Mealhada, Jueda, and Frenada ; the fifth at Fuentes 
de Honor, Ponte Vilhe, and Nave d'Avel ; the first at Aldea de 
Ponte and Albergaria; the light at Gallegos, and along the 
banks of the Agueda; and the cavalry at Cesmeo and the 
villages near. Along this line, by the extraordinary exertions 
of Mr. Kennedy and the commissariat department, the troops, 
upon the whole, were well supplied ; and though forage was 
rather scarce, still the cavalry contrived to keep up thfc condition 
in which they previously stood, and even to improve upon it. 
Sir Brent Spencer, upon whom, in the event of Lord Wellington's 
absence, the command of the whole devolved, was unremitting 
in his exertions to provide for the wants of the soldiers, and to 
secure them against surprise. But, on the latter head, no risk 
was apprehended ; and therefore Lord Wellington, as soon as he 
had seen arrangements in train, set off, accompanied by the 
heads of departments, for Badajoz. 

Information reached us that Marshal Beresford's situation was 



1811.] SITUATION OF BERESFORD. 259 

one of extreme difficulty and delicacy ; in fact, he had no other 
alternative than to fight with the Guadiana in his rear, or by a 
retreat, abandon Badajoz entirely, and permit the enemy, by the 
possession of the river, to strengthen and consolidate himself in 
Estremadura and the south of Spain. He knew, indeed, that 
Lord Wellington was hurrying to his assistance, and he was 
aware that two divisions had begun their march for the purpose 
of supporting him; and, had it been practicable to protract mat- 
ters, and avoid an action till the reinforcements should arrive, all 
would have gone on favourably. But the enemy pressed forward 
with so much rapidity, and manifested so decided an intention of 
overwhelming him, that, in point of fact, he had no choice left. 
Accordingly, he concentrated his troops at Valverde, whither Blake 
and Castanos, with 12,000 men, hastened to join him, and these 
three chiefs, having concerted plans, and made every disposition 
to receive the enemy, awaited a battle which appeared inevitable. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

Journey of Lord Wellington towards Badajoz — Battle of Albuera — Retreat 
of Soult, and renewal of the siege — It is pressed with vigour, and Fort St. 
Christ oval is breached — Movements of the enemy to relieve the place — 
Cavalry affair at Usagre. 

In consequence of the advices from the south, Lord Wellington, 
as soon as he saw matters in a proper train upon the Agueda, set 
off to join Beresford, and superintend the operations which that 
officer was conducting. We quitted Villa Formosa on the 15th, 
and, travelling at the rate of sixty miles a day, without baggage, 
or impediments of any description, arrived at Elvas on the 19th. 
Whilst performing this arduous journey, rumours relative to late 
transactions met us at every stage. At one place, it was stated, 
that the enemy was coming oror- in force, and that a battle might 
be hourly expected ; at another, that Marshal Beresford had 
resolved upon a retreat, not feeling himself strong enough to 
oppose the French ; and, at a third, that a great action had been 



260 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxiv. 

fought, and that it had ended in favour of the allies. It will 
readily he imagined that the last rumour tended, in no slight 
degree, to elevate our spirits. On reaching Elvas, however, more 
accurate details were given; for Colonel Arbuthnot, from the 
Marshal's head- quarters, met us there — and from him we received 
an official account of one of the most obstinate and sanguinary 
actions in which British troops were ever engaged. 

The best position to be assumed by an army desirous to check the 
advance of a hostile force from Seville to Badajoz, is immediately 
beside the village of Albuera,* among some undulating heights 
which, stretching towards the rear, are covered by two small 
streams running in parallel directions upon the flanks of the pla- 
teau. On this ground, Marshal Beresford determined to take 
post ; and for that purpose advanced his troops towards Albuera 
on the 14th and 15th. But Soult, having hurried from Seville 
by forced marches of not less than six leagues a day, was before- 
hand ; and the cavalry, which had been sent on as far as Almen- 
dralejo, to reconnoitre, was driven back in disorder. It was found, 
accordingly, on arriving at the village, that an extensive wood, of 
which it had been Marshal Beresford's intention to avail himself, 
was already in possession of the French ; and hence, whatever 
dispositions he might deem advisable to make, must be entirely 
restricted to the country on the western bank of the Albuera. 

The position selected for the army was accordingly taken up 
behind the little river Albuera, where the road from Seville to 
Badajoz and Olivenca, after passing the stream by a bridge, sepa- 
rates into two branches. Here, the ground rises from the river 
in gentle undulations, which, extending to the right, afford no 
single point d'appui more favourable than another, but tempt him 
who has already arranged his line along their summits, to draw it 

* " The village of Albuera is a street of mean houses, with a church, 
situated on a little river, from which it is named. This village is traversed 
by the high road leading from Seville to Badajoz ; which, about two hundred 
yards to the right, crosses the river by a handsome bridge of stone. Imme- 
diately to the left of Albuera, and just below the rough and rising ground on 
which it stands, there is another bridge of unhewn stone, old, narrow, and 
incommodious. The river, in summer, is not above knee-deep. Its banks, 
to the left of the old bridge, and directly in front of the village, are very 
abrupt and difficult ; but to the right of the main bridge, the passage of the 
stream is easy for all arms." — Sherer. 



1811.] ADVANCE OF SOULT. 261 

out from hill to hill, and eminence to eminence. It was here 
that the allied armies were posted on the evening of the 15th; 
their left resting on Albuera, and covered by the stream — the 
steep banks of which, together with some walls and buildings, 
afforded some shelter ; whilst their right, extending to a consider- 
able distance, found no commanding feature to lean upon. 

Marshal Beresford had under his orders a corps of Spaniards, 
whom he stationed in a double line upon his extreme right, be- 
tween two hillocks, one somewhat in advance of the other. Next 
to them came the second British division, which, under General 
Stewart, composed the centre ; and on the left of all were the 
Portuguese of General Hamilton's division, supported by General 
Alten's brigade of light Germans. The fourth division, under 
General Cole, which did not reach its ground till after the battle 
began, formed, in reserve, in rear of the second ; w T hilst the main 
body of the cavalry took post upon the right, to cover the Spani- 
ards, and prevent their being turned. With respect to the exact 
numbers of this army, it is not very easy to form a correct judg- 
ment, because the Spaniards were most inaccurate in their 
returns; but, taking the latter at 12,000, the Portuguese at 
8,000, and the British at 7,500, the total amount will reach to 
27,000. In cavalry, Marshal Beresford's corps was extremely 
weak — and his artillery amounted to thirty guns. 

The force with which Soult prepared to raise the siege of 
Badajoz was, in point of number, inferior to that of the allies ; 
but in cavalry, artillery, and the character of the troops, immea- 
surably superior. 20,000 French infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 
forty pieces of cannon, bivouacked, on the night of the 15th, in 
the wood ; and the whole advanced next day, in perfect order, to 
the attack. 

About nine o'clock on the morning of the 1 6th, a heavy force 
of cavalry, supported by two columns of infantry, were seen 
moving towards the bridge, to pierce the allied line in that quar- 
ter, and make themselves masters of Albuera. The enemy, how- 
ever, instead of coming on as had been expected, rapidly changed 
their plan, and, under cover of their cavalry, and favoured by a thick 
fog, filed off towards the right. Here, they pressed forward with 
an impetuosity which the Spaniards could not withstand ; and in 
a few minutes they were in possession of those commanding 



262 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxiv. 

heights on which the right flank of the allies depended for sup- 
port. The Spaniards behaved on this occasion with considerable 
gallantry. They gave way, it is true, and fell back ; but their 
retreat was conducted without confusion, and, though repulsed, 
they were not defeated. But their retrogression gave up the key 
of Marshal Beresford's position — and the only good road by 
which, in case of disaster, he could retire ; for it laid bare his line 
of communication with Valverde, and exposed him to the risk 
of being hemmed in between the river and the enemy. It became, 
therefore, an object of the first importance to recover the heights 
which had been lost ; and it was in striving to attain that end, 
that the chief portion of the loss occurred. 

Beresford endeavoured at first to bring back the Spanish troops 
to the charge ; but, finding them extremely unwieldy, and inca- 
pable of executing a nice manoeuvre, he passed the whole of 
Stewart's division through them, towards the right. This done, 
Stewart deployed his first brigade, consisting of 3rd (Buffs), the 
66th, the 2nd battalion 48th, and the 31st, into line, and pushed 
them, under Colonel Colbourn, up the hill against the enemy's 
columns. Their advance was spirited, and their fire admirably 
directed ; but, before they could approach within charging- 
distance, the enemy's cavalry broke in upon their right.* One 
wing of the Buffs was now directed to be thrown back ; but the 
regiment, confused, in part by the approach of the cavalry, and 
not rightly understanding the orders given, fell in upon the second 
brigade, which, under General Houghton, was advancing in 
column to its support. The movement unavoidably threw the 
supporting brigade likewise into confusion, as it happened to be 
in the act of deploying into line. The consequence was that the 
first brigade suffered terribly, as well by a tremendous fire of 
grape which was poured upon them from the height, as from the 
cavalry, which rode through and cut them up at leisure. The 
Buffs, 66th, and 48th, were, indeed, almost annihilated — and the 



* The Spaniards, during nearly the whole of this time, kept up a sharp 
fusilade, notwithstanding the English suffered from it equally with the enemy. 
When ordered to advance, however, to succour those who had, unfortunately, 
with rather more haste than judgment, hastened to their assistance, they were 
found immovable. — Ed. 



1811.] BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 263 

31st escaped a similar fate, only because, being on the left, it had 
time to form, and was thus enabled to present a regular front to 
the enemy. 

Meanwhile, Houghton's brigade had completed its formation, 
and advanced gallantly to the charge — the General himself 
animating his troops, and setting them an example of the 
most devoted bravery. He was thus employed, cheering them on, 
and waving his hat in front of the line, when three balls pierced 
him, and he fell. The brigade, however, was not daunted : it 
pressed forward, and the regiments of w 7 hich it was composed, 
namely, the 57th, 1st battalion 48th, and 29th, vied with each 
other in deeds of heroism. The 57th and 29th in particular, the 
former under Colonel Inglis, the latter under Major Way, per- 
formed prodigies of valour ; but, notwithstanding their utmost 
exertions, seconded, as they were, by those of the 28th, 34th, and 
39th, under Colonel Abercrombie, the enemy succeeded in main- 
taining their post. At this moment w T e had lost a whole brigade 
of artillery, with a large number of prisoners, and affairs wore an 
unpromising appearance. But Marshal Beresford determined to 
make one more effort for victory — and, happily, it was not made 
in vain. 

General Cole's division had not yet been engaged ; it reached 
the ground after the battle began ; and, having rested for a space 
in rear of the centre, was moved towards the right, where it 
formed en potence — and it was now ordered down into the valley, 
for the purpose of carrying this formidable height. 

Nothing could exceed the gallantry of the fusileer brigade, to 
which the arduous task was entrusted. Though deprived, at an 
early stage of the action, of their leader, Sir William Myers, the 
fusileer s pressed on without a moment's pause, and, amidst 
terrible slaughter, drove the enemy from the ridge which he had 
so long and so obstinately defended.* They were ably seconded 
by Colonel Abercrombie' s brigade, as well as by a brigade of Por- 

* The incessant fire of musketry from the Fusileers, baffled all the efforts 
of the enemy. His reverse, coming up to the support of those engaged, was 
driven back, volley after volley being poured upon it, until the French 
columns were completely shattered, and at length driven in one confused 
mass over the ridge. — Ed. 



264 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxiv. 

tuguese under Colonel Hervey, which repeatedly resisted and 
repelled attacks from the enemy's cavalry ; and they retook the 
captured guns, with the exception of a single howitzer, and three 
of eight stand of colours which had been lost. In this grand 
movement, General Cole, with almost every individual attached to 
his staff, was wounded; General Stewart received two contusions; 
and few of the senior officers, either of regiments or brigades, 
escaped unhurt. But its success was decisive of the fortune of 
the day ; the enemy made no fresh effort to regain his post — but, 
retiring in good order across the rivulet, took up, that night, the 
ground from which he had advanced in the morning. 

While this tremendous conflict was going on upon the right, 
several attempts had been made to penetrate the village, and 
break through our left in the direction of the bridge. The latter 
were bravely met by the Portuguese troops, who constantly drove 
back the columns as fast as they came on ; whilst General Alten's 
light Germans, lining the walls about Albuera, prevented the 
assailants from making any impression. Some cavalry, which 
showed themselves here, were watched by the 13th light dragoons, 
and by a Portuguese brigade, under Colonel Otway ; but the mass 
of the enemy's horse, independently of those squadrons which 
committed so much havoc among the infantry, was extended 
beyond our right, and threatened to take us in rear. It was 
judiciously opposed by General Lumley's heavy brigade — which 
moving as the enemy moved, and, continually presenting to them 
a front of resistance, hindered them from effecting a design 
which must have been productive of serious consequences. Our 
artillery, likewise, was admirably served ; its fire was most 
destructive, and the men stood to their guns till many of them 
were sabred. Indeed, there was not an officer or soldier, in any 
department of the army, who failed this day in doing more than 
duty. 

I have already spoken of the daring intrepidity of the fusileers, 
but the bravery of the 57th and 31st fell nothing short of that 
of their comrades. These regiments, having ascended the height, 
stood their ground nobly against all the efforts of a column of 
French grenadiers. The enemy's fire thinned their ranks, but 
never once broke them ; for, at the close of the action, the dead 
and wounded were found in two distinct lines, upon the very 




iSWEI? 



- 



1811.] INTREPIDITY OF BERESFORD. 265 

spots which they had occupied whilst alive and fighting. They 
fought, too, in every imaginable order which infantry can be 
called upon to assume. They resisted cavalry in square — 
deployed again into line, and received and returned repeated 
volleys, whilst a few yards only divided them from their opponents : 
at last, everything was carried by the bayonet. All this could 
not be done without prodigious slaughter on both sides — and the 
killed and wounded lay in masses so compact, that 7,000 bodies 
occupied a space of most limited dimensions — and our artillery, 
when advancing, towards the close of the day, were compelled to 
pass over them, deaf to their cries, and averting their gaze 
from the brave fellows thus laid prostrate in the dust. 

The victory w T as an important one — but it was purchased at a 
dearer rate than had yet been required in the Peninsula. Out of 
7,500 British troops engaged, 4,158 were placed hors de combat, 
the Portuguese lost 389, and the Spaniards nearly 2,000 ; so that 
there fell of the allies, that bloody day, no fewer than 6,577. Of 
the enemy's loss we were, necessarily, unable to form a cor- 
rect calculation, but it was estimated at full 8,000, among 
whom were three generals killed, and many superior officers 
wounded. 

During the battle of Albuera, a number of events occurred, 
honourable in the highest degree to individuals. A boy refused 
to resign the standard of his regiment except with life, and his 
life paid the forfeit of his gallantry.* 

During the hottest of the action, Marshal Beresford exposed 
himself with a degree of intrepidity, which could hardly fail of 
spreading an example of heroism around. f He repeatedly 

* Ensign Thomas, 3rd Buffs. 

f " When Stewart's imprudence in loosely bringing Colbourne's brigade 
into action, had occasioned it a loss short of annihilation, and the 
Spaniards, though they could not be induced to advance, fired without 
ceasing, with an English regiment in their front, Beresford actually seized 
an ensign and dragged him forward, with the colours, hoping that these 
useless troops would be inspirited to follow. Not a man stirred ; and the 
standard-bearer, when the Marshal's grasp relaxed, instantly flew back, to 
herd with his cold-blooded associates. In every charge of the fight, and on 
every part of the field, Beresford was seen conspicuously ; and, whatever 
might have been his failing as a general, his bravery as a man should have 



266 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxiv. 

dragged the Spanish officers from their ranks, compelling them to 
lead their men forward, and show them the way ; and, when indi- 
vidually charged by a Polish lancer, grappled his adversary by the 
throat, and threw him from his saddle. A very different fate 
attended the personal exertions of the Portuguese staff. They, 
too, were charged by a single lancer, who knocked down one with 
the butt of his pike, overset another man and horse, and gave 
ample employment to the entire head- quarters before he was 
finally despatched. These heroes declared that the man seemed 
possessed by an evil spirit ; and that when he fell at last, he 
literally bit the ground. The lancers, as is well known, were 
peculiarly daring in their attacks, and merciless in their opera- 
tions. They rarely gave quarter, but speared our men, whether 
offering resistance or giving proofs of submission. 

On the retreat of the enemy after the battle of Albuera, Mar- 
shal Beresford sent back General Hamilton's Portuguese division, 
with orders to observe Badajoz upon its southern side, whilst he 
himself advanced with the rest of his corps, and took post at 
Almendralejo. The troops were thus distributed when Lord 
Wellington arrived ; and, as it was essential that Soult's columns, 
which had concentrated at Fuente del Maestrc, should be 
watched, he did not interfere with the material parts of this 
arrangement. But the reduction of Badajoz was the object in 
which he felt most deeply interested — and the siege was regularly 
renewed. 

As soon as the two divisions came up from the position of the 
Agueda, Lord Wellington proceeded to invest the place anew, 
upon both banks of the river. For this purpose, on the 25th, 
the seventh division, under General Houston, drove in the 
enemy's posts upon the right bank, and established pickets within 
a short distance of Fort Christoval — at the same time that a 
flying bridge was thrown across the Guadiana, as at the last 
attack, and stores and materials forwarded from Elvas to the 
depots before the place. On the left bank, the Portuguese corps 
was already at its post ; and it was strengthened, on the 27th, 
by the arrival of the third division, which, marching from Campo 

commanded the respect of many, who have since treated his arrangements 
with unsparing severity." — Victories of the British Armies. 



1811.] SECOND SIEGE OF BADAJOZ. 267 

Mayor, crossed the Guadiana at the ford above the town. The 
garrison was thus shut completely within its works, and the 
business of the siege began. 

The total amount of men and means employed in this service, 
though certainly greater than had been employed before, was not 
such as to raise any lively hope that a speedy and successful ter- 
mination would crown our labours. There sat down before the 
place a besieging army of 14,000 or 15,000 men, including 3,000 
Spaniards, and 2,000 Portuguese militia ; and the artillery to be 
employed amounted to forty pieces, including four ten-inch, and 
six eight-inch howitzers. Of mortars we possessed none ; eight 
therefore, out of the ten howitzers, were directed to be used as 
such ; and the guns, of which two were twenty-four pounders, 
and four sixteen pounders, were all brass, and of Portuguese 
manufacture. The engineers' stores collected on the occasion, 
comprised 3,500 intrenching tools, 60,000 sand-bags, 600 gabions, 
a very few T fascines, and an extremely inadequate quantity of 
splinter proof timber and planks : whilst, independently of the 
officers, there were attached to the department 169 men of the 
line, to act as overseers, 5S carpenters, 48 miners, and 25 
rank and file, of the corps of royal artificers. The chief engineer 
and director of the operations was Lieutenant- colonel Fletcher ; 
Major Dixon was at the head of the artillery ; and Captains Ross 
and M'Leod were in charge of two depots, which had been estab- 
lished on each side of the river. 

To oppose this assailing force, there was understood to be, in 
Badajoz and its outworks, a garrison of three thousand men, 
amply provided with food and stores for two month's consump- 
tion — and their artillery, too, of excellent description. It num- 
bered fully 150 pieces; from which a fire might, at almost 
any point, be thrown out, infinitely superior to what we could 
direct against it ; and though, at first, we w r ere led to believe that 
the stock of ammunition was scanty, a short experience served 
to convince us that the rumour was without foundation. In spite, 
however, of these disadvantages, our engineers were sanguine. 
They determined to make a double attack — directing one against 
Fort Christoval, and the other against the castle. 

The large and fortified town of Badajoz stands upon the left 

T 



268 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap.xxiv- 

bank of the Guadiana, having one fourth of its enceinte washed 
by the river, which varies from about 300 to 500 yards in 
width, and secures all the space w r hich it embraces from insult. 
Towards the land side, its defences consist of eight regularly- 
constructed fronts, connected by a good covered way and glacis. 
The ravelines are, however, unfinished ; but the fronts possess 
whole revetments, and the escape of the bastions is thirty feet 
in height, though that of the curtains is considerably lower. 
In advance of these fronts are two detached works, namely, the 
Pardoleras, a crown work, about two hundred yards distant, and 
the Pecurina, a strong redoubt, four hundred yards removed from 
the glacis. On the north-east side, again, where an angle is 
formed by the junction of the river Revellas with the Guadiana, 
there is a hill 120 feet in height, the summit of which is crowned 
by an old castle ; and the walls of that castle, naked, weak, and 
only partially flanked, from part of the enceinte of the place. 
The castle itself embraces an area of very considerable extent — 
and might, if proper care were bestowed upon it, be rendered 
exceedingly formidable ; but its defences had been neglected, and, 
at the period, it was deficient even in parapet to shelter guns. It 
was against this point that our engineers determined to turn one 
of their attacks — and it was here that they seemed to possess the 
best chance of ultimately succeeding. 

On the opposite band of the Guadiana, and in a direct line with 
this ancient building, stand the heights of St. Christoval, whose 
altitude is little less than that of the hill of the castle, and may, 
from the peculiar shape and bearing of the latter eminence, be said 
completely to command it. The castle hill, it will be observed, 
forms a sort of inclined plain, which eases off towards the edge of the 
water ; and hence, a spectator from the summit of the heights of 
St. Christoval is enabled to see anything which goes on within 
its walls. To prevent an enemy from availing himself of this 
advantage, a square fort, of above 300 feet face, had been con- 
structed. It was strong, and regularly built, with a stone scarp, 
twenty feet in height; and able, from the rocky nature of the 
ground on which it stood, to offer a stout resistance. Between it 
and the town, however, the communication is not good; inasmuch 
as it is carried on entirely by means of a long bridge, subject to be 



1811.] FORT ST. CHRISTOVAL. 269 

enfiladed — or by the still more precarious instrumentality of 
boats. Against this fort the second attack was directed. 

Every preliaiinary measure having been adopted, working 
parties were ordered out on the night of the 31st, and ground 
broken before the Castle and Fort St. Christoval. The former 
operation went on wholly unobserved by the enemy, till daylight 
disclosed our people, then well covered by their embankment : 
but, when they were detected, an incessant fire of grape and 
round shot was opened and kept up. In spite, however, of this 
interruption, the men worked on — and four distinct batteries, at 
different distances from the place, were marked out, and in part 
completed. From that moment, reliefs regularly succeeded one 
another day and night ; and though the enemy, by shifting two 
or three of their guns, contrived to throw shot into our very 
trenches, still all the batteries, including one against the angle of 
the castle, were completed and armed by the 2nd of June. On 
the 3rd they opened ; and a heavy fire was kept up on both 
sides without the smallest intermission. 

It was now that the inefficient nature of Portuguese artillery, 
and the inferiority of Portuguese ammunition, became fatally con- 
spicuous. One after another our guns became disabled by their 
own fire ; whilst the breaching-batteries, though they caused the 
masonry of Fort Christoval and the castle to peel off, were far 
from producing the effect which had been anticipated.* On the 
side of the castle, all that could be said was that, at the end of 
several days, the wall and rampart appeared to be a little shaken ; 
but a practicable breach had not been made ; nor could it be sur- 
mised how far it was ever likely to be effected. On the side of 

* " The ordnance belonging to the garrison of Elvas is very ancient and 
incomplete ; unprovided with the improvements adopted by modem science 
to facilitate and render more certain the use of cannon ; and, although classed 
generally as 24-pounders, the guns were found to be of a calibre larger than 
the shot in the garrison of that weight. The fire from this ordnance was, 
therefore, very uncertain, and the carriages proved to be worse even than we 
supposed they were ; and both guns and carriages were rendered useless so 
frequently by the effect of our own fire, as to create delay, in consequence of 
the necessity which existed for exchanging both in the advanced batteries."— 
Jones's Journal of the Sieges, 

T 2 



270 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxiv. 

Fort Christoval, however our progress seemed more promising. 
Two bastions at length fell in — apparently filling up the ditch, 
and on the 6th, the breach being reconnoitred, it was conceived 
that an assault might be hazarded. 

The advanced station of our cavalry was, at this time, at 
Usagre, a small town, distant about two leagues from Almen- 
dralejo. Here General Lumley, who commanded the allied 
squadrons, took up his quarters ; and here an opportunity was 
afforded him of distinguishing himself. On the 25th, about 500 
of the enemy's cavalry crossed a little stream which runs before 
the village, and, filing through the street, which our people on 
their approach had evacuated, debouched at its extremity, and 
formed with a wall in their rear. General Lumley seized this 
favourable opportunity, by ordering out the 3rd and 4th dragoons 
to charge. They executed the movement in good style, and, 
overthrowing the French in a moment, cut down about 100, and 
made many prisoners. The rest fled in every direction ; whilst 
their comrades, in great numbers, stood upon the opposite bank 
of the rivulet, to witness a defeat which they could not interfere 
to prevent. Subsequently our men fell back upon Los Santos, 
Villa Franca, and Puebla ; and the enemy took quiet possession 
of Usagre. 

We heard at this time that Drouet had set out from Salamanca 
for the south, with seventeen battalions and several squadrons ; 
and that a large proportion, if not the whole of Marmont's army, 
was expected to follow. Lord Wellington instantly despatched 
orders for General Howard's brigade of the first division, as well 
as for a brigade of Portuguese infantry, to hasten from the 
Agueda, to reinforce us at Badajoz ; and instructions were 
conveyed to other divisions, to hold themselves in readi- 
ness to undertake a similar march. By and by, a rumour 
came that Drouet was at hand, and that his arrival at Cordova 
was expected on the 9th of June. Now, as Soult was at this 
time at Llerena, Villa Garcia, and the villages near, there could 
be little doubt as to his being able to collect a force upon the 
Albuera by the 1 2th ; and then the question arose, whether it 
would be impossible for us to continue our operations against 
Badajoz beyond the 10th ? It was quite evident that the covering 



1811.] CHARGE OF DRAGOONS. 271 

army, even after it should have been strengthened by the troops 
called in from the north, would not be competent to oppose Soult, 
thus increased to 30,000 men ; whereas, should Marmont appear 
upon the stage, to risk a battle with even the covering and besieging 
corps combined, would have been most injudicious. On all these 
accounts Lord Wellington determined to try the effect of an 
assault on the very first opportunity which should hold out the 
slightest prospect of success ; and the breach in Fort St. Chris- 
toval was no sooner pronounced practicable, than preparations 
were made to storm it.* 

Circumstances had occurred that rendered it indispensable to 
relieve Marshal Beresford from his command of the covering 
corps, because it was felt that, if he could not restore the alacrity 
and discipline of the Portuguese legions, no other officer need 
attempt it. He was accordingly called in — and General Hill 
proceeded to take upon himself the charge thus rendered vacant. 
At the same time Howard's brigade was incorporated with the 
second division : whilst the remains of the brigade lately com- 
manded by General Houghton, as well as of the Buffs, the 31st, 
and the 66th, being formed into a single battalion of detachments 
and placed in the brigade of General Lumley, were attached to 
the same division. The brigade of Portuguese, likewise* which 
marched from the Agueda at the same time with General 
Howard's regiments, took its station in the second division. 
Thus, whilst the third and seventh divisions, with one corps of 
Portuguese, and another of Spaniards, under the immediate 

* " The fort was evidently weakly manned, and the garrison not having 
yet brought any very destructive fire on the assailants, the officers considered 
the opportunity favourable for an attempt to force in by escalade, and 
directed twelve ladders, of 15 feet in length, which had been supplied with 
the view of aiding in mounting the breach, to be employed against the scarp- 
wall. The scarp being more than 20 feet in height, the attempt proved 
abortive; other points of less height were sought, and the ladders were 
applied in vain to almost every face and flank of the work. The garrison 
showered down upon the assaulting party shells, hand-grenades, stones, &c, 
in overwhelming quantities, for an hour, in which these impracticable attempts 
were persevered in. At 1 o'clock, a.m., the residue of the party retired, 
having lost twelve killed and ninety wounded. Lieutenant Foster, at the 
close of the combat, received a shot through the body, of which he died." — 
Jones's Journal of the Sieges. 



272 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxv. 

orders of Lord Wellington, pressed the blockade, and carried on 
the siege of Badajoz, the second and fourth divisions — with the 
light brigade of the King's German Legion, supported by General 
Cotton with the cavalry from the north, as well as by the cavalry 
of the south under General Erskine, covered their operations ; the 
infantry holding the positions of Albuera, as being the most 
advantageous in the neighbourhood, and the cavalry keeping 
watch at Almendralejo, Los Santos, Villa Franca, and the 
country around. 



CHAPTER XXV. 



Siege of Badajoz — Fort St. Christoval twice stormed — Movements to relieve 
the town — Lord Wellington determines to raise the siege, and retire into 
Portugal — Blake crosses the Guadiana, and retires to Cadiz — The British 
army takes post behind the Caya, and repairs the works at Elvas — Inter- 
cepted letter from Marmont to Berthier — The Allies go into cantonments. 

The breach in St. Christoval having been examined, and 
pronounced practicable, orders were issued that it should be 
assaulted on the night between the 6th and 7th of June. The 
forlorn hope, consisting of twenty- five men, advanced about 
midnight, under the guidance of Lieutenant Foster, and directed 
their operations against the right salient angle of the fort. By 
the fire of our batteries, the palisades had been destroyed ; and, as 
the counterscarp was here little more than four feet deep, it 
proved no obstacle to the assailants, who sprang into the ditch,, 
and marched straight to the foot of the breach. But here a sad 
reverse awaited them. The enemy, labouring incessantly between 
dusk and the hour of attack, had removed the rubbish, and the 
escarpe was found to stand clear seven feet from the bottom of 
the ditch. Our men, though unprepared for the occurrence,, 
made repeated efforts to surmount the obstacle, but all were 
unavailing. They accordingly determined to relinquish the 
attempt, and they might have retired with a very trifling loss, 
had they not been met by the main body of the storming party > 



1811.] STORMING OF ST. CHRISTOVAL. 273 

amounting to 155 men. These, having brought with them a 
few ladders, insisted upon trying the effect of an escalade ; and 
they unhappily planted their instruments against a point, the 
summit of which overtopped the longest of them by five feet. 
The consequence was, that the enemy, roused to a sense of their 
danger, hurled down into the ditch a shower of shells, grenades, 
stones, and other missiles, which, taking effect among men 
unavoidably crowded together, produced considerable slaughter 
and great confusion. The party at length retired, leaving behind 
them twelve dead, and carrying away upwards of ninety 
wounded. 

From this period up to the 9th, our people sedulously employed 
themselves in constructing new batteries, and making better 
preparations for a fresh assault. There arrived, upon the 8th, 
seven iron guns, which, having been transported from Lisbon to 
Elvas, were, from the latter place, forwarded to our camp ; and 
these, with the whole of our serviceable artillery, amounted to 
only seven heavy guns and two howitzers. They were kept 
incessantly at play ; but the practice was far from being accurate, 
and the walls seemed to be made of materials more than ordinarily 
durable ; for, after expending a considerable portion of ammuni- 
tion, it was found that the breach was but slightly enlarged. 
Still, as a good deal of rubbish lay under its gorge, it was again 
determined to try the fortune of an assault. 

While such was the evil fortune of the siege, Drouet had 
actually reached Cordova on the 7th and 8th, and, with 8,000 
men, was in communication with the corps of Marshal Soult. 
The latter, too, had refused his left, and was manoeuvring that he 
might unite himself with Marmont's army by Medellin. 

The enemy, we afterwards learned, entered Ciudad Rodrigo 
on the evening of the 5th with 2,500 cavalry, fourteen 
pieces of artillery, and 1 6,000 infantry ; and our light division 
retiring, on the 6th, as far as Nave d'Avel, the French 
pursued their march in two columns, chiefly of cavalry, 
along the roads leading to Gallegos and Carpeo. The mass 
which moved by the latter road was the stronger of the two, 
and was accompanied by six pieces of cannon. Our cavalry, 
observing them all the while, fell back to the high grounds, and 
formed a line between Espeja and Gallegos ; upon which the 



274 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxv. 

enemy pushed through the wood, in two bodies, with great 
impetuosity, and made a daring attempt to cut off a large pro- 
portion, if not the whole, of the force opposed to them. The 
cavalry, however, observed the manoeuvre, and skilfully defeated 
it. By inclining to their right, they avoided the left and front 
attacks directed against them, and, coming down with great 
gallantry upon the column on the Espeja road, overthrew and 
repulsed it. On this occasion, the Royals particularly distin- 
guished themselves. Our people then fell back to Sabugal, whilst 
the French, having merely entered Fuentes de Honor, and 
patrolled as far as Almeida and the Coa, withdrew their troops 
and ended their recognizance. 

Another movement was in progress. Despatches from Colonel 
Grant, who occupied the Puerto de Banos, informed us that two 
divisions of Marmont's infantry, with 500 cavalry, had passed 
along the rear of the reconnoitring columns, and arrived on the 
6th — the very day on which the recognizance was made — at Los 
Santos and Fuentes. They were commanded by Regnier, and 
continued their march upon Banos, at which place their leader 
slept on the night of the 9th, and, from intercepted letters, it was 
certain that Marmont intended to co-operate in raising the siege 
of Badajoz. The place must therefore be reduced at once, for 
it would be impossible to continue the siege in the presence of 
Marmont's and Soult's armies combined. 

Such was the general state of our affairs, when the breach in 
Fort St. Chris to val was pronounced practicable for the second 
time — and Lord Wellington gave orders that it should again be 
stormed, on the night of the 9th of June. 

On this occasion, the storming party consisted of 200 men — 
twenty-five of whom, as formerly, formed the forlorn hope, under 
Lieutenant Hunt, of the Royal Engineers. They moved from 
the trenches at the time appointed, and pushed directly for the 
ditch. The enemy were better prepared to receive them than 
before — and a heavy fire opened upon them as soon as they 
arrived within range of musketry. Unfortunately, Lieutenant 
Hunt was killed upon the glacis ; and though the troops leaped 
into the ditch with their accustomed gallantry, and pressed forward, 
as they imagined towards the breach, they had no leader to direct 
them — and, in consequence, lost their way. They went forward, 



1811.] FATE OF THE FORLORN HOPE. 275 

provided with two ladders of from twenty-five to thirty feet in 
length ; but they applied them, in error, to the face of the bastion, 
which was not in ruins, though partially injured by stray shot. 
The consequences were such as might be anticipated. After 
persisting in their efforts to escalade with the most daring bravery 
during a full hour, they were finally driven back, with the loss of 
forty men killed, and more than one hundred wounded.* 

Thus ended the second attempt on Badajoz. During the 10th, 
a truce was agreed upon, for the purpose of carrying off the 
wounded, and burying the dead ; and in the evening our guns and 
stores began to be removed. On the 11th, all that could be done 
without attracting notice, was effected; and on the 12th, the 
siege was formally raised, after it had cost the allies nine officers 
and 109 men killed, with twenty -five officers and 342 men 
wounded and taken prisoners. 

But, though the stores and materiel were thus removed from 
before Badajoz, it was not considered prudent to withdraw the 
covering army from its position on the Albuera. Under all cir- 
cumstances, the position of the Albuera was pronounced unten- 
able ; but there was no other on the left of the Guadiana which 
offered the slightest advantages, or held out to us the smallest 
inducement to take it up. 

Lord Wellington sent for Castanos and Blake at Albuera, and 
opened to them the views which he entertained, and the deter- 
mination to which he had come. He did so, prefacing his decla- 
ration by a statement, that nothing which they could do or say, 
should induce him to depart from his own plans. This done, he 
dismissed them, and immediately issued orders for the breaking- 
up of the army from Albuera and Badajoz. The movement took 

* " Every one who succeeded in reaching the parapet was instantly 
bayoneted down ; and the garrison, after a little while, mounting on the 
parapet, upset the ladders. At this time, two assaulting columns were com- 
pletely mixed together, and united in many strenuous endeavours to replace 
the ladders at various points of the front ; but the enormous quantity of large 
shells, hand-grenades, hags of powder, and combustibles, which the garrison 
threw into the ditch, rendered their perseverance and gallantry unavailing 
and after braving destruction till 10 p.m., and having 40 men killed and 100 
wounded, the remainder of the assaulting party were ordered to retire." — 
Jones's Journal of the Sieges, 



276 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxv. 

place on the 18th ; and all the stores and baggage being con- 
veyed to the rear, the columns moved, without confusion, to their 
new ground. 

It is to be observed that the object of this new alignment was 
purely one of defence. It was assumed that the enemy, who had 
collected in strength, would not content themselves with the 
relief of Badajoz, but press forward with a view to besiege Elvas, 
and probably make an irruption into Alentejo. Now the loss of 
Elvas would have supplied the French with an additional pivot on 
which to turn, and have completed the exposure of the richest and 
their most fertile districts in Portugal, Lord Wellington made up 
his mind to risk everything for preservation; and with this 
view he disposed his army in such order, as that it might seize 
the first favourable opportunity of striking a blow. 

From the 20th of June to the 21st of July, our army remained 
in its double encampment, at Portalegre and Torre del Mouro. 
Few incidents occurred, in a military point of view, to arrest 
attention, and of these almost all proved unsatisfactory. The 
enemy, instead of following us up, confined their operations 
entirely to the southern side of the Guadiana, never venturing 
upon anything on our bank of the river, except an occasional 
reconnaisance ; and these reconnaisances, being conducted gene- 
rally by cavalry, were often successful. 

Among many dispatches intercepted at the time, one taken 
from its bearer by some guerillas, was interesting. The letter 
was from Marmont, dated from Merida, subsequently to the relief of 
Badajoz, and the consequent retrogression of our divisions. It 
began by informing his Excellency the Prince of Neufchatel, that 
having succeeded, in conjunction with the Duke of Dalmatia, in 
raising the siege of Badajoz, the writer had since directed his 
attention to the re -organization of the army in Portugal. The 
system of requisitions, and the irregularity of supply, had been 
carried to so great a height, that the army was become little 
better than a rabble of banditti ; nor could anything be attempted 
with the slightest prospect of success, till all should be entirely 
changed, and the troops provided and paid in such a manner as 
to render them contented and manageable. To accomplish this, 
the Marshal proceeded to devise plans ; and he earnestly solicited 
instructions and assistance from the Emperor, to assist in carrying 



1811.] INTENTIONS OF THE ENEMY. 277 

them into execution. In the mean time, he intended to move to 
the right bank of the Tagus ; whilst Soult, who had heard of 
succours being sent from Cadiz to Tarragona, was preparing to 
march thither without delay. 

The letter went on to state, that with his own corps, amount- 
ing to 32,000 infantry, and from 3,000 to 4,000 cavalry, Marmont 
intended to place himself in some convenient camp between the 
Teitar and the Tagus, where he should be able to watch the 
conduct of his troops, and improve their discipline. In this case, 
and supposing that two or three months' repose were obtained, 
and that the remounts of horses, and re-equipments of various 
kinds promised, should arrive, he entertained no doubt that the 
fine army of Portugal would again become tres '-redout 'able ', and 
capable of executing any service in which the Emperor should 
employ it. He next specified the position and strength of our 
army — reported the departure of Blake's corps, and its embarka- 
tion for Cadiz, and entered into a variety of other particulars, 
which abundantly testified that the channels of information pos- 
sessed by the French, were as extensive as any at our command. 

I have reason to believe that Marmont's dispatch, combined 
with circumstances of less moment, determined Lord Wellington 
to forego ail offensive operations against the enemy in Spain. It 
was clear that, against odds so tremendous, he could not accom- 
plish anything of importance. Hence he determined to place his 
troops in temporary cantonments ; and, accordingly, the divisions 
on the 21st, began to break up. Two of these, the third and the 
sixth, were ordered to cross the Tagus, and occupy Castello 
Branco and the villages ; the seventh was directed to move upon 
Niza ; the light, to Campo Mayor ; the first and fifth to 
Portalegre, whither the head- quarters were removed ; and the 
second and fourth to Evora and its vicinity. Thus, a very 
strong corps of infantry, supported by the whole of the cavalry, 
was kept in Alentejo ; whilst the remainder of the army, taking 
post in the vicinity of the Tagus, became disposable on any point 
which might chance to be threatened. 



278 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxvi. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

Amusements of the officers — Lord Wellington suddenly moves towards 
Rodrigo, and invests the place — Disposition of the army in its new align- 
ment — The country round Ciudad Rodrigo — Reports that the enemy would 
raise the siege — Arrangements in consequence. 

For some time we contented ourselves with keeping pointers 
and greyhounds, and in indulging, as often as opportunities 
offered, in shooting, coursing, and fishing ; but now a taste for 
hunting prevailed, and fox-hounds and harriers were established 
in the different divisions of the army. At head-quarters there 
was an excellent pack, which afforded us occasional amusement ; 
and it is worthy of remark that into the enjoyments of the chase, no 
man entered more heartily than our leader. It was during this 
summer that he first adopted the custom — which he never afterwards 
laid aside — of throwing off at a settled fixture, whilst the army was 
not in the field. Then, in our quarters, we lived gaily and 
well. A spirit of good-fellowship and hospitality everywhere 
prevailed ; and, in the midst of wars, balls, private theatricals, 
and agreeable parties, were things of continual occurrence. 

It has been already stated, that on the 21st of July, the army 
broke up from its camps, to take a line of temporary cantonments 
on either side of the Tagus. All this was duly executed by the 
23rd ; and on that day the divisions, with the exception of the 
fifth, which still remained a league's distance from Portalegre, 
were housed at their respective destinations. The movement 
was hardly made when we were joined by four regiments of 
infantry and one of cavalry, from England — the 26th, 32nd, 68th, 
and 77th infantry, and the 12th light dragoons : all of them 
strong in numbers, and perfectly effective ; whilst the arrival, 
at Lisbon, of General Graham, who came as second in command, 
was officially announced. Graham had seen a great deal of 
service, wherever employed, had proved himself an officer of 
enterprise and talent, and his late success at Barossa added to 
his well-earned reputation. 

Whilst the rest of the army were thus indulging in dreams of 
quiet and repose, the ever-active mind of their leader was medi- 



1811.] FIELD SPORTS. 279 

tating an enterprise, hazardous, no doubt, but in the highest 
degree influential upon the general issue of the war. The pos- 
session of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz on one side of Spain, and 
of three out of the four principal fortresses on the other, gave to 
the enemy a facility of movement of which it was of the utmost 
consequence to deprive them ; and Lord Wellington's principal 
views had been directed to the recovery of places of whose impor- 
tance every day brought decided proofs. 

With these convictions, Lord Wellington was not disposed to 
permit a favourable opportunity for the re- capture of Ciudad 
Rodrigo to pass unheeded. The divisions had taken up their 
cantonments but a few days, when an intercepted return of the 
provisions in that place fell into his hands, from which it appeared 
that the existing stock was scanty, and that the prospects of a 
fresh supply were extremely questionable. It occurred to him, 
that were it practicable to invest Rodrigo, previously to the arrival 
of a convoy, famine might do the work of siege — whilst, at all 
events, a knowledge that the fortress was in danger, could not 
but dishearten Marmont, and alarm Soult in the midst of his 
southern operations. The plan was no sooner conceived than 
executed. Whilst the second British, and General Hamilton's 
Portuguese division of infantry, supported by two brigades of 
cavalry, received orders to remain at Estremos and Portalegre, 
under General Hill, for the protection of Alentejo, the remainder 
of the army, consisting of the dragoons, the light, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 
5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, was suddenly called into the field, 
and, on the sixth day after it had taken up its cantonments, was 
in full march towards the north. 

On the 1st of August, head-quarters reached Castello Branco, 
where a halt of a single day occurred. On the 8th, they were 
transferred to Sabugal ; and on the 10th, Lord Wellington halted 
at Fuente Guinaldo. A loose and extensive line was then taken 
up — from Villa Vicosa on the right, to Gallegos on the left — 
along which the several divisions and brigades were distributed — 
the 1st occupying Penamacor, the 4th Pedrogao, the 5th Payo, 
near the pass of Perales, the 6th Gallegos, the 7th Alfayates and 
Villa Mayor, and the light Mortegao, on the opposite side of the 
Agueda. With respect to the third division, it remained, with the 
bulk of the artillery, at Fuente Guinaldo ; whilst the cavalry was 



L 



280 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxvi. 

scattered here and there in squadrons and small parties, accord- 
ing as the nature of the ground rendered their presence desirable, 
or facility of accommodation invited. 

In many particulars the state of Ciudad Rodrigo had been 
erroneously represented. It was soon discovered that the 
scarcity of provisions under which the garrison was reported to 
labour, had been removed — for a convoy of stores of every 
description had entered the place just before our arrival, and it 
was now victualled for at least two months to come. Evidence, 
likewise, was not wanting, that the French Marshals were 
determined to hazard all, rather than permit a post of so much 
importance to be wrested from them ; and hence our siege must 
be commenced, under the moral certainty of our being attacked by 
all the disposable force in the country and long before it could be 
brought to a conclusion. 

The corps of Marshal Marmont, distributed through the vale 
of Plasencia, mustered, in all, 35,000 men. 15,000 were at 
Benevente, Toro, and Valladolid, and 10,000 within a march or 
two of Salamanca. It was not difficult to foresee that, when- 
ever Marmont should take the field, he would do it at the head 
of these corps combined ; or in other words, with a force of not 
less than 60,000 men.* Now, it unfortunatnly happened that the 
allied army was suffering from sickness at this moment, more 
severely than it had done at almost any previous period. There 
were in hospital, or unfit for duty 13,000 British, and 5,000 
Portuguese — full 1,000 of whom had broken down during the 
late march — and hence the utmost amount upon which it was 
possible to calculate, did not exceed 42,000 men. The question 
to decide was, whether, with such means, we should be justified 
in laying siege to a place, well supplied, well garrisoned, and 
covered by an army, surpassing our own, in point of numbers, by 
nearly one- third. 

Lord Wellington determined on the attempt. The fortress was 



* Composing for its numbers, one of the finest armies that even Napoleon 
could ever boast. Its entire strength was rather over 60,000 men, 7,000 of 
whom were cavalry, while the artillery company comprised 110 guns. The 
reinforcements, too, were composed of veteran soldiers, many of them being 
detached from the Imperial Guard, — Ed. 



1811.] BLOCKADE OF CIUDAD RODRJGO. 281 

accordingly blockaded — the garrison began to feel distress, and 
preparations for converting the blockade into a siege were slowly 
continued. At intervals, affairs of posts would occur, in which the 
enemy were occasionally successful ; whilst rumours came in to 
supply with subjects of speculation those who had little to occupy 
or to excite them. 

The first serious intimation that hostilities were about to com- 
mence, was given by a report that Marmont had broken up from 
his cantonments, and that his columns were in march towards 
Castile. This report came in about the 24th of August, and it 
was supposed to be authentic. Lord Wellington made instant 
preparations to meet the threatened danger. The divisions which 
had hitherto occupied cantonments between Fuente Guinaldo and 
the Tagus, closed up ; the first and fourth, passing the Coa, 
stationed themselves at Nave d'Avel, Fuentes de Honor, Villa 
Formosa, and Valdelamula; whilst the remainder took post on 
the heights of Pastores, El Boden, Montiago, Albergaria, and the 
places near. By this arrangement, the several brigades of the 
allied army were so distributed that they could, at a moment's 
notice, concentrate between the Agueda and the Coa ; whilst, all 
the principal defiles of the mountains being watched, the pos- 
sibility of throwing a corps, unobserved, either in Rodrigo or 
upon any link in our communications, was prevented. A point 
d'appui, likewise, for those in front, was obtained at Fuente 
Guinaldo, where a position was marked out, and strengthened by 
respectable intrenchments. In a word, every precaution was 
taken which the circumstances of the case demanded — and Lord 
Wellington was enabled either to fight to advantage, should he 
risk a battle — or, having kept out his advanced corps to the last 
moment, to fall back upon his resources unmolested. 



282 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxvii. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

Delay on the part of the enemy— They advance to the relief of Ciudad 
Rodrigo, throw in a convoy, and pass the Agueda — Skirnjishes along the 
front of the British line— Display of French troops— Lord Wellington 
retires to Alfayates — Partial actions during the movement — The enemy 
withdraw, and the British troops retire into cantonments — Ciudad Rodrigo 
observed by flying parties — Exploits of Don Julian Sanchez. 

It was now the middle of September, and the enemy's grand move- 
ment for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was still deferred, though 
each successive day brought proof that no great while would 
elapse ere it should receive its accomplishment. It was known 
that Marmont's columns were in march towards Tomames and 
Val de Fuentes, and that the imperial guards, with other troops 
to the number of 25,000 men, were collected in and about Sala- 
manca. Intercepted communications stated also that a convoy 
would arrive near the place on the 20th or 21st at the latest ; and 
that the force with which it was proposed to cover its introduc- 
tion, would render inadmissible on our part all idea of molest- 
ing it. Upwards of 60,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, it 
was said, were prepared to raise the blockade — and it was 
intimated that a fresh irruption into Portugal was at hand, and 
that a campaign as active as had yet been performed, and preg- 
nant with important results, might be expected. 

In confirmation of these reports, on the 24th of September a 
considerable body of the enemy showed themselves in the plain 
before Ciudad Rodrigo. They came by the Salamanca and 
Tomames roads, and were accompanied by a countless number of 
waggons, cars, and loaded mules. Their progress was slow, and 
cautious ; but towards evening the convoy began to enter the 
place, under cover of about fifteen squadrons of cavalry, which 
passed the Agueda, and a large column of infantry, which 
halted upon the plain. Still no symptoms were manifested of 
a design to cross the river in force, or to attempt anything further 
than the object which was thus attained; for the advanced 
cavalry withdrew at dusk, and all bivouacked near the town. In 
the morning, however, as soon as objects became discernible, one 



1811.] ATTACK ON PASTORES. 283 

corps of cavalry, amounting to at least five-and-twenty squadrons, 
supported by a whole division of infantry, appeared in motion 
along the great road, which, leading from Ciudad Rodrigo to 
Guinaldo, leaves El Boden on the left; whilst another, less 
numerous perhaps, but, like the former, strongly supported by 
infantry, marched direct upon Espeja. They both moved with 
admirable steadiness and great regularity ; and, as the sun hap- 
pened to be out, and the morning clear and beautiful, their 
appearance was warlike and imposing. 

As it was not for some time ascertained whether strong 
reconnaissances only, or the advance of the whole French army, 
were intended, and as Lord Wellington felt reluctance to abandon 
the heights of El Boden and Pastores, unless threatened by num- 
bers which it would have been useless to oppose, our troops 
neither shifted their ground, nor made disposition, by concentra- 
tion, to cover the threatened points. The enemy's columns, on 
the contrary, pushed on till the larger mass, which was moving 
towards Guinaldo, reached the base of some rising grounds, 
which were held by part of the third division. These troops 
instantly formed ; and, though they consisted of only one British 
brigade under Colville, a Portuguese regiment of infantry — 
the 9th — a few pieces of Portuguese artillery, and four squadrons 
of Al ten's cavalry, they arrested, for some time, the advance of 
the assailants. 

The enemy's column was permitted to approach almost to the 
base of the heights, before any disposition was made to impede 
its progress. The guns, indeed, opened upon the leading squa- 
drons when they came within range, and the fire was well 
directed. The infantry continued in close columns of battalions 
behind the ridge, and the cavalry stood in similar order, each 
man with the bridle of his horse slung across his arm. As soon, 
however, as it became distinctly manifest that an attack was in 
serious contemplation, our troops prepared to meet it with their 
accustomed gallantry and coolness. The infantry wheeled into 
line ; the cavalry mounted, and made ready ; whilst the artil- 
lery, redoubling their exertions, poured forth a shower of grape 
and case shot, which galled the enemy. The French extended 
their front and advanced as speedily as the nature of the ground 
would permit. 

u 









284 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxvii. 

The attack was begun by a column of cavalry, which charged 
up the heights in gallant style, cheering in the usual manner of 
the French, and making directly for the guns. The artillery-men 
stood their ground resolutely, giving their fire to the last ; but, 
there being nothing immediately at hand to support them, they 
were compelled to retire, and the guns fell, for a moment, into 
the hands of the assailants. But it was only for a moment ; for 
the 5th regiment was ordered instantly to recover them. They 
marched up in line, firing with great coolness ; and, when at the 
distance of only a few paces from their adversaries, brought their 
bayonets to the charging position, and rushed forward. This is, 
I believe, the first instance on record, of a charge with the bayonet 
being made upon cavalry by infantry in line, nor, perhaps, would 
it be prudent to introduce the practice, but never was charge 
more successful. Possessing the advantage of ground, and 
keeping in close and compact array, the 5th literally pushed 
their adversaries down the hill — retook the guns, and, limbering 
them to the horses which had followed their advance, removed 
them safely. Whilst this was going on in one part of the field, 
repeated and impetuous attacks were made in another upon the 
handful of cavalry, which, under Aiten's orders, manfully stood 
its ground. Columns of the enemy's squadrons pushed again and 
again upon the heights, at different points, and under different 
leaders ; but they were overthrown as regularly as they came on, 
by short charges from our resolute troopers, who drove them 
down the descent with great slaughter, and still greater confusion. 
It is worthy of remark that, on all such occasions, the assailants 
out- numbered the defenders by at least four tc one ; and that, em- 
boldened perhaps by their recent successes at the outposts, they 
came on with the reckless bravery which is exhibited by men 
accustomed to conquer. But nothing could exceed the steadi- 
ness of our cavalry ; and their excellence became only the more 
apparent, on account of the great odds to which they were 
opposed. There were present, in this very gallant rencontre, two 
of the 1st hussars of the King's German Legion, with a similar 
number of the 11th light dragoons. 

The action had continued in this state for some time, the 
enemy continually assaulting our front and left ; and we as con- 
tinually repulsing them, when Captain Dashwood, an active officer 



1811.] CAVALRY AND THE BAYONET. 285 

of the Adjutant- general's department, suddenly discovered a 
heavy column moving towards the rear of our right, round which 
it had penetrated unobserved. Not a minute was to be lost, for 
even a moment's indecision would have enabled the French to 
accomplish their object, of surrounding us. A retreat was 
accordingly ordered, and the heights were abandoned. The 
peculiarity of our situation compelled us to look rather to the 
celerity with which this manoeuvre could be executed, than to 
anything beside — and the retreat of the cavalry was, in conse- 
quence, more precipitate than orderly ; the infantry, which con- 
sisted of the 77th, 83rd, and 5th, covered it, and found fresh 
opportunities of exhibiting their steadiness and discipline.* 
They formed into squares in the plain in rear of the hussars, and 
when the French cavalry came on, in overwhelming numbers and 
at full speed, opened upon them a fire so destructive, that it com- 
pletely checked them. This was the last effort on either side. 
The enemy, overawed by the commanding attitude assumed by 
our infantry, drew back ; and our troops continued their march 
upon Fuente Guinaldo, where they arrived without further 
molestation. 

Whilst the right of the line was thus employed, the large 
masses of the enemy's cavalry and infantry bore likewise upon 
the left, and drove back the advanced posts from Carpio, They 
were opposed chiefly by the 14th and 16th dragoons, which 

* " But they had yet to learn of what stern stuff the British soldier is 
composed. In a moment, the 5th and 77th formed square, and in steady- 
silence awaited the coming onset. The charge was made — the cheering of 
the dragoons pealed over the battle-field as they came on at speed, aud with 
a fiery determination that nothing, apparently, could withstand. Against 
every face of the square, a hostile squadron galloped ; the earth shook, the 
cheers rose louder — another moment of that headlong speed must bring the 
dragoons upon the bayonets of the kneeling front rank. Then from the 
British square a shattering volley was poured in ; the smoke cleared away, 
and, but a few yards from the faces of the square, men and horses were 
rolling on the plain in death. The charge was repulsed, the ranks dis- 
ordered, and the French dragoons, recoiling from that fearless array they had 
vainly striven to penetrate, rode hastily off to re-form their broken ranks, and 
remove themselves from an excessive stream of musketry which had already 
proved so fatal." — Victories of the British Armies, 

u2 



286 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxvii. 

charged with great gallantry as often as opportunities offered ; 
but, as it was highly improbable that demonstrations made in force 
upon both flanks, would not sooner or later, end in a general 
action, Lord Wellington began early to make his dispositions for 
the event. For this purpose, the light division was commanded 
to cross the river, and hold the right of the line at Fuente 
Guinaldo ; the third and fourth divisions, with Pack's brigade, 
took ground flanked by the redoubts ; the seventh, which had 
hitherto been in reserve at Albergaria, closed up ; whilst the fifth 
remained on the right bank of the xlgueda, with a view to give 
additional security to that flank of the position. The cavalry 
were moved into the centre, and took post in front of the town. 
At the same time, the sixth division defiled from Gallegos and 
Espeja, towards its right; whilst General Graham, who com- 
manded the force on the left of Ituero, and was, w T ith the first 
division, at Nave d'Avel, received instructions, in case the right 
should be pressed, to march, at the shortest notice, to its support. 
Every movement was effected on the night of the 25th, without the 
slightest confusion. Only one circumstance worthy of notice oc- 
curred during the progress of operations — at Pastores, where the 
74th, and a battalion of the 60th regiment were posted. By some 
mistake the orders for the retreat of these regiments did not arrive 
till all support had been withdrawn, and the enemy were in their 
rear; upon which Colonel Trench, of the 74th, a very distinguished 
officer, with great judgment passed the Agueda, and made good 
his retreat by the right bank. He fell in, during his perilous 
journey, w T ith a party of French cavalry, most of whom he 
succeeded in making prisoners ; and, having re- crossed the river, 
overtook his division about midnight, with the two battalions 
unbroken and uninjured. 

The night of the 25th was spent as it is customary for soldiers 
to spend a night before they expect a battle ; officers lay down 
in their cloaks upon the floors of the houses — the men slept on 
their arms, round fires which blazed along the range of the 
position. 

Long before dawn, however, all were astir, and the different 
regiments looked anxiously for the moment which should behold 
the commencement of a game as desperate as any which they had 



1811.] MANOEUVRES OF MARMONT. 287 

yet been called upon to play. But, instead of indulging our 
troops as they expected, Marmont contented himself with making 
an exhibition of his force, and executing a variety of manoeuvres 
in our presence ; and it must be confessed that a spectacle more 
striking has rarely been seen. 

The large body of cavalry which followed us to our position, 
and had bivouacked during the night in the woods adjoining, were 
first brought up in compact array, as if waiting for the signal to 
push on. By and by, nine battalions of infantry, attended by a 
proportionate number of artillery, made their appearance, and 
formed into columns, lines, echelons, and squares. Towards 
noon, twelve battalions of the Imperial Guard came upon the 
ground in one solid mass ; and, as each soldier was decked out 
with feathers and shoulder-knots of a bloody hue, their appear- 
ance was most imposing. The solid column, however, soon 
deployed into columns of battalions — a movement which was 
executed with a quickness and accuracy that was admirable ; and 
then, after having performed several other evolutions with equal 
precision, the guards piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac. 
Next came another division of infantry, in rear of the guards, and 
then a fresh column of cavalry, till it was computed that the 
enemy had collected, on this single point, a force of not less than 
25,000 men. Nor did the muster cease to go on as long as day- 
light lasted. To the very latest moment we could observe men, 
horses, guns, carriages, tumbrils, and ammunition- waggons, 
flocking into the encampment, as if it were the design of the 
French general to bring his whole disposable force to bear against 
the position of Fuente Guinaldo. 

That position was held, the meanwhile, by three divisions only 
of the allied army, not one of which could bring 5,000 bayonets 
into the field. Our numerical inferiority was, therefore, fearful — 
and, as there was nothing in the nature of the ground to compen- 
sate for superiority in numbers, Lord Wellington determined to 
abandon his works, and retire. In accordance with this resolution, 
we began our retreat immediately after dark on the 26th ; the 
right wing taking the two roads which lead, one by Castelhas dos 
Flores and Furcalhos, the other by Albergaria and Aldea de Ponte, 
to Nave d' Avel, whilst the left fell back upon Bismula, and behind 



/ 



288 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxvii. 

the Villa Major river. The troops retired in such perfect order, 
that not only were there no stragglers, but not an article of bag- 
gage was left behind.* Our movements had, however, been watched 
by the enemy, for, on the morning of the 27th, they appeared in 
two columns, each consisting of twelve squadrons of cavalry, and 
a division of infantry, upon the two roads by which our right wing 
was retiring. These columns mutually supported each other ; 
and their great object appeared to be, not so much to overtake 
and force us to give battle, as to hurry us in our march. 

The enemy's force which marched by Furcalhos, was checked 
at that place by the infantry of the light division. They had 
fallen in, early in the day, with the cavalry, which, retiring before 
them, drew them to some broken ground, where the infantry was 
formed ; and a few discharges from the skirmishers served to 
convince them that here, at least, our line of march was not to be 
pressed. They therefore abstained from making the attempt ; 
but the corps which followed the Aldea de Ponte road, seemed 
animated by a more daring spirit, and pushed vigorously to obtain 
possession of a range of heights which led from that village to 
Nave d'Avel — and, had they succeeded, the communication between 
the right and left wings of our army would have been destroyed. 
But Lord Wellington no sooner observed their design than he 
took effectual measures to defeat it, by commanding the 3rd, 4th, 
and light divisions, with a considerable force of cavalry, to halt 
and concentrate upon the point threatened. The disposition was 
hardly effected, when our people were assailed by clouds of tirail- 
leurs, which, as usual, covered the front of the French columns, 
and a brisk skirmish ensued. It fell chiefly upon the 4th division, 
supported by Pack's Portuguese brigade and the cavalry. Indeed, 

* This masterly retreat of Lord Wellington excited greatly the admiration 
of the French. In the course of these critical operations, the Duke repeatedly, 
and, as was thought, perhaps, imprudently, exposed himself to the fire of the 
enemy ; once, indeed, only narrowly escaping being taken prisoner. 

When the French General, Marmont, learned the circumstances under 
which his formidable opponent had lain, for a day and a half, in his front, 
his astonishment and mortification were extreme. He, however, attributed 
Lord Wellington's good fortune to his star ; declaring, a little prophetically, 
that it was brilliant as Napoleon's. — Ed. 



1811.] RETREAT FROM GUINALDO. 289 

the brunt of it was borne by the fusileer brigade under Colonel 
Packenham ; but, though warm for the moment, it was not of 
long continuance. The enemy were driven, at once, from the high 
grounds which they had gained ; and fled, rather than retired, 
beyond iUdea de Ponte, pursued, with the impetuosity which 
English soldiers generally exhibit, considerably further than it had 
been intended to follow them. The consequence was, that our 
light troops were, in turn, driven back by the alarmed enemy's 
supporting column, which, alarmed by the firing, had crossed 
from the Furcalhos road. 

There were some heights, or rather acclivities, about Rendoa 
and Soito, which offered an extremely favourable position, the 
Coa covering both flanks, and a retiring angle of the river forming 
their point d'appui. Thither the army moved on the night of the 
2/th, and there it was proposed to fight a battle on the morrow, 
in case the French should covet one. With this view, the fifth 
division received orders to pass the Agueda at Navas Freas, and 
form the right of the line above Quadraseias. The fourth division 
drew up upon the left of the fifth ; the light, above Soito ; the 
third, in front of Pouca Tarenha : the first and sixth at Rendoa, 
where the ground was peculiarly strong ; the seventh, with the 
cavalry, forming a second line in the rear. There cannot be a 
doubt that we should have fought here with greater advantage 
than at Fuente Guinaldo ; because the natural defences would 
have favoured our troops, whilst the approaches for the enemy 
were difficult and exposed. Yet there were objections even to 
this position. There was no secure retreat. With a river like 
the Coa in our rear, it would have been absolutely necessary to 
repel at all points, the enemy's attacks, or perish ; for the line, 
once broken, could not be withdrawn. As it happened, however, 
the excellence of the position was not destined to be tried, for the 
enemy never approached it. Whether it was that Marmont's 
provisions failed him, or that he deemed it unwise to assail us 
upon ground so formidable, on the morning of the 28th, the 
strength of his columns had disappeared, and only a rear -guard of 
cavalry remained to keep possession of Aldea de Ponte. 

Notwithstanding the apparent retreat of the enemy's columns, 
Lord Wellington did not consider himself justified in abandoning 



290 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxvii. 

the line which he had taken up, till some more decisive proof 
should be afforded that immediate danger was at an end. 
About noon on the 28th, however, all doubts on the subject 
were removed by the return of Major Gordon ; who, so long 
ago as the 25th, had been sent to the French army as the 
bearer of a flag of truce, and whom Marmont had detained during 
the progress of his operations. Major Gordon was, as might be 
expected, well stored with interesting anecdotes relative to the 
situation and feelings of the French army. He had received 
marked attention from Marmont and others of the generals, with 
whom he lived on terms of familiarity, and who scrupled not to 
carry him along with them in their rides, and to give him the 
fullest insight into all their dispositions and arrangements. He 
spoke of the enemy's troops as being generally well appointed and 
equipped, especially the cavalry and imperial guards ; and he 
estimated their numbers at full 60,000, with 120 pieces of cannon. 
The French expressed themselves in terms of the highest respect 
touching the military talents of Lord Wellington, of which they 
considered his retreat from Fuente Guinaldo as furnishing a bril- 
liant specimen ; for they had anticipated an action at that place, 
and all their plans were laid to secure a decisive victory. The 
great bulk of their army, it appeared, was to have been directed 
against our right, partly forcing, and partly turning it ; and whilst 
the cavalry, of which they brought full 6,000 into the field, 
amused and occupied the centre, our left was also to have been 
assailed. They were, therefore, not a little disappointed, when 
the dawn of the 27th displayed our works and position aban- 
doned ; and, whilst they lamented the mischance which had thus 
wrested the laurel from their brows, they gave our chief full credit 
for the prudence which dictated his determination to fall back. 
Major Gordon further stated that the French, when they first 
passed the Agueda, entertained no other design than merely to 
reconnoitre our position, and retire again ; but that, irritated by 
their cavalry loss, they pushed on, and were afterwards tempted, 
from a contemplation of our extended alignment, to bring up, as 
they did on the 26th, the whole of their army. 

Now, however, the campaign was at an end. They were all 
in full march towards Spain, for the purpose of separating into 



L811.] END OF THE CAMPAIGN. 

corps, and retiring to different quarters ; that of General D'Or- 
senne into Galicia, where, after it should have received large 
reinforcements, and have passed under the command of Oudinot, 
it was to hecome the army of the north ; whilst that of Marmont, 
with its ancient title of the Army of Portugal, was to return to 
its original station about Plasencia. 

On the 29th of September, the allied army broke up from its 
position in front of Alfayates — and leaving the light and fourth 
divisions to observe Rodrigo. and discharge the duty of the out- 
posts, passed the Coa, and withdrew into cantonments. By this 
arrangement, a line was taken up, which extended from Pena- 
macor, on the right, to Celerico, on the left ; and head -quarters 
being established at Frenada, every disposition was made to pay 
attention to the sick, of which the numbers increased daily. 
When we first established ourselves in Fuente Guinaldo, there 
were, besides Portuguese, 13,000 British soldiers in hospital, — 
when we retired behind the Coa, that number had considerably 
increased ; and we had not inhabited our new quarters a week, 
before it swelled to the enormous amount of 16,000 men. The 
unhealthy season came on ; fevers and agues made rapid progress 
amongst us, till scarcely a regiment could muster upon parade 
two-thirds of its numerical strength, and the medical attendants 
almost sank beneath the fatigues of duty. To add to our dis- 
comfort, the billets were small and incommodious — the rain, 
which fell in torrents, penetrated the thin roofs of the cottages 
among which the troops were distributed — and even the larger 
mansions, or chateaux, of which the general and staff- officers 
were put in possession, ceased to resist a deluge so incessant. 
Then, our out-door occupations were destroyed. We could 
neither hunt nor shoot, nor follow the employments which, in 
dry weather, contributed to health and amusement. On the 
whole, the period of our sojourn among the villages on the left 
bank of the Coa, was one of the least interesting throughout the 
Peninsular war. 

In this dreary and monotonous interval, Lord Wellington 
ceased not for a moment to devise plans for the future. Before 
the weather broke, serious thoughts were entertained of making 
an attempt, by escalade, upon Ciudad Rodrigo ; but the rising of 



292 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxvn. 

the waters caused it to be abandoned. Next, a scheme was 
devised for the commencement and prosecution of a siege, so 
soon as the aspect of affairs in La Mancha and Galicia might 
authorise the measure ; and working parties were in consequence 
employed at Almeida, with the view of converting it into a place 
d'armes against the projected undertaking. Without absolutely 
investing it, flying parties passed continually round Rodrigo, to 
interrupt the communications between the garrison and the army 
in its rear ; and these performed, on several occasions, services of 
considerable importance. 

Don Julian de Sanchez was one of the most enterprising of 
the guerilla chiefs. He commanded a small body of irregular 
horse, with which he repeatedly executed exploits such as few 
men besides himself would have attempted, until his name became 
as famous in the rude songs of his countrymen, as it was dreaded 
by the invaders of his country. Don Julian had thrown himself 
into Ciudad Rodrigo when Massena besieged it ; and contributed 
not a little, both by example and personal exertions, to the gallant 
defence which it offered ; and when at last a surrender became 
indispensable, he cut his way through the enemy's lines and 
escaped. Since that period, he had harassed and destroyed 
numerous convoys in Asturias, Galicia, and the northern pro- 
vinces ; and now, having attached himself to our army, he 
rendered himself exceedingly useful, by taking an active part in 
the patrolling of Ciudad Rodrigo. 

It was the custom of the French garrison to send out their 
cattle, every morning, beyond the walls to graze, under the protec- 
tion of a guard, which at once tended them, and watched the 
movements of our parties. Don Julian determined to surprise 
the herd and keepers, and for this purpose concealed his people, 
day after day, among the broken ground on the bank of the 
river, in the immediate vicinity of the town ; but the guard 
proved, for a time, so vigilant, that no opportunity occurred of 
effecting his design. At last however^ an accident occurred, 
which enabled him to accomplish, not only his original purpose, 
but one which he did not dream of attaining. 

It happened on the 15th of October, that General Regnaud, 
the governor of the place, rode out attended by his staff and a 



1811.] CAPTURE OF REGNAUD. 293 

slender escort, and ventured, incautiously, to pass the Agueda, at 
the very spot where Don Julian's ambuscade lay concealed. He 
was instantly surrounded by the Spanish cavalry, and made 
prisoner ; and, as if fortune had determined to reward the latter 
for their patience, the cattle appeared, at the same moment, at a 
sufficient distance from the walls to authorize an attack. It was 
made with the most perfect success, and both Governor and 
cattle were conveyed in triumph to our head -quarters. In a 
native of any country except France, such an unlucky coincidence 
would have produced a degree of gloom not to be shaken off; 
but by General Regnaud, his misfortunes were borne with the 
utmost philosophy and good- humour. He became a frequent 
guest at Lord Wellington's table, and we found him an ex- 
tremely entertaining as well as intelligent companion. He talked 
freely of the designs of his own superiors, and laid open to us 
much of the internal economy of the French armies, among the 
leaders of which — it appeared from his statements, no cor- 
diality prevailed ; and his reasonings on the general aspect of the 
war, though not always sound, were invariably specious and 



PART III. 






1811.] ENTERPRISE OF HILL. 29i 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

Increasing jealousies among the Spaniards — Disasters in the south — Prepara- 
tions to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo — The French armies suddenly withdraw 
towards the south and east of Spain — Lord Wellington moves to the front, 
and invests Rodrigo— Progress of the siege — Storming and capture of the 
lace. 

Whilst we were thus situated on the Coa, affairs assumed, in 
other quarters of the Peninsula, an appearance that was not 
encouraging. At Cadiz, discord prevailed among the inhabitants 
-and the government; whilst the Spanish troops, instead of 
improving in discipline, became more and more inefficient every 
day. All classes, too, manifested towards their allies a degree of 
jealousy, for which no cause could be assigned ; they suspected 
every proposal, and threw impediments in the way of every 
design, provided it originated with an English officer, or was 
to be carried into execution by English soldiers. 

We were thus situated, when the report of a brilliant enter- 
prise, conducted by General Hill, in Spanish Estremadura, came 
in to enliven us. When Marmont withdrew to his cantonments 
around Plasencia, he left at Merida, under General Girard, 
a, corps which subsequently returned to the vicinity of Zafra, 
where it took post. Girard remained here quietly for some time ; 
but, being ordered to levy contributions on the inhabitants of 
Caceres, he moved, about the middle of October, towards that 
place ; thus endangering the depot of Castano's corps, which had 
there head- quarters. To counteract this movement, General 
Hill was directed to take the field. He advanced from Portalegre 
on the 22nd, and, causing the enemy to evacuate Aleseda, of 
which they had recently possessed themselves, pursued them as 
far as Alcuerca, where he contrived, in a masterly and scientific 
manner, to surprise and disperse them. 

Passing the night of the 21st at Malpartida, where he 
obtained information of the enemy's incaution that induced him 
to entertain a hope that he might be overtaken, and brought 
to action — he put his columns in march at an early hour on the 

x 



296 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxviii. 

morning of the 27th, and, following by-paths, arrived that evening, 
unobserved by Girard, at Alcuerca. He was now within one 
short league of Arroyo del Molinos, the village where Girard's 
corps was to pass the night, and the enemy remained in utter 
ignorance of his proximity, till they found themselves attacked on 
the morning of the 28th, just as they were preparing to commence 
their march.* Taken by surprise, they offered, as might be 
expected, no resolute resistance ; and Hill's success was so 
complete that, out of 2,500 infantry, and 600 cavalry, of which the 
French corps originally consisted, scarcely 500 escaped. General 
Girard himself was wounded, and his artillery taken. General 
Hill received, as he deserved, the highest encomiums for the 
ability with which his enterprise was conducted ; and the exploit 
continued for some time to furnish the chief topic of conversation 
at head-quarters. 

The year 1812 opened — Almeida was again restored — and prepa- 
rations were busily made for throwing across the Agueda a bridge 
on tressels, sufficient to resist the influence of the stream. 
Stores and ammunition, with a considerable train of heavy 
artillery, were moved towards the front; and the divisions 
stationed there, were employed in the construction of gabions 
and fascines. Everything indicated that Ciudad Rodrigo would 
be regularly besieged ; and the first opportunity which offered for 
the purpose was not permitted to pass. 

During the last three months, the enemy's troops in the north 
and centre of Spain had remained tolerably quiet, there being no 
force, with the exception of General Abadia's corps, to occupy 
their attention ; whilst in the south, hostilities were carried on 
with vigour. Master of Tarragona, and victorious over every- 

* The French were, at first, inclined to doubt that a hostile force could be 
upon them ; but, above the howling of a storm which was raging, they heard 
the rush of infantry, and, in a moment, the cheering of the 71st and 92nd 
regiments, and, the very a-propos inquiry, " Hey Johnny Cope, are ye wakin' 
yet," played upon the Highland bagpipes. Girard and his dragoons now 
galloped off, offering what irregular resistance they could, while the infantry, 
forming square, endeavoured to cover their retreat. It was too late, however ; 
they were surrounded ; there was no escape, and, while the fire from the 
English guns opened on the squares, the dragoons dispersed the cavalry, and 
the 13th, dashing forward, captured the artillery. — Ed. 




«*■* 










1812.] STATE OF AFFAIRS. 297 

thing in the field, Suchet sat down before Valencia, whilst Victor 
drove back Ballasteros under the walls of Gibraltar, and directed 
a considerable division of his corps against Tariffa, In the mean- 
while, Drouet, at the head of 12,000 men, ensured the submis- 
sion of Spanish Estremadura ; and Soult, whose head-quarters 
were understood to be at Seville, kept that kingdom in subjection. 

The fortress of Murviedro, which Suchet found it necessary to 
subdue, as a preparatory step to the reduction of Valencia, how- 
ever, cost him dear. Tariffa, too, being occupied by 1,000 
English soldiers under Colonel Skerret, withstood and repelled all 
the efforts of the enemy to carry it — whilst bands of guerillas 
infested the rear of the French armies, and seriously retarded 
their progress. It became necessary, under these circumstances, 
to reinforce their strength from other provinces. The whole of 
the disposable regiments in the vicinity of Madrid were, in con- 
sequence, moved to Toledo; and, towards the end of the year, 
Marmont himself broke up from Plascencia and Talavera, and fell 
into the same line. D'Orsenne, with the army of the centre, 
took the road to Burgos ; and we were thus left without any- 
thing in our front, as well as upon the side of Biera, as in the 
direction of the Alentejo. 

Lord Wellington was no sooner made acquainted with these 
movements, than he directed General Hill to advance upon 
Merida, with the view of alarming Drouet, to draw off part of the 
enemy's force from Ballasteros, invest Ciudad Rodrigo in form, 
and wrest it, if possible, out of the hands of a garrison left now 
to its own resources. 

The attempt on Rodrigo was most hazardous., and nothing 
could be more difficult than its investment. It stood upon the 
brink of a rapid river, surrounded by a plain destitute of positions, 
water, or cover for the troops. It would therefore be necessary, 
after driving the garrison within their lines, to carry on the siege 
by relays of divisions ; or in other words, to keep the main body in 
cantonments on the left bank of the Agueda, whilst a sufficient 
force should carry on the works upon the right bank, whilst 
the rest relieved them in turn of duty. Now, though the 
Agueda is fordable during dry weather, it requires but a few 
hours of heavy rain to render the fords impassable ; whilst the 

x2 



298 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxvnr. 

rain, should it last but a few days, would inevitably sweep away the 
only bridge which we had found practicable to lay down. In the 
next place, the means at our disposal, whether of transport or 
attack, fell infinitely short of the lowest calculation formed by 
the engineers. Instead of 1,400 cars — the amount demanded — 
we could muster no more than 450 ; and our whole materiel 
consisted of 38 twenty-four pounders, and 12 howitzers. We 
possessed not a single mortar, and our stock of powder and 
shells was scanty. There was, moreover, every reason to appre- 
hend that, as soon as the enemy should be made aware of our 
design, they would hasten to defeat it. Yet it was absolutely- 
necessary that something should be done, to satisfy our allies- 
that we were not indifferent to their calamities ; and, as the only 
choice lay between the siege of Rodrigo and an advance intc* 
the interior of Spain, Lord Wellington determined on the former. 
Accordingly, on the 5th of January, the divisions in the rear 
closed up — on the 6th and 7th, the army assembled — and on the 
8th, we crossed the Agueda in force, and completed the invest- 
ment. 

Ciudad Rodrigo is built on a rising ground, on the right 
bank of the Agueda ; it has a double enceinte all round it %. 
the interior wall is of an old construction, of the height of 
thirty-two feet, and is generally of bad masonry, without flanks,, 
and with weak parapets and narrow ramparts ; the exterior 
enclosure is a modern fausse-braie, of a low profile, and is con- 
structed so far down the slope of the hill, as to afford but little 
cover to the interior wall ; and, from the same cause of the 
rapid descent of |he hill, the fausse-braie itself is very imper- 
fectly covered by its glacis. On the east and south sides, there 
are ravelines to the fausse-braie ; but in no part is there a 
covered way, nor are there any counter- mines. Without the 
town, at the distance of three hundred yards, are the suburbs \ 
they are enclosed by a bad earthen retrenchment, hastily thrown 
up by the Spaniards during the investment of the place in 
1810;" and the French, since they had been in possession of 
Rodrigo, had made strong posts of three convents — one on 
either flank of the suburbs, and one in the centre ; and they 
had also converted into an infantry post the convent of Santa 



1812.] INVESTMENT OF RODRIGO. 299 

Cruz, situated just beyond the glacis on the north-west angle 
of the place. The works of the suburbs, therefore, though, 
contemptible in themselves, yet, as supported by these con- 
vents, were considered as fully competent to resist a coup- de- 
main. 

The ground without the place is generally flat, and the surface 
rocky, except on the north side, where there are two hills, called 
the lesser and the greater Teson ; the one, at 1 80 yards from the 
works, rises nearly to the level of the ramparts, and the other, at 
6.00 yards distance, to the height of 13 feet above them. The 
soil on these hills is very stony, and, during winter, water 
(usually) rises at the depth of six inches below the surface ; the 
French had erected a small redoubt on the highest hill, which, 
from its situation, prevented any attack on that side till it should 
be taken : this redoubt was supported by two guns, and a 
howitzer in battery, on the top of the fortified convent of St. 
Francisco, at 400 yards from it, and a large proportion of the 
artillery of the place, (particularly mortars and howitzers, placed 
behind the rampart of the fausse-braie), was in battery to fire 
upon the approach from the hill.* 

There were two points at which the place might be assailed ; 
one, on the eastern and southern sides, where the ground was 
flat, but the suburbs extensive ; the other on the north, where the 
hill and redoubt protected it from insult. Lord Wellington 
seemed at first disposed to make his approaches from the former 
of these quarters ; but, on mature deliberation, it was found that 
a superior fire from the northern face would not present obstacles 
so serious as those which the rocky nature of the soil, and the 
resistance to be expected from the fortified convents, would offer 
on the other. It was known, too, from the system of attack 
adopted by Massena, that the walls on the northern front might 
be breached at a distance ; whereas, on the southern and eastern 
fronts, it appeared doubtful, from the natural fall of the ground, 
whether any impression could be made, except from batteries 
erected on the crest of the glacis ; and, as the saving of time was 
a matter of the first consideration, that which promised mcst 
speedily to lay open the body of the place was pronounced to be 

* Jones's Journal of the Sieges. 



300 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxviii. 

the best. Accordingly, Lord Wellington, having closely recon- 
noitred the city in all its faces, determined to act upon the 
second. 

With this view, he resolved that ground should be broken on 
the night of the day in which the investment was effected ; and 
as it was essential to obtain possession of the redoubt which 
crowned the greater Teson, orders were issued that it should be 
attacked by a party of the light division, and carried by escalade. 
No ladders had been issued, or were prepared, and the men set 
to work to construct them from sides of a few Spanish cars 
which had conveyed the intrenching tools from Almeida. These 
were torn to pieces — and, long before the appointed hour, a suf- 
ficient quantity for the contemplated service was completed. 

Three hundred men of the 52nd and 96th regiments, under 
the command of Lieutenant- Colonel Colbourne, were ordered to 
assault the outwork. They were to be supported by two firing- 
parties, which received instructions to keep up a warm discharge 
of musketry upon the opposite flanks, for the purpose of dis- 
tracting the attention of the garrison ; whilst the storming-party, 
descending into the ditch, should cut away the palisades and 
escalade the redoubt. Everything was effected with admirable 
order and daring courage. At nine o'clock at night, the detach- 
ments moved to the posts assigned them, and, finding that the 
palisades were close to the outward side of the ditch, sprang over 
them, without pausing to break them down. They then rushed 
pell-mell into the redoubt, and, taking the enemy completely by 
surprise, made themselves masters of it, and the entire garrison 
which had been appointed to defend it. Two officers, forty men, 
and three pieces of cannon were the fruits of their success ; which 
was purchased by the loss of only six men killed, with three 
officers and sixteen men wounded. 

The way being thus cleared to ulterior operations, 700 men 
immediately advanced towards the hill, 300 of whom were to 
effect a lodgment close to the redoubt, whilst 400 should open 
the communications from the rear. They succeeded in both objects, 
with wonderfully little loss ; for the enemy, irritated by the fall of 
the outwork, directed all their fire upon it, and our people were 
thus enabled to pursue their tasks almost unmolested. When 
morning dawned, therefore, the cover was found to be such, that 



1812.] CAPTURE OF A REDOUBT. 301 

reliefs might, with perfect safety, be employed to complete by 
day what had been so well begun at night ; and hence, within 
little more than twenty-four hours from the investment of the 
place, our engineers found themselves in a situation to mark out 
> the first parallel. 

This was begun, and so far brought to perfection, between 
sunset on the 9th and sunrise on the 10th, as to afford excellent 
shelter to the workmen. Indeed, so unremitting were the zeal of 
the superintendents and activity of the troops, that, before noon 
on the 13th, not only was the first parallel completed, but three 
batteries, capable of mounting thirty-two pieces of artillery, were 
erected. The guns were brought up, the platforms laid, and an 
ample supply of ammunition lodged in the magazines ; and the 
opening of the batteries was an occurrence which might be hourly 
expected. 

We were thus situated, when intelligence arrived at head- 
quarters, which, without alarming either Lord Wellington or his 
followers, increased the anxiety of all to bring the under- 
taking speedily to an end. Marmont, after proceeding in the 
direction of Valencia as far as Ocana, had suddenly announced 
that his presence was not required in the east — and, returning 
with four divisions, had taken the route of the Guadarama pass 
towards Valladolid and Salamanca. His object was believed to be 
to throw supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo, of our operations against 
which, however, both he and D'Orsenne were still believed to be 
in ignorance. Stranger still, it was said that even at Salamanca, a 
distance of only sixteen leagues from our trenches, not a rumour 
of the siege had, up to the 12th, transpired. 

All this was wonderfully favourable, but still it was the opinion 
of Lord Wellington, that sufficient time would not be granted for 
a regular and scientific prosecution of the siege. He therefore 
directed that the batteries in the first parallel should be armed, 
and that they should open at once upon the body of the place, 
without pausing to silence the enemy's fire, or ruin his defences.* 



* " Intelligence, in the mean time, had been received, that induced Lord 
Wellington to alter his system of attack. Marmont was collecting his 
detached divisions, and his avowed object being the relief of the place 
Wellington determined to prevent it, by storming Rodrigo, without waiting 



302 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxviii. 

By this means he hoped to effect a breach in the course of a few 
days ; when he would either storm with the counterscarp entire, 
or approach by the more secure but tedious process of sap, 
according as Marmont should, or should not, show a disposition 
to molest him. The thing most dreaded was a junction between 
Marmont and D'Orsenne, as their force would outnumber us in 
the same proportion in which it had outnumbered us before — and 
then we must either abandon our works, or separate our army 
into a covering and besieging corps. For the enemy to effect 
this junction, however, a larger space of time would probably be 
required than would be necessary on our part to accomplish the 
reduction of the place ; and hence, we felt no apprehension that 
our labours would be interrupted by the united armies of Portugal 
and the centre. Still a very considerable force, perhaps 40,000 
men, could be brought against us so early as the 27th or 28th ; 
and even 40,000 men would occasion no trifling inconvenience to 
troops entangled, as we were, round a strong place, and destitute 
of any favourable position from which to act against them. 

Lord Wellington at once urged the siege on, and took every 
precaution to secure those employed in it from interruption. 
Some of the divisions which had occupied cantonments con- 
siderably in the rear, were moved up, and placed in quarters — 
the fifth at Abergaria, at Janca, and on the Coa — and the seventh 
at Payo. The cavalry, consisting of the brigades of Generals 
Slade and Anson, of the 1st hussars, of Alten's, of the 3rd 
dragoons and 4th dragoon guards under Le Marchand, with 
four troops of horse artillery, were at Ituero ; and General Brad- 
ford's brigade of Portuguese infantry, at Barba del Puerco. 
General Hill, likewise, received instructions to throw a couple of 
brigades across the Tagus at Villa Velha, for the purpose of 
giving additional support to our right ; whilst he himself, in case 
of need, should fall back upon Portalegre and Niza. Thus it was 
calculated that an army of 38,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry 
could, within a few hours, be assembled at any point ; and, that 



to blow in the counterscarp ; in other words, to overstep the rules of science, 
and sacrifice life rather than time ; for such was the capricious nature of 
the Agueda, that in one night, a flood might enable a small French force to 
relieve the lace.' — Napier. 



1812.] SURPRISE OF A GARRISON. 303 

effected, there was little ground for apprehension, let Marmont 
take the field when he might. 

In the meanwhile, our works before the town were proceeding* 
vigorously. There was a fortified convent on the right of the 
redoubt, which commanded the ground upon which it was pro- 
posed to form a second parallel. Its reduction was, of course, 
necessary — and the service was performed on the night of the 
13th, in the handsomest manner, by the light companies of 
guards, supported by Lord Blantyre's brigade. Never was sur- 
prise more complete. Our men approached the post unobserved, 
and, making their way within the barricade, found the garrison of 
fifty men collected around a large fire, and sound asleep. The 
enemy, aroused thus awkwardly from their slumbers, fled in all 
directions, without making the faintest effort to defend themselves \. 
and, as they left arms, knapsacks, and everything behind, they 
leaped easily from the windows, and effected their escape — but. 
the convent remained in our possession, and it proved of the 
utmost utility in covering the progress of the sap, which wa& 
immediately begun, and carried on to the line of the projected 
parallel. 

The enemy had hitherto confined their resistance to a heavy 
cannonade from the walls; but on the 14th, they tried the 
fortune of a sortie, and, for a time, their success was such as to 
threaten serious consequences. An exceedingly culpable custom 
prevailed among the troops stationed to defend the trenches, by 
which the old guard, as soon as the relief came in sight, began to 
move off; thus leaving the advanced line, for a brief space r 
undefended from any effort which the garrison might make to 
take possession of it. From the tops of the towers, on which 
officers were constantly stationed, this negligence on our part 
was observed ; and the Governor, having ascertained that it was a 
matter of daily occurrence, resolved to take advantage of it. At 
eleven o'clock, therefore, in the forenoon of the 14th, about five 
companies sallied from the town, just as one of our guards had 
quitted the trenches and the other was as yet some distance 
from them ; and they pushed on with so much haste, that they 
arrived at the very wall of the convent before they could be 
stopped. The workmen, unarmed and surprised, could only 
retire ; but, an alarm being given, Lord Blantyre's brigade, with a 



304 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxviii. 

detachment of the Germans, hastened to the spot, and threw them- 
selves between the point of attack and the French troops. The 
latter were instantly driven back — and they fled within the town, 
having effected no object besides upsetting a number of the 
gabions. 

On this morning, twenty-five twenty-four pounders were placed 
in battery — and their fire was directed partly to breach and partly 
upon the convent of San Francisco. At four o'clock in the after- 
noon, it began ; and a spectacle more strikingly magnificent, has 
rarely been witnessed by a British soldier. The evening was 
remarkably beautiful and still ; there was not a cloud in the sky, 
nor a breath of wind astir, when suddenly the roar of artillery 
broke in upon its calmness, and volumes of smoke rose slowly 
from our batteries. These, floating gently towards the town, soon 
enveloped the lower part of the hill, and even the ramparts and 
bastions, in a dense veil ; whilst the towers and summits, lifting 
their heads over the haze, showed like fairy buildings, or those 
unsubstantial castles which are sometimes seen in the clouds on a 
summer's day. The flashes from our guns, answered as they 
were, promptly, from the artillery in the place — the roar of their 
thunder reverberating among the remote mountains of the Sierra 
de Francisca — these, with the rattle of the balls against the 
masonry, and the occasional crash, as portions of the wall gave 
way, proved, altogether, a scene which, to be rightly understood, 
must be experienced. 

The point against which our efforts were directed, was that 
which the French, during the siege of 1810, had breached, and 
which, according to the opinion of our engineers, had not yet 
obtained that solidity which time bestows on masonry. It was, 
however, so well covered by the fausse-braie, that doubts were 
entertained, whether it would be practicable to reach it with 
effect till after the latter should have been blown in ; whilst the 
distance at which our batteries were erected, fully 650 yards from 
the crest of the glacis, rendered the practice less accurate and less 
destructive. Both these circumstances told against us ; but our 
guns, of English manufacture, were excellent of their kind, and 
our gunners skilful ; and it was easy to perceive that the top of 
the rampart crumbled rapidly away, and that it required only 
a better position to allow of our object being attained, Prepa- 



1812.] FRENCH GALLANTRY. 305 

tions were accordingly made to advance our works — and a sap, 
destined to crown the summit of the lesser Teson, was begun. 

The guns, which were directed exclusively upon the convent of 
St. Francisco, after some hours of heavy firing, reduced it to a 
heap of ruins; and it, as well as the suburbs, were taken 
possession of, by the 40th regiment, soon after dusk on the 14th. 
Parties were then employed in extending the second parallel, and 
throwing up fresh batteries ; and on the 1 7th, our trenches were 
advanced to the summit of the nearest hill, within 180 yards 
of the body of the place. From the new batteries, so command- 
ing a fire was brought to bear, both upon the main breach and 
upon an old tower, to the right of it, that the latter at length fell 
with a tremendous crash, and the former was pronounced prac- 
ticable. Pits were next dug, here and there, along the glacis, 
into which riflemen were introduced, with orders to fire uninter- 
mittingly upon the embrasures ; whilst a continual shower of 
grape and canister, thrown in both by night and day, cleared the 
faces of the breaches, and hindered any attempt at repairing them. 

Such was the condition of Ciudad Rodrigo — the fausse-braie 
shaken to atoms, and two formidable breaches in its main walls ; 
when Lord Wellington, willing to spare the lives of his own 
troops, and of the garrison, sent in to demand a surrender. The 
reply, though not such as could have been desired, was never- 
theless one which all brave men must admire ; and the words of 
the Governor were these : — " Sa Majeste l'Empereur, m'a confie 
le commandement de Ciudad Rodrigo. Je ne puis pas le 
rendre. Au contraire, moi et la brave garnison que je com- 
mande s'enseveliront dans ses mines." 

Nothing remained but to carry the place by assault. On the 
18th the town was closely reconnoitred by Major Sturgeon, of 
the staff corps, whose exertions and ability, from the commence- 
ment of the siege, had been conspicuous. He reported that on 
the left of the main breach there was a favourable point of entrance 
for a body of troops, which might assist in flanking the approach 
of the column of attack in that quarter — whilst the lesser breach 
on the right was perfectly accessible. Lord Wellington, satisfied 
by the declaration, determined to defer the attack no longer- — 
and the night of the 19th was accordingly fixed upon for the 
assault. 



306 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxviii. 

Orders were issued that the attack should be made by such 
divisions as should happen to be on duty that day in the 
trenches ; and, as the light and third divisions enjoyed that good 
fortune, upon them devolved the honourable task of carrying 
Oiudad Rodrigo by assault. 

The third division, consisting of the brigades of M'Kinnon 
and Campbell — that is to say, of the 45th, 74th, 88th, and five 
companies of the 60th regiments, comprising the former — and of 
the 5th, 77th, 83rd, and 94th, forming the latter — were to carry 
the main breach. They were to be preceded by their light com- 
panies, under Major Manners, as a storming party ; and these, 
again, were to be headed by parties carrying wool-packs and 
ladders ; the former for the purpose of filling up the ditch, and 
the latter to enable the assailants to mount the wall. They were 
to form, General M'Kinnon's leading and Colonel Campbell's 
supporting, in the second parallel ; and they had in reserve a 
Portuguese brigade, drawn up in order in the trenches. To aid 
this principal attack, a demonstration was to be made on the 
right by Major O'Toole, of the 95th rifle corps, at the head of five 
companies of that regiment, with the light companies of the 83rd 
and 94th ; and the particular care of guiding of this little column was 
assigned to Major Sturgeon, at whose suggestion it prepared to 
act. In the meanwhile, the smaller breach on the left was to be 
stormed by the light division, consisting of Vandeleur's and 
Barnard's brigades — in other words, of two battalions of the 
52nd, one of the 43rd, two of the 95th, and two of Cacadores. 
The attack was to be led by Vandeleur's brigade, which, issuing 
from the left of the convent St. Francisco, was to descend into 
the ditch, and advance, first upon the breach in the fausse-braie, 
and then upon that in the body of the place. As soon as they 
should succeed in gaining the summit of the fausse-braie, they 
were to extend to their right, for the purpose of communicating 
with M'Kinnon's brigade, and flanking the assault of the principal 
wall ; and whenever they had crowned the breach, against which 
they were directed, they were in like manner to turn to the 
right, and join the main attack. This done, and a communica- 
tion between the two columns being established, an effort was to 
be made to burst open the Salamanca gate, opposite the convent 
of St. Francisco ; whereupon, the rest of the division, who up 



1812.] PREPARATIONS FOR STORMING. 307 

to that moment were to remain in reserve, were to enter and 
secure the place. Here, as at the greater breach, a select party 
of men were appointed to head their comrades ; they consisted of 
300 volunteers, under the command of Major Napier ; and they, 
like the storming-party elsewhere, were preceded by the bearers 
of bags, ladders, and other engines for assault. 

Partly with a view to draw the enemy's attention from the 
breaches, and partly in hope that, during the confusion, an 
entrance might be obtained by escalade, Pack's Portuguese brigade 
received instructions to demonstrate, as soon as the firing 
should become general, against the outwork of St. Jago, and 
the convent of La Caridad. They were to plant their ladders at 
the moment when their comrades issued from the trenches ; and 
were to render the attack real or false, according as circumstances 
should direct. The last clause in these instructions was 
not, perhaps, the least interesting to those affected by it ; being 
this : — " Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by assault this evening 
at seven o'clock. "* 

As the preceding orders appeared at an early hour in the day, 
ample time was afforded for making every preparation which cir- 
cumstances required, and both men and officers were fully and 

* " Courage, like other qualities, has its varieties. Some men are born 
brave ; others acquire intrepidity from example ; and even a timid spirit may- 
be stimulated by action, until personal apprehension is overcome. Amid the 
crash of battle, the dullest soul catches a glorious impulse, and, for the time, 
casts off its natural torpidity. To exert, however, that mental calmness, 
which conveys, in brief and lucid language, the details of plans of action, 
requiring the agency of many, and whose success the misconception of an 
individual might destroy — this demands a philosophic concentration of 
thought, which many, found foremost in the press of fight, never can obtain. 
This, the most important quality of a great general, Napoleon and Wellington 
possessed extensively ; and when the fate of battle hung upon a hair, both 
were calm and self-collected, and the order upon which victory or defeat 
depended, was issued with a coolness that approached insensibility. The 
terrible attack at Essling was simply indicated by a gesture ; and when 
tidings were brought, upon that bloody evening, which might have palsied 
the firmest nerves, not a feature of Napoleon was seen to alter. Sitting on 
the embankment of a field-work, undisturbed by the roar of his own artillery 
or a responding thunder from the batteries of the fortress, Lord Wellington 
penned the plan of the assault ; and when that writing went forth, the doom 
of Ciudad Rodrigo was sealed !" — Life of Wellington, 



308 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxviii. 

correctly apprized of the duties which they were expected to 
perform. True to the very moment, each column took its 
station, in readiness to obey the signal of advance. It would be 
no easy matter to describe the state of a soldier's feelings during 
a pause such as ensued. The evening was calm and tranquil, 
and the moon, in her first quarter, shed over the scene a feeble 
light, which, without disclosing the shape or form of particular 
objects, rendered their rude outline distinctly visible. There 
stood the fortress, a confused mass of masonry, with its breaches 
like shadows cast upon the wall ; whilst not a gun was fired from 
it, and all within was still and motionless as if it were already a 
ruin, or its inhabitants buried in sleep. On our side, again, 
the trenches, crowded with armed men, among whom not 
so much as a whisper might be heard, presented no unapt 
resemblance to a dark thunder- cloud, or a volcano in that state 
of tremendous quiet which precedes its most violent eruption. 
But the delay was of short continuance : and at a few minutes 
past seven o'clock, the word was passed that all were ready* — and 
the troops poured forward with the coolness and impetuosity of 
which British soldiers alone are capable, and which nothing can 
successfully oppose. 

No piece of clock-work, however nicely arranged, could obey 
the will of its maker more accurately than the different columns 
that night obeyed the wishes of their chief ; and his orders were 
executed at every point with the same precision and regularity as 
if he had been manoeuvring so many battalions upon a revue 
plateau. M'Kinnon's brigade, amidst showers of grape and 
musketry, rushed, without a check, to the foot of the great 
breach, and, in spite of numerous obstacles, and the most deter- 
mined resistance, topped the summit. 

* " Darkness came on ; and with it came the order to " stand to arms !" 
With calm determination, the soldiers of the third division heard their com- 
manding officer announce the main breach as the object of attack, and every 
man prepared himself promptly for the desperate struggle. Off went the 
packs ; the stocks were unbuckled, the cartouch-box arranged to meet the 
hand more readily ; flints were screwed home ; every one, after his individual 
fancy, fitting himself for action. The companies were carefully told off ; the 
sergeants called the rolls, and not a man was missing." — Victories of the 
British Armies, 



1812.] DEATH OF CRAUFURD. 309 

But a serious opposition awaited them. The enemy, driven 
from the main wall, took shelter behind a retrenchment, in front 
of which they had dug a ditch of considerable width ; and whilst 
our men were vainly endeavouring to pass it, a mine was sprung. 
The havoc occasioned by that terrible explosion was prodigious, 
and numbers of the bravest and most forward were blown up. 
Unfortunately for the army at large, the gallant M'Kinnon was 
among them ;* but the rest, nothing daunted by the fate of their 
comrades, only redoubled their exertions, with a courage which 
seemed to rise in proportion to the difficulties opposed to it.f 
They were thus situated, when Major O'Toole's little column, 
which had acted under the guidance of Major Sturgeon, upon the 
right, joined them ; when, finding that all their efforts were fruit- 
less, and that it was impracticable to press further till the results 
of other attacks should be known, they established themselves 
among the ruins. 

In the meanwhile, both the light division under Craufurd, and 
the Portuguese brigade under Pack, were carrying out their 
instructions. The former, issuing from the convent, made for the 
lesser breach, their brave chief leading, as few like himself could 
have led, when a musket- ball struck him in the arm, and, 
penetrating the side, lodged in his lungs. He fell — and was 
borne dying from the field. Almost at the same moment, Major 
Napier, commanding the storming-party, Colonel Colbourne of 
the 52nd, and General Vandeleur, all most distinguished and 
brave officers, received severe wounds, and the troops were left 
to the guidance of accidental leaders, and their own bravery ; but 
neither the one nor the other were wanting. The pause of a 
moment, and only of a moment, occurred, when, with a shout 
w T hich was distinctly heard over the roar of musketry and cannon, 



* McKinnon was borne by the officers of the Coldstream guards to Espeja, 
and there interred. — Ed. 

f At this moment, the brave Mackie, who led the forlorn hope, dropped 
from the rampart into the town, and found that the trench upon the right of 
the breach had been cut quite across, and that thus an opening had been left 
by which assailants might enter. Regaining the rampart, he led his men 
through this opening into the town ; and the enemy, immediately on ir 
appearance, fled, and took refuge in the citadel. — Ed. 

Y 



310 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxvur. 

they renewed the charge, and in five minutes had won the ascent. 
Then arose the cry of victory from every quarter ; for General 
Pack's Portuguese had succeeded in their escalade, and the 
troops, rushing along the ramparts speedily opened the way to 
the third division, and the town was our own. 

The enemy fled in the utmost disorder. They were pursued 
from street to street, and from house to house, with the fury 
which is irrepressible among men flushed with conquest, and 
exasperated by the memory of comrades slain ; and all who con- 
tinued to offer the slightest resistance were immediately put to 
the sword. To the honour of British soldiers, however, be it 
recorded, that not a single life was taken in wantonness. He 
who threw down his arms was spared by the very hand which 
had been uplifted to destroy him — and hence, out of a garrison 
which consisted originally of 1,800 combatants, full 1,500 were 
made prisoners. 

It were vain to attempt any description of the scenes of 
plunder and confusion which now presented themselves in every 
quarter of the town. The firing, which had ceased for a moment, 
because the contest was at an end, was renewed, here and there, 
in the extravagance of triumph ; whilst shouts and screams 
mingled fearfully with the groans of the wounded, and the out- 
cries of intoxicated men. Many houses, in different districts, 
burst into flames, whether wantonly or accidentally excited it 
was impossible to determine ; whilst the churches were ran- 
sacked, the wine and spirit cellars emptied, and for several hours 
every species of enormity was perpetrated. All these things 
occurring during the night, the darkness of which being but 
imperfectly dispelled by the light from the burning edifices, pro- 
duced an effect which none can desire to witness a second time. 
At length the drunken dropped asleep ; the wounded were 
removed to temporary hospitals ; and though, of the houses 
already on fire, the greater proportion were burned to the ground, 
the further progress of the flames was arrested. By dawn on the 
following morning, a degree of order was restored, such as could 
scarcely have been anticipated. 

The allied casualties, during the progress of this important 
siege, were, as might be expected, numerous — 9 officers 
and 217 men being killed, and 84 officers and 1,000 men 



1812.] RE-CAPTURE OF RODRIGO. 311 

wounded. Of these — 6 officers and 140 men were killed, and 
60 officers and 500 men wounded, on the night of the 
assault alone. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the loss of 
so many valuable lives was keenly felt, not only by private 
friends, but by the army in general ; and, among them all, there 
fell not one more universally nor more justly lamented than 
Major-general Craufurd. He was an officer of whom the 
highest expectations had been formed, and who, though pre- 
cipitate, perhaps, and headstrong, had on many occasions, shown 
that in the qualities which are requisite to make up the character 
of a good soldier, he was eminently rich. He received, while head- 
ing one of the assaults, a wound which was at once pronounced 
to be mortal, and he survived only a few hours — which were 
hours of much suffering. We buried him next day in the breach, 
and did not quit his rude but honoured grave without paying a 
tribute of unavailing regret to his memory. 

To the talents of Colonel Fletcher, chief engineer; of Major 
Dixon, director of the artillery ; and Major Sturgeon, of the staff 
corps, the highest praises were given by our illustrious chief. 
The fruits of the victory were, as I have already stated, 1,500 
prisoners, a quantity of ammunition and military stores, and no 
fewer than 321 pieces of cannon, of different calibres, but almost 
all serviceable. 

Thus fell the important fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo. Its con- 
queror lost no time in putting the works once more in a state of 
defence ; and long before Marmont, who was exerting himself to 
| relieve it, could bring his troops into the field, the British army 
was in full march towards other and no less memorable triumphs. 



y2 



312 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxix. 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

March to Badajoz — Siege— Capture of the place. 

Nothing could be more unlooked-for on the part of the 
enemy, than the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. The reduction of the 
place had occupied Massena nearly ten months, and Marmont 
reasonably calculated on having two-thirds of that space of time 
at his disposal. His astonishment, therefore, on finding that 
within ten days from its investment, and three from the opening of 
the batteries, this formidable fortress had been carried by assault, 
exceeded his powers of expression. In the report which he made 
of the affair, he described it as something for which he was quite, 
unable to account ; and the fine army of 60,000 men which he 
had assembled for the purpose of relieving the place, was once- 
more broken up, and retired to winter quarters. In like manner,, 
the effect produced, both at home and in the Peninsula, was very 
great. The Spaniards conferred upon Lord Wellington the title, 
of Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, and raised him to the rank of a. 
grandee of the first class. The Prince Regent gave him the. 
dignity of an earl ; and the parliament voted him an additional 
grant of £2,000 a year. 

No effort was made in any part of Spain to turn to account 
the opportunities which this bold and successful operation had. 
created. Though Marmont drew his army from the north, and. 
from the south, leaving the Asturias, Galicia, and part of Aragon 
bare, advantage was not taken of the circumstance to gather 
strength in those quarters ; and if in Catalonia a spirit of resist- 
ance still displayed itself, it operated as often unfortunately as 
the reverse. General Lacy, deceived by Maurice Matthieu, 
fought a battle on the 24th of January, near Tarragona, in 
which he sustained a signal defeat ; while Ballasteros's success at 
Castana, on the 1 6th of February following, was more than 
counterbalanced by the surrender of Pensicola, with its ample 
stores and ammunition, to a detachment of Suchet's army under 
General Severoli. 



1812.] SITUATION OF LORD WELLINGTON. 313 

It had never been the custom of the British commander to rely 
too much on the exertions of his allies, or, having obtained a new 
triumph, be it even very important, to sit down and enjoy his 
honours — and the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo opened the way to 
another and a not less daring undertaking. He now determined 
to lay siege to Badajoz, and, by the reduction of that fortress, 
to secure the right of his line of operations, as he had already 
done the left. Accordingly, he exerted himself to repair the 
damages which the works of Ciudad Rodrigo had sustained — and, 
entrusting the place to a Spanish governor, he himself moved off 
towards the Tagus. He was the more encouraged in this under- 
taking, as he was aware that, with the exception of part of the 
iifth corps, which, under General Darican, occupied La Serura, 
JEstremadura was unoccupied by French troops, and, conscious of 
his own inability to face the enemy's force when assembled, he 
still calculated on being enabled to reduce the place before any 
concentration could be effected. 

Success depended on secresy — and, while preparations were 
effected, it was absolutely necessary that neither Soult nor Mar- 
in ont should be alarmed. The collection of stores, and the 
movement of siege artillery and ammunition, was, therefore, a 
delicate operation. The materiel required for the attempt must 
be obtained from Lisbon and Almeida — and was to be brought 
up by the roads least likely to cause any observations from the 
enemy* — while the garrison of Elvas, under the pretext of 
repairing the fortifications, employed itself in fitting up plat- 
forms and making fascines, of which, in due time, a sufficient 
quantity was prepared. Finally, on the 6th of March, the army 
broke up from its cantonments, and, leaving a division with some 
•cavalry to observe the line of the Agueda, reached Elvas on the 
11th, and on the 16th crossed the Guadiana. Three divisions, 
under Beresford and Picton, at once invested Badajoz, while the 

* By means of the most strenuous exertions, Lord Wellington had suc- 
ceeded in rendering his battering-train effective, and in securing a tolerable 
supply of ammunition and stores, yet he was scarcely prepared to commence 
a regular siege ; being without mortars, and his miners being few and inex- 
perienced ; while, should the enemy advance, or even the expected stormy 
weather set in, the investment would be interrupted, and his efforts rendered 
unavailing. — Ed. 



314 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxix. 

remainder pushed back General Drouet from Villa Franca, and 
compelled him to concentrate. 

While the third, fourth and light divisions sat down before 
the place, the first, sixth, and seventh, with two brigades of 
cavalry, under Sir Thomas Graham, to cover the siege, advanced 
to Los Santos, Zafra, and Llerena — while the second British 
division, Hamilton's Portuguese, with a brigade of cavalry, under 
Sir Rowland Hill, took post at Almandralejo and Merida. While 
the troops were on their march, and, indeed, up to the evening of 
the 1 6th, the weather continued remarkably fine ; but the morning 
of the 17th was particularly cold and rainy. Notwithstanding 
the inclemency of the weather, on the afternoon of that day, and 
without any molestation from the enemy, ground was broken 
within a hundred and sixty yards of a formidable outwork, called 
Fort Picurina ; and, throughout the whole of the 1 8th, the troops, 
although annoyed by a heavy cannonade from the town, and 
seriously inconvenienced by bad weather, pushed forward the 
operations. The 19th saw the wall under cover, and the same 
night, a spirited sortie which the governor attempted, was 
repulsed. The 10th was spent in completing the parallel, and 
erecting two batteries : the one for breaking down the palisades, 
and otherwise injuring the defences of the Picurina, the other 
was intended to enfilade the space between the outwork and the 
town. From that date, till the 25th, the besiegers continued to 
push the advances — and the besieged to harass and discommode 
them by an unceasing fire. The elements likewise fought against 
the assailants ; for such was the violence of the storm, that 
during the night of the 21st, the Guadiana rose with unlooked- 
for rapidity — and a pontoon- bridge, by which, heretofore, the 
communications between the troops employed in the siege, and 
the depots had been kept up, was carried away. Serious appre- 
hensions were consequently entertained that it might be found 
necessary to retire from before the place ; and nothing but the 
determination of Lord Wellington, and the zeal and intelligence 
of the officers under him, could have remedied the disaster by the 
substitution of a flying-bridge. 

These, however, were not the only difficulties which the 
besiegers had to overcome. The rain fell in torrents — the 
trenches were flooded — and the ground became so soft, that it was 



1812.] THIRD SIEGE OF BADAJOZ. 315 

found impossible either to work with effect, or drag guns from 
one part to another. Yet, by extraordinary exertion, several 
batteries were armed on the evening of the 24th ; and, at day- 
break next morning, they opened their fire . 

The effect produced upon the defences of fort Picurina could 
not be correctly ascertained — but Lord Wellington determined to 
hazard an assault the same night. It was accordingly executed 
in fine style, by five hundred men of the third division, and, after 
a desperate struggle, which the enemy continued to maintain 
even after the ramparts had been crowned, fort Picurina was 
carried. On the part of the assailants, four officers and fifty men 
were killed, fifteen officers, and 250 men, wounded ; while out of 
a garrison consisting of 250 men, only thirty-four escaped. 

Fort Picurina was carried with such celerity, that the French 
had no time to make a movement in support of the detachment ; 
but scarcely had the firing slacked, when the whole face of the 
town that looked towards the lines, became one volume of fire. 
At the same time, our people, hearing the sound of a drum in the 
lunette of St. Roque, fancied that a sortie was about to be made, 
and opened a fire from the trenches, which caused that of the 
enemy to redouble. No serious results, however, took place on 
either side. About midnight, the useless fusilade subsided, and 
the engineers hastened to make a lodgment on the ground which 
had been won, and connect it, by means of a boyau, with the 
first parallel. 

Throughout the whole of the 26th, working parties were em- 
ployed in the Picurina, and against them the enemy directed a severe 
and unceasing fire. They sustained it, however, with their accus- 
tomed bravery — and, the same night, not only established the 
second parallel, but threw up two breaching-batteries, which, 
next morning, began to play. It was now a complete trial of 
skill, for the besieged, aware of the point of attack, busied them- 
selves in counter- working the besiegers, while the batteries on 
both sides kept up an incessant fire, and, occasionally, a sortie 
was attempted. At last, Lord Wellington, having brought up 
the fifth division from Beira, and strengthened a portion of his 
line which had hitherto been vulnerable, determined to bring 
matters to a crisis ; and, finding that three breaches were effected, 



316 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxix. 

which the engineers pronounced practicable, he issued orders, on 
the 6th of April, for a general assault. 

According to orders issued, the assault was to be given at ten 
o'clock that night. Three efforts were first resolved on — namely, 
to storm both breaches, and escalade the castle, should oppor- 
tunity permit it to be attempted with any prospect of success. 

The defences of Badajoz have already been described. But 
besides its own defences, the fortress had the advantage of 
a valuable outwork, namely, a redoubt crowning the heights of 
San Christoval, and separated from the castle by the Guadiana. 
The communication between Badajoz and this fort was difficult 
to maintain, being kept up by means of an exposed bridge or 
open boats. Against the old castle, with walls of a prodigious 
height, unbroken by shot, and probably protected by traverses 
within, Picton, with the third division, was directed ; while the 
breaches were to be stormed by the fourth and light divisions, 
respectively; one being on the face of the bastions of Trinidad, 
the other on the flank of that of Santa Maria. They were not 
very far apart — a circumstance, in the darkness of the night too 
likely to produce confusion ; and, as there chanced to be near 
them an unfinished ravelin, this danger was increased fourfold. 
Yet the orders, like all that came from the same source, were 
clear and explicit ; while those to whom they were addressed, and 
to whom their execution was entrusted, were men who could 
comprehend and carry out the daring plans of their able 
superior. 

The night was extremely dark, when the divisions selected for 
this desperate service formed at their respective alarm-posts, and 
moved, in profound silence, to the points of attack. Late in the 
day, additional efforts were determined on ; and, while General 
Leith was directed to employ a brigade of the fifth division 
in escalading the bastion of St. Vincente, or the curtain and 
flank between it and the bridge over the Guadiana, General 
Colville was ordered to attempt the third breach in the curtain 
between the bastions Santa Maria and Trinidad. 

The third division had hardly reached the bank of the Rivellas, 
when the garrison of the castle discovered them, and opened a 
fire from the whole face of the work. It did not check them for 



1812.] TREMENDOUS CONFLICT. 317 

a moment, for they reached the heights in the most perfect order, 
reared the ladders against the wall, and began to escalade. But 
for this too, the enemy were prepared. Huge beams of timber, 
enormous stones, loaded shells, and cold shot, crushed all who 
planted foot on the foremost of these ladders ; while, at the same 
time, a murderous discharge of musketry fell upon the columns, 
and produced terrible slaughter. Fresh ladders were reared, and 
again the men mounted — but those who gained the summit were 
roughly hurled back again, or bayoneted when they topped the 
wall. But nothing could check their desperate intrepidity. By one 
ladder, at last, the wall was gained — the garrison became terror- 
stricken — another, and another was reared — up swarmed desperate 
men — the ramparts were won — the garrison driven off — and, 
while some were put to the sword, others laid down their 
arms. 

All this while, a tremendous conflict was maintained at the 
breaches, and on the ramparts of the bastion of St. Vincente. 
The fourth and light divisions, springing into the ditch, pushed 
boldly against what they believed to be the face of their allotted 
breaches — and, having forced the ascent, found, to their mutual 
surprise, that they had mistaken for the breach an unfinished 
ravelin. When such a misfortune befalls in the dark, and under 
such a storm of missiles as then hailed from the ramparts, it is 
next to impossible, by any exertions of the officers, to repair 
it. Those who led on that terrible night, w T ere the elite of 
England's soldiers, and the men who followed were worthy of 
them ; yet they came to the breaches in disorder, and in disorder 
the assaults were given. It was a vain and profitless exertion of 
desperate courage. The whole face of the town was one blaze 
of fire. Live shells, barrels of flaming pitch, bags of gunpowder 
that exploded as they reached the ground, poured into the ditch, 
where the bundles of hay which had been used to facilitate a 
descent, took fire, and of the wounded not a few were, unhappily, 
burned to death. Moreover, the brave men who reached the 
summits of the breaches found they were cut off from the body 
of the place by retrenchments, while across these were chevaux- 
de-frise of sword-blades — behind which the French soldiers 
stood secure, and bayoneted all who endeavoured to remove 






318 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxix- 

them. The storming-parties were driven back into the ditch, — 
where, unable to advance, yet unwilling to retire, they remained, 
enduring with a degree of patience which was absolutely mar- 
vellous, the weight of a fire to which even they had not 
previously seen a parallel. 

Meanwhile, the escalade of St. Vincente was not neglected. 
A brigade of the fifth division, under General Walker, sur- 
mounting every obstacle, won the ramparts with comparatively 
little loss, and, turning to the right, advanced in the direction of 
the breaches, where their presence was sorely needed. But by 
one of those strange accidents which occur in war, and for which 
it is impossible to account, an unexpected stand made by a 
body of the enemy, served to paralyze their energies — they 
became panic- struck,* and were driven back to the very bastion 
by which they had found entrance. Here, however, 200 men of 
the 38th regiment had been kept in hand by Colonel Nugent, and 
they checked the French with a volley and a charge ; and then 
the whole brigade, recovering its order, advanced in a body 
towards the breaches, and, taking the defenders in the rear, 
entirely dispersed them. Then were the fourth and light divi* 
sions, which Lord Wellington had withdrawn and reformed, led 
again to the front. The garrison offered no resistance, and the 
place was entered on all sides ; for the third division had by this 
time blown open the gates of the castle. The governor, with a 
few hundred men, fled across the river, and shut himself up 

* The French offered a most desperate resistance, but it was unavailing. 
Bastion after bastion was stormed and carried ; but, in carrying the last, 
General Walker received a severe wound. At the same moment, a soldier, 
alarmed by a lighted port-fire, called out that a mine was sprung, and here- 
upon ensued a regular panic among the assaulting party. The men who, a 
moment before, seemed to have laid aside all thought of danger, fell back 
dismayed, and General Vielland, immediately leading on a French detach- 
ment, drove the affrighted soldiers before him, and regained possession of the 
whole of the works. But, at the bastion of St. Vincente, by which the 
stormers had entered, a weak battalion of the 38th were in reserve ; and these 
at the moment the enemy closed, delivered a destructive aud shattering volley, 
cheered, and charged. Their comrades, gathering confidence from their 
example, instantly re-formed, all advanced together, quickly drove the enemy 
from their advances, and the place was won.— Ed. 



1812.] SURRENDER OF ST. CHRISTOVAL. 319 

in Fort St. Christoval, but next day, hung out a white flag, 
and he and his men became, like the survivors in the town, 
prisoners of war. 

The loss sustained by the allied army, in this service, was very 
heavy. It amounted to little short of 5,000 men ; yet, when the 
importance of the conquest is taken into consideration, our 5,000 
men were not too much to pay for it. On the part of the enemy, 
about 3,500 prisoners were made — all that survived of the gar- 
rison ; while, in artillery, ammunition, and military stores, the 
acquisition was singularly valuable.* 

If the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo had confounded the calculations 
of the French generals, the capture of Badajoz was still a greater 
marvel. They had never counted on the occurrence of such an 
event, nor were their proceedings such as, in any point of view, 
were calculated to prevent the misfortune. For to Soult, at all 
events, the designs of Lord Wellington were known on the 1 7th 
or 18th of March, yet he lingered about Seville, with an army of 
40,000 men, and began to move only at the moment when the 
object he had wished to defeat had been accomplished. In like 
manner, Marmont, though apprised of the march of the English 
from the Agueda, contented himself with making a predatory 
inroad into Lower Beira, from which no results could occur 
favourable to himself, or hurtful to his enemy. The consequence 
was, that these two chiefs, instead of acting on the offensive, 
were obliged to retire one after the other ; Soult, pressed by the 
British cavalry, in the first instance, with some loss at Llerena ; 
and Marmont, immediately afterwards, when Lord Wellington, 
turning to his left, drove the enemy from Sabugal and Castello 
Branco, and compelled them to concentrate again at Salamanca. 

The British army was exhausted by its winter campaigns, and 
the repose of nearly a month was granted to it in cantonments 



* The quantity of materiel required during this memorable siege, was 
tremendous. There were expended, in the course of it, 2,523 barrels of 
powder, each containing 90 lbs. ; 31,861 round shots, 1,826 common and 
spherical 5£ inch shells, and 1,659 rounds of grape and case shot ; 70,000 
sand-bags also were required, 1,200 gabions, 700 fascines, and 1,570 entrench- 
ing tools ; and, in addition, 3,500 Spanish dollars were disposed of; for even 
a siege cannot be carried on without hard cash. — Ed. 



320 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxix. 

between the Agueda and the Coa. Not for one moment, how- 
ever, was the mind of its great leader unemployed. He had 
already determined to carry the war into the heart of Spain, and 
it was necessary for the furtherance of his plans, that the course 
of the Tagus, through the Estremadura, should be in his power. 
There was a bridge at Almaraz, on the only line of communica- 
tion, below Toledo, between the armies of the north and south. 
This the French had strongly fortified, and seemed determined 
to keep. Besides a t&e-du-pont, they had erected there two 
formidable redoubts, one on either side, called respectively forts 
Napoleon and Ragusa ; and of these Lord Wellington resolved to 
make himself master. With this view, Sir Rowland Hill was 
despatched, at the head of his division, early in May. On the 
16th, he reached Xaraicejo, and, hoping to surprise the French, 
lie continued his march all night. But, the roads being very bad, 
the troops were wearied out, and, long before day dawned, the 
general found that his opportunity was lost. He, therefore, halted 
■on the 17th, on a mountain range, about five miles distant from 
Almaraz, and delayed his attack till daybreak on the second day. 
The enemy, who had been informed of his approach, imagined 
that the delay would prove of infinite advantage to themselves. 
They entrenched the only road by which artillery could be 
■brought up, and regarded the danger as having passed away. But 
Sir Rowland Hill leaving his artillery behind him, made a night- 
march, with his infantry, through the defiles of the mountains ; 
came upon the enemy's redoubts, when he was least expected, 
and carried them by escalade, one after another, with the loss, on 
Iris part, of less than 200 men. The British troops pursued the 
fugitives from Fort Napoleon so closely that they entered the 
X&e-du-pont together, pell-mell; whilst Fort Ragusa, dismayed 
by the spectacle which it had witnessed, opened its gates. 
Having accomplished this brilliant service, General Hill secured 
his conquest, retraced his steps, and effected his junction with 
the main body of the army, long before Soult and Marmont, who 
had been advertised of his movement, were in a condition to 
intercept, or even to molest him. 



1812.] NIGHT MARCH AND ESCALADE. 321 



CHAPTER XXX. 

State of affairs in the North — Preparations for a new campaign — Advance to 
Salamanca — Reduction of the forts — Battle of Salamanca — Madrid — March 
on Burgos— Siege of the castle — Retreat to the Portuguese frontier— Cam- 
paign concludes. 

The advantages secured to the allies by this bold and 
masterly movement, will hardly be understood, unless some 
notice be taken of the condition of things elsewhere, not merely 
on the stage where the British armies were playing their part, 
but in other parts of the Peninsula, and, indeed, generally 
throughout Europe. Up to this moment, Napoleon had been 
left free to direct his undivided energies towards the subjugation 
of Spain. From the peace of Tilsit, the continent had sub- 
mitted to his yoke — and if Russia exhibited an inclination 
to evade the Milan decrees, the Czar permitted privately, 
what he did not venture publicly to authorize. Napoleon, how- 
ever, thought fit to draw the cord too tight, and Alexander felt 
the pressure. He had borne without remonstrance the seizure 
of the Duchy of Oldenburgh ; but when Napoleon went farther* 
and threatened his own dominions with invasion, he, too, began 
to arm in self-defence. In the month of May, 1812, that rupture 
took place which was to determine, by its issue, whether Europe 
should acknowledge one master ; and Napoleon, too confident in 
his own fortunes, put himself at the head of his armies and 
marched on Moscow. 

The war in Spain, which had hitherto occupied the first 
place in public attention, became from that hour, as far as 
France was concerned, a matter of minor consideration. What- 
ever effective battalions were at the disposal of the war-minister, 
were forwarded to the Vistula ; while, to recruit the regiments in 
Spain, depots were formed in the south, out of which, from time 
to time, a body of conscripts were equipped and despatched to 
reinforce the French armies. Lord Wellington's army consisted 
of 60,000 men, Portuguese and Spaniards included. Of these, 
10,000 infantry, with about 1,200 cavalry, were cantoned on the 



322 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

Tagus, at Almaraz ; while the Commander-in-chief, with the 
remainder, prepared to operate on the north of that river, against 
Marmont. The capture of the redoubts at Almaraz, had, in some 
degree, isolated the French marshal ; and, although he was at 
the head of 50,000 veterans, Lord Wellington felt himself in a 
condition to cope with him. 

At the same time, Lord Wellington had to observe Soult, who, 
commanding the army of the south, was round Seville and 
Cordova, with 58,000 men — while Suchet held the eastern pro- 
vinces, with 50,000 excellent troops — Souham was in the north 
with 10,000— and the army of the centre, probably 15,000 more, 
was disposed around the capital, and kept open the communica- 
tions between the detached corps. 

On the other hand, there were on foot no Spanish armies 
deserving of the name. Bands of guerillas moved, indeed, hither 
and thither, rendering the communications between the French 
armies and their depots exceedingly insecure ; but throughout the 
north and west, and centre of Spain, there was no single corps in 
arms of any military respectability. In the east, Generals Lacy 
and Sarsfield were at the head of corps which did good service, and 
occupied Suchet pretty well ; whilst D'Eroles, more bold than pru- 
dent, committed himself at Rhonda with General Rourke, in a com- 
bat which ended in his total defeat and the dispersion of his troops. 
Yet were the French far from being masters of the country. Few 
fortified towns, Cadiz and Alicante excepted, continued to display 
the standard of independence, but every Sierra and mountain 
range swarmed with the enemies of oppression, out of whom an 
army, formidable from its numbers, if not for its discipline, might 
at any moment be formed. But it had never entered into the 
councils of the allies to furnish a nucleus round which such an 
army might be gathered. A considerable body of troops, at this 
period, partly English, partly foreigners in English pay, came 
from Sicily and the Mediterranean, and, landing at Alicante, 
under General Sir Thomas Maitland, prepared to effect a diver- 
sion in Lord Wellington's favour. 

Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief, after having given his 
army a few weeks' repose, during which he established maga- 
zines at Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the Douro, broke up 



1812.] CONTEST OF CAVALRY. 323 

from his cantonments, and advanced in the direction of Sala- 
manca. On the 1 7th of June, his divisions crossed the Tonnes, 
by the fords above and below the town, and, finding no force in 
the field competent to resist them, marched direct upon the 
capital of the province.* 

But Marmont, though he fell back as the allies approached, 
did not leave Salamanca unprotected. Of the convents and 
colleges which commanded the bridge, he had formed two or 
three redoubts, into which he threw a garrison of 800 men, with 
an ample supply of ammunition and other necessaries. 

Lord Wellington could not leave in his rear a fortified post 
which commanded one of the great lines of his operations — and ac- 
cordingly, on the morning of the 1 7th, he invested these redoubts 
with the sixth division, while he himself took up a position in 
advance, so as to cover the siege and hinder supplies from being 
thrown into the garrison. 

Unfortunately, the means for the reduction of these forts were 
sadly limited — and works which would have crumbled in a day 
before a siege train, made a tedious and mischievous resistance. 



* " No enemy appeared ; for days the march was leisurely continued ; 
until, on clearing the forest at Valmasa, the German hussars in advance, had 
a slight skirmish with a French picquet. The enemy's cavalry, few at first, 
gradually showed themselves, extending in detached parties over the plain ; 
while others, occupying the rising grounds that flanked it, indicated that they 
intended to allow no inferior force to oblige them to retire. The British 
horsemen rode forward, and a sharp contest succeeded, marked with all that 
animation which attends a cavalry affair. Parties were observed firing or 
charging in all directions. Repeated attacks were made by either force, as 
circumstances warranted, or as they became more numerous at the particular 
points. In one direction was to be seen a troop or squadron charging half 
their number of opponents, who, by a precipitate retreat, fell back on others, 
until their strength became superior, when, in turn, they for a time carried 
with them the successful tide of battle. The plain was covered with officers 
and scattered cavalry soldiers. Carbines and pistols were discharged without 
intermission ; and frequent personal conflicts took place. On one occasion 
Major Brotherton, of the 14th fight dragoons, mounted upon a very small 
Spanish horse, crossed swords with a French officer of chasseurs, and con- 
tinued cutting and parrving until the melee broke up the encounter."— Leith 
Hay. 



324 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

An attempt to carry Fort Vincente by escalade failed. 
Yet neither this repulse, nor the manoeuvring of the French 
general, who made more than one movement, as if to interrupt 
the siege, could divert Lord Wellington from his purpose. Some 
changes of ground took place, during the progress of which the 
cavalry and light troops occasionally came into collision ; but 
Marmont did not succeed in opening his communications with 
Salamanca — and the siege, as soon as ammunition came up, was 
resumed. On the 27th of June, the smaller redoubts were 
carried by assault — and the governor of St. Vincente sur- 
rendered at discretion. 

No sooner was Marmont aware that the forts were carried, than 
he retreated towards the Douro.* He was closely followed by 
the allies, whose cavalry engaged his rear -guard while occupied 
with the passage of the river, and caused them a serious loss. 
The passage being gained, the rest felt secure, inasmuch as the 
bridges and fords were in their own possession. Accordingly, 
Marmont halted on a range of high ground which extends from 
Polios to Simancas, on the Pisuerga ; and, keeping his centre at 
Tordesillas, watched from thence the British line, which, with its 
head-quarters in Rueda, stretched from La Seca to Polios. 

As both Toro and Zamora had been fortified, and the other 
points by which the Douro could be passed had been put in a 
state of defence, Lord Wellington felt that he had only one 
course to pursue — to wait till the failure of supplies, and the 
operations of the guerilla parties, should compel the enemy to 
move, either in advance or retreat ; while Marmont, on the other 
hand, looked daily for the junction of a corps of 8,000 men, 
under Bonnet, from the Asturias, which would give him a supe- 
riority in numbers. 

* The river, occasionally written ' Douro ' and ' Duero/ rises in a mountain 
lake, in Old Castile, and passes, in its course, the site of the ancient Nu- 
mantia. At Simancas, it is joined by the Pisuerga, into which the Arlanza 
and Carrion previously discharge themselves. Then, by a south-westerly 
course, it runs to Tordesillas, and turning afterwards towards the west, 
passes through Toro and Zamora. Fed by the minor streams of Leon, 
the Douro enters Portugal, and, after the most lengthened course of the 
Peninsular rivers, falls into the Atlantic at Oporto. — Ed. 






1812.] RETREAT OF MARMONT. 325 

On the 16th of July, Marmont took the offensive, and passed 
two divisions across the river at Toro. Lord Wellington made a 
feint in the direction which the enemy seemed to threaten, and 
then, with the larger portion of his army, took post upon the 
Guarena, where the fords and heights furnished him with points 
abundantly defensible. Accordingly, when — on recalling his 
divisions from Toro, Marmont ascended the river to Tordesillas, 
and, crossing there, made a forced march upon Rueda, he failed 
in inflicting the slightest injury on his able opponent. The 
fourth and light divisions fought their way back to the main 
body, and once again the hostile armies faced each other, each 
with its strength entire, and all itsl ines of operations cara nd 
open. 

The English and French occupied the opposite banks of the 
Guarena for a whole day, during which there occurred a sharp 
affair of cavalry, which gave to some of the regiments an oppor- 
tunity of distinguishing themselves, and occasioned to each side a 
oss of between 400 and 500 men. It was the result of an attempt, 
on Marmont's part, to turn the left of the Allies, in which he 
signally failed ; but which he followed up on the next day with 
a still more serious movement against their right. On this 
occasion, he so far succeeded, that Lord Wellington made a 
complete change in his dispositions, and, crossing the upper 
Guarena, at Vallesa and El Omo, prepared to deliver battle. But 
for this the French general was not yet prepared ; so he still con- 
tinued to manoeuvre by his left, and was followed in all his 
marches by one who was at least his equal in all the mysteries of 
tactique. In like manner, the whole of the 20th was spent 
in similar evolutions — both parties marching still in the same 
direction, manoeuvring always in parallel lines, and often within 
musket -shot of each other. Still, except when from time to time 
the artillery opened, not a shot was fired ; but onwards and 
onwards the armed masses went, as if their mutual object was 
rather the exhibition of military science, than to join, when 
opportunity permitted, in mortal strife. 

By this time the tide of war had carried them to the Tormes, 
which river the French passed on the 21st, between Rueda and 

z 



326 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

Alba, thus threatening to envelope the right of the English army, 
and interpose between it and Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington, 
however, penetrated the design, and prevented its execution. 
Marching upon the bridge at Salamanca, he likewise crossed the 
Tormes the same night ; so that, at daybreak on the 22nd, the 
imposing spectacle was again presented, of two lines confronting 
o ne another in position, each prepared to fight, when a favourable 
occurrence or a false movement should warrant the striking of the 
first blow. 

The ground occupied by the Anglo-Portuguese army extended 
from the Tormes to two steep and rugged heights ; which, 
from some peculiarity in their formations and bearings, the 
Spaniards have called the Arepiles. The position of the French, 
more sheltered and screened by woods, embraced the high grounds 
of La Pina, with the villages of Calvarasso de Nuba and Calva- 
rasso de Abaxo. Both armies were anxious to seize the heights, 
and the business of the day opened with attempts, on both sides, 
to seize and secure the Arepiles. In these the enemy so far suc- 
ceeded, that they gained the more distant of the two hills, and 
this compelled the English to throw back their right wing, and 
^occupy the village of Arepiles with light troops only. But no 
serious inconvenience resulted from this change of order. Lord 
Wellington, ready either to engage or to fall back, according as 
circumstances might require, held his troops in hand throughout 
the greater part of the day ; for Marmont's manoeuvres were 
perplexing in the extreme, and, till he should have developed his 
plan more fully, there remained nothing for the British general to 
effect, except to watch events and remain on the defensive. 

It was quite clear that Marmont's views pointed throughout 
to the outflanking of the allied right, and gaining the Rodrigo road, 
thus cutting off their communications with that fortress. Lord 
Wellington saw this, and permitted the enemy to play their own 
game ; but he stood quite prepared, at the same time, to take 
advantage of the first mistake, and the opening for which he had 
long and anxiously waited came at last. 

There had been severe fighting about Arepiles, from which a 
detachment of the guards would not be driven, and the third 



1812.] DISPOSITIONS FOR BATTLE. 327 

division, under General Packenham, had taken ground to the 
right, to support them. Such a change of position, moreover, 
had been effected in the allied line, as to bring the right very 
nearly to the ground which, at dawn, the left had occupied, and to 
change, in a great degree, the entire front of the previous order 
of battle. By these means, Lord Wellington, having secured his 
communications with Portugal, felt comparatively at ease ; and, 
^wearied with observing the movements of the enemy, had 
descended from the high ground at the Arepiles, and with his 
staff, and as many officers as could be gathered round him, had 
sat down to a hasty meal. It was yet in progress, when it was 
intimated that Marmont was extending his left. The allied 
commander rose instantly, seized his glass, saw the error com- 
mitted by his opponent, and, without a moment's delay, turned it 
to account. The dispositions of the French, though masterly 
against one less self-collected, had been, throughout the day, in 
Wellington's opinion, full of hazard. They aimed at too much — 
and, manceuvering to throw themselves in force upon the English 
right, risked, as the event proved fatally, the weakening of their 
own right and centre. Lord Wellington saw that filing con- 
stantly in one direction disconnected the divisions of Marmont's 
army, and left an interval where he might strike to advantage. 
He seized the opportunity with the precision which belongs to 
liim, and the day was his own. 

Among other dispositions which were made during the 
morning, the third division had been moved to the extreme 
right of the line, where, with the main body of the cavalry, it 
lay hid from the enemy's observation. The first and light 
divisions were on the extreme left — though now they communi- 
cated with the reserve of the Arepiles, which stand in the centre 
of the plateau. In rear of the village of Arepiles, and formed 
in two lines, were the fourth and fifth divisions, having General 
Pack's Portuguese brigade on the left of the latter, and General 
Bradford's on the right of the former. The sixth and seventh 
divisions again, with Don Carlos D'Espana's Spaniards, were in 
reserve ; and the artillery took its ground in such intervals as 
gave to it the most commanding sweep, both of the enemy's 
front, and of the line of retreat which was to be kept open for 

z 2 



328 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

the allies. It is scarcely necessary to add, that from all incum- 
brance of baggage and stores, the latter was kept carefully clear, 
and that the dust which was raised by mules and the commis- 
sariat, in their movement to the rear, tended not a little to deceive 
the enemy. Compact, therefore, and in every sense of the term, 
available, was the allied army, being formed on the string of a 
bow, round which, strange to say, the French were seeking to 
carry themselves ; threatening one flank, while the real design 
was to envelope the other. It was the first mistake that Mar- 
mont had made, and Wellington nevei; permitted him to 
retrieve it. 

Lord Wellington had dined amid the ranks of the third 
division, and Packenham, its frank and chivalrous leader, was one 
of those who shared his simple and soldier-like meal. To him 
the commander-in-chief gave his orders, somewhat in the fol- 
lowing words : — " Do you see those fellows on the hill, Packen- 
ham ? Throw your division into columns of battalions — at them 
directly — and drive them to the devil/ ' Instantly the division 
was formed — and the order executed admirably. As he passed 
Packenham stopped, for a moment, near his brother-in-law, and 
said, '■ Give me a hold of that conquering hand !" and then rode 
off, watching every movement with a soldier's eye, and directing 
his columns to their proper places; — while Lord Wellington, 
turning round, observed to his staff; " Did you ever see a man 
who understood so clearly what he had to do ?" Lord Welling- 
ton was right. The attack of the third division was not only the 
most spirited, but the most perfect thing of the kind that modern 
times have witnessed.* Regardless alike of a charge of cavalry, 

* Marmont apprehended that his opponent would seek to avoid a contest, 
by retreating ; and, in order to enforce an action, hurried on his dispositions, 
pushing forward the division of Thomieres, with his light cavalry and fifty 
pieces of artillery. The centre columns were debouching from the forest, 
and a corresponding movement on the part of the allies was to be the signal 
for the enemy to attack. But, of a sudden, a change of attitude became 
observable among the masses on the English heights, and, while the French 
were yet uncertain as to what the movement might portend, the allied 
brigades rapidly closed up, and the third division, rushing down the hill, fell 
vigorously upon those who bad been waiting a favourable moment to assail 
them. — Ed, 



1812.] BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. 329 

and of the murderous fire which the enemy's batteries opened, 
on went these fearless warriors, horse and foot, without check or 
pause, until they won the ridge ; and then, the infantry giving 
their volley, and the cavalry falling on sword in hand, the French 
were pierced, broken, and discomfited. So close, indeed, was 
the struggle, even where foot met foot, that, in several instances, 
the British colours were seen waving over the heads of the 
enemy's battalions, while the dragoons broke through square and 
line ; taking deep vengeance for the death of the gallant General 
Le Marchant, by the havoc which they made in the ranks of 
those who slew him. 

By this magnificent operation, the whole of the enemy's left 
was destroyed. Upwards of 3,000 prisoners remained in the 
hands of the victors, while the rest, broken and dispirited, fell 
back in utter confusion, upon the reserves, whom they swept 
away with them in their flight. Meanwhile, in the centre, a 
fiercer contest was going on, caused by an unsuccessful attempt 
on the part of General Pack, with his Portuguese, to possess 
himself of the Arepiles height, on which the enemy still 
retained his hold. Being suddenly charged by 1,200 French 
infantry, just as they had gained the summit, and were spent with 
toil, the Portuguese were unable to sustain the shock, and broke 
and fled, in such confusion that the flank of the fourth division, 
with which they communicated, was left exposed. Against it 
the enemy directed their next efforts, and, General Cole being 
already wounded, some impression was made ; but the advance 
of a brigade of the fifth division speedily restored the battle, 
and, from that moment, victory was never doubtful. Pouring 
into the enemy's line a well-directed fire, the two divisions 
steadily advanced, and, the enemy retreating, they gained the 
crest of the position. 

There was a fatality upon the French General and his troops 
that day. All the skill which they had exhibited in the 
manoeuvres of the previous week, the blunders of one half- hour 
compromised ; while Marmont himself, struck down by the 
explosion of a shell, was carried off the field early in the battle, 
with a broken arm and two severe wounds in the side. The 
command then devolved upon Clausel, who did all that man, in 
his situation, could do, to retrieve the fortune of the day : or, 



330 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

failing that, to secure an orderly retreat. He threw back such 
of his corps as were yet unbroken, upon a new position at right 
ngles with the ground that had been lost, and exerted himself to 
rally, upon this new and well- chosen line, the fugitives of his 
broken left wing. But Lord Wellington was not to be arrested 
in his success, nor could his troops be restrained in their career 
of victory. The light division, supported by the first, which up 
to this moment had scarcely been under fire, was moved forward 
to the right ; while the sixth, advancing under a heavy fire, and 
sustaining and repelling a charge of cavalry, attacked the new 
alignement in front. Nothing could withstand the impetuosity- 
of the rush. Once more the enemy broke and fled ; and, covered 
by the division of General Foy, escaped, and saved themselves. 

Darkness had set in, ere the light and first divisions began 
their movement. Through the gathering gloom they continued 
it — the former marching with shouldered arms, all except the 
skirmishers, till an opportunity offered of giving the volley with 
effect. In like manner the pursuit was continued till ten o'clock 
at night, and even then it would probably not have ceased, had 
not Lord Wellington calculated — with every appearance of 
justice — on being able, when the morrow came, to dictate 
his own terms to the enemy. There were but two points at 
which the Tormes could be passed, namely, at Muerta, and at 
Alba de Tormes ; of the former the English general took the 
command, by pushing the light division towards it, while the 
latter he had left, but a few hours previously to the fight, in the 
safe-keeping of a Spanish garrison. Unfortunately, however, the 
Spaniards, apprehending that they should be isolated, had 
abandoned the fort early that morning,* — while the first division, 
which had been directed to march to their support, missed its? 



* " I had desired the Spaniards to continue to occupy the castle of Alba de 
Tormes : * * * had evacuated it, I believe, before he knew my wishes ; and 
he was afraid to let me know that he had done so ; and I did not know it 
till I found no enemy at the fords of the Tormes. When I lost sight of 
them in the dark, I marched upon Huerla and Eucinas, and they went by 
Alba. If I had known there had been no garrison in Alba, I should have 
marched there, and should probably have had the whole."-— Wellington's; 
Letter to Graham. 



1812.] RETREAT OF CLAUSEL 331 

way in the darkness. The consequence was, that when the 
morrow came, and the pursuit was resumed, it led only to a 
gallant attack upon the enemy's rear-guard, for the main body 
was safe across the river. Clausel had marched all night, and, 
finding the ford at Alba de Tormes open, passed his troops through. 
But the victory was, notwithstanding this misfortune, most 
complete. 7,000 prisoners, two eagles, with a number of cannon 
and other trophies, remained in the hands of the English. 10,000 
men, in addition, either died on the field, or were disabled by 
wounds ; whereas, the loss on the part of the allies amounted to 
scarcely 5,000 men, among whom were one general officer killed, 
and five wounded. Lord Wellington spoke, in terms of well- 
merited praise, of the devotion and gallantry of his whole army — 
nor will the charge of Baron Bock's and General Arens's brigades 
of cavalry, while pressing on the rear of the fugitives, ever be 
forgotten. These corps, advancing from different points, over- 
took a large body of French cavalry, with three battalions of 
infantry, in a strong position behind the village of La Serna : the 
cavalry were overthrown in a moment — and then, the corps dash- 
ing at the infantry, the squares were swept through, and the 
whole were either slain or taken. 

After this disaster, Clausel continued his retreat by forced 
marches. The arrival, from the north, of 1,200 cavalry and a 
corps of horse artillery, though it sufficed not to restore his con- 
fidence, or repair the losses which his army had sustained, placed 
at his disposal greater means of protecting his rear ; while the 
English, far from their supplies, found themselves unable to over- 
take or seriously molest him. He reached Valladolid without 
having sustained any fresh disaster — and, evacuating it again 
before Lord Wellington arrived, continued his march, in extreme 
disorder, upon Burgos. 

The allied leader had thus accomplished one part of his gigantic 
plan. He had effectively cleared the northern frontier of Portugal, 
and rendered it impossible for the enemy to unite against him 
in overwhelming numbers, except on a line entirely in the rear. 
He now turned round to accomplish another object, namely, to 
strike at the army of the centre, to rid himself of that incum- 
brance likewise, and at the same time liberate Madrid from the 
presence of the intruder. With this view, he halted at Valladolid 



332 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

only a single day ; and on the 1st of August, re-crossed the 
Douro, and took up a position at Cuellar. Meanwhile, Joseph, 
ignorant of the result of the late battle, was on his way, with 
20,000 men, to join Marmont, and had arrived at the neighbour- 
hood of Arevolo, before the intelligence of that officer's defeat was 
communicated to him. He directed his columns instantly 
towards Segovia, for the purpose of drawing off the attention of 
the English general from Clausel, and occupied it with his right, 
at the moment when Wellington was completing his preparations 
to march upon Madrid. But he did not venture to hold his 
ground, after Lord Wellington's purposes began to develop 
themselves. On the 7th of August the British army moved, 
leaving the sixth division, with General Arens's brigade of cavalry 
to observe the line of the Douro ; while Joseph, retreating with 
precipitation, left the passes of the Guadarama open, and returned 
to Madrid, where the confusion was now extreme. 

The French had endeavoured to prevent any authentic report of 
the battle of Salamanca from making its way to the capital.* In 
this, however, they but partially succeeded, and their own agents 
and adherents alone were kept in ignorance of it; for rumour, 
with her hundred tongues, was busy in every circle, and the 
advantages gained, important as they w r ere, were greatly exagge- 
rated. The immediate arrival of the allies in the capital was 
confidently anticipated, and the deliverance of Spain from the 
yoke of the foreigner was counted upon as a necessary conse- 
quence of a British occupation of Madrid. When, therefore, the 
inhabitants saw the intruder fortifying the Retiro, while he sent 
off all manner of baggage, and whole families of his adherents 
from the city, it was not without difficulty that they were 
restrained from exhibiting their joy by other methods than open 

* The news of his General's defeat was quickly carried to Napoleon, and 
reached him at a moment when he was ill prepared for tidings of disaster. A 
nation had risen in arms to repel his unwarrantable aggressions, and were 
determined to maintain their independence or to perish ; retreat or advance 
were alike attended with imminent danger ; and, in the midst of this perplexity, 
came the announcement of the defeat of his best troops, and of his brother's 
flight from his capital. In a moment, his oft-repeated boast, that the tri- 
colour would permanently wave from the towers of Madrid, was shewn to be a 
vain one, for the British flag was flying above the walls of the Retiro. — Ed. 



1812.] MARCH UPON MADRID. 333 

and constant congratulations. It does not appear, however, that 
any outrages were committed. Marshal Jourdan, with question- 
able policy, threw a garrison of 1,700 men into the Retiro ; and 
the knowledge that such a force was ready to act against them, 
kept the populace of Madrid quiet, even to the last. 

Lord Wellington's march was conducted with all the celerity 
and good order which distinguished every movement of his now 
magnificent army. On the 7th, he entered Segovia : on the 8th, 
he was at St. Ildefonso, a beautiful summer retreat for the kings of 
Spain,* where he halted an entire day, in order that his columns 
might close up, and be in a condition to act with effect, should it 
be necessary, on the morrow. The Guadarama mountains were 
then crossed, and General D' Urban' s Portuguese horse, sup- 
ported by Captain Macdonald's troop of horse artillery, some of 
the cavalry of the German Legion, and one of the light battalions, 
drove in a body of about 2,000 French cavalry, which were in 
observation in the plain beyond the mountains. This occurred 
on the morning of the 10th, but in the evening, the same force 
returning, with Joseph himself, to reconnoitre, a second time 
engaged General D' Urban, with a different result. The Portu- 
guese being ordered to charge, advanced accordingly; but sud- 
denly they became panic-stricken, and fled. The consequence 
was the capture of three of Macdonald's guns — which, owing to 
the depth of the roads, he could not remove, and the loss of 200 
men and about 120 horses. But the German cavalry did their 
business nobly, and checked the pursuit, till Ponsonby's brigade 

* "San Ildefonso is a village fifty miles north of Madrid. Here is situated 
the palace of La Granja, a favourite summer residence of the royal family. 
The building and gardens, with the numerous jets-d'eau> were formed after 
the model of the palace and gardens of Versailles, by the Bourbon dynasty, on 
their accession to the throne of Spain. The palace is situated at the bottom 
of the Sierra Nevada, an attached ridge of the Guadarama, in the recess in 
the north side of the mountain, which rises to a considerable height, covered 
with trees to its summit, and to the east and west, thus sheltering it at all 
times from the scorching heat of summer. The front of the building looks 
to the gardens, which rise before it, till they terminate in the craggy, pine- 
covered summit, adding much to the picturesque beauty of this delightful 
, residence. The whole presents a scene, certainly, much more calculated to 
remind the beholder of the verdure and freshness of a more northern clime, 
nan of the burning fields and ultry suns of Spain. — Mackie. 



334 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

and some of the seventh division, came up ; upon which the French 
drew off, and the guns, of which they had burnt the carriages, 
were recovered.* 

Such an affair was rather mortifying than disastrous, for it did 
not check the advance of the allies one hour. On the following 
morning, Lord Wellington resumed his march, and on the 12th, 
entered Madrid in triumph, f 

Long before the advanced cavalry reached the suburbs, they 
were met by crowds of both sexes, who rent the air with vivas 
and grasped the hands of the soldiers — while every door was 
thrown open, and every house illuminated. The city exhibited 
the appearance of a carnival, and the festivities were kept up till 
the dawn of the 13th came in. Yet was Lord Wellington careful 
to preserve order, even while he carried forward, without inter- 
ruption, the military operations in which he was engaged. That 
very evening the Retiro was invested ; and, as it was incapable of 
defence, it opened its gates next morning. Immediately, the 
new Constitution was proclaimed ; Don Carlos D'Espana was 
appointed governor of the city, and the people — still rejoicing, yet 
restrained from excesses of every sort — returned to their usual 
employments. 

All this while, the war, with an amazing sound of bustle and 
preparation, was permitted to languish elsewhere. An English 
squadron arrived, indeed, at Corunna, and, landing some marines 
and seamen, busied itself, with the Spanish corps nearest at hand, 
in the reduction of places which were of little use to anybody. 
In the east, likewise, a corps of 6,000 men, under General Mait- 
land — of which a large portion consisted of foreign levies, took 



* " It was one of the most disgraceful and unlooked-for events that had 
taken place during the campaign. To be beaten at any time was bad enough ; 
but to be beaten by a handful of Lancers, on the eve of entering Madrid, and 
almost in view of the city, was worse than all." — GrattarCs Reminiscences. 

f An immense collection of military stores fell into the hands of the allies. 
Within the walls were found 189 brass guns, 900 barrels of powder, and 20,000 
stand of arms, with magazines of clothing, provisions and ammunition, and a 
quantity of cables and cordage, which afterwards proved a most valuable 
acquisition. The eagles of the 13th and 51st regiments were also taken, 
immediately transmitted to England, and presented by Major Burgh to the 
Prince Regent. — Ed. 



1812]. FLIGHT OF KING JOSEPH. 335 

possession of Alicante, where it observed Suchet's army — and 
offered itself, but in vain, as a nucleus round which the Spaniards 
might have gathered strength. Meanwhile, Soult, with what 
object in view it is hard to determine, lay in his entrenched camp 
before Cadiz, against which, filled with Spanish and English 
troops, and amply supplied from the sea, it was quite certain that 
he could accomplish nothing. In June, he had threatened Hill, 
whom Lord Wellington had left in Estremadura to observe him, 
and there had occurred an affair at Ulna, in which General 
Slade's heavy cavalry suffered some loss, and sustained a defeat. 
But Hill flanked himself on the position of Albuera, which had 
been strengthened by redoubts and field-works, and showed so 
bold a front, that Soult did not venture to attack him. He, 
therefore, directed his march upon Seville, and, leaving a gar- 
rison there, laid siege to Cadiz, which he had not succeeded in 
carrying, as he had expected, by surprise. Thus, while skirmishes 
were fought, and victories claimed on both sides, the French and 
Spaniards remained, as far as the final issues of the contest were 
affected, in pretty much the same relative situations, towards each 
other, as they had occupied when the struggle first began. For, 
everywhere, the invaders were successful in the field, and the. 
resources of the best- organized provinces — those of the east — 
were at their disposal ; whereas, both there and elsewhere, not 
one rood of land owned their sway, except that which was occu- 
pied by their camps or garrisons. 

The battle of Salamanca produced an important change in the 
aspect of affairs throughout the Peninsula. Joseph fled from the 
capital, and, retiring towards Valencia, directed Soult and Suchet 
to unite their armies and retrieve his fortunes, should that be 
practicable. There needed no second summons to assure Soult 
of the necessity of this junction. Feeling that his position before 
Cadiz was worse than useless, he broke up his camp, destroyed 
his heavy cannon, and fell back to meet the fugitive king. His: 
rear was briskly followed in retreat by Colonel Skerret, and 
the Spanish division of General Cruz Alazon ; and, after a 
sharp action, Seville was recovered by assault. Two hundred 
prisoners, and much baggage, fell into the hands of the 
conquerors. 

Soult's retreat from Andalusia and Estremadura rendering 



336 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

Hill's presence in the latter province no longer necessary, he was 
ordered to join the main body at Madrid. There was no obstacle 
in the way to prevent the accomplishment of this movement ; 
but the situation of Lord Wellington — even with this addition to 
his force — was extremely critical. Stimulated to fresh exertions 
by the misfortunes which had befallen them, the French generals 
endeavoured, on all sides, to show a renewed front, and the lapse 
of a short time sufficed to place them all — Clausel, with his 
defeated army not excepted — on a footing, in some respects more 
formidable than that which they had held previously to the 
battle of Salamanca. And it was impossible, under these cir- 
cumstances, for the Allied general to retain his hold upon Madrid, 
where no efforts were made to call forth the military resources, 
either of the city, or of the surrounding districts.* 

Three courses were now left open to him. Either he might 
advance into the south, against Soult, in which case he must 
expose his rear and flank to the operations of Clausel and 
Jourdan ; or, he might proceed to Alicante, establish his commu- 
nications with Maitland, threaten the armies of Arragon and the 
centre, and prevent their junction with Soult, leaving a corps of 
sufficient strength to guard the passage of the Douro ; and, 
lastly, he might advance against the army of Portugal, which had 
again assumed an offensive attitude, and, pressing General Paget, 
had compelled him to withdraw to the opposite side of the river. 
The last of these plans of operation was finally adopted. Lord 
Wellington was assured that the resources of Galicia were not only 
not wasted, but that since the expulsion of the French, three years 
previously, they had never been called out ; and, as he knew 
that reinforcements from England would almost immediately 
reach him through the harbours on that coast, he thought it best 
to narrow the distance between himself and them. Besides, the 
Spaniards sought only to be put in possession of Burgos, and 
they would be able, with their own troops, to find Clausel 



* No pecuniary resources were to be found in Madrid. The inhabitants 
fed the garrison, and the produce of the sequestered and crown lands was 
readily given up to the allies, on promise of future payment ; but when money 
was required for the military chest, a few thousand dollars were all that 
could be procured, upon the most unquestionable security.— Ed. 



1812.] EVACUATION OF MADRID. 337 

employment. Accordingly, two divisions being left to garrison 
Madrid, General Hill was directed to take post, with his corps, 
at Aranjuez ; and Ballasteros, with his Spaniards, received orders 
in case Soult should approach the capital, to join himself to this 
latter corps, and oppose him. This done, Lord Wellington, 
with the remainder of his army, quitted Madrid, and, passing 
the Douro at the fords of Herrera and El Abrojo, took 
possession of Valladolid, from which Clausel retired at his 
approach. 

There was not much fighting in the progress of the march, 
which carried the British army through the valley of the 
Arlanzon, towards Burgos. Frequently the enemy appeared 
disposed to make a stand,* for he showed 18,000 infantry and 
2,000 cavalry, in line, and the allies were obliged to turn him. 
But the object of the French seemed rather to save their 
baggage than to risk a battle — and, having accomplished this 
object, they immediately resumed their retreat. 

On the 19th of September, Lord Wellington entered Burgos, 
whence Souham, who, the day before, had arrived to supersede 
Clausel in the command, fell back to Rumesca, leaving 2,000 
men to garrison the castle, against which the English general 
determined to commence operations at once. 

The means to besiege a place, no matter how unimportant, 
were quite inadequate to warrant any certainty of success. 
Lord Wellington's train was limited to eight pieces of battering- 
cannon; namely, three eighteen-pounders, long guns, and five 
twenty-four pound iron howitzers ; while of ammunition, the 
supply was proportionably scanty. But it was of great consequence 
that he should not be long hampered w r here he was; and he 
trusted, and not without reason, to the good fortune of his 
former exploits. Accordingly, a formidable horn- work on the 
hill of St. Michael, which commanded some part of the castle, 
was assaulted that very night ; and the assault, though bravely 
resisted, was perfectly successful. It cost the assailants dear ; 

* " At Cigales and Dueas, in the Pisuerga valley ; at Magoz, Torquemada^ 
Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega, in the valley of the Arlanzon, 
the French General thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 
16th 7 by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino." — Napier. 



338 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

400 men were killed and wounded ; yet was it an important 
acquisition, and the gallantry of Major Cocks, to whose exertions 
the success might mainly be attributed, received the commenda- 
tion it deserved. 

From this date, up to the 20th of October, that is, throughout 
the space of an entire month, the siege dragged on. The means 
at the disposal of the British general were so inadequate, that the 
ordinary rules of war were laid aside, and the brave hearts and 
strong right arms of the soldiers, were required to accomplish that 
which, in ordinary cases, is entrusted to the skill of the engineer. 
Instead of battering in breach, mines were carried under the 
castle walls, and exploded; while, by escalade, the troops won 
post after post, not without a terrible, though necessary, expendi- 
ture of human life ; for the Castle of Burgos was a place of com- 
manding altitude, and, considering the process adopted for its 
reduction, one also, of prodigious strength. It consisted of 
three distinct lines of fortifications, which, being drawn round the 
-cone of the hill, rose one above the other ; while last of all was 
the ancient keep, a solid mass of masonry, within which, after all 
the exterior defences were carried, it was still competent for a 
small and resolute garrison to maintain themselves. Moreover, 
there were within these lines 2,000 as good troops as ever carried 
arms, and at their head was General Du Breton, an officer of 
proven skill and determined courage. Everything, therefore, was 
against the attempt which Lord Wellington had determined to 
make — save the conviction of the advantages that must arise from 
success, and a perfect knowledge that whatever men could do 
to obtain it, would be done by the gallant soldiers under his 
command. 

Lord Wellington had brought with him from Madrid, four 
divisions of his army — the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh, with two 
Portuguese brigades, and all the materiel which was at his dis- 
posal. To the first and sixth divisions, and the brigades of 
Portuguese, was entrusted the conduct of the siege, while the 
fifth and seventh took post on the high road to France, to watch 
the proceedings of Souham's army, and cover the operations as 
they went on. Nothing could exceed the devotion of both officers 
and men. Though twice repulsed, first on the night of the 21st, 
and afterwards on the 29 th, the assailants won the outer line, on 



1812.] SIEGE OF BURGOS. 339 

the 4th of October, by rushing up the ruins of a breach while it 
still smoked and heaved from the effect of a mine which had 
recently exploded. Here they were assailed next day, before they 
could cover themselves or establish a lodgment, and, after much 
desperate fighting were driven back again ; but what they have 
once gained, British soldiers are unwilling to lose ; in turn they 
re- issued from the lines, attacked the breach a second time, and 
a second time were successful. This triumph, unhappily, was 
evanescent as it had been brilliant. A heavy fire was continually 
poured upon them, and frequent sorties made, in one of which, 
executed a little before daybreak on the 8th, all their works were 
destroyed, and Major Cocks, the gallant leader in the assault 
upon St. Michael, was slain. 

Little was to be done against the second line, except by storm- 
ing — but the guns continued to fire at intervals, and red-hot shot 
w r ere thrown upon the church of La Blanca, with the design of 
setting it on fire. But though it frequently emitted smoke from 
the roof, no conflagration took place ; and the enemy's cannonade 
from the keep was so overpowering, that the English batteries 
could not withstand it. Accordingly, an attempt was made to 
keep down the fire by musketry, which had no other effect than 
to exhaust the supplies in store. From this also, the troops were 
directed to abstain ; but mines were pushed forward, and breaches 
effected, through which, on the afternoon of the 1 8th, storming- 
parties were directed to make their way. The honour of leading, 
on this occasion, was assigned to detachments of the guards and 
the King's German legion, and both, it must be admitted, did 
their duty nobly. 

They gained the summit of the breaches, and formed along the 
rampart ; but, unfortunately, they were not promptly supported — 
and the garrison attacking them in overwhelming numbers, they 
were driven down the slope with heavy loss. This was the last 
attempt to reduce the Castle of Burgos — for Lord Wellington, 
€nding that the whole of the French force in Spain was moving 
towards him from opposite directions, became uneasy — and after 
an affair at the outposts with Souham's advanced guard, in which 
Lord Edward Paget greatly distinguished himself, he suspended 
the proceedings, and waited a brief space to watch the event. 



340 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

Lord Wellington had good cause for apprehension. Souham, 
reinforced by every disposable man from the north, was in full 
inarch to deliver battle, should such be necessary, and to relieve 
the beleaguered fortress. Elsewhere, too, all the moveable 
columns of the enemy were pouring towards Burgos as a centre. 
Soult, abandoning Seville, as has been mentioned, marched 
rapidly upon Granada and Murcia ; while King Joseph and 
Marshal Jourdan, leaving Suchet to observe the eastern pro- 
vinces, hastened to join him with their troops. The whole united, 
moved upon Madrid; so that, by the 21st of October, not fewer 
than 70,000 men were in position near Aranjuez. 

Meanwhile, Sir Rowland Hill, putting himself at the head of two 
divisions, observed the enemy with great boldness, yet not with- 
out a consciousness of his insecurity. Ballasteros, so far from 
obeying the orders which were issued to him, had taken offence 
at the appointment of Lord Wellington as Commander-in-chief 
of the Spanish armies ; and, having hung upon the flanks of 
Soult' s corps as far as Granada, he halted there and drew off 
into the interior. For this he was very properly degraded by the 
authorities, and sent into banishment at Ceuta. But the mis- 
chief occasioned by an outburst of temper so ill-timed, was 
irremediable — a free road was left to the enemy to the gates of 
the capital, and beyond them to Wellington's rear, should 
General Hill's corps be overpowered. 

Such was the state of affairs on the 21st of October. Burgos 
still held out, and, from the defective means of attack at the 
disposal of the besiegers, the hope of reducing it appeared distant 
as ever. In Wellington's immediate front stood Souham, with 
an army numerically equal to the allies, and, in point of cavalry, 
very superior. Hill was seriously threatened; and the flank 
and rear of Wellington menaced also by forces too powerful to 
be encountered — while of the Spanish levies, some were dis- 
persed, others inactive, and the few which kept the field, neither 
disciplined nor armed. It is true that General Maitland held 
Alicante with an Anglo- Sicilian army — and that from Cadiz, 
now open to the interior, a British brigade under Colonel Skerret 
was hastening towards Madrid. But against Suchet, the most 
active of the French marshals, and commanding an army nume- 



1812.] RAISING OF A SIEGE. 341 

rous, well-organized, and flushed with constant success, Maitland 
could make no head ; while Skerret's troops were a mere handful, 
which, however excellent as far as they went, could not seriously 
affect the issue of a battle. Under these circumstances there 
remained for Lord Wellington no choice but to retreat. It was 
necessary that his communications with Portugal should continue 
uninterrupted ; for from Portugal he still continued to draw all 
his supplies, and to give him any chance of making head against 
the multitudes that pressed him, he must at once concentrate his 
divisions. Accordingly, the siege of Burgos was formally raised, 
during the night of the 21st of October. Whatever was service- 
able of the wretched artillery with which it had been carried on., 
the troops withdrew ; and the whole army, filing under cover of 
the darkness, across the bridge of the Arlanzon, suffered almost 
nothing from the fire of the batteries of the castle.* 

Lord Wellington did not move alone. An express was sent off 
to Sir Rowland Hill, warning him of the intended retreat, and 
desiring that Madrid should be instantly abandoned, and 
Salamanca be the place of rendezvous for the separated columns. 
Accordingly, Sir Rowland, having been joined by Skerret,. 
began his march, which was the more necessary because of 
the disposition which the enemy had exhibited of interposing 
between him and his line of communications. He did not 
abandon Madrid, however, till after the Retiro had been dis- 
mantled, and the stores and provisions which it was found 
impossible to remove had either been distributed among the 
inhabitants, or rendered useless to the enemy. Then, having 
taken due precautions for the preservation of order, he fell back* 
by easy marches, on the Tonnes. 

The retrograde movements of Lord Wellington's columns were 

* To pass an army over bridges, within even musket-range of an enemy's 
batteries, may justly be considered a most perilous operation, and one that 
requires the utmost skill in the commander and discipline among the troops. 
In this instance, however, it was effected, and in a most masterly manner. 
Silence and rapidity, of course, were strictly enjoined; and the wheels of the 
gun-carriages were muffled with straw. As night fell, the abandonment of 
the position was commenced ; and although it was moonlight, the first 
division succeeded in passing over without the loss of a man. — Ed. 

A A 



342 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

at once more rapid, and beset with greater perils. Souham, 
though he lost an entire day by the skilful march which was 
executed on the night of the 21st, put the strength both of men 
and horses to the test, in order to recover it; and on the 23rd, 
there was a sharp affair upon the Harmora, in front of Celada del 
Gamino, in which Lieut. -Colonel Pell, of the 16th Light 
Dragoons, was taken prisoner, and our cavalry sustained some 
loss. But Colonel Halket, with the light infantry of the German 
legion, was at hand to support them, and he did that duty gal- 
lantly. The French cavalry were driven back — and the march 
was continued as far as Cordovilla, where the head- quarters were 
that night established. 

During the whole of the 24th, the enemy, though they hung 
upon the rear, appeared little anxious to bring on a battle. 
They had been taught, by the result of yesterday's affair, that 
their adversaries were nowise dispirited ; and they did not con- 
ceive that they were in force enough to press them too severely. 
Yet had Lord Wellington serious difficulties to contend against. 
In the first place, his means of transport were so defective, that 
to move forward the sick and wounded was all but impossible — 
and, secondly, the line of march running through one of the 
greatest wine countries in Spain, no exertions on the part of the 
officers could keep the men from drinking to excess.* It is a 
known characteristic of the British soldier, that, while advancing, 
he is tractable and obedient, but when called upon to retreat, 
he loses, not his courage, but his temper, and too often becomes 
unmanageable. But the officers exerted themselves most strenu- 
ously, and a forced march of twenty miles having been accom- 
plished, the army took up, at night, a strong position between 

* " Torquemada witnessed a most disgraceful scene of riot and confusion 
on the part of the British. There, immense wine-stores were found and 
plundered ; and it was computed, that at one time, 12,000 men were lying in 
the streets and houses, in a state of helpless intoxication. Nor was the 
boasted sobriety of the French proof against the temptation which these well- 
stored cellars presented. On their subsequent occupation of the town, 
Souham was obliged to stay his march for twelve hours ; for his own corps 
numbered more drunkards than even that of Lord Wellington." — Victories of 
the British Armies. 



1812.] SKIRMISHES DURING RETREAT. 343 

Villa Muriel and Duenas, on the Carrion. Here a brigade of 
guards, under the Earl of Dalhousie, which had landed at 
Corunna, joined the allied commander ; and here, partly to give 
time for the removal of his hospitals, and partly with the view to 
afford Lord Hill an opportunity of coming up, Lord Wellington 
determined to halt during the whole of the 25th. 

The Carrion, and the Pisuerga, by which the front of the 
English army was now covered, are both spanned by bridges at 
various points ; and it was deemed necessary, as a measure of 
precaution, to destroy them. Those at Villa Muriel and Duenas 
were blown up ; but, at Palencia, the enemy attacked the detach- 
ment employed in the work, and saved the bridges. The same 
disaster occurred at Tercejo, where a mine exploded imperfectly, 
and the covering- party, under Captain Ferguson, of the 58th 
regiment, were all made prisoners. This enabled the enemy to 
throw a corps across the Pisuerga, and to threaten the British 
posts which guarded the Carrion ; but a movement in advance 
by the brigades of Generals Pringle and Barnes, obliged them to 
fall back, and they recrossed the stream in confusion. In like 
manner, though they crossed the Carrion, at Palencia, in con- 
siderable force, they were not able to maintain themselves. A 
body of Spaniards, being ordered to dislodge them, failed ; but 
the fifth division soon came up, and, after some sharp fighting, 
they were driven to the opposite side of the river. 

On the 26th, the march was resumed, and carried the army 
sixteen miles to the rear, and placed them behind the Pisuerga, 
above Cabezon del Campo, where the bridge was barricaded and 
secured, but where no attempts were made by the enemy to 
carry it. Souham, impeded and delayed by the necessity that 
was forced upon him of repairing the bridges at Duenas and 
Villa Muriel, did not show himself till the evening, — and when 
the mists of the morning cleared away, and permitted a full view 
of the French columns, Lord Wellington recommenced his retreat 
down the Pisuerga ; the enemy vainly endeavouring to interrupt 
the movement by a cannonade across the stream, which did some 
damage to the hospital, wounded an officer of artillery, and 
excited a momentary alarm among the muleteers and other 
followers of the camp. But an attempt to gain possession of 
the bridge at Cabezon failed entirely. 

a a2 



344 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

The 28th exhibited the same species of military operations, 
Lord Wellington still stretching towards the Douro, and Souham 
seeking an opportunity of interposing between the allies and that 
river, and attacking the bridges at Simancas and Valladolid — 
but from both points he was driven back with loss. 

On the 29 th, the Douro was crossed at Tudela and Puerte del 
Douro, and, the bridges being destroyed, and the waters much 
up, both officers and men began to regard themselves as secure. 
But the same night, a body of French infantry swam the river, 
near Tordesillas, and, coming by surprise on a German battalion, 
which had been posted there to guard the bridge, put them to 
the rout ; and, by a most gallant exploit, re-established the 
communication.* It thus became necessary for the allies to make 
a fresh movement, and ground was, early next morning, taken up 
along the heights which extend from Tordesillas to Rueda. 
Here Lord Wellington determined to receive a battle, should 
Souham take courage to offer it ; and here, in nearly the 
same position which he had occupied the previous July, and 
which he had abandoned to win the victory of Salamanca, he 
remained in an attitude of warlike repose, up to the 6th of 
November. 

While the commander-in-chief was executing these masterly 
manoeuvres, Sir Rowland Hill, an officer well qualified to 
co-operate even with Lord Wellington, was retiring in excellent 
order, with his divisions from Madrid, His first day's march 
carried him to the park of the Escurial ; during the second, he 
threaded the passes of the Guadarama mountains ; his third 
enabled him, by means of patrols, to open a communication 
with Loid Wellington, which, at the close of the fourth, that is, 

* " The French arrived, and seemed for some time at a loss, but very soon 
sixty French officers and non-commissioned officers, headed by Captain 
Guingret, a daring man, formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, 
and then plunged into the water, holding their swords with their teeth, and 
swimming and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a 
cannonade, they thus crossed this great river, though it was in full and strong 
water, and the weather very cold ; and having reached the other side, naked 
as they were, stormed the tower. The Brunswick regiment then abandoned 
its position, and these gallant soldiers remained masters of the bridge." — 
Napier, 



1812.] EXPLOIT OF FRENCH OFFICERS. 345 

on the 3rd of November, was fully established. From that 
moment, both divisions of the army may be said to have been 
masters of themselves. Their lines of retreat were very clearly 
marked — and every league which they accomplished drew them 
nearer to a common centre, on which it would be easy to act 
according to the front presented by the enemy ; and towards that 
common centre, on the 6th of November, their combined move- 
ments began. 

On that day, Hill w T as at Alba de Tormes ; and on the 7th, 
the light division, which covered his rear, reached the same point. 
Lord Wellington fell back upon Torrecilla del Orden, and on the 
Sth, occupied the heights of St. Christoval, in front of Salamanca. 
Here, Hill's little army became incorporated with his own, and 
the defence of Alba de Tormes was left to a Portuguese division 
cinder General Hamilton. But Souham, who had halted on the 
Douro, till Soult and Jourdan should come up, did not show 
himself till the 9th. On that day, however, General Hamilton's 
post was furiously assailed by fifteen squadrons of cavalry and 
twenty guns, the unceasing efforts of which, upon troops in 
position, made no impression whatever ; and the Portuguese held 
their ground. But the odds against Lord Wellington were, by 
this time, such as to render the chances of success in a pitched 
battle everything but certain. The marshals had brought to bear 
upon his 48,000 foot and 5,000 horse, not fewer than 80,000 
infantry and 12,000 cavalry; and they showed no disposition — . 
even with that superiority in point of numbers, rashly to commit 
themselves. The whole of the interval between the 9th and the 
14th was spent in reconnoitring, and not till they had discovered 
three fords near Encinas did the French generals make any effort 
to close with their enemy. 

The river being crossed, it was no longer id Lord Wellington's 
power to hold, with safety to his communications, the position 
which heretofore he had occupied. He accordingly changed his 
ground ; and, taking up the line of his great victory of the 
previous June, he there showed such a front as induced the 
Marshals to conclude that he intended to accept battle. On the 
15th the enemy presented themselves in prodigious force, and a 
cannonnade began, but it led to no serious fighting. It was 



346 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxx. 

clearly the design of the Marshals to outmanoeuvre the allies, 
and the march of their cavalry towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road 
left no doubt as to the nature of the object which they intended 
to accomplish. Accordingly, about two in the afternoon, Lord 
Wellington's army began to move towards the Agueda, the whole 
marching in three parallel columns, having the cavalry on the 
left, and the Spaniards on the right. It was a day of incessant 
and terrible rain ; indeed, for some time previously, the weather 
had broken entirely, and the whole face of the flat country was 
inundated. Through roads which had attained the consistency of 
mud, the troops went onwards, each step sinking the men beyond 
the ancles ; while, at night, they halted in a wood where the soil 
was literally a swamp. In like manner, the 17th found them 
marching under a deluge, the rear threatened continually by the 
enemy's cavalry, and halting from time to time, to beat them 
back. Neither did the day pass without some disaster. The 
centre column, having quitted its ground rather too soon, gave an 
opportunity to some of the enemy's horsemen of penetrating into 
the interval, when they fell upon the baggage, caused considerable 
alarm, and carried off Sir Edward Paget a prisoner. This officer 
having observed that the space between one division and another 
was wider than was prudent, had ridden back to hurry forward 
the loiterers, and, arriving at the point of attack just as the 
French cavalry had come up, to the regret of the whole army, 
he was surrounded and made prisoner. 

The march continued, and when the columns reached a stream 
which flows beneath the heights of Samunoz, sharper work appear- 
ed to be cut out for the troops ; inasmuch as the rivulet, swollen 
by the late rains, was passable only at one or two points, and the 
French pressed briskly on the rear. The light division conse- 
quently drew up, among the steep ground, and, with Major Mac- 
donald's brigade of horse artillery, prepared to give battle. But 
the enemy would not engage ; they collected, indeed, in consi- 
derable force under cover of the forest, and opened a heavy 
cannonade, which occasioned some loss, and when the light 
division, having seen the rest of the army safe, Began to retire, 
then they pushed forward. But a warm skirmish, and nothing 
more, carried the light troops in good order across the stream. 



1812.] THE ARMY IN CANTONMENTS 347 

There they halted for the night, being again left without either 
food or shelter ; though cheered, amid those privations, with 
something like a hope that the morrow might bring them at least 
revenge ; but in this they were disappointed. 

The enemy, worn out with the exertions of the previous days, 
molested them no more ; and on the 1 9th the allied army, 
without further difficulty, took cantonments round Ciudad 
Rodrigo. 

Thus ended the campaign of 1812, without all question the 
most masterly, if not the most brilliant, which Lord Wellington 
had yet conducted. Besides putting him in possession of two of the 
most important fortresses which cover the principal roads from 
Spain into Portugal, it enabled him to achieve the great victory 
of Salamanca; to deliver Andalusia and the southern provinces 
from the weight which pressed them down ; to drive the intruder, 
at least for a while, from his capital ; and to derange the whole 
plan of operations which he and his marshals had most carefully 
arranged. Had there been in the counsels of Spain any degree 
of energy, or in its armed bands any discipline, or even the 
capability of acquiring it, it seems impossible but that advantage 
would have been taken of the opportunities of striking with effect 
which were thus amply afforded. With the exception of Suchet's 
corps, and a few garrisons and moveable columns here and there, 
not a Frenchman capable of bearing arms, but had been called 
away to one point. Joseph, Jourdan, Souham, and Soult, all bore 
upon Lord Wellington, and though he found them such constant 
employment that they had no leisure to look elsewhere, yet, 
during that unfortunate interval, no progress was made in the 
organization of the Spanish forces, nor did they endeavour to act, 
except as guerillas, on the enemy's communications. On the 
contraiy, because Burgos had not fallen, and the British army 
had found it necessary to retreat, a feeling of despondency 
seemed to take possession of every mind — and he, who felt that 
he had gained much, and would presently, be in a position to 
gain more, was harassed by complaints from all quarters. Lord 
Wellington, however, was not the sort of man to yield to diffi- 
culties — and, having sharply reproved his troops for their irregu- 
larities during the retreat, he placed them in winter- quarters 



348 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

behind the Agueda ; while, the French having withdrawn — he 
devoted this period of repose to preparations for a new campaign, 
to be commenced with increased vigour, and also with better 
hopes of ultimate success. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 



Difficulties with which Lord Wellington was beset — His new arrangements 
with the governments — The campaign of 1813 opens— Advance from the 
Douro — Brilliant successes — Battle of Vittoria — Sieges of St. Sebastian, 
and blockade of Pamplona — Battles of the Pyrenees — Second siege of 
St. Sebastian— City taken by storm— Passage of the Bidassoa — Battles of 
the Nivelle and the Nive — End of the campaign. 

Until the Duke of Wellington's dispatches were given to the 
world, the extraordinary difficulties which hourly presented them- 
selves to the allied commander could be but imperfectly imagined. 
Not only was it necessary for him to struggle against party 
prejudices, and the mistaken dread of expense at home; but 
he had all the perverseness of Portuguese duplicity, and all the 
pride of Spanish indolence to contend with; and while, apart 
from these, his opinions were perpetually sought in reference to 
projects, every one of which might have given occupation, by 
itself, to a mind moulded in less gigantic proportions than his own. 
Among other things, the Spaniards having recently conferred upon 
him the chief command of their armies, he judged it expedient, so 
soon as the campaign had fairly ended, to proceed to Cadiz, to 
hold personal communications with the Cortes and the Regency, 
Thither, accordingly, he proceeded ; and, in spite of every obstacle 
which personal jealousy and a spirit of procrastination could 
fling in his way, he succeeded in effecting a reorganization of the 
national force, and the junction of the general staff to his own. 
In the efforts which he made to infuse more vigour into the civil 
government, he was not so successful : " I wish," he says, in a 
letter to Lord Bathurst, written after he had returned to his head- 



1813.] LORD WELLINGTON AT CADIZ. 349 

quarters at Frenada, " that some of our reformers would go to 
Cadiz, to see the benefit of a sovereign popular assembly calling 
itself ' Majesty/ and of a written Constitution, and of an 
executive government called ' Highness,' acting under the control 
of his ' Majesty' the assembly. " But his language in reference to 
military affairs was more cheering. " I have been at Cadiz," 
he writes to Sir Thomas Graham, " where I have placed military 
affairs on a better footing than they were before, in the way of 
organization." So also, a rapid journey which he made to 
Lisbon was not without its uses, while his representations to the 
home authorities, though not always acted upon as they ought to 
have been, brought out, during the winter, large and important 
supplies of every description. For the first time since the com- 
mencement of the war, tents were issued to the troops ; camp- 
kettles of a more convenient size were supplied ; and there came 
out, besides a large remount, several fine regiments of cavalry 
and infantry, with guns, and a pontoon train. Hence, as spring 
came round, he was able to take the field with an army more 
effective and more numerous than had ever before obeyed his 
orders. Of British and Portuguese alone, he counted on 65,000 
— while the Spaniards, though not greatly to be depended upon, 
were still believed to be tolerably available. 

It was not, however, on account of the increased exertions 
among the allies, that the prospects of the war became more 
cheering than they had been previously. Napoleon had sus- 
tained unexpected reverses in Russia ; and, to recruit his shat- 
tered armies in the north, large drafts were made from the forces 
in Spain, and some of the ablest of the generals were removed. 
Among others, Soult was withdrawn ; and the chief command 
devolved, consequently, upon Joseph himself. But Joseph, 
though still supported by 160,000 good troops, felt himself so 
insecure, that while he fortified the line of the Douro, he ceased 
not to look back towards the Ebro — and even as early as the 
month of March, he seemed to have counted on a retreat as far 
as the latter river. 

Meanwhile, the Anglo- Sicilian corps which had hitherto 
remained inactive in Alicante, began to show a front. 
Under the command of Sir John Murray, it took the field 
in April, and fought a gallant, though indecisive action, at 



350 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

Castalla; of which the results forced Suchet to a retreat, and 
infused fresh courage into the minds of men who felt, at last, 
that they had been brought to Spain for more purposes than 
parade. Moreover, there was great activity among the smaller 
bands, which, under Longa and Mina, and their subordinates, 
ranged through the eastern provinces, and occasioned the enemy 
much loss and great anxiety. All these events contributed, in 
their several degrees, to raise the moral tone of the allies, while, 
at the same time, they threw a damp upon the spirits of the 
intrusive king and the chiefs by whom he was supported. But 
the day w r as coming when operations of a more decisive character 
should occur — and the storm, long delayed, burst at last, w T hich 
was destined to sweep the invaders over their own frontier. 

It had been Lord Wellington's intention to put his army in 
motion by the 1st of May, at the latest. The difficulty of 
bringing up the pontoons, with other accidents, prevented him 
from moving till the 16th, but on that day, he quitted his long 
line of cantonments, and in three columns bore upon the enemy. 
Six divisions of British infantry, two of Portuguese, with a large 
force of both Portuguese and British cavalry, crossed the Douro 
under Sir Thomas Graham, so as to take ground, by corps, at 
Braganza, Onteiro, Vimioso, Malhaded, and Miranda de Douro. 
Lord Wellington himself headed, at the same time, to Salamanca, 
with the light division and a brigade of cavalry — while Sir Row- 
land Hill, w 7 ith his own division, the second, and a force of 
Spaniards, marched from Estramadura towards Alba de Tormes. 
The grand point of junction was Valladolid ; and the object of 
the combined movement, was to turn the enemy's posts upon the 
Douro, and force them back beyond Burgos and the capital. 

No success could be more perfect than that which attended 
the operation. Lord Wellington entered Salamanca as the rear 
of the French withdrew, and his cavalry, falling upon that of the 
enemy, defeated it w r ith the loss of 200 prisoners, and many 
more killed and wounded. General Hill, too, came up so 
rapidly and so well, that no attempt could be made to stop 
him — and the columns, uniting between the Tormes and the 
Douro, paused till the fate of Graham's operations should be 
known. 

These, owing to bad roads, and swollen rivers, were more tardy, 



1813.] PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN. 351 

while the route which he followed was exceedingly circuitous; 
but in the end all difficulties were surmounted. Lord Wellington, 
leaving his own corps, passed the Douro on the 29th, and joined 
Graham between that river and the Esla. On the 30tb, the troops 
advanced as far as Carragales ; and on the following morning 
began to cross the Esla. 

It was a perilous service, for the current ran strong, the ford 
was deep, and the bottom full of large stones, yet the hussars, 
taking each an infantry soldier in charge, effected it gallantly. 
A few were swept away ; others a good deal bruised ; but, as the 
enemy's picket offered no resistance, the loss sustained was 
trifling. Immediately, a bridge was thrown over the river, and 
the infantry and guns made good their passage without hazard or 
inconvenience. 

Lord Wellington's splendid manoeuvre had thus accomplished 
all its purpose. The army, never for a moment losing its com- 
munications with Ciudad Rodrigo, was so placed as to have half 
encircled the French cantonments, thus driving the enemy not only 
out of Salamanca, Zamora, and the line which they had hereto- 
fore held, but forcing them back upon Toro, and rendering their 
divisions in Madrid exceedingly nervous. These latter, indeed, 
would not venture to keep their ground. They fell back both 
from the capital and Toledo, crossing the Upper Douro and 
marching upon Burgos ; while the allies, advancing towards 
Toro, swept all before them, not without a brilliant and success- 
ful cavalry action at a little distance from the town. Then 
followed, in rapid succession, the passages of the Carrion and the 
Pisuerga — the enemy, though now entirely concentrated, offering 
no opposition, but taking up a position as if they meant to seek 
a battle, rather than permit Burgos to fall into the hands of the 
pursuers. 

Once more, however, the courage of King Joseph seemed to 
fail him when the moment of action had arrived. Lord Welling- 
ton, after a few days' halt, by which his rear was enabled to close 
up, and his jaded men and horses were refreshed, made a flank 
movement against Reille, who was strongly posted above the 
village of Hormoza — and, pressing him hard with his cavalry, he 
compelled him to retire. But the retreat, though difficult, was 
conducted in admirable order; the French behaved with sur- 



352 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

passing gallantry, and the two armies continued, from day to day, 
in each others presence, and with an increasing respect for one 
another. Still the tide of success was turned — and it never 
ceased to flow in one unvaried stream while a French soldier 
remained upon the Peninsula. 

A battle for the preservation of Burgos was, however, confi- 
dently anticipated, but that event did not take place. While 
the allied divisions were resting on their ground, or moving up 
to take their respective positions in the proposed line of attack, 
they were alarmed, on the morning of the 13th of June, by a 
sound as of an earthquake, and ascertained, soon afterwards, that 
the castle of Burgos had been blown up, and that the French 
were in full retreat upon the Ebro. A close and well ordered 
pursuit immediately began — -not, however, for the purpose of 
assailing them in front, and bringing on an action where the 
banks were high, and the passes difficult. Lord Wellington 
had a different design — he moved to the left, and, traversing a 
*wild and rocky district, where it was not supposed that artillery 
-could move, he won the bridges of San Martin, Rocamunda, 
and Puente Arinas. By these, on the 14th and 15th, the pas- 
sage of the river was effected, and such was the skill with which 
the important end was gained, that, on the 16th and 17th, an 
opportunity was given for the achievement of two brilliant affairs 
by two separate columns of the army. Not far from Trias, and 
at a place called San Milan, the light division fell in with a 
strong body of troops, which, having been heretofore employed 
in keeping the Biscayans in order, was on its march to join 
King Joseph, at Vittoria. A fierce and prompt attack, though, 
for a while, fiercely resisted, ended in the overthrow of that 
column, which, leaving behind about 300 prisoners, dispersed 
and sought for safety among the mountains. In like manner, 
the fifth division encountered a strong corps at Espejo, which, 
confident in its numbers, began the battle, but here, as at San 
Milan, the British troops prevailed, and the enemy retreated 
towards the Bay as. 

It was evident, from these and other signs of concentration, 
that the enemy were not disposed to abandon Spain without a 
trial of strength. Lord Wellington, during his advance on the 
19th, found a strong rear-guard on the left of the Bayas, which 



1813.] ACTION AT SAN MILAN. 353 

he drove back, after a little manceuvering, upon the road 
between Pancorbo and Vittoria. On the 20th, he halted his 
leading divisions, to enable the rest to reach their ground— 
and, finding the enemy were halted also, he proceeded to recon- 
noitre. The French were strongly posted, with their right in 
front of Vittoria, to defend the passages of the Zadorra, near that 
city — and their left resting upon the heights of La Puebla de 
Arganzon.* In rear of the divisions which formed the left, 
there was a strong reserve at the village of Gomecha ; while 
the right of the centre drew up upon a hill which commanded 
the whole valley — a position, in every point, singularly defensi- 
ble. It was altogether a formidable position, and was held by 
75,000 excellent troops, with a park of 152 pieces of cannon, 
encumbered however, with an enormous train of baggage and 
am munition -waggons. 

Lord Wellington determined to attack ; and, at an early hour in 
the morning of the 21st, he carried his determination into 
effect. 

The dispositions for the battle may be easily understood. Sir 
Rowland Hill, with the second British division, the Portuguese of 
the Conde de Amarante, and General Murillo's Spaniards, was 
ordered to drive the enemy from the heights of Puebla — while 
Sir Thomas Graham, with the first and fifth divisions, supported 
by two brigades of cavalry, and Colonel Longa's Spaniards, was 
to make a wide detour to the left, and, crossing the Zadorra, fall 
upon the enemy's right, and cut them off from the great road 
which leads from Vittoria to Bayonne. At the same time, the 
centre, consisting of the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and light divisions, was 
ordered rather to threaten than deliver their attack, till it should 
be ascertained that the movements on the flanks had been 
executed — and they were then directed to carry the entrenched 



* u It is remarkable, that within sight of this ground, the battle of Najara 
was fought, in which Edward the Black Prince, acting as the ally of a bad 
man, defeated the best troops in France, under their most distinguished 
leader, Bertrand Du Guesclin, who was come in support of a worse. It is 
also remarkable, that the Prince of Brazil, before the battle of Vittoria was 
fought, should have conferred the title of Duque de Vittoria upon Lord Wel- 
lington."— Souther/. 



354 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

bridges that spanned the Zadorra in their front, and overthrow all 
that might oppose them. Such was the plan — simple and scien- 
tific — and its execution was suited, in every respect, to the 
valour and experience of those to whom it was confidently 
entrusted. 

A little before daylight, the troops were under arms. Hill and 
Graham advanced boldly towards their points of attack, while 
the generals in command of the remaining divisions moved upon 
the river, where, for some hours, there occurred little else than a 
skirmish between the light infantry and the French outposts. 
But, elsewhere, more serious work was in progress. With a 
brigade of Spaniards, Hill carried the heights at a rush ; because, 
strange to say, the French had occupied them loosely, and did 
not seem to expect that they would be assailed ; but the event 
showed, that to take was easier than to retain possession. The 
Spaniards were, in their turn, assailed — and the advance of the 
71st regiment, with a light battalion from General Walker's 
brigade, alone prevented the enemy from recovering this, the key 
of their position. Here the fighting was obstinate ; neither side 
being willing to yield ; and the slaughter was consequently heavy. 
Colonel Cadogan, a brave and intelligent officer, was among the 
number of the slain. But the valour of the English ultimately 
prevailed, and the heights of Puebla remained in their possession. 

While this was going on at the right of the allied line, the left, 
under Sir Thomas Graham, was actively and successfully em- 
ployed. On some high grounds which look down upon the 
villages of Gamarra Mayor, and Abechuco, both villages on the 
great road from Vittoria to Bilboa, he encountered a division of 
the enemy, who had there entrenched themselves, and appeared 
resolute to hinder his passage of the river. But, without hesita- 
tion he attacked them — Pack's Portuguese, and Longa's Spaniards 
leading the way, and driving them from their ground — while 
Robertson's brigade of the fifth division carried Gamarra Mayor 
with the bayonet. This done, the first division were directed 
against Abechuco, which they carried with the utmost gallantry ; 
nor could all the enemy's efforts, and they were several times 
repeated during the day, succeed in recovering either of the 
villages. Accordingly, the confusion which the successes of the 
allies on other points had occasioned, became speedily irretriev- 



1813.] BATTLE OF VITTORIA. 355 

able — for the centres had already come in contact, and everywhere, 
the French were beaten most decisively. Crossing the Zadorra 
at four different points, the 4th, light, 3rd, and 7th divisions, 
assailed the high ground on which, as yet, the enemy had main- 
tained himself unmolested, and, after a desperate resistance, 
pushed him from it. 

Now commenced a general retreat, which the occupation of two 
out of the three roads by which it might have been effected, 
changed speedily into a rout. Guns, tumbrils, waggons loaded 
with baggage, and with plunder, fell into the hands of the victors, 
or of the camp-followers who attended them ; while, out of the 
whole park, only one gun and a howitzer remained to the enemy. 
Had the nature of the country allowed a free use of cavalry, the 
French infantry must have been cut to pieces — for, as it was, the 
regiments which effected their escape, arrived at Pamplona, and 
took shelter in the defile beyond it, without arms, and in a state 
of complete disorganization.* 

Since the commencement of the war in the Peninsula, the 
allies had never gained a victory so complete as this in every 
point of view, or one pregnant with such important consequences. 
They had been opposed to the united strength of the French 
armies, and had totally overthrown them ; for, with the excep- 
tion of one body of 15,000, under Clausel, which did not come 
up to the Ebro, and another, of which Foy was in command, and 
which had been in observation of Bilbao, every disposable soldier 
belonging to the armies in the south, north, and that of Portugal, 
had been brought into the field. On the other hand, the 
absence of the sixth division, which observed Clausel, and pro- 
tected the long line of communications between the camp and its 



* Incapable as they were of offering any resistance, darkness and the nature 
of the ground alone favoured the escape of the routed and totally disorganized 
battalions. At the distance of two leagues from Vittoria, the pursuit was 
given up, but the horse-artillery continued for some time to harass the retreat 
by a discharge of shells and round shot. Lord Wellington returned to the 
city about nine in the evening, and found every door closed and every 
lattice darkened. A solitary lantern hung in front of each house, and gave to 
the place a most mournful and melancholy aspect. Two nights before, 
Vittoria had blazed with fight, in honour of the presence of King; Joseph. — 
Ed. 



356 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

supplies, diminished the strength of the allied army by nearly 
seven thousand men ; while, in point of artillery, the allies were 
greatly inferior. 

Lord Wellington followed up his victory with his customary 
activity, and made an attempt to intercept Clausel, by detaching 
three divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry to the 
right. This had very nearly accomplished the object, for Clausel, 
in ignorance of the battle, was marching upon Vittoria throughout 
the whole of the 22nd — but, having ascertained that the allies 
were already there, he suddenly wheeled about, and took post 
at Logrono. On learning he was likely to be attacked, he 
hastened towards Saragossa ; and there abandoning his artillery, 
and losing some prisoners, from the attacks of Mina, he escaped, 
by the pass of Jaca, into France. 

Thus was Lord Wellington freed from all apprehension on one 
flank, and he instructed Sir Thomas Graham, with his division, to 
rid himself of every incumbrance on the other. There was a 
sharp encounter between the left column and Foy's corps in 
Tolosa, which the latter had barricaded and endeavoured to 
maintain. But they were driven from the town with heavy loss, 
and never afterwards made an effective stand. Graham, pushed 
Foy from position to position, back to the pass of Irun — and 
ceased to follow only when the French, withdrawing across the 
Bidassoa, left the whole of Biscay and Guipuscoa unencumbered 
by their presence. 

While these brilliant operations delivered the northern and 
western provinces, leaving only to the intruder the fortresses of 
Pamplona and St. Sebastian, with the island of Santona — on the 
eastern coast the war was carried on more languidly, and suc- 
cesses, even when they were accomplished, led to no satisfactory 
results. Sir John Murray, having determined on his base of 
operations, embarked his troops, with a magnificent battering- 
train, at Alicante ; and, not being opposed, made good a landing 
at Tarragona. The enemy's posts were driven in, and ground 
broken before the place ; but ere the batteries had done their 
work, there was an alarm of Suchet's advance, and the troops, 
leaving the cannon in the trenches, hastily re-embarked. This 
was a sad mortification to the men and officers of that army; 
who, had they been well commanded, would doubtless have 



1813.] SIEGE OF TARRAGONA. 357 

emulated their comrades, who, on another portion of the stage, 
were sweeping onward, with the flood- tide of success. When 
Lord William Bentinck took the command, which he did on the 
return of the expedition to Alicante, news of the battle of Vittoria 
had arrived ; and Suchet, instead of pressing a disheartened foe, 
found himself under the necessity of immediately giving ground. 
Lord William marched after him ; and, on the 30th of July, 
Tarragona was a second time invested. But Suchet was too 
active and too determined, to relinquish his hold upon Catalonia ; 
and he advanced, in force, to raise the siege. Lord William's 
posts of observation were surprised and driven in. He himself 
risked a battle in an exposed situation beyond the Llobregat, 
where he suffered much, and from which his retreat was insecure ; 
and then, being recalled to Sicily by the aspect of affairs in that 
quarter, he relinquished the command to Lieutenant-general 
Clinton. The latter, crippled in many ways, could act only on 
the defensive throughout the remainder of the season — while the 
French evacuated Tarragona, after blowing up the fortifications, 
and confined themselves nearly to the line of the Llobregat, of 
which Barcelona was the key. 

It does not appear to have formed any part of Lord Welling- 
ton's plan at this period of the war, to carry his victorious arms 
into the South of France. He felt that an accommodation be- 
tween Napoleon, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia, 
which seemed then not unlikely, might occur — and that would 
render it impossible for him to maintain himself beyond the 
Pyrenees ; but, of keeping the line of the mountains he was very 
sanguine — and, as a necessary measure for that purpose, he turned 
his attention to the strong-holds on the ramparts of which the 
tri-coloured flag still floated. For the active siege of Pamplona, 
however, the means at his command were inadequate ; and, con- 
sequently, he resolved to blockade it. For this purpose a chain 
of redoubts was thrown up round the place ; the corn within that 
chain was swept off or burnt — the aqueduct which supplied the 
place with the principal part of its water was cut — and a Spanish 
corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men were left to invest it. St. Sebastian, 
on the other hand, he considered himself in a condition to reduce 
— and Sir Thomas Graham, with the left column of the army 

B B 



358 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

proceeded to attack it. At the same time, a body of Spaniards, 
who for some days previously had invested it, were withdrawn, 
and placed so as to cut off all communication between the 
garrison of Santona and the land. In order to cover these opera- 
tions, he disposed his divisions along the passes between Pam- 
plona and the east coast ; a disadvantageous position, doubtless, 
because it was at once extended, and with difficult communica- 
tions. All these arrangements were made so early as the first 
week in July, and, ere the month went out, the most satisfactory 
proofs were afforded, that they had been conceived and executed 
with equal skill and effect. 

Up to this time, the war in Spain had been regarded by 
Napoleon as an affair of secondary importance. He seems tc* 
have troubled himself but little, whether his generals gained vic- 
tories or sustained defeats ; doubtless because he believed that on 
the fields of northern Germany the real battle of the empire must 
be fought, and that, if there fought successfully, the losses else- 
where experienced would be easily remedied. Intelligence of 
Joseph's defeat at Vittoria, however, awoke him from this dream. 
He then perceived that not only was Spain lost, but that France 
itself was seriously endangered ; and he adopted the only measures 
then at his disposal to avert that danger. 

Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia — the officer, among his 
marshals, in whom he reposed the greatest confidence — was 
immediately sent back to assume the command of the defeated 
armies ; and with unlimited authority, as Lieutenant of the 
Empire, to call to him, from every quarter, the resources of the 
country . 

Soult reached the Spanish frontier on the 13th of July, and 
lost no time in acting up to the spirit of his instructions. Fresh 
artillery was brought forward — new levies were enrolled — General 
Clausel's corps was joined to the main body, and the whole 
underwent a complete organization. Boats, likewise, were col- 
lected at St. Urogne, competent to the formation of two bridges - r 
and every other disposition was made for the renewal of offensive 
hostilities. On the 23rd, a proclamation appeared, in which, attri- 
buting all the misfortunes that had recently occurred to the incapa- 
city of his predecessors in command, Soult predicted future success, 



1813.] ALARM OF NAPOLEON. 359 

and promised the soldiers that they should celebrate the Emperor's 
birthday in the city of Vittoria. Of all these proceedings, Lord 
Wellington was never for a moment in ignorance — but he 
adhered to his own plan, and carried on his own operations with 
unwavering steadiness ; while the siege of St. Sebastian was 
pressed with as much vigour as if there were no force, within a 
thousand miles, capable of molesting those engaged in it. 

The fortified convent of St. Bartolomeo, which covers the 
approach of the town from the side of Hernani, having been 
carried by assault, ground was broken before the body of the 
place, and batteries were thrown up and armed. A fire was 
opened, under the weight of which the walls soon began to 
crumble — and on the evening of the 24th, the breaches were 
reported practicable, and Sir Thomas Graham, acting in obedience 
to his orders, resolved to storm them the day following. 

M The town of St. Sebastian," says Jones, in his Journal of 
the Sieges, " containing nearly 10,000 inhabitants, is built on a 
low peninsula, running north and south ; the defences of the 
western side being washed by the sea, and those on the eastern 
side, by the river Urumea, which, at high water, covers four feet 
of the masonry of the scarp. 

" The works of the land-front, across the Isthmus, consist of a 
single front of fortification, exceeding 350 yards in length, with 
a flat bastion in the centre, covered by a horn-work, having the 
usual counterscarp, covered way and glacis ; bat the defences 
running lengthways of the peninsula, consist merely of a rampart 
wall, indifferently flanked, without either ditch, counterscarp, 
glacis, or other obstacle in its front; and farther, this naked scarp 
wall, on the eastern side, is seen from its summit to its base, from 
the Chope range of sand hills, on the right of the Urumea, at 
distances of 500 to 1,000 yards. 

" At the extremity of the peninsula, a rocky height, called 
Monte Orgullo, of the considerable base of 400 yards by 600 
yards, rises steeply to a point, which is occupied by a small work 
or citadel, called Fort La Mota. The whole of this promontory 
is cut off from the town, by a defensive line near its foot ; and its 
southern face is covered with batteries which plunge into the 
lower defences of the place, and add, materially, to their powers 
of resistance. 

b b 2 



360 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

" It appears to be an unaccountable oversight (even looking to 
moderate security against surprise), to have left the eastern 
defences of the town without cover or a second obstacle, as the 
Urumea, for two hours before and after low water, is so shallow 
as to be fordable ; and, for the same period, a considerable space 
becomes dry on the left bank of the river, by which troops can 
march from the Isthmus, along the foot of the sea scarp wall of 
the town, to its very extremity next the castle. 

" Marshal Berwick, when he besieged St, Sebastian in 1719, 
aware of this circumstance, threw up batteries on the Chope sand 
hills, to breach the eastern town walls, and, whilst that was 
effecting, pushed on approaches along the Isthmus, and established 
a lodgment and batteries on the covered way of the hornwork of 
the land-front, to prevent its left branch impeding the approach 
to the beach." 

It was at that flank which the river washes that Sir Thomas 
Graham resolved to push his approaches — and there the principal 
breaches were effected. Watching, therefore, the fall of the tide, 
he sent the columns to the attack on the morning of the 25th, 
and great was the gallantry which the troops displayed in their 
efforts to penetrate. But, though a few succeeded in entering the 
town, the remainder were arrested by the furious discharges of all 
arms, from the defences of the place ; and, after sustaining a very 
severe loss, they returned to the trenches in confusion. This was 
the more mortifying, inasmuch as the low state of the magazines 
rendered it impossible, till fresh supplies of ammunition should 
arrive from England, to continue battering the breach : and Soult's 
operations, already commenced, would render even a close blockade 
of the place both inconvenient, and probably, impracticable. 

Marshal Soult's proclamation to his army was issued on the 
23rd. On the 24th, he drew towards St. Jean Pied- de-Port, 
between 30,000 and 40,000 men, and, at an early hour of the 
25th, fell upon General Byng's brigade, which occupied the pass 
of Roncesvalles. This main attack he supported by another, 
while General Drouet, at the head of 13,000 men, was directed 
against Sir Rowland Hill, in the Puerto de Maya, or pass which 
covers the valley of the Bastan ; and both were pressed with such 
vigour, that, despite a display of extraordinary gallantry, the 
allies were forced to give ground. Sir Rowland Hill was not 



1813.] BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES. 361 

followed : but Byng's brigade, to support which the fourth divi- 
sion had come into line, as well as the third division, when 
found on the retreat, were borne back, on the 25th, as far as 
Zubiri; on the 26th, to the high ground between Huerte and 
Olaz. Here, during the whole of the 27th, and a large portion 
of the 28th, desperate fighting took place, Lord Wellington him- 
self being on the ground. The enemy made the most extraordi- 
nary efforts to drive the fourth division from the hills which they 
had occupied, but all without success. Repeated charges of the 
bayonet were given and received, and, invariably, to the enemy's 
disadvantage ; while, fresh divisions coming up, the point assailed 
became, from hour to hour, more free from danger. Thus, on 
the 28th, the sixth division came up, and forming across the 
valley of Lanz, received and repulsed a fierce attack of the 
French from the village of Sorauren. Then was Soult's fury 
directed against the left of the fourth division ; where, having 
broken a Portuguese battalion, the French had a momentary 
triumph. But the arrival of Major-general Ross's brigade in 
support, soon changed the face of affairs, and from the ground 
which they had already won, the invaders were driven by the 
bayonets of the 27th and 48th regiments. 

Meanwhile, Sir Rowland Hill, having ascertained the retreat of 
the third and fourth divisions, fell back upon Ostiz, whither, on 
the 29th, Drouet's divisions] followed — and against him, Soult 
directed his principal attack. With this view, large bodies of 
troops were, during the night of the 29th, detached from the 
position which, heretofore, they had occupied — and 'this was done 
with the greater readiness as the ground in question was very 
strong and difficult of access, and Soult naturally concluded 
that the English general would scarcely attack it in front. But 
in this he was mistaken. No sooner was the departure of those 
corps observed, than the allies became, in their turn, the assail- 
ants, — and ridge after ridge was won with a facility which 
astonished the very conquerors. Yet was the battle raging, all 
the while, with more dubious fury along that part of the field 
which Hill had been directed to maintain. The allies — in no 
solitary instance defeated — yet being outnumbered, were forced to 
change their ground by a movement to the rear ; and Soult, by his 
very success in that part, involved himself in serious difficulties* 



362 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

The French general had counted too much on the inexpugnable 
nature of the ground which he had deprived of some of its 
defenders. Lord Wellington made himself master of it with 
comparatively little difficulty ; and, following up his advantages, 
thus fell in, almost on the rear of the column which had out- 
stepped its proper front in pursuit of Sir Rowland Hill. Had 
this occurred a little earlier in the day, the total destruction of 
Soult's army would have been inevitable ; but the evening had 
already closed, and, favoured by the night, the enemy escaped. 
They stole away towards the pass of Dona Maria, where two 
divisions still showed a formidable front. The rest continued in 
rapid retreat towards France. 

No rest was given to the beaten enemy. On the 31st, Sir 
Rowland Hill, by one road, with the seventh division, pushed 
forward to the attack of the rear-guard in front, while Lord Wel- 
lington led the fourth division and General Byng's brigade, by the 
pass of Velate, upon Wanla, to turn their flank. When thus 
assailed in force, they could not hold their ground a moment, and 
suffered terribly in their flight. 

This was the last of one of the most magnificent series of 
military operations which had taken place in the Peninsula. 
Soult, who had advanced in the full confidence of success, was 
worsted at every point ; and, having hastily sent back his guns 
and cavalry, which he had fondly hoped to employ on the plains 
of Asturias, gladly carried back his columns of infantry, broken, 
dispersed, weakened, and regularly beaten, once more beyond the 
Bidassoa. 

On the 1st of August, the allied army took nearly the same 
positions as it had held on the 25th of July ; and the siege 
of St. Sebastian, as well as the blockade of Pamplona, were 
vigorously recommenced. In the operations in front of the 
latter town, there was nothing brilliant or interesting to recount. 
During the bustle of Soult's advance, the garrison made a sortie, 
in which they contrived to take some pieces of cannon from the 
Spaniards, but, on the retrogression of their countrymen, they 
returned to a defensive system, which the Spaniards did not 
think it worth while to interrupt. 

On the other flank of the line it was different. The siege of 
St. Sebastian, which had been interrupted by the late events, 



1813.] SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN. 363 

was, as far ar circumstances would permit, instantly resumed ; 
and, on the arrival of the long-expected supplies from England, 
Sir Thomas Graham pushed it vigorously. Batteries of greater 
.strength, and in many respects more advantageously planted, 
opened on the 25th — and, on the 30th, three breaches were effected, 
two of which were pronounced practicable. 

On the previous occasion, the tide flowed at so early an hour, 
that the conflict had almost ceased ere daylight broke. Now, 
it was eleven o'clock in the morning when the troops filed from 
the trenches — and, amid the gathering of a thunder-storm, which 
burst presently upon their heads, the assault was given. The 
struggle was long and desperate. Mounting the ruins, the assail- 
ants found themselves so vigorously opposed, that, for nearly an 
liour, they could not gain the summit ; and it is questionable 
whether they would have crowned it at all, had not Graham 
caused his siege artillery to fire over the heads of the storm- 
ing party, to destroy an enemy elevated scarcely three feet 
above the leading files.* At last a mine blew up, while yet 300 
French grenadiers were standing over it. A Portuguese regiment, 
under Major Snodgrass, pushed, at the same instant, upon the 
lesser breach, and, amid the confusion which these events pro- 
duced, the storming-party effected an entrance. The greater 
portion of the garrison, to the number of 2,000 men, perished, or 
were made prisoners, while the remainder, amounting to less than 
1,500, escaped into the castle. 

xA fortified place is never carried by assault without the com- 
mission of great irregularities on the part of the victors. On 
the present occasion, the British troops went beyond all former 
precedent. Smarting under the remembrance of a former repulse, 
and irritated by the fatigue to which, for nearly six weeks, 



* " During this siege, several of the pieces were discharged upwards of 
9,000 times in uninterrupted succession, without experiencing any material 
-damage. Their fire was so accurate at the last attack, that they were 
employed in throwing shrapnel-shells, filled with powder and balls, over the 
Jheads of the besiegers, for the purpose of driving away the besieged who 
lined the top of the breach. It was one of these shells which set fire to a 
quantity of obusses and bombs that stood on the rampart, and occasioned an 
-explosion, which created so much confusion in the place as to produce its 
falL"— Thierry. 



364 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxix. 

they had been subjected, they advanced to the attack, burning 
for revenge ; and, having found wine and spirits in abundance, 
indignation which should have operated against the garrison, w T as 
directed, with reckless fury, upon the inhabitants. To add to the 
horrors of the scene, the fire which the enemy had applied to 
houses near the breach, spread to others more remote, till the 
whole town became involved in a general conflagration. Then 
might be seen such spectacles as are witnessed only during the 
sack of a captured city. The drunkard's wild shout, mingled 
with the groans of the wounded; the dead and the stupefied 
lay together in the streets ; and not a few, overpowered by their 
own intemperance, perished amid the flames. Yet there were 
not wanting traits of nobleness in that wild assemblage of desperate 
and excited men, and of this the following may be accepted a& 
an instance. 

On the afternoon of the day on which the town was taken, 
two officers went to the breach, to search among the] dead 
which thickly covered it, for the body of a missing friend. 
When thus employed, a musket-ball passed between their heads ; 
and, on looking round, they saw a wounded Frenchman with his 
piece just discharged. Infuriated by an unprovoked attack, one 
of them, addressing himself to an English soldier who stood 
near, desired him to " shoot that rascal/ ' The man went up to 
the Frenchman, who, incapable of standing, could only retain a 
sitting position. He levelled his musket, but immediately 
brought it again to the recovery. "Lord, Sir," was his remark, 
M I can't shoot a poor devil like that." The soldier suffered 
nothing for his humanity, and the wounded Frenchman was 
kindly removed to the hospital. 

While the assault of St. Sebastian was going on, Soult, 
anxious to relieve the place, made another attack on the left of 
the allied army, by w T hich the siege was covered. He advanced in 
great force, against the heights of San Marcial, where a Spanish 
corps kept post, and threatened at the same time, the great road 
which traverses the pass of Irun, and leads directly to the har- 
bour of Passages. Lord Wellington, not yet trusting to the 
steadiness of the Spaniards, had supported them with part of the 
fourth and fifth divisions ; but, on this occasion, the latter were 
never brought into play. The Spaniards behaved remarkably well ; 



1813.] PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA. 365 

and, as the ground they held was of prodigious strength, all 
Soult's attacks were repulsed — the French, after sustaining a 
heave loss, retired once more across the Bidassoa — and when 
evening came, the mountain was undisturbed by the echo and 
roar of cannon, or the sharp and rapid pealing of musketry. 

From this time, to the beginning of October, the hostile armies 
continued inactive. The castle of St. Sebastian, which, after the 
fall of the town, continued to hold out, surrendered, after a bom- 
bardment, and on the 7th of September, the place having been 
given up to the Spaniards — the divisions hitherto employed in the 
siege rejoined the army in the field. 

Lord Wellington, who was unwilling to hazard an invasion of 
France so long as the policy of the northern powers should remain 
doubtful, knew, notwithsanding, that he could advance as far as 
the Adour, or perhaps, to the Garonne, and that there was not 
any force in the southern provinces to alarm him. But he knew 
also, that if peace should be concluded in Germany, it would be 
impossible to maintain himself on either line. He therefore con- 
tented himself with making, for the present, the Pyrenees the 
limits of his achievements, and busied himself in fortifying the 
passes, so that his position, extensive as it was, should be per- 
fectly defensible. 

Meanwhile, reinforcements came in, both to his camp and to 
that of Soult. Both generals, acting cautiously, were quite 
aware that hostilities might, in all probability, be renewed on 
a sudden; and the course of events was not slow in demon- 
strating that, in arriving at this conclusion, both had reasoned 
justly. 

Though the allied army rested in its camp, there was no 
moment either of night or day, when it was not in a condition 
to be moved ; and, accordingly, early in October, preparations 
were made to force the passage of the Bidassoa and penetrate 
into France. It was well known that Soult had published 
a furious proclamation, in which the inhabitants of the menaced 
provinces were invited to take up arms, and the hostile 
troops threatened, not only with desperate resistance in the field, 
but also with guerilla warfare even to the knife. In answer to 
this unmanly threat, Lord Wellington issued an order, in which 
he reminded his troops that they were at war not with the people, 



366 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

out with the ruler of the French nation — and positively prohibited, 
on pain of death, everything like marauding, or any violence to 
the peasantry. This was accepted as a sort of warning note ; 
men gathered from it that great events were speedily to follow, 
and they were not deceived. 

A couple of hours before daybreak, on the morning of the 7th, 
the several divisions got quietly under arms, and moving, while it 
was yet dark, to their own advanced posts, they waited for the 
signal to fall on. 

The positions of the French and allied armies ran at this time, 
from the Bay of Biscay, along opposite ridges of steep and rocky 
mountains, as far as the Pass of Roncesvalles. Both were singu- 
larly steep and rugged — yet both, as well from the extent of front 
•as because the communications from point to point were broken 
and difficult, offered almost as many points of attack as the 
hostile generals could desire. Accordingly, while the first and 
fifth divisions menaced the fords below the bridge, in three sepa- 
rate columns, the Spanish troops under General Freyre showed a 
like number of columns above them — while farther to the right, 
the enemy's intrenchments at Puerto da Vera were threatened by 
the light division, who advanced upon them by two roads, both 
steep, yet neither inaccessible. 

Nothing could exceed the steadiness and bravery with which 
these several attacks were executed. On the allied left, and 
•consequently, on the right of Soult's line, redoubt after redoubt 
was carried in a run — the Spaniards climbing the faces of the 
mountains and behaving most nobly. On the opposite flank, 
though the fighting was more desperate, the success was fully 
as complete. The enemy's intrenchments in the Puerto were 
•entered at the point of the bayonet, and immediate preparations 
made to attack the fortified camp at Sonne. On that service the 
'Spaniards, supported by the seventh division, were principally 
'employed; and they accomplished it to the entire satisfaction 
of the illustrious commander — who, in his despatches, honourably 
mentioned them as having " behaved as well as it was possible 
for any troops to do." Yet it was not till the 8th that the 
enemy could be driven from this formidable chain of works, and a 
lodgment made on the top of the hermitage, a steep cone which 
coyered the right of their line, and from which they refused to be 



1813.] CAMP AT ST. JEAN DE LUZ. 367 

driven. At last, however, with a loss wonderfully insignificant, 
all the intrenchments, which it had cost Soult so much time and 
labour to throw up, were carried. His soldiers, indeed, hardly 
displayed the valour which on previous occasions they had 
exhibited — and he led them back, dispirited, to a second and still 
more formidable line, by which he hoped to arrest the victors ere 
they should cross the Nivelle. 

The district which the allies had thus acquired, though con- 
venient for a temporary halting-place, offered no inducement for 
quartering troops during the approaching season. It was singu- 
larly bleak and barren ; and, in many places the troops must 
remain among the mountains, where " winter and rough weather" 
would affect them with the greatest severity. Independently of 
his disinclination to leave Pamplona with his garrison in his rear, 
the state of Europe elsewhere still rendered Lord Wellington 
reluctant to commit himself at too great a distance from the 
Spanish frontier. Accordingly, the troops continued to occupy 
their camps along the bare sides of the Pyrenees, till the 
beginning of November ; when, Pamplona, having surrendered, 
preparations were made to strike another blow while yet the 
season of the year Would permit. The enemy's position had been 
closely reconnoitred ; but a succession of heavy rains broke up 
the roads so completely that, until the 10th, the attack could not 
be made. Then, however, some of the brigades commencing the 
march at midnight, and others at an hour more advanced, the 
army quitted its ground, in numerous and separate columns, to 
assail the enemy's lines. 

The position which was thus attacked, extended from the 
sea along a range of low hills which rise on the left of the 
Nivelle. It then crossed that river, and, passing to the heights 
which cover Ainhoue, included the Petite la Rhune mountain, 
and the scarcely less formidable hill of Mondarrain. Soult, with 
indefatigable industry, had covered his position with redoubts and 
intrenchments. Every road was defended by abattis and intrench- 
ments ; every commanding eminence crowned by a field-work ; 
and all were so disposed that the fire of each might protect 
and enfilade the works in its vicinity. Of his right, in particular, 
Soult had exhibited great jealousy; it was judged inexpedient 
to molest him seriously there ; and Sir John Hope, who, some 



368 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

time previously, had succeedecTSir Thomas Graham in the com- 
mand of the left column, received instructions to refrain from 
attempting anything more than to drive in the pickets, and secure 
the attention of the enemy. 

But, on the centre, a different game was played. There, Hill, 
Beresford, and Alten, with their respective corps, fell upon the 
enemy with L such impetuosity that, though it was one o'clock in 
the day before all the troops got under fire, before dark the line 
of intrenchments had ceased to be tenable. From mountain and 
ravine the French were driven, with the loss of 1,500 prisoners 
fifty- one pieces of cannon, and a considerable quantity of ammuni- 
tion and military stores ; while the casualties in the ranks of the 
allied army amounted to no more than 500 killed and some 
2,000 wounded. 

The battle ceased with daylight ; and the assailants lay upon 
their arms, expecting to renew the attack so soon as morning 
should have dawned. But the light showed that no such exertion 
would be required. Soult, perceiving that his line was pierced in 
various directions, and that his communications with Bayonne 
were menaced, retreated under cover of the night — and was 
already beyond the Nivelle, and in full march towards the Adour, 
when the columns of the allies began to follow. 

Lord Wellington had been peculiarly favoured by the weather 
during the operations of the 10th. Next morning, the rains began 
again, and, under their pitiless pelting, the French were pushed 
beyond the Nive, and through the village of Bidart, into an 
intrenched camp which they had formed in front of Bayonne. 
It was impossible, with roads destroyed and rivers swollen by the 
floods, to molest them there ; and Lord Wellington placed his 
troops, consequently, in cantonments between the Nive and the 
sea — both sides enjoying, for a long space, a welcome relaxation 
from the fatigues of active warfare. 

The line which the allies had taken up was both narrow and 
inconvenient. It enabled them, indeed, to communicate freely 
with England and with Spain ; but it cut them off from all 
the fertile districts which lie to the west and north of the Nive, 
and gave to the enemy abundant facilities for drawing from thence 
ample supplies for themselves. Not for a moment, therefore, had 
Lord Wellington intended to restrict himself to that position — 



1813."! BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE. 369 

and he took advantage of the first favourable opportunity which 
presented itself to enlarge the scope of his supplies. With this 
view, Sir Rowland Hill was instructed to cross the river on the 
9th of December : while the centre and left of the army pushed 
forward — the one, that it might not lose its connexion with new 
posts about to be established — the other, for the double purpose 
of giving employment to a large portion of the enemy's troops, 
and obtaining a closer and more accurate survey of his intrench- 
ments on the Adour. 

Everything went on that day as the allied leader could have 
wished. Sir Rowland Hill bridged the Nive at Cambo, and 
pushed back the enemy's divisions from its further banks. Beres- 
ford supported him by making a similar movement at Ustaritz, 
while Sir John Hope, following the great road, drove in the 
pickets, and established himself within three miles of Bayonne. 
During the progress of these movements, the loss on both sides 
was slight, because the enemy made no determined resistance ; 
and the close of day found the left column and the light divisions 
both reinstated in t their former quarters, and the corps of Hill 
and Beresford in excellent communication, so as to interpose, in 
some degree, between the left of the enemy's camp and the 
detached post which they had at St Jean Pied de Port. 

There had been some hard fighting to accomplish this ; but 
there did not appear any disposition on the enemy's part to 
hazard much to disturb Lord Wellington's new arrangement. 
Sir Rowland Hill, when daylight came in on the 10th, found 
that the enemy had withdrawn entirely from his front ; and 
quietly took an alignment with his right pointing to the Adour, 
and his left leaning on Ville Franque ; whence, by means of a 
bridge, he had connected himself with Beresford, who, on his 
part, resumed his old quarters on the left bank of the Nive. 

So matters passed on the right and centre of the army. On 
the left, the troops were disposed in their former cantonments ; 
the guards, with the staff of the head- quarters, and a large 
portion of the artillery, in St. Jean de Luz — the fifth division, 
Lord Aylmer's independent brigade, and a corps of Portuguese, 
among the villages and detached dwellings which extend from 
St. Jean de Luz to Bidart. In like manner the light division 
re-established itself in Arcanques ; and, both from it and the fifth, 



370 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

strong posts were thrown out in front to observe the roads, 
guard the denies, and give warning to the troops in reserve, 
should the enemy make a movement towards the front. But 
not till towards ten o'clock in the day, was any alarm given. 
Then, however, the pickets of the fifth and light divisions found 
themselves suddenly attacked by overwhelming numbers ; and a 
furious contest began, of the results of which, no one who had 
judged by the comparison of the numerical strength of the con- 
tending parties, could have entertained a moment's doubt. 

The attack in question was planned with excellent skill, and 
carried into execution with great daring. Observing the forward 
position of Hill, and imagining that the left and left-centre of the 
allied army must be very much weakened, Soult, during the night 
of the 9th, had withdrawn every disposable man from his intrench- 
ments on the Nive, and, passing them through Bayonne, fell, with 
extreme fury, upon the column commanded by Sir John Hope, 
and the light division which supported it. It was against the 
former, however, that he mainly directed his efforts. The pickets 
of the light division were driven in, and the church and chateau 
of Arcanques, both strong posts, were threatened. His heavy 
columns also, coming down the great road, bore upon the 
advanced brigade of the fifth division ; and, covered by a cloud 
of tirailleurs, made rapid progress. 

There is a chateau, in the middle of a wood, on the right of that 
road and a small lake upon the left. To secure the passage of 
the column, one detachment rushed into the wood, while another 
bore upon the posts which had been established in the hamlet ; 
and, at both points, the fighting was desperate. But, Portuguese 
and English, vying with each other, stoutly held their ground, 
and, though very roughly handled, the pickets were not driven in. 

The sound of heavy firing, followed by the arrival of mes- 
sengers in hot haste, soon gave an alarm to the brigades in the 
rear ; and, forming beside their cantonments, they moved rapidly 
towards the high road, and advanced, in excellent order, to the 
scene of action. Groups of wounded friends and captured 
enemies met them by the way ; and from each, as it passed, 
they gathered some intelligence. At last, the field of battle 
appeared, and, while admiring the steadiness of the handful of 
red-coats that held it, the enemy's artillery opened upon them- 



1813.] BATTLE OF THE NIVE. 371 

7 selves. They pushed on, however, and were soon in their places 
i in the line. Then followed a sort of lull in the firing, as if Soult 
I had paused to consider how to act under such a change of circum- 
' stances. Then came another furious onset ; and, when dark- 
* ness set in, the hostile armies were precisely where they had been 
i at two o'clock in the da} T , and both lay down, beside their fires,. 
I to await the coming of the morrow. 

That morrow came, and with it a renewal of this desperate 

I strife. Through the wood — once, and only once, on the plateau 

beyond — and repeatedly on the high road, both infantry and 

[ cavalry were warmly engaged — but the enemy gained no advan- 

[ tages. On the contrary, the result of each attempt, on their 

: part was to increase their own loss, and leave the allies more 

: and more confident in their invincibility. And thus it continued 

throughout the whole of that day, and a great portion of the 

following one : for, even on the 12th, the hostile lines faced one 

another — though the actual collision seldom went beyond a smart 

skirmish, or an affair of posts. Meanwhile, fresh columns, 

on either side, arrived in support of those engaged ; frequent 

changes of ground took place, and much reconnoitring ; but 

the approach of darkness found each in the occupation of the 

alignment that belonged to it, and both jaded with four days of 

incessant exertion, during which they had had little leisure to eat, 

far less to cook. 

While the left was thus employed, the right, under Sir Rowland 
Hill, kept its ground on the right bank of the Nive. It was well 
that both commander and his troops were accustomed to the- 
sort of drama in which they were so soon to become actors ; for 
Soult, defeated in his attempts upon the great road, drew off 
during the night of the 1 2th, and threw the whole weight of hi& 
army upon Hill's corps. A very fierce, but comparatively short 
struggle ensued. Beaten back, as often as they hazarded an 
attack, the French discovered that their was no point throughout 
the extent of the allied line, for the safety of which provision had 
not been made ; and they retired, at last, within their fortified 
camp, leaving 5,000 men, dead or wounded, on the field. 

This was the last military operation of importance, which gave 



372 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxi. 

a character to the campaign of 1813.* The enemy did not 
venture to molest the allies in their winter quarters. The latter 
were exposed as little as possible to the inclemencies of the 
weather; and, except when their turns came for outpost duty, 
both men and officers enjoyed a season of repose. And well and 
nobly had they earned it — for never, by a British army, was such 
a series of brilliant successes accomplished, as the course of that 
campaign had enabled Lord Wellington, and his companions in 
arms, to achieve. The month of May found them between the 
Agueda and the Tagus, observed by a force greatly superior to 
their own, and masters only of Portugal, from which it seemed 
cempetent for an enemy, with a little skill and determination, to 
drive them. The month of December beheld them victors in 
five pitched battles, after having swept the whole armed power 
of France over broad and rapid rivers — across wide and fertile 
plains — through, the passes of the Pyrenees, and back into the 
hitherto unviolated territory of la belle France. Equally incapable 
of arresting their triumphs, had proved the strong-holds of 
Burgos, Pamplona, and St. Sebastian. The first was abandoned 
and blown up ; the second yielded to the slow but sure process 
of blockade; and the third, despite Soult's best efforts to 
relieve it, was carried by assault in open day. Never, in the 
military annals of Great Britain, had such a page been recorded ; 
and, as events were flowing on favourably, and with strong 
current elsewhere, the anticipations of what the next year might 
bring forth were bright and ardent, and, as they proved, well- 
founded. 

* " They fought well in this long series of actions, far better than they had 
done in defending their position upon the Nivelle ; and this can only be 
explained by the different feeling with which men, and especially men of the 
French temperament, are animated when standing on their defence, from that 
which excites them when they are themselves the assailants. Marshal Soult, 
who was never wanting in ability, never displayed more than on this occa- 
sion. This often-repeated effort cost him his best troops, and forced upon 
him the mortifying conviction, that brave as they were, and admirably 
disciplined, they were, nevertheless, inferior to their opponents ; for all 
circumstances here had been in his favour ; the points of attack were at his 
own choice ; and, wherever he attacked, he brought into the field a greatly 
superior force ; yet everywhere he had been defeated." — Leith Hay. 



1813.] NAPOLEON AND FERDINAND. 373 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

State of affairs in Spain and in the North — Movements of the Bourbons — 
Opening *of the campaign of 1814 —Passage of the Adour — Bayonne in 
Tested — Battle of Orthez — Manoeuvring — Progress of the war in Catalonia 
— Battle of Toulouse — Sortie from Bayonne — Peace. 

It will be necessary now to take a hurried glance at the state of 
affairs in other quarters, as well where a British army kept the 
field as on the banks of the Rhine, already covered with columns 
of Russian, Austrian, and Prussian soldiers. In Catalonia, the 
war had languished more and more in proportion as drafts were 
made from Suchet's corps, to supply in part the vacancies which 
his Russian and German campaigns had made in the ranks of 
Napoleon. Now, the operations, both of the French and the 
allies were confined to an occasional reconnaissance on either 
side, and strenuous exertions were made by both, to store and 
place in a defensible condition the fortresses of which they were 
in possession. But, in the month of November, Napoleon, utterly 
defeated at Leipsig, made his entry into Paris, and demanded of 
his Senate a reinforcement of 300,000 men, as well as enormous 
supplies of money and materiel. These were voted — but it was 
one thing to vote, and another to gather in such a number of 
conscripts in a country exhausted like France — and Napoleon, 
little confident in the physical means at his disposal, endeavoured, 
by artifice, to produce dissension among the allies, whom he 
despaired of checking by open force. 

In the furtherance of this policy, he concluded a treaty with 
Ferdinand, by which he agreed to restore him to the throne of 
Spain, on condition that Spain should require every foreign 
soldier, English as well as French, to evacuate her territory — and 
also that, to all who had taken office under the intruder, their 
titles, honours, and estates should be secured. The Junta and 
Regency, which conducted the affairs of Spain in turn, had often 
acted unwisely, and always weakly ; but on the present occa- 
sion they behaved well. They expressed their satisfaction at 

c c 



374 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxxii. 

the prospect of finding a legitimate sovereign again among them ; 
but they positively refused to ratify any engagements into which 
he, while in a state of durance, should enter. The results were 
that, for a time, the French and Spaniards maintained towards 
each other a hostile attitude — though, in Catalonia, at least, few 
blows were exchanged between them — and those few led to no 
important results. 

Meanwhile, the Northern Powers, having arrived on the right 
bank of the Rhine, appeared to hesitate, as if they questioned 
the prudence of going further. They issued proclamations, 
declaring their anxiety for peace, and denounced Bonaparte as an 
enemy to the world. But still they scrupled to push on — and 
their culpable delay enabled the French ruler so far to complete 
his preparations, as to take the field, at the head of an army — 
not, indeed, capable of stemming the tide, but sufficiently 
powerful to give serious annoyance to the invaders. Their 
forward movement, however, had, at least, this good effect — it 
caused a large proportion of the German regiments, which were 
attached to the armies of Soult and Suchet, to look round for an 
opportunity of deserting. Such an opportunity the battalions of 
Nassau and Frankfort found. They passed over, with their arms 
and standards, to the allied line, and, to the number of 1,500 
men, were put on board of ship, and sent off to their respective 
countries. In Catalonia, likewise, a spirit of dissatisfaction 
arose among them — and though it was discovered, and frus- 
trated, Suchet was obliged to disarm them all, to the number 
of 4,000, and marched them to the rear. 

These were occurrences sufficiently trying to the moral as well 
as physical strength of the French armies ; and these came not 
alone. While Soult vainly endeavoured to rouse a spirit of 
resistance among the peasantry, and General Harispe, a native of 
the Basque country, used his best efforts to gather them around 
him in La Vendee and about Bordeaux, the feeling of ancient 
loyalty began again to show itself. The spirit of La Roche - 
Jacquelin revived — and voices were heard from almost every 
village, demanding that the white flag should again be 
unfurled. 

The idea of restoring, at the point of the bayonet, the House 



1813.] ASPECT OF AFFAIRS. 375 

of Bourbon, had not yet been seriously entertained in any 
quarter ; and even the British government, and Lord Wellington 
himself, exhibited no disinclination to conclude a peace with 
Napoleon, provided it could be based on terms which should 
hold out a guarantee for its continuance ; but the princes of the 
exiled family were, as was natural, more sanguine. Already had 
the Duke d'Angouleme offered to join the British army with 
20,000 Frenchmen, or to throw himself into the heart of La 
Vendee, and there raise the standard of his House. But he was 
not encouraged in either project, because the step must have 
committed those by whom it had been sanctioned ; yet he seemed 
determined to take it — and, in the winter of 1813, he arrived, 
almost unattended, at Passages. There he was met by the 
English general, in rear of the cantonments ; and it was agreed, 
that he should assume a fictitious name, and keep his projects in 
abeyance; while he became Lord Wellington's guest, at the head- 
quarters of the invading army. But the proper moment of 
letting him loose, so to speak, was not yet come — and Lord Wel- 
lington exercising over him the same moral influence which he 
exercised over everybody, not a word was spoken, nor movement 
made, which could by possibility commit the allies to any definite 
proceeding. 

Thus passed the winter : — the allies, impeded in their opera- 
tions by the nature of the country, which heavy floods rendered 
unfit for the movement of troops ; and Soult, using his best 
endeavours, by strengthening his fortifications, and drilling the 
conscripts, who reached him in large numbers, to make ready 
against the spring. 

The position of the French marshal, naturally strong, was so 
much improved as to induce a persuasion, even among his dispi- 
rited battalions, that they could not be seriously molested. 
On the right was Bayonne, with an entrenched camp, which had 
been constructed in its front. The centre, under the command 
of Drouet, extended along the right bank of the Adour to Port 
de Lanne, and guarded the islands De Rive and De Resins — 
his left skirted the Bidouse, from its confluence with the Adour 
to St. Palais, and was strengthened by the presence there of 
almost all his cavalry. Meanwhile, St. Jean Pied de Port was 

c c 2 



376 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxxii. 

put in a posture of defence, and made a rallying point for 
Harispe's Basque irregulars, whom a division of regular troops 
were directed to support. Haslingue, being covered with works, 
became the principal depot for the army ; and the bridges on the 
Bidouse, at Guiche, Bedache and Came, were all fortified. 
Other posts were taken and retrenched, such as the town of Dax. 
where a magazine was established, for the reception of such 
supplies as should be drawn from the interior. In a word, every 
preparation which the skill of the engineer could suggest, or the 
activity of the Marshal carry through, was made, to stop the 
victor at the A dour, and protect the interior of France from 
insult. 

It was the middle of February, 1814, ere the state of the 
weather, and the condition of the roads, would permit Lord 
Wellington to move. On the 14th, however, his troops marched 
out of their cantonments, and General Hill, interposing between 
the left of the enemy and St. Jean Pied de Port, left the latter 
place to be invested by Mina and his Spaniards ; while Hill him- 
self, with the second division, and Murillo's Spaniards, following 
General Harispe to the heights of La Montagne, attacked him 
there ; the British troops advancing in his front, while the 
Spaniards endeavoured to cut him off from the bridge at Le 
Palais. But the Spaniards, always slow, did not reach this point 
in time; and Harispe was, in consequence, enabled, after sus- 
taining a sharp contest, to pass the Bidouse unmolested. General 
HilL however, did not relax in the pursuit. He, too, passed the 
Bidouse, crossed the Gave de Mauleon, in spite of a broken 
bridge and the utmost exertions of the French to prevent it, 
and, defeating them with much slaughter, took up a commanding 
position at Sauveterre. 

Nothing could be more complete than the success which 
had attended these operations. From a country singularly 
strong, because everywhere intersected by rivers, the enemy were 
driven ; and they now showed their principal front in rear of the 
Gave d'Oleron It was not Lord Wellington's purpose that they 
should continue there ; and, the better to facilitate his own 
operations, Marshal Beresford, with the centre, and Sir John 
Hope with the left of the army, were both put in motion. 



1814.] BLOCKADE OF BAYONNE, 377 

It was his greatest present object to establish a bridge across 
the Adour, below Bayonne, by means of which a constant com- 
munication with St. Jean de Luz might be kept up — or the 
Adour itself — should it prove navigable for ships of burthen, 
be converted into the harbour from which the necessities of the 
army might be supplied. But this project, bold and hazardous 
at the best, could not be thought of unless the enemy's atten- 
tion was elsewhere called away ; and it w r as so to distract it, 
that the movements by the right of the allied army were under- 
taken and carried forward. 

The Adour, running with a strong current, passes through 
the heart of Bayonne, where it is spanned by two bridges, 
both of them cut in the centre, and connected again by draw- 
bridges. Both in the city and below it, there is a great body 
of water, for the channel is deep, and the breadth of the stream 
not less than 600 yards. At the mouth, however, there is a 
bar, which, though in the season of the floods it offers no impedi- 
ment to navigation, cannot, after the floods have ceased, be 
crossed by any vessel drawing more than ten feet water. To 
bridge this river, it would be necessary to force decked vessels 
over that bar, and, against a strong current, this could be 
accomplished only by the assistance of a strong and leading 
sea. Accordingly, though all the preparations w T ere complete so 
early as the 17th, the 23rd came ere it was possible for Sir 
John Hope and Admiral Penrose to apply them, for the surf ran 
high, and the wind was adverse, so that the chasse-marees could 
not approach. The left column of the army, however, got under 
arms ; and, after a good deal of skirmishing, established itself 
round the intrenched camp, seized the village of Miglot, and 
the sand-hills below r the town, and, on three sides, put Bayonne 
itself in a state of blockade. Then, being anxious to obtain a 
hold upon the opposite bank, they caused rafts of pontoons to 
be constructed, by means of which, 600 of the guards, two 
companies of riflemen, and a few rockets, were carried across. 
It was a matter of extreme surprise to all who witnessed this 
movement, that the enemy should have made no attempt to 
interrupt it. But this inaction did not continue, as a heavy 
column pushed from the citadel, to attack and overthrow 
the handful of brave men who had established themselves 



378 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxxii. 

among the sand-hills. A brief, but sharp contest ensued. The 
rockets were thrown with effect ; and the guards, having 
delivered their volley, charged, and the enemy retreated in great 
disorder, like men whose morale a succession of defeats had broken. 

Early in the morning of the 24th, the flotilla of small craft, 
from which the bridge was to be formed, arrived at the mouth of 
the Adour. It was a moment of high and anxious excitement to 
the army — for the wind blew fresh, there was a heavy swell upon 
the bar, and over that the frail boats must pass. Boldly and 
skilfully that passage was effected, though not indeed without 
the loss of life — inasmuch as several upset, and the crews perished 
— but, owing to the matchless skill of the brave crews that 
manned them, with far greater facility than the most sanguine 
had anticipated, the chasse-marees were taken up to their 
stations, and the ground-work of the bridge was laid. The con- 
struction was so rapid, that, by the 26th, infantry could pass it, 
and by the 27th it was reported by the engineer, complete.* 

The result of this operation was the general investment of 
Bayonne. The garrison driven within the walls, found them- 
selves in a state of siege, and Sir John Hope made arrangements 
for throwing up redoubts for the reduction of the citadel. 
While the left column was thus occupied, Lord Wellington, at 
the head of Hill's and Beresford's corps, had made good the 



* It was composed of six-and-twenty chasse-marees, strongly lashed to 
each other, anchored side by side — a heavy gun occasionally serving as an 
anchor, and moored both at stem and stern, to prevent their position being 
altered by the ebb and flow of the current. Across the decks of these were 
strained chain cables, upon which were laid strong planks of oak, and these 
being properly secured, a platform, at once yielding and sufficiently sub- 
stantial to bear the weight of artillery, was obtained ; while, above the bridge, 
a boom was laid across the river, to arrest the fire-ships or floating timber 
which it was expected the enemy would set adrift. For the purpose of 
narrowing the channel, and thus producing a stronger current, which should 
prevent the sand from accumulating on the bar, the French had erected stone 
piers of considerable extent, which greatly lessened the space of water to be 
bridged, and, from their breadth, afforded also an excellent causeway ; and 
although — from the ocean swell and land-floods to which the Adour was con- 
stantly exposed — the French engineers had thought it impracticable to secure 
pontoons in that river, a sand-bank, fortunately shifting, served as an excel- 
lent breakwater, and protected and preserved the work." — Ed. 



1814.] BATTLE OF ORTHES. 379 

passage of the Gave d'Oleron at various points, attacked, with the 
fourth and seventh divisions, the fortified posts of Haslingues and 
Oyergave, and compelled the enemy to withdraw, with heavy 
loss, within the tete-du-pont at Peyre-Lorade. This done, the 
communications between Sauveterre and the Gave de Pau were 
threatened. Whereupon, from the former, Soult withdrew his 
people, and took up a new and more formidable position on the 
other side of the river. He was now completely isolated from the 
intrenched camp at Bayonne, and saw the road to Bordeaux 
threatened ; but, having well studied his ground, he declined to 
accept the battle which Lord Wellington was eager to deliver. 
He stood, at this time, on the high road to Dax, which, passing a 
sloping and formidable hill, was strengthened by the village of 
St. Boes, on which it rested. His left occupied the heights above 
Orthes, and guarded the passes of the river — -while the centre, 
thrown back, could hardly be attacked at all, unless at the risk of 
the assailants having to sustain a cross fire on both their flanks. 
Yet, in that stupendous position, Lord Wellington resolved to 
attack him. 

It was the object of the allied general to turn the right of 
Soult's line ; and, with this view, the fourth division received 
orders to carry St. Boes. They took the village, though not till 
after a fearful struggle. The division having deployed, pressed 
forward to assault the heights by which both the village and the 
fields around it were commanded — but, although repeated attempts 
were made to carry these heights, they failed. 

Lord Wellington perceived the emergency, and, with a master's 
hand, changed the whole order of battle. He suddenly brought 
up the third, sixth, and a portion of the light divisions, all of 
which he threw upon the enemy's left, and such was the 
superiority of the combined attack that it bore down all opposi- 
tion. The French wavered, and fled ; upon which, the victors, 
bringing up their right shoulders, closed in upon the centre ; and 
all, both there and on the right, became shaken, and confusion 
quickly followed. 

That w r hich was at first a retreat, grew, by degrees, a flight. 
General Hill fell upon the fugitives from the Gave above Orthes. 
General Sam's brigade of cavalry, and the 7th Hussars, under 
Lord Edward Somerset, scoured the road to St. Sever, and the 
result was the capture of six guns, a great many prisoners* 



380 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxxij. 

and baggage in abundance ; while, of those who escaped, num- 
bers threw away their arms and deserted. On the 1st of March,, 
head-quarters were established at St. Sever, while the enemy* 
abandoning the road to Bordeaux, continued his retreat in the 
direction of Agen. 

The sudden rise of the rivers by a heavy fall of rain on the 1st, 
prevented Lord Wellington from pushing further than St. Sever 
for several days, but the allied army was not inactive. Soult 
had established an extensive magazine at Ain, and, with the fore- 
thought which belongs to a great commander, detached, even 
during his retreat, a considerable corps to cover it, and gave 
orders that it should be removed without delay. But he had an 
enemy to deal with, prompt and anticipative as himself. Sir Row- 
land Hill was despatched with the second division, and a corps of 
Portuguese, to attack the enemy's corps ; and the assault was too 
vigorous and well-directed to be withstood. The enemy were* 
beaten at all points, and — in addition to 100 prisoners — arms, 
ammunition, and materiel of every kind, fell into the hands of 
the allies. 

From that moment, Soult's line of retreat became fixed and 
immutable. He gave up the road to Bordeaux through the 
Llandes ; abandoned what appeared to be his original intention 
of taking ground about Agen and Condon, and, ascending the 
course of the Adour, marched direct upon Tarbes. 

Though the necessity imposed upon Lord Wellington of 
repairing the bridges which Soult in his retreat had broken down r 
compelled him, with his main army, to linger some days about 
St. Sever, Marshal Beresford, on the 7th of March, was 
directed to march, with the fourth and seventh divisions of 
infantry, and General Vivian's brigade of cavalry, towards 
Bordeaux. The Marshal set out accordingly, and, on the 12th,. 
reached that ancient city, where he was welcomed by the 
authorities with every demonstration of joy — while the white 
flag replaced the tri- colour, and Louis XVIII. was formally 
proclaimed. 

This was the first open avowal of a return to ancient prin- 
ciples, which had as yet been made in any part of France ; and 
it was the more bold because a Bonapartist garrison had evacuated 
the place, only a few hours previously to Beresford's arrival — 
while not only the forts along the Channel of the Garonne, 










WIW1 . 



1814.] SURRENDER OF BORDEAUX. 381 

but several of the rural districts around were still occupied by* 
imperial troops and animated by Bonapartist predilections. On 
the whole, however, the popular feeling was decidedly in favour 
of the Bourbons ; and Beresford, acting up to the instructions 
which he had received, threw no impediment in the way of its- 
manifestation, though he declined formally to sanction it. He 
received the Due d'Angouleme, however, who arrived shortly 
afterwards, with every mark of respect and exerted himself te 
open the navigation of the river, and preserve order both in the 
city and the suburbs. But Lord Wellington could not spare sa 
large a detachment from his army of operations. He had ascer- 
tained that Suchet, abandoning Catalonia, was in full march to 
join Soult, and he accordingly desired that Beresford, with the 
fourth division, should return, while the seventh, under Lord 
Dalhousie, should remain and garrison Bordeaux. Beresford lost 
no time in following these instructions ; and the fall of the rivers,, 
as well as the progress of events which ensued, rendered it a 
matter of congratulation to all concerned, that he w T as enabled thus- 
early to rejoin head- quarters. 

The march of the two divisions on Bordeaux no sooner 
became known to Marshal Soult, than, with equal boldness and 
good sense, he at once assumed the offensive. He assembled his- 
columns at Conchez on the 13th, and advancing towards Hill's- 
position, made a show of attacking it. But Lord Wellington, 
aware of the design, had already concentrated about Aire ; and 
the French, not conceiving that they were in sufficient strength. 
fell back without accomplishing their intended object. It was 
now the turn of the allies to harass them. Having called in all 
his detachments, and brought up about 8,000 Spaniards from 
their quarters at Irun, Lord Wellington, on the 18th, moved 
forward, and, driving the enemy before him, overtook and 
charged their rear- guard among the vineyards in front of Vic- 
Bigorre. The French suffered a good deal, and retreated in 
great confusion ; making an effort, however, to rally about. 
Tarbes, which they reached on the evening of the 19th. But the 
display of the allied columns as they moved forward .to attack,, 
was, or seemed to be, all for which the enemy had waited. 
The position of Tarbes was abandoned almost without a shot — 
nor did Soult halt or show front again, till he had taken shelter 



382 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxxil. 

within the lines which he had so long and carefully strengthened 
in front of Toulouse. 

Lord Wellington as soon as he received certain intelligence 
that Suchet had made preparations to abandon Catalonia, and 
march to the assistance of Soult, gave orders to General Clinton, 
who had succeeded Lord William Bentinck in the command of 
the Anglo- Sicilian force in the east of Spain, to break up his 
army, and, sending portions to Gibraltar and Sicily, to lead the 
remainder along the valley of the Ebrc, to join himself. At the 
same time, the great bulk of the Spanish armies, which, since the 
battle of the Nivelle, had been kept in quarters about Irun, was 
ordered to the front ; and measures taken, as soon as the state of 
the roads would permit, to pass the Garonne and attack the enemy 
in his formidable position. 

But before this decisive step could be taken, the current of 
events had run elsewhere in so unlooked-for a channel, as mate- 
rially to alter the situation in which both Lord Wellington and 
Sir H. Clinton then stood. Napoleon, after failing in his attempt 
to obtain from Ferdinand such terms as must have interrupted 
the good understanding between the English and Spanish 
nations, gave to the King of Spain his freedom unshackled; 
stipulating only for the dismissal of such garrisons as still 
occupied the strong-holds in the south-eastern provinces. But 
Ferdinand, even when he pledged himself to this, knew that the 
act would not be sanctioned by the Cortes ; and the proposition, 
when made known to Sir Henry Wellesley, the English Minister 
at Seville, was scouted as inadmissible. Between 30,000 and 
40,000 of the best of Napoleon's troops were shut up in these 
fortified places ; and it would have ill served the purposes for 
which both England and Spain were in arms, to have liberated 
them at this important crisis, to reinforce his armies in the field. 
Accordingly, a direct refusal was given to Suchet, when, on the 
passage of the King to Gerona, he applied for a redemption of the 
pledge — and Sir Henry Wellesley, with great judgement, detained 
General Clinton in Catalonia ; because, without his presence, it 
would have been impossible to prevent these garrisons from effect- 
ing Suchet' s intentions. For this bold step the English minister 
was highly commended by Lord Wellington — while the latter, 
though he regretted that his means had not received the increase 



1814.] RESTORATION OF KING FERDINAND. 383 



which he had anticipated, gave ample proof, ere many days had 
passed, that he was still strong enough to beat his enemy, let him 
meet him when and where he might. 

The city of Toulouse stands on the right bank of the Garonne, 
above its point of junction with the great canal of Languedoc, 
so as to be covered on three sides by these water- courses ; on the 
eastern and northern faces by the canal, on the western side by 
the river. There is, indeed, a suburb, called the Faubourg of St. 
Cyprian, which occupies the left bank of the river, and, sur- 
rounded by a strong brick wall, communicates with the city by 
means of a bridge. But the city itself stands on a peninsula ; and, 
being accessible only from the south, constitutes a strong and 
extensive rallying- point for an army which is reduced to act on 
the defensive. Like other French towns of its age and character, 
Toulouse is surrounded by a wall, which though old, is of great 
thickness, with numerous towers, that flank each other. But its 
defences were inadequate to withstand the efforts of modern war- 
fare, and Soult had, in consequence, adopted every necessary 
expedient to improve them. On the south, little was required. 
There lay the Faubourg St. Michael, with the road to Nar- 
bonne, both, however, so entirely covered by a bend in the 
Garonne, that for their safety no apprehensions could be enter- 
tained. But, selecting as his own position a formidable range of 
heights, which, running between the canal and the river Ers, 
cover the town on its eastern face, he strengthened it by redoubts 
and field-works wherever it seemed to be accessible, and there he 
determined to abide a battle. 

It is worthy of remark, that by this disposition of his army he 
had accomplished two grand objects. Should he succeed in 
maintaining himself there, he would save Toulouse — should he 
however, be beaten, his retreat was secure across the canal, as 
every bridge was fortified. But, judging from his letters to 
Suchet, he entertained very sanguine hopes of victory ; yet still, 
his dispositions were made with military prudence, so that, should 
a reverse take place, it would not come upon him by surprise, or 
find him unprepared. 

Lord Wellington began his operations on the 28th of March. 
So unfavourable, however, for military movements was the 
state of both the weather and roads, and so full and rapid were 



384 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxxir. 

the rivers, that not till the 8th of April could the Garonne 
be passed, or the army brought into an attitude to allow of 
dispositions for the meditated attack being made. Moreover, 
it was found, on reconnoitring the enemy's position, that he had 
posted himself with such excellent skill, that any attempt to turn 
him would be unsuccessful. But Lord Wellington knew his 
troops, and the troops knew their general — and what the one 
planned, the other executed boldly and brilliantly — and, as the 
event proved, with unquestionable success. 

After a fruitless effort to lay down a bridge, so as to bring his 
columns in front of the suburb of St. Michael, Lord Wellington 
left General Hill to threaten that of St. Cyprian, and, crossing 
below the town, ventured upon an extended flank march — of all 
the operations in war — where an enterprising enemy is to be 
dealt with, certainly the most hazardous. Nay, more — there 
was a moment when, by the breaking of the bridge, two divisions 
of British troops, under the immediate direction of Marshal 
Beresford, stood completely isolated — and yet no attack was made 
upon them, and things went forward as if no accident had 
occurred. 

Lord Wellington's plan embraced several attacks ; General 
Hill, at the suburb of St. Cyprian, Picton, with the third division, 
at the lower extremity of the canal, and Baron Alten, with the 
light division, higher up, were all to make demonstrations. They 
were to drive in the enemy's pickets — threaten the lines of 
defence — but not to be drawn, by any partial success, to commit 
their respective corps too seriously. Meanwhile, Beresford, with 
the fourth and sixth divisions, was to move round the enemy's 
intrenchments, and, crossing the Ers, was to pass, with his right 
flank exposed, by the very base of the fortified heights where the 
strength of Soult's army was in position. By this bold and 
dangerous march, he would gain the extreme right of the line, 
— where he was to form, charge, and drive the enemy before him 
— while Don Manuel Freyre, with 10,000 Spanish infantry, was 
to keep the other side of the Ers till he should reach the village 
of Croix d'Orade, where he, too, was to form, and whence, so 
soon as Beresford should be ready ; he was to make an attack on 
the left of the enemy's position. The communications between 
these separate corps were to be kept open by such of the cavalry 



1814.] BRAVERY OF BERESFORD. 385 

as could be spared from other operations, while the artillery took 
post at every point whence it could operate with effect in support 
of the various attacks. 

So extensive a disposition for battle could not be made 
without incurring many and serious risks. In the first place, 
the very extent of country covered by the troops in position, 
was far greater than, in a military point of view, their numbers 
authorized them to occupy. In the next place, a sudden rise of 
the river would at once leave Hill and his division dependant on 
their own unaided exertions ; and, lastly, Beresford's march 
offered a positive temptation for Soult to descend from his moun- 
tain position, and assume the offensive. Beresford, meanwhile, 
held on his course gallantly, and, when Soult attacked him as he 
marched, the brigade employed sustained a severe defeat. He 
gained the right of the position, brought up his own left shoulder, 
and, carrying at the point of the bayonet the redoubts which he 
had been commanded to win, stood, as a conqueror, on the same 
level with the enemy.* 

The Spaniards were, however, less fortunate. They went on, 
for a time, boldly enough, till they reached a sort of covered way, 
the protection afforded by which screened them from the effects 
of the enemy's fire — and no persuasion on the part of the 
generals at their head could induce them to advance further. 
Then, there was a rush from the hill, of French infantry, which 
they would not withstand, but turned their backs and fled. It is 
reported of Lord Wellington, that, foreseeing what was about to 
happen, he turned to an officer near him, and demanded, 
whether he had " ever seen 10,000 men run away ?" And when 
an answer was returned in the negative, he added, " Wait a 
minute, then, and you will see it now." Be this, however, as 
it may — he had already, ere the rout took place, made such 
arrangements as to render it comparatively innocuous. A por- 

* During his march, Beresford had on his left the Ers, flowing parallel to 
the fortified heights on his right ; while the swampy ground he had to pass, 
narrowed as he advanced, and became at every step more difficult. Defying 
all obstacles, however, with but a single gun, and having one flank shut in by 
the river and the other commanded by the artillery upon the heights — which 
were held by 14,000 men — Beresford pressed forward, gained the desired 
point, and formed at the foot of the position. — Ed. 



— — 



386 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap, xxxii. 

tion of the light division, being brought from the station assigned 
to them, were placed in reserve, and through these, who opened 
right and left, the Spaniards ran off tumultuously. Then were 
the red jackets moved to the front, and, in five minutes, one 
English battalion had accomplished the object for which a 
whole Spanish division had struggled for half an hour, and in 
vain. 

Meanwhile, Marshal Beresford, who had been compelled, by 
the state of the roads, to leave his artillery behind, occupied the 
ground of which he had first made himself master. But no 
sooner had he got his guns, than he resumed the offensive 
instantly. Marching along the ridge, and carrying, in succession, 
two formidable redoubts, he seized some fortified houses, almost 
in the centre of the enemy's line. A desperate effort from the 
canal was made to recover these, but it was effectually repulsed ; 
while, at the same time, the Spaniards, having rallied, were 
brought again into action ; and, from the left, not less than from 
the right, the storm thickened fearfully around the French com- 
mander. He stood it bravely for a time ; but, at last, con- 
fidence forsook the enemy, and the whole range of heights 
being abandoned, they retired into the town. Not even there, 
however, was it Lord Wellington's purpose that they should 
enjoy a moment's repose. Throughout the day of the battle 
(the 10th), he had abstained from attacking the bridges — because 
success at these points, even had it been obtained, would have 
contributed nothing towards the attainment of the object which 
he had in view ; and Picton, who, with his usual impetuosity, had 
once, at least, converted a feint into a real attack, failed signally. 
But, now, the case was different. Having driven the enemy into 
the city, it was Lord Wellington's purpose to keep them there ; 
and, to accomplish this, a perfect command both of the canal and 
the river was necessary. 

It was late ere the firing ended on the 10th. On the 11th, 
at an early hour, the English general hurried across the Garonne, 
that he might ascertain the precise situation of Hill's corps ; 
leaving orders that a fresh distribution of cartridges should be 
made, both for the infantry and artillery, and that the pontoon 
bridge should be moved up nearer to the town of Toulouse. 

But these arrangements were not completed in sufficient time 



1814.] BATTLE OF TOULOUSE. 387 

to permit the renewal of active operations that day — although 
all was ready for a complete investment of the place upon the 
12th, had Soult judged it expedient to abide the issue.* During 
the night of the 11th, however, the French Marshal evacuated 
the town, and, leaving all his sick and wounded behind, and 
giving up his communication with Suchet, he retreated — though 
still in good order — towards Carcassone.f Immediately, the 
allied army marched into the city, where they were received by 
all classes of the inhabitants as deliverers. The white flag was 
hoisted on the towers of the churches ; the bells were rung ; 
the Te Deum was chaunted, and, at night, there was a general 
illumination. And, as if it had been the will of Providence, 
that the triumph of these loyal people should be without alloy, 
that very afternoon, official information was communicated to 
them of the great events which had already fallen out at 
Paris. 

Colonels Cook and St. Simon — the former commissioned by 
the English minister, the latter by the Provisional Government 
of France, arrived at Lord Wellington s quarters, to announce 
that Napoleon Bonaparte had abdicated the throne — that the 

* " The army being thus established on three sides of Toulouse, I imme- 
diately detached our light cavalry to cut off the communication by the only 
road practicable for carriages which remained to the enemy, till I should be 
enabled to make arrangements to establish the troops between the canal and 
the Garonne. 

"The enemy, however, retired last night, leaving in our hands General 
Harispe, General Baurot, General St. Hilaire, and 1,600 prisoners. One piece 
of cannon was taken on the field of battle ; and others, and large quantities 
of stores of all descriptions, in the town." — Wellington Despatches. 

f " It will scarcely be believed, that some French writers call Toulouse 
a victory. But a very slight inquiry will place that claim at rest. 
"What, let it be simply asked, were the relative objects of Soult and 
"Wellington ? Was it not with one to hold a city, that the other was as 
anxious to obtain ? And what were the results ? Soult, after his defeat at 
Tarbes, had made forced marches to complete the defences at Toulouse, and 
garrison a place to which he attached such value. His opponent advanced 
more leisurely ; for, as the end was great, so also were the means limited and 
the difficulties many ; were they not surmounted ? he desired to pass the 
Garonne, and he did pass it ; he desired to win the position and works of 
Mont Rave, and he did win them ; he desired to enter Toulouse, and he did 
enter it, as a conqueror at the head of his troops."— Napier, 



388 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. [chap. xxxn. 

House of Bourbon had been restored to its place at the head of 
the French nation — and that no further ground of enmity between 
the French people and the allies now existed. 

There was but one feeling everywhere, so soon as the extra- 
ordinary news got abroad, — that of exultation and joy, but it was 
not unmixed with regret. Had the messengers of peace arrived 
but two days sooner, many valuable lives would have been 
.saved ; for not upon the heights of Toulouse alone had the blood 
of the brave been shed unnecessarily. 

Sir John Hope, it will be remembered, had . been left with the 
first and fifth divisions, a corps of Spaniards, a brigade or two 
of Portuguese, and Lord Aylmer's independent brigade, to carry 
on the blockade of Bayonne — the citadel of which he had closely 
invested, and was making every preparation to attack. Though 
the enemy resisted these approaches, by keeping up a constant 
fire of artillery and musketry on the working- parties, they had 
hazarded no sortie ; and the 14th of April came, bringing with 
it a rumour of peace, ere anything of the kind had been 
attempted. But, early in the morning of that unfortunate day, 
about two hours before dawn, the garrison sallied in force ;* and 
an affair not less sanguinary than any which had occurred 
^since the opening of the campaign ensued. For a while, 
the enemy seemed to carry everything before them. The 
village of St. Etienne, which lay close to the glacis, was taken ; 
the guards of the trenches were driven back, and a magazine of 
fascines was destroyed. But reinforcements soon came up, when 
the battle was renewed with fresh fury, and all the posts of 
which the assailants had for a moment made themselves masters, 



* Rumours of Napoleon's abdication were already in circulation. It was 
generally believed that the Emperor was either dead or dethroned, 
and Thouvenot's sortie, was perfectly unwarrantable. It was his duty, 
binder such circumstances, to remain upon the defensive, abating nothing 
of his vigilance, but refraining from all hostile demonstrations on the part of 
his presumed master, until he should be fully satisfied he had a master, and 
.one who had relinquished nought of his authority. An opposite and reckless 
-course of proceeding did not prove advantageous to him. His loss in killed 
and wounded, amounted to near 1,000 men, with a General. The allies 
.suffered to about the same extent, losing also a General, the gallant Hay.— 
Ed. 



1814.] PEACE. 389 

were rapidly recovered. Unfortunately, however, the success was 
not achieved without a serious loss to the victors ; about 800 
men were placed hors-de-combat, by death, or wounds, or cap- 
ture. General Hay was killed while defending St. Etienne, and 
Sir John Hope, in an attempt to rally the fugitives, had his horse 
shot under him, and was made prisoner. 

It is true that the enemy suffered more severely, their casual- 
ties amounting to 900 men at the least ; yet this was but sorry 
consolation — blood had flowed unnecessarily, when the talk of 
peace was on the lips of the combatants. It was, however, 
the last blow struck in that war. Within a few days, the 
white flag was hoisted on the ramparts of Bayonne — and the 
armies of England, of Spain, and Portugal, saluted it with a feu- 
de-joie. 

Thus terminated the most momentous struggle in which, for 
its existence as a nation, Great Britain had ever been engaged. 
For twenty years she had maintained a deadly contest, often with 
difficulty, sometimes amid reverses, but never with dishonour ; and 
it had now closed more triumphantly than the most sanguine of 
her own children could have anticipated. There is no disposition, 
in this country, to detract from the merits of other nations. Spain 
and Portugal, as far as the discordant elements of their govern- 
ments would permit, did their parts; and Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia, w r ell sustained their ancient reputation. Yet, it is certain 
that had not England sustained them all — showing an example in 
the field and infusing spirit in the council- chamber — the gigantic 
catastrophe which closed the career of that wonder of his age, 
Napoleon, could never have been brought round. Nor, when the 
name of Napoleon is mentioned, let us forget that of the great 
commander to whose determined perseverance and unrivalled abi- 
lities England is mainly indebted for the undisputed renown which 
raised her to the first place among the military nations of Europe. 
Had there been in the Duke of Wellington less firmness than 
belonged to his character, the cause of the Peninsula would have 
been, even at the outset, given up as hopeless, and the Peninsula 
and the whole continent left prostrate at the feet of Napoleon. 

There is little to be told in reference to the events which 
ensued, on the cessation of hostilities in the South of France. 
Ferdinand, setting aside his Cortes, took to himself the exercise 

D D 



390 STORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR [chap.xxxii. 

of kingly power. Louis XVIII. mounted a throne which he 
fenced round too closely with the soldiers of Napoleon to ensure 
for it any degree of security. The northern Princes retired to 
their respective dominions ; and, while the glorious chief went to 
Paris in the capacity of ambassador, the allied army, which he 
had so often led to victory, broke up, and the British divisions, 
embarking in the Garonne, quitted the south of France, 
whose hills and valleys had witnessed equally their unrivalled 
gallantry in the field, and their admirable conduct when in 
quarters. 

Years have passed — the actors in the scene are dropping fast 
away — and of that splendid army of which its unrivalled leader 
proudly boasted — " that it was the most perfect machine the 
world ever produced, and one with which he could have gone 
anywhere, and done anything/' the elements are rapidly dis- 
solving. A few years more, and the material of the old Peninsular 
army will have crumbled into dust, — but its glorious memory will 
exist for ever. 



INDEX. 



A. 

Abadia, Gen. 296. 
Abercrombie, Col. 263. 
Abrantes, Marquis de, 20. 
Alazon, Gen. Cruz, 335. 
Albuera, battle of, 262. 
Albuquerque, Lieut.- Gen. the 

Duke of, 22, 146, 181, 184, 

194,196, 197. 
Almeida, treachery of Garrison of, 

222 ; Siege of, by the British, 

255. 
Alten, Gen. 261, 264, 283, 284, 

302, 368, 384. 
Alvarez, Gen. 244. 
Amarante, Count, 353. 
Angouleme, Due d', 375, 381. 
Anson, Gen. 240, 302. 
Anstruther, Gen. 64, 71. 
Antonio, the Infant, Don, 36 — 8 
Arbuthnot, Col. 260. 
Aradia, Gen. 102. 
Arens, Gen. 331—2. 
Arenschild, Col. 211. 
Arrezaga, Gen. 197. 
Arvignac, Col. 114. 
Asturias, Prince of, see Spain, 

King Ferdinand of. 
Auckland, Gen. 71, 74. 
Avril, Gen. 60. 
Aylmer, Lord, 369, 388. 

B. 

Badajoz, siege of by the French, 
243 ; by Lord Wellington, 250, 
266, 315; recapture of, 318. 

Baird, Lieut.. Gen. Sir D. 91, 92, 
97, 98, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 



113, 114, 119, 124, 131, 136, 

137, 138, 141. 
Ballasteros, Gen. 242, 297, 312, 

337, 340. 
Bernard, Gen. 306. 
Barnes, Gen. 343. 
Barreto, Don J. O. de, 21. 
Bayonne, siege of, 377- 
Beauharnais, Eugene, 35 — 6. 
Beckett, Major, 189. 
Belvidere, the Conde, 100, 101, 

142. 
Bentinck, Gen. Lord Wm. 96, 

137, 151, 357, 382. 
Berkeley, Admiral, 239. 
Beresford, Marshal, 86, 92, 141, 

142, 146, 147, 148, 149, et seq. 
Berthier, Marshal, 236. 
Bessieres, Marshal, 31, 57, 58, 

100, 114, 162. 
Bidassoa, passage of the, 365. 
Blake, Gen. 57, 58, 59, 90, 95, 

97, 98, 100, 101, 105, 106, 108, 

142, 199, 259, 277. 
Blantyre, Lord, 303. 
Bock, Baron, 331. 
Bonaparte, Joseph, 57, 90, 162, 

172, 182, 191, 192, 199, 332, 

333, 335, 340, 347, 351. 
Bonnet, Gen. 324. 
Bordeaux, occupation of, 380. 
Bourke, Lieut.-Col. 168, 172. 
Bowes, Gen. 68, 74. 
Bradford, Gen. 302, 327. 
Brennier, Gen. 256—7. 
Breyner, Don P. 20. 
British army, landing of in Spain, 

54 ; in Portugal, 64 ; embarka- 
tion of at Corunna, 141. 



392 



INDEX. 



Burgos, siege of, 337. 

Burrard, Sir Harry, 64, 71, 72, 

76, 77, 78, 89. 
Busaco, description of, 225; battle 

of, 227. 
Byng, Gen. 360—2. 



Cadiz, Lord Wellington at, 349. 

Cadogan, Col. 232, 354. 

Cameron, Gen. 150, 155, 158, 
162, 184, 187- 

Cameron, Col. 232. 

Campbell, Gen. A. 150, 184, 187, 
188, 239, 255, 256, 306. 

Gen. H. 150. 

Col. 306. 

Campo Mayor, siege of, 244. 

Caraffa, Gen. Don Juan, 16, 17, 
21, 24, 28, 60. 

Carlos, the Infant, Don, 35. 

Castanos, Gen. 41, 46, 47, 49, 
90, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 
108, 142, 259, 275, 295. 

Chabran, Gen. 50. 

Cintra, Convention of, 80. 

Ciudad Rodrigo, Governor of, 
305 ; siege of by the French, 
204 ; fall of, 210 ; sieges of by 
Lord Wellington, 280, 299; 
recapture of, 310. 

Clinton, Lieut.-Gen. 357, 382. 

Clausel, Gen. 329, 331, 332, 336, 
337, et seq. 

Cocks, Major, 338—9. 

Colbert, Gen. 127. 

Coibourne, Col. 262, 300, 309. 

Cole, Gen. 218, 226, 233, 250, 
261, 263, 264, 329. 

Collingwood, Lord, 54. 

Colville, Gen. 316, 383. 

Cook, Col. 387. 

Cordova, Pillage of, 43. 

Corunna, retreat upon, 119; bat- 
tle of, 137. 

Cotton, Major-Gen. 150, 154, 
155, 156, 184, 204, 223, 272. 



Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, 63, 
64,81, 88, 135. 

Coupigny, Marquis de la, 46 — 7. 

Cox, Gen. 201, 220, 221. 

Crackenbourg, Capt. 208. 

Cradock, Sir John, 143, 146, 148, 
149. 

Crauford, Gen. 68, 124, 131, 173, 
190, 195, 200, 207, 210, 211, 
215, 216, 217, 226, 231, 239, 
240, 309, 311. 

Cruz, Don Juan de la, 47, 49. 

Cuesta, Gen. 57, 58, 59, 86, 106, 
142, 145, 146, 167, 168, 169, 
170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 
177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 
183, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 
195. 

D. 

Dalhousie, Earl of, 343, 381. 
D'Alorna, the Marquis, 221, 222. 
Dalrymple, Sir Hew, 54, 64, 78. 

79, 82, 87, 89. 
Darican, Gen. 313. 
Dashwood, Capt. 284. 
Delaborde, Gen. 22, 23, 66, 67, 

68, 69,72, 73,74, 158. 
D'Eroles, Gen. 322. 
Dixon, Major, 267, 311. 
D'Orsenne, Gen. 291, 297, 301, 

302. 
Douro, passage of the, 159. 
Doyle, Gen. 98. 
Drieberg, Gen. 151. 
Drouet, Gen. 241, 270, 273, 297, 

314, 360, 375. 
Du Breton, Gen. 338. 
Dufour, Gen. 47. 
Duhesme, Gen. 30. 
Dupont, Gen. 29, 40, 42, 43, 44, 

45, 49, 50, 54, 60, 90. 
D'Urban, Gen. 333. 

E. 

Echeverria, Don P. A. de, 43. 
Eguia,Gen. 181, 196, 197. 
Erskine, Gen. Sir Wm. 256, 272. 



INDEX. 



393 



Espana, Don Carlos de, 244, 327, 

334. 
Etruria, Queen of, 37. 

F. 

Fane, Gen. 68, 150, 154, 238, 239. 

Ferguson, Capt., 343. 

Major-Gen. 65, 68, 69, 

74. 

Fletcher, Lieut.-Col. 267, 311. 

Fordyce, Major, 189. 

Forjaz, Don M. P. 21. 

Forts Napoleon and Ragusa, cap- 
ture of, 320. 

Foster, Lieut. 272. 

Foy, Gen. 241, 330, 356. 

Franceschi, Gen. 112, 158, 174. 

Francisco de Paula, the Infant 
Don, 37, 38. 

Fraser, Gen. 8,92, 119, 131, 136. 

Freire, Gen. 65. 66, 82, 366,384. 

French army, retreat of into Ga- 
licia, 163 ; from Santarem, 245; 
from Salamanca, 324. 

Frere, Rt. Hon. J. H. 110. 

Fuentes de Onor, battle of, 251. 

G. 

Galluza, Gen. 83, 84. 

Gal way, Lord, 201. 

Gardiner, Major. 189. 

Girard, Gen. 295, 296. 

Gobert, Gen. 45, 47. 

Godoy, Manuel, 6. 7, 10, 11, 12, 

13, 14, 25, 28, 31,32, 33, 34, 

36, 37, 42. 
Gordon, Major, 290. 
Gen. Sir Thomas, 278, 

286, 314, 350, 351, 353, et seq. 
Grant, Col. 274. 

H. 

Hacket, Col. 342. 

Hamilton, Gen. 248, 261, 266, 

279, 314, 345. 
Harispe, Gen. 374, 376. 
Hay, Gen. 389. 



Hervasti, Gen. 206, 210. 

Hervey, Col. 160, 264. 

Hill, Gen. Sir Rowland (after- 
wards Lord), 65, 68, 141, 146, 
1 50, et seq. 

Hope, Gen. Sir John, 84. 85, 92, 
93, 97, 99, 102, 108, 131, 135, 
136, 141, 367, et seq. 

Houghton. Gen. 262, 261. 

Houston, Gen. 254, 258, 266. 

Howard, Gen. 270, 271. 

Hunt, Lieut. 274. 

I. 

Imaz, Gen. 244. 
Infantado, the Duke del, 142. 
Inglis, Col. 263. 
Izquierdo, Don E. 12, 32. 

J. 

Jones, Capt. 120. 

Jourdan, Marshal, 182, 191, 198, 
333, et seq. 

Junot, Marshal, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
27, 28, 45, 54, 60, 61, 62, 63, 
66 9 73,78,80, 82,88, 111, 114, 
205, 222, 229. 

K. 

Keats, Vice- Admiral, 55. 
Kellerman, Gen. 28, 61, 63, 72, 

73, 78, 79, 168, 202. 
Kennedy, Mr. 258. 

L. 

Lacy, Gen. 312, 322. 

Lafoes, Duke de, 8. 

Lake, Col. 70. 

Lapisse, Gen. 143, 145, 186. 

Largos, Gen. 177. 

Lasalle, Gen. 58, 114. 

LeFebre, Gen. 52, 114, 122. 

Leigh, Col. 120. 

Leith, Gen. 223,226, 316. 

Le Marchand, Gen. 302, 329. 



394 



INDEX. 



Loison, Gen. 23, 60, 62, 66, 67, 

68, 72, 73, 161, 228. 
Longa, Col. 350, 353, 354. 
Longthwert, Gen. 151. 
Londonderry, Marquis of, 77, 

151. 
Louis XVIII. of France, 380, 390. 
Lumley, Gen. 254, 271. 

M. 

Macdonald, Major, 333, 346. 
Macelliny, Gen. 114. 
Mackenzie, Col. 136. 
Gen. 149, 150, 551, 

183, 184, 185, 187. 
Mackie, Lieut. 309. 
Mackinnon, Gen. 306, 308, 309, 

311. 
Mac Leod, Capt. 267. 
Madrid, entered by the French, 

35 ; massacre at, 39 ; entered 

by Lord Wellington. 334. 
Maitland, Gen. Sir Thomas, 322, 

334, 336, 340, 341. 
Majendie, Capt. 28. 
Manners, Major, 306. 
Manningham, Gen. 137. 
Marchand, Marshal, 198. 
Marmont, Marshal, 114, 258, 

270, et seq. 
Matthieu, Gen. M. 312. 
Maubourg, Gen. Latour, 343, 

348. 
Mendizabal, Gen. 242, 243. 
Mendonca, Don J. A. S. 21. 
Menezes, Lieut.-Gen. Don F. de, 

20. 
Merle, Gen. 58, 227. 
Mermot, Gen. 158, 228. 
Miller, Gen. 234. 
Mina, Gen. 350, 356. 
Moncey, Marshal, 30, 40, 42, 50, 

51, 52, 114. 
Montbrun, Gen. 246. 
Montiniere, Gen. 202. 
Moore, Sir John, 64, 76, 77, 81, 

90, 91, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 



106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 
113, 116, 117, 118, 122, 124, 
127, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 
136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141. 

Mor, Conde Monteiro, 201. 

Morla, Gen. 54, 96, 109. 

Mortier, Marshal, 174, 197, 199, 
202, 213, 223, 224, 243, 244, 
249. 

Murat, Marshal, 31, 34, 35, 36, 
37,38. 

Murillo, Gen. 353, 376. 

Murray, Col. 82, 151. 

Major-Gen. Sir John, 

151, 155, 157, 159, 160, 161, 
163, 349, 356. 

Myers, Sir Win, 263. 

N. 

Napier, Major, 138, 307, 309- 

Capt. 131. 

Napoleon, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 

et seq. 
Neufchatel, Prince of, 276. 
Ney, Marshal, 114, 144, 162, 168, 

170, 174, 192, 198, 202, 205, 

210, 228. 
Nightingale, Gen. 68. 74. 
Nivelle, the, and the Nive, battles 

of, 366, et seq. 
Noronha, Don F. de, 20, 108. 
Nugent, Col. 318. 

O. 

Ocana, battle of, 197- 

O'Donaghoe, Gen. 168, 177, 179. 

O'Farrell, Gen. 13. 

Oliviera, Don Luis de,-6l. 

Omel, Gen. 98. 

Oporto, Bishop of, 145; plunder 

of, 145. 
Orthes, battle of, 379. 
O'Toole, Major, 306, 309. 
Otway, Col. 122, 264. 
Oudinot, Marshal, 291. 



INDEX. 



395 



p. 

Pack, Gen. 231, 246, 256, 257, 

et seq. 
Pakenham, Gen. 289, 327, 328. 
Paget, Gen. 92. 109, 111. 112, 

115, 120, 122, 132, 136, 137, 

139, 151, 155, 156, 157, 159, 

336. 
Paget, Sir Edward, 339, 346. 
Palacia, Marquis de, 142. 
Palafox, Gen. 98, 106, 107, 142, 

244. 
Parque, the Duke del, 198. 
Payne, Gen. 151, 155, 204. 
Pell, Lieut.Col. 342. 
Penrose, Admiral, 377. 
Picton, Gen. 223, 226, 227, 246, 

258, 313, 316, 384, 386. 
Ponsonby, Gen. 333. 
Portugal, Regent of, 15, 19, 22, 

32 ; proposed partition of, 14 ; 

flight of Royal family of, 23 ; 

Junot appointed Regent of, 

26 ; revolt of, 61. 
Prince Regent, the (afterwards 

George IV.), 312. 
Pringle, Gen. 343. 
Proby, Lord, 99. 
Prussia, King of, 357. 
Pyrenees, battles of, 361. 

Q. 

Quesnel, Gen. 28, 60, 61. 
Quiske, Brig. -Gen. 178. 

R. 

Rayneval, M. de, 15, 
Reding, Gen. 46, 47. 
Regnaud, Gen. 292, 293. 
Regnier, Gen. 212, 214, 219, 

227, 237, 276. 
Reille, Gen. 351. 
Requena, Gen. 50. 
Reyno, Marquis del, 191. 
Robertson, Col. 354 
Roliya, battle of, 68 . 



Romana, Marquis de la, 13, 55, 

90, 98, 100, et seq. 
Ross, Col. 84. 

Major-Gen. 361. 

Capt. 267. 

Rourke, Gen. 322. 

Russia, Czar, (Alexander) of, 321, 

357. 
Russian Admiral, the ; see Sinia- 

vin, Admiral. 

S. 

Saint Croix, Gen. 234. 
Saint-Cyr, Gen. Gouvion, 114, 
Saint-Simon, Col. 387. 
Saint Vincent, Earl, 12. 
Salamanca, battle of, 328. 
Sampaio, the Conde, 2 1 . 
Sanchez, Don Julian de, 292, 

293. 
San Juan, Gen. 98, 99, 102, 103, 

111. 
San Milan, action at, 353. 
San Sebastian, siege of, 260, 362. 
Sarsfield, Gen. 322. 
Savary, Gen. 364. 
Sebastiani, Gen. 169, 172, 173, 

174, 182, 196, 197, 199. 
Sever oli, Gen. 312. 
Sherbrooke, Gen. 151, 155, 182, 

183, 188. 
Silveira, Gen, 143, 144, 151, 152, 

161, 219, 241. 
Skerrett, Col. 297, 335, 340, 341. 
Siniavin, Admiral, 20, 80, 81, 88. 
Slade, Gen. 115, 302, 335. 
Snodgrass, Major, 363. 
Solano, Marquis, 16, 24, 25, 28, 

32, 42. 
Sontag, Gen. 151, 253. 
Soult, Marshal, 101, 113, 114, 

116, et seq. 
Spain, insurrection throughout, 

41. 
King (Charles IV.) of, 8, 

9, 14, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 

39, 56. 
Ferdinand, 10, 13, 31, 



396 



INDEX. 



32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 60, 382, 

389. 
Spain, Queen of, 6, 32, 35, 37 ,39. 
Spanish Princes, seizure of, 37, 

39. 
Spencer, Gen. Sir Brent, 54, 60, 

64, 71, 203, 204, 226, 220, 239. 

240, 248, 258. 
Stanhope, Major, 138. 
Stockier, Gen. F.B.G. 22. 
Strange, Mr. 42. 
Strangford, Lord, 19. 
Strongonoff, Baron, 12. 
Stewart, Gen. Charles William, 

see Londonderry, Lord. 
Gen. R. 150, 154, 155, 1S6, 

245, 261, 264. 
Sturgeon, Major, 305, 306, 309, 

311. 
Suchet, Marshal, 182, 297, 212, 

et~seq. 



Talavera, battle of, 184. 

Talbot, Col. 211. 

Tallaia, Major, 244. 

Taranco y Piano, Gen. Don F. 

16, 24, 25, 28. 
Tarragona, siege of, 356. 
Taylor, Lieut.-Gen. 76. 
Thomieres, Gen. 23, 62, 66, 72, 

158. 
Tilson, Major- Gen. 150, 154, 

186, 187. 
Torres Vedras, position of, 73 ; 



strength of, 213 ; march upon, 

231 ; lines of, 233. 
Toulouse, battle of, 387. 
Trant, Col. 156, 234. 
Travot, Gen. 213. 
Trench, Col. 286. 



Vandeleur, Gen. 306. 

Venegas, Gen. 169, 173, 174, 

179, 182, 190, 191, 192, 196, 

197. 
Victor, Gen. 133, 143, 145, et seq. 
Videl, Gen. 45, 47, 49. 
Vimiero, battle of, 75. 
Vittoria, battle of, 354. 
Vivian, Sir Hussey, 380. 

W. 

Walker, Gen. 318, 354. 

Warde, Major-Gen. 137. 

Waters, Col. 158. 

Way, Major, 263. 

Wellesley, Sir Arthur, 56, 59, 60, 

63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, et seq. 
Wellesley, Sir Henry, 382. 
Whittingham, Capt. 98. 
Williams, Lieut-Col. 251. 
Wilson, Sir R. 143, 151, 182, 190, 

195, 198, 242. 

Z. 

Zaragoza, siege of, 52. 
Zavas, Gen. 181. 



THE END. 



LOND ON: 

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